{ "id": 1033990, "name": "MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Harrington v. American Family Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "2002-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-2810", "first_page": "385", "last_page": "394", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 385" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289670 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222774 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281486 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 847", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2526132 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0847-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3024638 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519212 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 979", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505813 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2521619 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026040 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573874 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472354 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959868 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0389-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 768, "char_count": 23061, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.308231893012438e-08, "percentile": 0.38807841692701 }, "sha256": "5a4f9c1103230c6cc109201ccf4b1ab1a594be087747248f3babd3b7565e3ff1", "simhash": "1:d8fd646afd0cc41d", "word_count": 3655 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CAMPBELL, EJ., concurs" ], "parties": [ "MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, doing business as Green Acres Landscaping, purchased an insurance policy from American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American) that consisted of commercial general liability coverage and commercial inland marine coverage in the amount of $1 million. The commercial general liability policy included an endorsement that provided coverage for hired auto and nonowned auto liability. In addition to the commercial general liability policy, plaintiff purchased a separate group automobile liability policy in order to provide coverage for the vehicles being operated in connection with his business. Pursuant to the terms of this policy, bodily injury liability was limited in the amount of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence; accordingly, plaintiff contracted for uninsured motorist coverage in the amounts of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.\nPlaintiff alleges that on June 17, 1994, he was struck by an automobile while riding a bicycle. Ultimately, plaintiff settled with the driver\u2019s insurer, Farmer\u2019s Insurance Company, for the full available policy limits of $100,000. Plaintiff then submitted a claim to American for uninsured motorist coverage based on a belief that his damages exceeded $100,000. American denied plaintiffs claim on the basis that the amount paid by Farmer\u2019s Insurance Company equaled the uninsured motorist coverage available to plaintiff under the separate group automobile liability policy.\nOn September 29, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against American wherein he alleged that the commercial general liability policy was subject to section 143a \u2014 2 of the Illinois Insurance Code and that, by operation of law, he was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of that policy. 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2 (West 1992). Based on that allegation, plaintiff requested that defendant be ordered to arbitrate the matter as if uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $1 million was included in the commercial general liability policy and that the court find that defendant had engaged in improper claims practices.\nAmerican filed an answer to plaintiffs complaint in which all of plaintiffs relevant allegations were denied. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that American was required by section 143a \u2014 2 to offer him uninsured motorist coverage in connection with his purchase of the commercial general liability policy because that policy included an endorsement for hired auto and nonowned auto liability. Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings was stricken because plaintiff had not complied with defendant\u2019s outstanding discovery requests.\nOn June 29, 1999, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for declaratory judgment. In counts I and II of that pleading, plaintiff re-alleged the same relevant facts contained in the original complaint and requested that the trial court reform the commercial general liability policy so that it included uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $1 million and order American to arbitrate the matter. Furthermore, in count III, plaintiff asserted that American, through its agent Anthony Stajszczak, breached a duty of care it owed to him by negligently advising him with respect to his insurance needs and by failing to provide him with adequate insurance. In count IV plaintiff argued that defendant\u2019s conduct with respect to the sale of the commercial general liability policy was in violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1992)).\nAmerican answered counts I and II of the first amended complaint for declaratory judgment and filed a motion to dismiss counts III and IV The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to count IV but denied the motion as to count III.\nOn September 27, 1999, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint for declaratory judgment which included an amended count IV Additionally, in the second amended complaint, plaintiff joined Anthony Stajszczak as a defendant with respect to counts III and IV Defendants filed a motion to dismiss count IV and answered the remaining counts. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss count IV and, shortly thereafter, defendants filed an answer to it.\nOn May 26, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to counts I and II of the second amended complaint. Specifically, plaintiff reiterated his argument that the inclusion of the endorsement in the general liability policy brought the policy within the scope of section 143a \u2014 2 and required that an offer of uninsured motorist coverage be made at the time plaintiff purchased the policy.