{ "id": 1034086, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CUAHATEMOC HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hernandez", "decision_date": "2002-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-0792", "first_page": "343", "last_page": "352", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 343" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171592 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57342 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132347 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "finding that it is not a proper function of the appellate court to act as an advisory body to the supreme court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79352 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "finding that the appellate court has no authority to overrule or modify a supreme court opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5080105 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Wolfson, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906704 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "Wolfson, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 1012", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79377 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/1012-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123281 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 U.S. 285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3562259 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1892, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295-96" }, { "page": "710" }, { "page": "912-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/145/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850326 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2979749 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2434276 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520748 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676395 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3151941 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561152 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 980", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3642439 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985", "parenthetical": "holding that the victim declarant's statement was admissible to show her intention of meeting the defendant on the thirteenth floor of a building" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0980-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344394 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304-05" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822307 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2476774 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/393/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780290 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164-65" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0155-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 997, "char_count": 22996, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.288123747755178 }, "sha256": "bdf72b08832908c9ad4fc169d4749bdb69fb11bc859f39e2fd2361cd4a77b7da", "simhash": "1:e7b2a821765aa474", "word_count": 3840 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "QUINN and REID, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CUAHATEMOC HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Cuahatemoc Hernandez was charged with first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. After a jury trial, he was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to 44 years\u2019 imprisonment for first degree murder and a concurrent term of 6 years for the attempted first degree murder charge. Defendant now appeals, and no issues are raised regarding the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nAt trial, Alfredo Leon testified that on April 16, 1998, around 8 p.m., he drove to the house of his cousin, Jose Ortega, to pick him up. The two of them then drove to 18th Street. When they saw the defendant walking down the street, Jose instructed Alfredo to pull over so he could talk to his friend. Alfredo testified that he had seen the defendant two or three times before and knew the defendant as \u201cTemo.\u201d The defendant got into the backseat of the two-door Toyota and the three men then \u201cdrove around.\u201d At the defendant\u2019s request, Alfredo stopped the car at West 18th Place and May Street so that the defendant could talk to some of his friends. When the defendant got back into the Toyota, he told Alfredo to drive to the defendant\u2019s house so that he could get something. Alfredo testified that he drove the defendant to his home and that he parked in an alley near the house. Alfredo and Jose remained in the car while the defendant got out and walked toward 19th Place. After approximately five minutes, the defendant emerged from a house that was not his own. Defendant had one hand under his coat and he walked toward the driver\u2019s side of the Toyota. Alfredo was about to open the door when the defendant brandished a gun, pushed it through the driver\u2019s side window, and then started shooting at them both. Alfredo stated that he covered his head with both of his hands and ducked down into the car seat. He also testified that he heard approximately nine gunshots. One bullet struck Alfredo in the back of the head, injuring his fingers in the process.