{ "id": 1034054, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA KOLZOW, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kolzow", "decision_date": "2002-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-3026", "first_page": "457", "last_page": "460", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 457" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527782 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438", "parenthetical": "noting that trial court orders entered outside the scope of appellate court mandate are void" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171646 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "trial court has a positive duty to follow unambiguous directives in mandate issued by reviewing court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2851737 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456212 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821398 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777558 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 951", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3589571 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "958" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0951-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 833", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183357 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836-37" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0833-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3151759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "reviewing court authorized to sua sponte increase defendant's sentence on appeal because sentence was void and could therefore be corrected at any time" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864523 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3", "parenthetical": "sua sponte addressing trial court's jurisdiction to rule on defendant's motion for reconsideration of dismissal of postconviction petition" }, { "page": "3" }, { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527712 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "Kolzow II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257196 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "Kolzow I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 434, "char_count": 8188, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0086041858798998e-07, "percentile": 0.5414863955388904 }, "sha256": "bb86f73f5571f3a5aab01151756552196d073cf122bba94350f23de1cef92ddd", "simhash": "1:2f2f047673685985", "word_count": 1342 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GALLAGHER, EJ., and O\u2019BRIEN, J, concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA KOLZOW, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MARA FROSSARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Donna Kolzow was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the death of her three-month-old son, who died of heat stroke after she left him unattended in a car for several hours. She was sentenced to three years\u2019 probation, with the conditions of counseling and six months in Cook County jail. This court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence on direct appeal in People v. Kolzow, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9 (1998) (Kolzow I). Defendant subsequently served four months of her six-month jail term and then filed a motion seeking early release based on her good behavior pursuant to section 3 of the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (730 ILCS 130/3 (West 1998)). The trial court denied her motion, but released her on \u201cI bond\u201d pending the outcome of her subsequent appeal of its denial. On November 2, 2000, while defendant was out on bond and her appeal of the trial court\u2019s order denying her early release was pending in this court, her case arose in the trial court on the return date for termination of probation, and the trial court entered an order terminating her probation. The report of proceedings from that date does not indicate that the trial court was aware that there was an appeal pending before this court at that time. Approximately three months later, on February 26, 2001, this court affirmed the trial court\u2019s previous denial of defendant\u2019s motion seeking early release and ordered that defendant \u201cshould resume serving her sentence.\u201d People v. Kolzow, 319 Ill. App. 3d 673, 682 (2001) (Kolzow II). After the mandate was issued pursuant to our decision in Kolzow II, defendant filed a motion to bar her incarceration, contending the trial court could not comply with our mandate because it lost jurisdiction over her case when her probation was terminated. At the hearing on her motion, the trial court ruled that our mandate was to stand and entered an order denying defendant\u2019s motion to bar her incarceration. The order, however, allowed defendant to remain free on bond pending the outcome of her appeal of the denial of her motion. Defendant now appeals that denial, reasserting her contention that the trial court could not require her to resume serving the sentence pursuant to our mandate because it lost jurisdiction over her case upon terminating her probation. The State responds that regardless of whether the trial court\u2019s order terminating defendant\u2019s probation was valid, it had jurisdiction to comply with our mandate because defendant\u2019s jail term was an \u201cindependent condition\u201d of her probation which remained enforceable after her probation was terminated.\nThe State does not address whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate defendant\u2019s probation. We, however, find this issue dispositive of the instant appeal and therefore address it sua sponte. See People v. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998) (sua sponte addressing trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to rule on defendant\u2019s motion for reconsideration of dismissal of postconviction petition); see also People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995) (reviewing court authorized to sua sponte increase defendant\u2019s sentence on appeal because sentence was void and could therefore be corrected at any time).\nThe filing of a notice of appeal transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court instanter and simultaneously divests the trial court of jurisdiction to enter additional orders of substance in a case. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d at 3; People v. Carter, 91 Ill. App. 3d 635, 638 (1980); Brownlow v. Richards, 328 Ill. App. 3d 833, 836-37 (2002). Thereafter, the trial court may not enter an order that would modify the order or judgment being appealed or have the effect of interfering with the appellate court\u2019s review of it. People v. I.W.I., Inc., 176 Ill. App. 3d 951, 958 (1988); Brownlow, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 837. However, the trial court does retain jurisdiction to determine matters, such as applications for deposition costs, that are collateral or incidental to the judgment being appealed. Brownlow, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 837.\nAny order or judgment entered by a trial court without jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993); In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998); People v. Hall, 291 Ill. App. 3d 411, 416 (1997). \u201cA void judgment, order or decree of a court will be reversed on appeal whenever brought before the court by any means possible in the particular case.\u201d People v. Magnus, 262 Ill. App. 3d 362, 365 (1994). Our duty to vacate void judgments, orders, and decrees \u201cis based upon the inherent power of the court to expunge from its records void acts of which it has knowledge.\u201d Magnus, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 365.\nIn the instant case, the trial court entered an order denying defendant\u2019s motion seeking early release but allowing her to remain free on bond pending the outcome of her appeal of that order. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of appeal indicating her intent to appeal that order. The filing of this notice of appeal operated to transfer jurisdiction to this court and to divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enter any additional orders of substance. See Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d at 3; Carter, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 638. Despite the filing of this notice of appeal, the trial court entered an order terminating defendant\u2019s probation while her appeal was still pending before this court. This order released defendant from any obligation to serve further time in jail and thus disposed of the very issue she had invoked our jurisdiction to review via her appeal of the trial court\u2019s previous order denying her motion seeking early release. The rule that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to enter additional orders of substance in a case obviously aims to preserve judicial resources by ensuring that trial courts and courts of review do not needlessly expend time and energy simultaneously reviewing the same or related issues in a case. To disregard the applicability of that rule in the instant case would undermine its purpose by condoning the simultaneous pursuit of the same relief \u2014 early release from jail \u2014 in both the trial court and the appellate court. Accordingly, because the probation termination order effectively modified the order already under review by this court in Kolzow II, we hold that it was entered without jurisdiction and vacate it as void.\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument in her instant appeal of the trial court\u2019s order denying her motion to bar incarceration is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter that order. Defendant bases this argument on the mistaken assumption that the trial court\u2019s order terminating her probation was valid and therefore extinguished its jurisdiction to enter any further orders. Contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, the trial court had jurisdiction to comply with the mandate issued pursuant to our decision in Kolzow II and properly found, in denying defendant\u2019s motion to bar her incarceration, that it was bound by that mandate. See Bond Drug Co. of Illinois v. Amoco Oil Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d 190, 196 (2001) (trial court has a positive duty to follow unambiguous directives in mandate issued by reviewing court); see also People v. Melka, 319 Ill. App. 3d 431, 438 (2000) (noting that trial court orders entered outside the scope of appellate court mandate are void).\nAccordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we direct the clerk of the circuit court to vacate the trial court\u2019s order terminating defendant\u2019s probation and affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to bar her incarceration.\nAffirmed.\nGALLAGHER, EJ., and O\u2019BRIEN, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MARA FROSSARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederick F. Cohn, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth McCurry, Julie Line Bailey, and Kathleen Warnick, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA KOLZOW, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 01 \u2014 3026\nOpinion filed June 28, 2002.\nRehearing denied July 24, 2002.\nFrederick F. Cohn, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth McCurry, Julie Line Bailey, and Kathleen Warnick, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0457-01", "first_page_order": 475, "last_page_order": 478 }