\nOn September 6, 2000, American filed its response and cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings as to counts I and II. American asserted that it was entitled to entry of the judgment in its favor on plaintiffs request to reform the policy to include uninsured motorist coverage insomuch as the subject commercial general liability policy provided coverage only for the liability of the plaintiff for injuries sustained by third parties in connection with his business and not for injuries sustained by plaintiff himself. In simpler terms, American argued that a \u201cliability only\u201d policy cannot be held subject to the requirements of section 143a \u2014 2.\nOn October 12, 2000, the trial court ruled that the commercial liability policy was a \u201cliability\u201d policy as opposed to a \u201cvehicle\u201d policy and that the endorsement was also limited solely to liability. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order granting American\u2019s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, denying plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, and entering judgment in favor of American and against the plaintiff on counts I and II.\nPlaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, which was granted by the trial court. The trial court entered an order granting plaintiffs motion to reconsider, vacating the order of October 12, 2000, and granting judgment in favor of plaintiff on counts I and II of the second amended complaint for declaratory judgment.\nNext, American filed a motion to reconsider the trial court\u2019s order of March 6, 2001, which was subsequently denied by the trial court. American now appeals the trial court\u2019s ruling on counts I and II of the second amended complaint.\nThe issue before us is whether the trial court correctly determined that the commercial general liability policy issued to plaintiff was subject to section 143a \u2014 2 of the Illinois Insurance Code. We affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff on counts Land II of the second amended complaint.\nOn appeal, American asserts that the commercial general liability policy issued to plaintiff does not fall within the ambit of section 143a \u2014 2, and, therefore, it was never required to offer plaintiff uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that section 143a \u2014 2 mandates reformation of the commercial general liability policy to provide uninsured motorist coverage, and, therefore, the trial court\u2019s decision should be affirmed. Since the case at bar stems from the trial court\u2019s judgment on the pleadings, the standard of review is de novo. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. City of Chicago, 317 Ill. App. 3d 569, 571 (2000).\nFirst, we consider the nature of the insurance coverage purchased by plaintiff. In the case at bar, plaintiff purchased a commercial general liability policy for the period from November 2, 1993, to November 2, 1994, naming as the insured Michael Harrington, doing business as Green Acres Landscaping, operated as a sole proprietorship. Attached to the policy is an endorsement titled \u201cHired Auto and Non-Owned Auto Liability.\u201d \u201cWhen a court interprets an insurance policy, there are only two sources upon which it may base its analysis: the plain language of the policy and the plain language of the Insurance Code of 1937 as it existed at the time the policy was written.\u201d Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Miller, 190 Ill. App. 3d 240, 244 (1989), citing Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 156 Ill. App. 3d 979, 984 (1987). Only where an ambiguity exists should the court look to other materials. Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 244, citing Price v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 116 Ill. App. 3d 463, 470 (1983).\nMindful of the aforementioned rules of law, we will examine the plain language of the policy, as amended with the endorsement, and section 143a \u2014 2 of the Insurance Code in an effort to determine whether American had a duty to offer uninsured motorist coverage to plaintiff in connection with his purchase of the commercial general liability policy. Moreover, case law tells us that in order to determine whether the commercial general liability policy at hand falls within the scope of section 143a \u2014 2, we must first determine whether the direct benefit, albeit the financial benefit of the policy at hand, is received by the insured, the plaintiff in the case at bar, or by the individual who is physically injured himself.\nIn Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 245, this court relied on insurance classifications set forth in the Insurance Code to reach the conclusion that \u201c[ljiability insurance protects the insured from financial losses for claims brought by other persons which are legally recoverable against the insured.\u201d Uninsured motorist coverage, on the other hand, constitutes coverage where, regardless of the insured\u2019s liability, the insured is protected from financial losses for his or her injury caused by and legally recoverable from another person who owns and/or operates an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 245. If an insurance policy contains no express uninsured or underinsured coverage provision, the insured cannot recover on his own liability policy. Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 247.\nIn Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 246, the issue was whether the insurance company had a duty to offer uninsured motorist coverage in connection with an umbrella policy. Cincinnati was decided in 1989 and, at that time, the Illinois Insurance Code provided in pertinent part:\n\u201c \u2018Insurers providing personal liability coverage on an excess or umbrella basis are neither required to offer, nor are they prohibited from offering or making available coverages conforming to this Section on a supplemental basis.\u2019 \u201d Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 246, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 73, par. 755a\u20142(6).\nSince 1989, section 143a of the Insurance Code has been rewritten and no longer includes this provision. At the time this provision was in effect, however, the Cincinnati court held that, in light of the statutory language, the insurance company was under no duty to offer the plaintiff uninsured motorist coverage in conjunction with her umbrella policy. In addition to citing to the aforementioned provision for support, the Cincinnati court cited to Hartbarger v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 391 (1982).