\nAfter the shooting stopped, Alfredo turned and saw that Jose was slumped over in the car seat. He testified that, at the time, he did not know if Jose was alive or dead. Alfredo then drove his car to the home of Jose\u2019s brother, Mauricio Ortega, about one block away. Upon arriving at Mauricio\u2019s house, Alfredo got out of the car and ran to see Mauricio.\nAfter Alfredo testified, Mauricio took the stand and confirmed that Alfredo came to his door on the night of April 16, 1998. Alfredo was bleeding and was \u201cvery nervous, very scared\u201d and \u201cvery excited\u201d as he told Mauricio that \u201cTemo\u201d had shot at them. Mauricio then got into the car and instructed Alfredo to drive them to Cook County Hospital. Alfredo parked near the emergency entrance of the hospital and ran inside where he told police officers and the emergency medical personnel what had happened. The doctors put Jose on a stretcher and rolled him into the emergency room and examined Alfredo for his injures.\nJose died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. During the autopsy, the medical examiner found one bullet wound to the deceased\u2019s inner right thigh, one to the back of his left hand near the base of his thumb, and one to the back of his head. The wounds were consistent with Jose being in a seated position and the shooter standing above him and on his left. However, there was no evidence of close-range fire on Jose\u2019s skin. Close-range stippling usually occurs when the weapon is fired from 18 inches away or closer. The parties stipulated that a firearms expert would testify that all three bullets recovered from Jose\u2019s body were fired from the same gun.\nAlfredo was treated at Cook County Hospital for a period of one week. During that time, police officers visited Alfredo, and he told them that \u201cTemo\u201d was the person who had shot him and his cousin. He also gave the officers the defendant\u2019s address. In addition, both Alfredo and Mauricio identified a photograph of the defendant. At trial, Alfredo denied telling police officers who were present in the emergency room that he and the others had been at a party, had an argument, and that the shooting occurred outside the party.\nOne week after he was released from the hospital, Alfredo moved from Illinois to Nebraska. At trial, Alfredo explained that he moved away because he was afraid of the defendant\u2019s family. After a few months, Alfredo returned to Chicago so that he could meet with Detectives Vasilopoulos and Deacy on July 15, 1998. Subsequently, however, Alfredo moved from Nebraska to Idaho, again allegedly out of fear of the defendant\u2019s family. He also acknowledged at trial that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office had to send investigators to bring him back for trial. The State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office paid for his transportation to Chicago so that he could testify.\nDetective Vasilopoulos testified that at 10 p.m., on April 16, 1998, he and his partner, Detective Deacy, drove to Cook County Hospital to respond to a radio call. Upon arrival, he found the victim\u2019s car parked outside the emergency room entrance. A window had been shattered and there was blood in the car. Detective Vasilopoulos found a quarter-sized spot of saliva on the top of the driver\u2019s side door. He testified that it looked as if someone had spit on the car\u2019s door. This saliva was inventoried and tested, and it was determined to have a DNA profile that matched that of the defendant. In fact, it was stipulated at trial that this DNA profile would be expected to occur in approximately 1 in 2.1 quadrillion unrelated Hispanic persons. However, there was no fingerprint evidence linking the defendant to the car.\nVictoria Hernandez Hill, the defendant\u2019s sister, testified that she and her brother were living in the same house in West 18th Place in Chicago during April of 1998. She testified that he left their home on the night of April 16, 1998, and she did not see or hear from the defendant again until August 21, 1998.\nDefendant was arrested in California on July 22, 1998. He was in possession of a California state identification card that listed his name as \u201cC. Miguel Hernandez.\u201d The defendant\u2019s brother, Santiago, lived in California and, prior to the incidents in this case, the defendant had visited him three or four times for different periods of time.\nFor the defense, police officer Terry Abbate testified that he was already present at Cook County Hospital when Alfredo arrived on the night of the shooting. Officer Abbate interviewed Alfredo within two to four minutes of Alfredo\u2019s arrival at the hospital. Abbate testified that Alfredo was \u201cvery frantic\u201d during the interview and that Alfredo was attempting to get doctors to come outside and help his cousin, who was still in the car. Abbate testified that after he spoke with Alfredo, he told his partner what Alfredo had said. When Officer Ab-bate\u2019s partner returned to the police station, he prepared a written report. Later, Abbate read and signed the report. According to the report, Alfredo identified himself as Leon Villejo and stated that there were three victims; that the three victims were at a party at a nearby house; that the three victims got into an argument with the defendant; and that they went outside with the defendant to discuss the matter.