{ "id": 1209176, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN RUPPENTHAL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ruppenthal", "decision_date": "2002-05-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201401\u20141231", "first_page": "916", "last_page": "923", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 916" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 953", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961", "parenthetical": "in stalking case, \"[w]here speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222743 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "in stalking case, \"[w]here speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Mont. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 4573945 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "1143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/255/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 N.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906765 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 N.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381797 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926975 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468", "parenthetical": "State proved defendant's specific intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual abuse by his arrival at agreed place and time and his admission that he was waiting for minor boy with name that detective assumed on Internet" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 962", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140347 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "969-70", "parenthetical": "State proved defendant's specific intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual abuse by his arrival at agreed place and time and his admission that he was waiting for minor boy with name that detective assumed on Internet" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0962-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "in case involving child abduction statute, the State may \"validly proscribe the luring or attempted luring of children into motor vehicles for criminal purposes, although that attempt may involve speech\"" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260435 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "in case involving child abduction statute, the State may \"validly proscribe the luring or attempted luring of children into motor vehicles for criminal purposes, although that attempt may involve speech\"" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 N.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 1136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980627 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1145-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/1136-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3210236 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 1336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1344" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2561126 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 N.E.2d 1196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1202", "parenthetical": "discussing solicitation to commit murder" }, { "page": "1202" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5108096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "discussing solicitation to commit murder" }, { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0280-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 764, "char_count": 16987, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6209871801190665e-07, "percentile": 0.6872362056629556 }, "sha256": "f86cfa49d4461c69424876b4b6e26dd0fab6acfd014fa12fb16fca5e56f1d88d", "simhash": "1:3bb75c9f6cd16067", "word_count": 2805 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:37:46.779771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN RUPPENTHAL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the defendant, Stephen Ruppenthal, was convicted of two counts of indecent solicitation of a child and was sentenced to two years of probation. Ruppenthal was arrested at O\u2019Hare International Airport in Chicago after communicating on the Internet with a person whom he believed to be a 14-year-old girl named \u201cStacy,\u201d but who was actually a Cook County sheriff\u2019s detective. On appeal, defendant first argues that because he did not in fact solicit a minor but instead communicated with an adult, he should not have been charged with indecent solicitation of a child under section 11 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 6 (West 2000)). He asserts that section 11 \u2014 6 of the Code is unconstitutional and represents an improper exercise of state power because prohibiting the solicitation of an adult by another adult who mistakenly believes the object of the solicitation is a minor is not causally related to the protection of children. In addition, defendant claims that Illinois courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate his case because he communicated with \u201cStacy\u201d via computer from California. For the reasons stated below, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction.\nPrior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon the same arguments that he now raises on appeal, and his motions were denied. The following facts were presented at a stipulated bench trial. On April 26, 2000, Cook County sheriffs detective Michael Anton logged onto a Internet site titled \u201csex\u201d and assumed the identity of a 14-year-old girl named \u201cStacy.