\nThe Cincinnati court noted that, in Hartbarger, this court stated that \u201c \u2018[a]n umbrella liability policy is generally designed to protect the insured from a judgment against him in an amount greater than that provided for in the underlying policies.\u2019 \u201d Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 247, quoting Hartbarger, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 394. In addition, the Cincinnati court stated:\n\u201cThe Hartbarger court found that umbrella policy coverage is entirely different from coverage under an automobile policy and found that both insured and insurer intended that this umbrella policy was to protect the insured against excess judgments in favor of others.\u201d Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 247, citing Hartbarger, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 396.\nThe Hartbarger court reasoned that, ultimately, the monetary benefit of an umbrella policy falls upon the injured individual, not the insured. We note that where uninsured motorist coverage is involved, the monetary benefit ultimately falls upon the insured. Thus, these two, separate types of policies \u201cprotect\u201d different classes of \u201crecipients.\u201d Aware of this observation, the Hartbarger court refused to rewrite provisions of the umbrella policy simply to expand the coverage to include uninsured motorist coverage, which serves to benefit the insured. Cincinnati, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 247, citing Hartbarger, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 396.\nSection 143a \u2014 2(4) of the Illinois Insurance Code requires that on or after July 1, 1983, the insurer offer additional uninsured motorist coverage in connection with every motor vehicle policy. 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(4) (West 1992). Thus, we must ask whether the commercial general liability policy at issue in the case at bar constitutes a motor vehicle policy or, perhaps, a policy more similar to that of an umbrella policy.\nThe commercial general liability policy at bar is unambiguous. Section I (coverage A) of the policy clearly provides plaintiff with liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage. However, attached to the policy is an endorsement. This court has held that \u201cif there is a conflict in meaning between an endorsement and the body of the policy, the endorsement controls.\u201d Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 847, 853 (1972). Moreover, the endorsement clearly states that it changes the policy and, more specifically, modifies the commercial general liability coverage portion. The endorsement at issue provides liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the maintenance or use of a \u201chired auto\u201d by plaintiff or plaintiff\u2019s employees in the course of business. Additionally, the endorsement provides coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of any \u201cnon-owned auto\u201d by any of plaintiff\u2019s employees. We find that, in effect, the endorsement transforms the commercial general liability policy into a motor vehicle policy for purposes of section 143a \u2014 2 of the Insurance Code. Thus, we hold that pursuant to section 143a \u2014 2, American\u2019s agent, Anthony Stajszaczak, had a duty to offer plaintiff uninsured motorist coverage. In light of our finding that the endorsement at issue forces the commercial general liability policy into the realm of motor vehicle policies, we hold that this court\u2019s decision in Cincinnati is inapplicable since it dealt with an umbrella policy.\nAmerican contends that we cannot reach such a holding because doing so is inconsistent with the language set forth in section 143a\u2014 2(1) of the Insurance Code. Section 143a \u2014 2(1) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cAdditional uninsured motor vehicle coverage. No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be renewed or delivered or issued for delivery in this State with respect to any motor vehicle designed for use on public highways and required to be registered in this State unless uninsured motorist coverage as required in Section 143a of this Code is included in an amount equal to the insured\u2019s bodily injury liability limits unless specifically rejected by the insured.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(1) (West 1992).\nAccording to American\u2019s interpretation of section 143a \u2014 2(1), this provision requires that uninsured motorist coverage only be offered in conjunction with policies insuring against \u201closs\u201d suffered by the in sured. American asserts that this provision does not apply to policies insuring against either loss or liability. In essence, American is arguing that the uninsured motorist coverage provision only applies to policies where the only injury insured is the insured\u2019s potential injury. In the case at bar, the endorsement provides coverage for bodily injury and property damage inflicted by the plaintiff, the insured, on another party; therefore, defendant contends that section 143a \u2014 2(1) does not apply to the policy at bar. Furthermore, like an umbrella policy, American asserts that the policy at bar, which it interprets as a \u201cliability only\u201d policy, is aimed at protecting the injured third party, rather than the insured. Thus, just as the Cincinnati court refused to require that uninsured motorist coverage be offered in conjunction with an umbrella policy, American asks that this court find that uninsured motorist coverage need not be offered in conjunction with a policy designed to protect the insured only against liability to others.\nWe cannot agree with American\u2019s argument. To begin, this court has held that \u201c \u2018every liability insurance policy issued for any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in Illinois must provide coverage for bodily injury or death caused by an uninsured or hit-and-run vehicle.\u2019 \u201d Norris v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 326 Ill. App. 3d 314, 321 (2001), quoting Luechtefeld v. Allstate Insurance Co., 167 Ill. 2d 148, 152 (1995). American itself states that the policy at bar, including the endorsement, constitutes a liability policy; therefore, we find no reason why the Norris holding is not applicable to the case at bar. Furthermore, we note that American neither cites to Norris in its briefs nor offers any case law refuting Norris.