\nMoreover, Officer Vasilopoulos testified that, in his interview with Alfredo, Alfredo stated that he drove to Jose\u2019s house in the evening on April 16, 1998, and that Jose was taking a shower. Alfredo stated that Jose told him to \u201cgo pick up Temo,\u201d and that he then drove around 18th Street by himself. Finally, he stated that after he picked up Temo, he returned to Jose\u2019s house to pick him up. Alfredo, however, denied all of those facts at trial.\nAfter closing arguments, the jury returned guilty verdicts for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. Thereupon, defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 44 years for first degree murder and 6 years for attempted first degree murder. Defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied.\nA trial court has considerable discretion in determining the admissibility of hearsay statements, and this court will not disturb the court\u2019s ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155, 164-65 (1994). The defendant\u2019s main argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to present evidence of his statements of future intent through the testimony of his siblings. He notes that evidence of statements of future intent have been considered admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, to show the intent of the declarant and to prove \u201cthe doing of the intended act.\u201d M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.5, at 802 (7th ed. 1999). Such evidence, he continues, is admissible regardless of the unavailability of the declarant. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.1, at 786-89 (7th ed. 1999). In addition, the declaration of future intent need not be contemporaneous with a related act. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.7, at 805-06 (7th ed. 1999).\nHere, defendant requested to adduce evidence of his statements to his brother and sister regarding his intent to move to California prior to the incidents of this case. These statements, defendant notes, were made well before he actually moved to California as, according to the offer of proof by defense counsel, the defendant had \u201cbeen talking about [the move] for months.\u201d The defendant also asserts that this evidence was crucial to rebut the State\u2019s claims that his move to California demonstrated his consciousness of guilt and that he was intending to flee from a murder conviction.\nThe trial court, however, ruled that this evidence was inadmissable for two reasons. First, the court held that evidence of declarations of future intent were only admissible when the declarant was unavailable. The court noted that since the defendant was available, he had to testify before any evidence of his declarations to his brother and sister could be entered into evidence. Second, the court found the evidence unreliable due to a presumed bias on the part of the defendant\u2019s siblings.\nThis finding, defendant asserts, is in error. The supreme court has held that in criminal cases, a defendant has the right to show, by any competent evidence, facts which tend to prove that the defendant did not leave from a consciousness of guilt. See People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1977), citing People v. Autman, 393 Ill. 262 (1946), and People v. Davis, 29 Ill. 2d 127 (1963). Moreover, defendant claims, the trial court\u2019s finding is directly contradicted by the factually comparable case of People v. Reddock, 13 Ill. App. 3d 296 (1973). In Reddock, this court found that a deceased declarant\u2019s statements to his sister were admissible to show his intent to accompany the defendant on a trip and that he left on that trip. Reddock, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 304-05. See also People v. Silvestri, 148 Ill. App. 3d 980, 985 (1986) (holding that the victim declarant\u2019s statement was admissible to show her intention of meeting the defendant on the thirteenth floor of a building).\nHere, defendant intended to bring out evidence of his statements to his brother and sister to show that he intended to move to California prior to the shooting. Such a declaration of future intent should have been admissible, he argues, to show his intent \u2014 regardless of his availability. Accordingly, he concludes that by being unable to counter the State\u2019s claim that he moved to California to flee a murder conviction and that his flight showed consciousness of guilt, he was undeniably prejudiced.\nThe State does not quibble with the defendant\u2019s definition of the \u201cdeclaration of intent\u201d hearsay exception. Indeed, it too cites Cleary and Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence for the proposition that a declaration of intent \u201cmay be admitted as proof that the intended act was done.\u201d In the present case, the defendant argues that he should have been allowed to prove that he previously spoke of his intent to move to California. Therefore, the \u201cintended act\u201d was his actual moving to California. However, as the State notes, there was no issue as to whether the intended act was already completed, as the State had already proven that the defendant had moved to California. Accordingly, the State claims that because the defendant is not arguing that his declaration of intent should have been admitted to prove that the intended act was actually done (i.e., that he moved to California), the hearsay exception does not apply in this case.