\u201d Defendant, who was 53 years old and lived in T\u00f3males, California, communicated privately with \u201cStacy\u201d for about two hours using his home computer. The State entered into evidence a transcript of their on-line conversation, which is included in the record.\nWe relate only the pertinent portions. Defendant told \u201cStacy\u201d that he was 46 years old. \u201cStacy\u201d replied that she would \u201cbe 15 real soon.\u201d Defendant said his flight would stop in Chicago the following day and suggested they meet at O\u2019Hare and \u201cfind a private place and be together.\u201d Defendant said he wanted to rub her chest and vagina and that they \u201cwould find a place in the airport without many people and sit together\u201d and they could be under a blanket so no one would see what they did. Defendant told \u201cStacy\u201d his flight number and asked her to meet him at his gate. Defendant said that if she was ready tomorrow, they could \u201cfind a place,\u201d perhaps a restroom, where he could put his penis in her vagina; he later stated, \u201cI can\u2019t promise we can do it. It will depend if we can find a place.\u201d \u201cStacy\u201d told defendant her last name was Hugh and she would wear her school uniform.\nWhen defendant arrived at O\u2019Hare, a female sheriffs detective dressed as \u201cStacy\u201d met him at his gate. The female detective approached defendant and said his name. Defendant replied, \u201cYes, I thought it was you, but I wasn\u2019t sure. It\u2019s good that you wore your uniform. Then I knew it was you.\u201d After further conversation between the female detective and defendant, Detective Anton asked defendant who he was meeting. Defendant said he was meeting Stacy Hugh. Defendant was placed under arrest. After his arrest, defendant told Anton and a prosecutor that he thought \u201cStacy\u201d was \u201cabout 15\u201d years old. The remainder of defendant\u2019s statement was consistent with the evidence presented at trial. The trial court convicted defendant of two counts of indecent solicitation of a child with the intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual abuse, pursuant to section 11 \u2014 6(c)(3) of the Code G720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 6(c)(3) (West 2000)). Those counts were premised upon defendant\u2019s stated intent to touch the vagina of a minor child. The trial court acquitted defendant on a third count of indecent solicitation, stating that although the parties stipulated that defendant had suggested sexual intercourse, defendant\u2019s intent on that issue \u201cseem[ed] to be unresolved.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant first challenges the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, arguing that the law violates his \u201cfirst amendment right to freedom of thought and belief.\u201d He asserts that his conviction was \u201ca function of one element only \u2014 his belief that he was speaking to a child\u201d and that the only act that accompanied his belief was the communication with Detective Anton, an adult. Defendant claims that because he did not commit an illegal act, he was punished only for his \u201cbad state of mind.\u201d\nSection 11 \u2014 6 of the Code provides:\n\u201cA person of the age of 17 years and upwards commits the offense of indecent solicitation of a child if the person, with the intent that the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse be committed, knowingly solicits a child or one whom he or she believes to be a child to perform an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 12 \u2014 12 of this Code.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 6(a) (West 2000).\nThe statute defines \u201csolicit\u201d as:\n\u201cto command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to perform an act by any means including, but not limited to, in person, over the phone, in writing, by computer, or by advertisement of any kind.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 6(b) (West 2000).\n\u201cChild\u201d is defined as \u201ca person under 17 years of age.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 6(b) (West 2000).\nThe criminal act defined by the statute is knowingly soliciting a child or one believed to be a child to perform an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct, with the intent that the conduct be committed. 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 6(a) (West 2000). The offense of solicitation is complete when the principal offense is commanded, encouraged or requested with the intent that it be committed. People v. Edwards, 243 Ill. App. 3d 280, 289, 611 N.E.2d 1196, 1202 (1993) (discussing solicitation to commit murder); see also People v. Schnurr, 206 Ill. App. 3d 522, 533, 564 N.E.2d 1336, 1344 (1990). \u201cWhether or not the actual crime took place is meaningless under the applicable statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 8\u20141 [now 720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 1 (West 2000)]). Defendant\u2019s offense was complete when the words at issue were spoken ***.\u201d Edwards, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 611 N.E.2d at 1202.