\nAdditionally, a review of section 143a \u2014 2(1) shows that the statutory language clearly requires that uninsured motorist coverage be offered in connection with any motor vehicle policy \u201cinsuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of \u00e1 motor vehicle.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(1) (West 1992). The key words in this provision are \u201cany person.\u201d See also 215 ILCS 5/143a\u2014 2(4) (West 1992). This provision does not discriminate between the insured and the injured third party. Section 143a \u2014 2(1) applies to any policy insuring against loss, whether it be the insured\u2019s loss or the third party\u2019s loss, resulting from liability imposed by law. While American offers a very creative argument, we find it implausible that the legislature intended that the option to purchase uninsured motorist coverage only apply to a narrow class of motor vehicle policies.\nIn sum, the endorsement sold to plaintiff provided auto liability coverage, and, therefore, American was required to offer plaintiff uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the insured\u2019s bodily injury liability limits. Holland v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. App. 3d 463, 465 (1991); 215 ILCS 5/143a \u2014 2(1) (West 1992). It is undisputed that American failed to take any steps to offer plaintiff uninsured motorist coverage as required by statute. Therefore, statutory law and case law require that the commercial general liability policy at issue be reformed to contain uninsured motorist coverage.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court properly granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff on counts I and II of the second amended complaint. Consequently, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order of March 6, 2001, granting plaintiff\u2019s motion to reconsider, and the trial court\u2019s order of June 20, 2001, denying American\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, EJ., concurs", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE QUINN,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. I do not agree that the endorsement at issue modified the commercial general liability policy in such a manner that section 143a \u2014 2 requires it to be reformed to contain uninsured motorist coverage.\nThe endorsement is titled \u201cHIRED AUTO AND NON-OWNED AUTO LIABILITY.\u201d In pertinent part, it provides \u201cHIRED AUTO LIABILITY \u2014 The insurance provided under Coverage A (Section 1) applies to \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 arising out of the maintenance or use of a \u2018hired auto\u2019 by you or your employees in the course of your business.\u201d\n\u201cNON-OWNED AUTO LIABILITY \u2014 The insurance provided under Coverage A (Section 1) applies to \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 arising out of the use of any \u2018non-owned auto\u2019 in your business by any person other than you.\n^ ^\n\u2018Hired auto\u2019 means any \u2018auto\u2019 you lease, hire or borrow.\n* * *\n\u2018Non-owned auto\u2019 means any \u2018auto\u2019 you do not own, lease, hire or borrow which are used in connection with your business.\n* * *\nAll other terms, agreements, conditions, and provisions remain unchanged.\u201d\nThe policy itself provides:\n\u201cSECTION 1 \u2014 COVERAGES\n$ ^ ^\nCOVERAGE C. MEDICAL PAYMENTS\n^\n2. Exclusions\nWe will not pay expenses for \u2018bodily injury\u2019: a. To any insured.\u201d\nThe unambiguous language of the endorsement provides that the insurance provided under coverage A (section 1) only applies to bodily injury arising out of (1) the maintenance or use of an auto leased, hired or borrowed by Harrington or his employees in the course of Harrington\u2019s business; (2) the use of any \u201cnon-owned auto\u201d used in Harrington\u2019s business by someone other than Harrington.\nIt is uncontroverted that Harrington\u2019s bodily injuries were suffered when he was riding on a bicycle. Of course, a bicycle is neither a \u201chired auto\u201d nor a \u201cnon-owned auto.\u201d It is also uncontroverted that the vehicle which struck Harrington was not being used in Harrington\u2019s business. Consequently, even if we were to reform the commercial general liability policy to include uninsured motorist coverage for those autos specified in the endorsement, Harrington could not recover.\nI think it is also important to note that our supreme court has stated that section 143a does not place \u201cany restriction on the right of the parties to an insurance contract to agree on which persons are to be the \u2018insureds\u2019 under an automobile insurance policy.\u201d Heritage Insurance Co. of America v. Phelan, 59 Ill. 2d 389, 395 (1974); followed by Cohs v. Western States Insurance Co., 329 Ill. App. 3d 930, 937 (2002).\nAs the bodily injury suffered by plaintiff did not arise out of the use of a \u201chired auto\u201d or a \u201cnon-owned auto\u201d in the course of Harrington\u2019s business, the trial court should have granted judgment in favor of the defendant on counts I and II of the second amended complaint. Because of this, I believe that it is unnecessary for this court to decide the issue of whether section 143a \u2014 2 applies to commercial general liability insurance policies that contain endorsements providing coverage for autos under certain conditions. I think this case is an excellent example of why advisory opinions are to be avoided. See Barth v. Reagan, 139 Ill. 2d 399, 419 (1990).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE QUINN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Norton, Mancini, Argentati, Weiler & DeAno, of Wheaton (Thomas J. Long, of counsel), for appellant American Family Mutual Insurance Company.", "Law Offices of Meyer & Blumenshine, of Chicago (Scott A. Blumenshine and Mitchell B. Friedman, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 01 \u2014 2810\nOpinion filed June 28, 2002.\nNorton, Mancini, Argentati, Weiler & DeAno, of Wheaton (Thomas J. Long, of counsel), for appellant American Family Mutual Insurance Company.\nLaw Offices of Meyer & Blumenshine, of Chicago (Scott A. Blumenshine and Mitchell B. Friedman, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0385-01", "first_page_order": 403, "last_page_order": 412 }