\nThe State is correct that section 803.5 of Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence indicates that the declaration of intent exception to the hearsay rule can only be used to prove that the declarant did the act that he intended. Following the State\u2019s argument, therefore, it might appear that this exception cannot be used as evidence of the declarant\u2019s intent. However, this is contrary to this court\u2019s previous holdings in Reddock and Silvestri, and section 803.7 of Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence, all of which specifically found the declaration of intent exception to permit a declarant\u2019s hearsay statement to show his or her intent to do something or to prove that he or she did so. Reddock, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 305; Silvestri, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 984; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.7, at 805-06 (7th ed. 1999). Accordingly, we find that the State\u2019s argument on this ground fails.\nNevertheless, with regard to the defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in finding the exception inapplicable due to the defendant\u2019s availability to testify, both Reddock and Silvestri seem to indicate otherwise. In fact, in both cases, the declarants were actually decedents, thereby rendering them most unavailable.\nIn Reddock, the first criminal case in Illinois concerning this exception, the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. In so doing, it found the then-recent case of State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E.2d 755 (1971), to contain a thorough analysis and summary of the law. In Vestal, the Reddock court noted:\n\u201c[T]he trial court permitted the wife of a murder victim to testify regarding the deceased\u2019s statement made prior to departure from their home in which he spoke of his plan to travel with the defendant on a business trip. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that although hearsay, the statement was properly admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule in that it satisfied the two-fold basis for hearsay exceptions: necessity (provided by the unavailability of the declarant), and a reasonable probability of truthfulness ***.\u201d Reddock, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 304.\nAccordingly, it appears that if the Vestal court had not found the factual circumstances of that case matched what it considered the two-fold basis for hearsay exceptions, it, as well as the Reddock court, would have found the exception to be inapplicable.\nIn Silvestri, the court reiterated that two-fold basis for hearsay exceptions:\n\u201cStatements indicating a declarant\u2019s state of mind are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable and there exists a reasonable probability that the testimony is truthful. (People v. Floyd (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 541, 470 N.E.2d 293; People v. Bryant (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 266, 462 N.E.2d 780.) Such statements, however, must be relevant to a material issue in the case. (People v. Floyd (1980), 103 Ill. 2d 541, 470 N.E.2d 293; People v. Bryant (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 266, 462 N.E.2d 780.) A decedent\u2019s hearsay statement is admissible, for example, to show his intent to accompany defendant someplace or to prove that he did so ***.\u201d Silvestri, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 984, citing Reddock, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 296.\nAccordingly, before making the determination that the declarant\u2019s statements were admissible, it first made the explicit finding that the victim was unavailable to testify and that there was a reasonable probability that the testimony was truthful. Accord People v. Coleman, 116 Ill. App. 3d 28 (1983); Laughlin v. France, 241 Ill. App. 3d 185 (1993); People v. Davis, 254 Ill. App. 3d 651 (1993); People v. Curtis, 262 Ill. App. 3d 876 (1994).\nAs defendant notes, however, there are also cases that have admitted evidence under this exception without determining a declarant\u2019s availability. See Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295-96, 36 L. Ed. 706, 710, 12 S. Ct. 909, 912-13 (1892); People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 319-20 (1983). In the recent case of People v. Hansen, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1012 (2002), this court, in a footnote, recognized this dispute:\n\u201cOur supreme court has *** stated that the declarant must be unavailable in order for his statement to be admissible under this exception. [People v.] Floyd, 103 Ill. 2d [541, 546 (1984)]. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, [however,] statements are admissible under the state-of-mind exception even if the declarant is available (Fed. R. Evid. 803(3)), and it has been suggested that this should be the rule in Illinois. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.4, at 801-02 (7th ed. 1999)[(\u2018The disturbing indication that this hearsay exception requires that the declarant be unavailable [citations] is incorrect, ill-advised and accordingly should not be followed ***.\u2019)]; People v. Nyberg, 275 Ill. App. 3d 570, 586, 646 N.E.2d 65 (1995) (Wolfson, J., specially concurring) [(opining the belief that an available declarant\u2019s statement of his then-existing state of mind can be reliable evidence)]; [People v. ]Berry, 172 Ill. App. 3d 256 [(1988)].