\nDefendant argues that although he intended to commit a sexual act with a child, he committed no crime by speaking words of solicitation to an adult. We disagree. Defendant is being punished for his intent to engage in sexual activity with someone he admittedly believed to be under the age of 17 and his solicitation of that activity. The fact that defendant\u2019s words were transmitted to an adult does not negate defendant\u2019s belief that he was speaking to a minor, which is the culpable act defined by the statute. The specific intent required to prove the elements of the offense of solicitation can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and acts of the defendant. People v. Lewis, 84 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561, 406 N.E.2d 11, 15 (1980). Defendant\u2019s trip to IUinois for the admitted purpose of meeting a girl he knew to be \u201cabout 15\u201d exhibited his intent to engage in the sexual activity discussed on the Internet.\nRegarding defendant\u2019s attempt to claim first amendment protection for the substance of his on-line conversation with \u201cStacy,\u201d the element of criminal intent \u201ctransforms mere recitation of \u2018loose\u2019 words which may mandate first amendment protection into the offense of solicitation.\u201d Lewis, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 561, 406 N.E.2d at 15. It would be impossible for the act of solicitation to occur without the exchange of words between offender and victim, and defendant\u2019s \u201cbeliefs\u201d and his discussions with children or those he believes to be children regarding sexual activity do not rise to the level of constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Powell, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 1145-46, 735 N.E.2d 119, 126-27 (2000); People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 227, 657 N.E.2d 953, 961 (1995) (in stalking case, \u201c[w]here speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection\u201d); People v. Williams, 133 Ill. 2d 449, 457, 551 N.E.2d 631, 634 (1990) (in case involving child abduction statute, the State may \u201cvalidly proscribe the luring or attempted luring of children into motor vehicles for criminal purposes, although that attempt may involve speech\u201d).\nThe Williams court further discussed the necessarily inchoate nature of the child abduction statute:\n\u201c[T]he luring or attempted luring of a child into an automobile for a criminal purpose is in no way protected by the first amendment. *** Once a child is taken into a vehicle and whisked away by a person harboring a criminal motive, it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for law enforcement personnel to intervene for the protection of the child. The State undoubtedly has broad powers to avert such potentially dangerous situations.\u201d Williams, 133 Ill. 2d at 457, 551 N.E.2d at 634.\nThat principle also can be applied to the indecent solicitation statute. Furthermore, we reject defendant\u2019s protests that he was the victim of a Cook County sheriff\u2019s department \u201cthought patrol\u201d that polices beliefs that defendant contends are \u201cbeyond the reach of the legislature.\u201d Officers did not invade defendant\u2019s home during his online conversation with \u201cStacy\u201d and arrest him based upon the contents of that conversation. Indeed, hundreds of similarly inappropriate exchanges undoubtedly take place every day on the Internet. Those discussions, although disturbing, are not illegal if not acted upon. Defendant, however, demonstrated his intent to commit the sexual acts by traveling to Illinois to meet \u201cStacy,\u201d whom he believed to be under the age of 17, at an arranged time and place. See People v. Patterson, 314 Ill. App. 3d 962, 969-70, 734 N.E.2d 462, 468 (2000) (State proved defendant\u2019s specific intent to commit aggravated criminal sexual abuse by his arrival at agreed place and time and his admission that he was waiting for minor boy with name that detective assumed on Internet). Defendant\u2019s behavior is sufficient to support his conviction for indecent solicitation of a child.\nDefendant next contends that section 11 \u2014 6 of the Code represents an improper exercise of the Illinois legislature\u2019s power because prohibiting discussion of sexual activity between adults, as occurred between defendant and Detective Anton on the Internet, is not causally related to the protection of children. Defendant\u2019s assertion is premised on his flawed argument that it is not illegal for an adult to ask another adult, whom the perpetrator believes to be a child, to commit a sex act. As already discussed, that is precisely the behavior that section 11 \u2014 6 prohibits, when it is coupled with the intent to engage in sexual activity.\nThe Illinois Constitution empowers the legislature to define conduct that constitutes a crime and determine the nature and extent of the punishment for that offense. People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 468-69, 705 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1998). The State of Illinois has a legitimate interest in protecting minor children from the indecent solicitation of sex acts by adults. If defendant had actually discussed sexual activity with a willing 14- or 15-year-old girl who agreed to meet him at the airport, the police could not likely intervene before actually catching defendant and the girl in the unlawful behavior. As with the child abduction statute in Williams, if an adult and a minor discuss sexual activity and the adult displays the intent to engage in that activity, it is virtually impossible for law enforcement to prevent such a crime from occurring unless the legislature treats it as an inchoate offense.\nDefendant again questions the legislature\u2019s ability to classify his belief that he was speaking to a minor into \u201can element to be proved by the prosecution.\u201d He argues that the State does not normally concern itself with a defendant\u2019s belief and that \u201call that mattered was whether the defendant\u2019s act[ ] constituted an offense.\u201d The Illinois legislature defined the offense of indecent solicitation of a child as requiring the specific intent to engage in the indecent conduct that is solicited by the defendant. Defendant admitted that he thought he was speaking to a minor. Defendant\u2019s arguments are without merit.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case because the words of solicitation were spoken in California, not in Illinois. He cites section 1 \u2014 5 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 5 (West 2000)), which defines state criminal jurisdiction and states in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense which he commits, while either within or outside the State, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:\n(1) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the State; or\n(2) the conduct outside the State constitutes an attempt to commit an offense within the State[.]\n***\n(b) An offense is committed partly within this State, if either the conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within the State.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 5(a), (b) (West 2000).\nDefendant argues that the crime with which he is charged was not committed wholly or partly within Illinois because the only element of the offense of indecent solicitation of a child \u2014 the utterance of words of solicitation \u2014 occurred in California. He claims that the prosecution did not have to prove that his words of solicitation were communicated to an Illinois resident and that therefore no part of the offense took place in Illinois.\nBoth defendant and the State cite People v. Baker, 268 Ill. App. 3d 16, 643 N.E.2d 286 (1994), which we find supports the State\u2019s position. In Baker, the defendant was charged with making a harassing telephone call from Ohio to an individual in Illinois. Baker, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 16, 643 N.E.2d at 287. Based upon section 1 \u2014 5(b) (720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 5(b) (West 2000)), which gives Illinois jurisdiction over a crime if the conduct or the result occurs within the state, the Baker court held that because the alleged result of the conduct was harassment in Illinois, the offense was committed partly in Illinois, and jurisdiction was proper here. Baker, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 17, 643 N.E.2d at 287. The court noted Illinois\u2019s \u201cvalid public interest in protecting people in Illinois from harassing telephone calls originating outside the State.\u201d Baker, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 17, 643 N.E.2d at 287.\nDefendant asserts that the solicitation statute defines the offense only in terms of culpable conduct and not as to any result, and therefore jurisdiction is only proper where the words of solicitation were spoken. However, defendant\u2019s crime is distinguishable from a conduct-based offense such as gambling outside Illinois, as in Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 759, 656 N.E.2d 123 (1995), on which defendant partially relies. Although the offense of solicitation is complete upon the utterance of words of solicitation, no solicitation can occur unless the offending words are heard by another person. Defendant attempted to solicit sexual activity with a girl under the age of 17 living in Illinois, and he traveled to Illinois with the admitted intent of engaging in the sexual acts. The result of defendant\u2019s solicitation brought him within Illinois\u2019s borders. As with the telephone harassment discussed in Baker, Illinois has a valid public interest in protecting minor children in this state from individuals who seek underage sexual partners using the Internet. We find that Illinois had proper jurisdiction over this case.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence. As part of this judgment, we grant the State\u2019s request to assess defendant $100 as costs for this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur.\nDefendant finds \u201ctroubling\u201d the State\u2019s method of proving that he believed he was speaking to a minor. However, defendant admitted to police that he thought \u201cStacy\u201d was about 15 years old.\nIn discussing its solicitation law, which was modeled on the Illinois statute, the Montana Supreme Court noted that \u201cthe status of the person solicited is neither an element of nor a defense to the crime of solicitation.\u201d State v. Sage, 255 Mont. 227, 229, 841 P.2d 1142, 1143 (1992).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert D. Kuzas, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Eve Reilly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEPHEN RUPPENTHAL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20141231\nOpinion filed May 24, 2002.\nRehearing denied July 2, 2002.\nRobert D. Kuzas, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Eve Reilly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0916-01", "first_page_order": 934, "last_page_order": 941 }