\u201d Hansen, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1023 n.2.\nIn the end, the Hansen court found that because the declarants all were unavailable in that case anyway, it need not concern itself with this dispute. Hansen, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1023 n.2.\nUltimately, regardless of what we may think of the supreme court\u2019s requirement that the declarant be unavailable, we are bound to follow the precedent set in Floyd, especially considering that the supreme court more recently denied the appeal of both People v. Silvestri, 113 Ill. 2d 583 (1987), and People v. Nyberg, 165 Ill. 2d 561 (1996). These denials seem to indicate that the court does not intend to change its position that the declarant needs to be unavailable to fit within this exception. See Chicago Journeymen Plumbers\u2019 Local Union 130 v. Department of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, 201 (2001) (finding that the appellate court has no authority to overrule or modify a supreme court opinion); People v. Quick, 321 Ill. App. 3d 392, 395 (2001) (finding that it is not a proper function of the appellate court to act as an advisory body to the supreme court). Consequently, under Floyd, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nHowever, even if we were to reverse the trial court\u2019s rejection of the defendant\u2019s evidence of his declaration of intent due to the defendant\u2019s availability, our job would not be complete. Rather, we would then also look to what has been deemed a more important factor: the reliability of that hearsay evidence. As the supreme court has noted, \u201cthe question to be considered in deciding the admissibility of *** an extrajudicial statement is whether it was made under circumstances which provide \u2018considerable assurance\u2019 of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. [Citation.]\u201d People v. Thomas, 171 Ill 2d 207, 216 (1996).\nIn the instant case, the trial court found that the defendant\u2019s statement was not made under circumstances that provided a considerable assurance of reliability, i.e., it found that the brother\u2019s and sister\u2019s testimony would be biased. Moreover, their proposed testimony would not have been specific. The offer of proof was that the defendant\u2019s siblings would have testified only that the defendant had been \u201cplanning to move to California. He had been talking about it for months.\u201d However, the siblings would not have testified that the defendant said that he intended to leave on April 16, or any other particular time, just that he had been planning to move. Given the great discretion the trial court is allowed to employ (see West, 158 Ill. 2d at 164), we could rightly defer to that discretion and affirm its finding of unreliability.\nIn any event, even if we were to have found that the trial court erred in excluding that evidence, we also think that such error would be harmless. Mindful of the nonspecific nature of his siblings\u2019 proposed testimony, we think that if it had been introduced, it would have done little to persuade the jury that the defendant\u2019s departure on the very night of the shooting was preordained. As the State points out, evidence which is general or which lacks specificity has less weight than that which is specific. See People v. Owens, 323 Ill. App. 3d 222, 233 (2001).\nIn addition, the excluded testimony was cumulative of other evidence that enabled the defendant to make the exact same argument that he claims he was precluded from making. During trial, the court permitted the defense to ask the defendant\u2019s other brother, Miguel, if he has any relatives who live in California. Miguel testified that he and the defendant have an older brother named Santiago who lives in California, and he further testified that the defendant went there to visit Santiago three or four times in the past. During closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that the defendant had gone to California at least three times before going there on April 16, 1998, that the defendant had a family member in California, and that previously he had spent three years of his life in California. Defense counsel also argued that defendant\u2019s move to California was not suspicious because he had \u201cties to the community\u201d whom he visited there. In the end, therefore, it appears that the evidence that was presented at trial did enable defense counsel to counter the State\u2019s argument that the defendant moved to California in an attempt to flee a murder conviction and that such flight showed defendant\u2019s consciousness of guilt. In short, because this testimony would have added nothing to the evidence that was already in the record, any potentially perceived error was harmless.\nFor all of the above stated reasons, we affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence.\nAffirmed.\nQUINN and REID, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Todd Avery Shanker, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Peter D. Fischer, and Owen D. Kalt, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CUAHATEMOC HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 01 \u2014 0792\nOpinion filed June 28, 2002.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Todd Avery Shanker, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Peter D. Fischer, and Owen D. Kalt, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0343-01", "first_page_order": 361, "last_page_order": 370 }