{ "id": 1034073, "name": "ROBERT PRESTON, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Bell Trucking, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Preston v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "2002-07-08", "docket_number": "No. 3-01-0697WC", "first_page": "708", "last_page": "716", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 708" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 1213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1215" }, { "page": "1215" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 1131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1133", "parenthetical": "finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5220615 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 N.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 1081", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336086 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1085" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/1081-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 N.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "discussing amendment of an application for adjustment of claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411668 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "discussing amendment of an application for adjustment of claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140361 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 N.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2536192 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 1277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575604 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5479904 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 N.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564620 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381867 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45790 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660-61" }, { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 So. 2d 1212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9614467 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1216", "parenthetical": "motion for disqualification of appellate justice left \"to the discretion of the justice sought to be disqualified\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/378/1212-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 794, "char_count": 19984, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.031642127335083e-08, "percentile": 0.3163954732495987 }, "sha256": "5b5a833dcd0f7b2e1b38acc8bb3652e69f06a44158de7204de9d1151936a5bff", "simhash": "1:84d3cdb1a2c53c79", "word_count": 3213 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HOFFMAN, HOLDRIDGE and RARICK, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "ROBERT PRESTON, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Bell Trucking, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant Robert Preston appeals from an order of the circuit court of Stark County confirming the November 22, 1999, decision of the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission) denying claimant\u2019s claim for additional compensation and attorney fees under sections 19(k), 19(Z), and 16 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(k), 19(Z), 16 (West 1998)). The respondent employer is Bell Trucking. The issues are whether (1) the Commission\u2019s decision is void because the procedures employed violated claimant\u2019s right to due process; (2) the Commission\u2019s denial of additional compensation and attorney fees was invalid because the Commission did not have a sufficient record before it to make that determination; and (3) the Commission\u2019s denial of additional compensation and attorney fees was contrary to law or against the manifest, weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nClaimant filed an amended petition for additional compensation and attorney fees subsequent to the arbitrator\u2019s award. This same arbitrator\u2019s award was the subject of a section 19(g) proceeding, and the relevant underlying facts are set out in a Third District Appellate Court decision in that case. Preston v. Bell Trucking, 295 Ill. App. 3d 659, 660-61, 693 N.E.2d 506, 507 (1998). In the section 19(g) proceeding, claimant was awarded judgment on the arbitrator\u2019s award of $74,144.64, arbitration attorney fees of $14,828.93, $1,651.70 arbitration costs, $71 for the section 19(g) filing fee, $6,406.25 section 19(g) attorney fees, $155.55 section 19(g) costs and section 2 \u2014 1303 interest of $5,886.16 from January 24, 1996, through December 13, 1996, and $18.28 per day until award, interest and section 19(g) sanctions are paid in full. In an opinion filed April 9, 1998, the appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment in the section 19(g) proceeding, specifically finding that \u201c[bjecause the defendant refused to pay the award of the Commission for over nine months, the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.\u201d Preston, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 662, 693 N.E.2d at 508. In the appellate court, claimant also filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b)) on May 6, 1998, that the appellate court denied on May 21, 1998.\nSection 19(g) of the Act provides that a party may obtain a judgment based on a final award of an arbitrator or decision of the Commission \u201cwhen no proceedings for review are pending.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 1998). The record does not disclose that the Commission took any further action on respondent employer\u2019s petition for review.\nIn this case, the Commission found the following facts. Respondent employer hand delivered to claimant a check for the arbitrator\u2019s award and interest conditioned upon full satisfaction of all sums owing on December 6, 1996, and on December 9, 1996, claimant rejected the tender. The circuit court\u2019s decision in the section 19(g) proceeding was rendered on December 16, 1996. After the appellate court\u2019s decision in the section 19(g) proceeding, on May 18, 1998, claimant filed with the Commission an amended petition for additional compensation under section 19(k) and attorney fees under section 16 of the Act. On October 19, 1998, claimant filed a petition for additional compensation under section 19(Z) of the Act. On October 27, 1998, claimant filed another amended petition based on nonpayment of medical expenses. On July 7, 1999, respondent employer filed a response to the petitions. Claimant filed a supplemental argument on September 13, 1999.\nThe Commission denied claimant\u2019s petition for additional compensation under section 19(k) and attorney fees under section 16, finding that the respondent employer reasonably believed it had a valid review pending before the Commission. The Commission also found that the appellate court\u2019s denial of the request for sanctions under Rule 375(b) included an implicit finding that the issues raised in the appeal in Preston were not frivolous and the appeal was taken in good faith. The Commission found that respondent employer\u2019s delay in paying the arbitrator\u2019s award was not unreasonable, vexatious, deliberate, or the result of bad faith or an improper purpose. The Commission also denied the claim for additional compensation under section 19(Z) because the petition filed October 19, 1998, was time-barred, not having been filed within two years after the arbitrator\u2019s award. The Commission cited section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 1992)) and Blacke v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26, 644 N.E.2d 23 (1994).\nIn this appeal, claimant raises issues concerning the Commission\u2019s handling of her petition to disqualify Commissioners Douglas E Stevenson and Richard M. Gilgis filed June 23, 1998. Commissioner Gilgis was not assigned to this case, and the Commission did not address the motion to disqualify relative to Commissioner Gilgis. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on December 17, 1998, presided over by Commissioner Stevenson. Prior to that hearing, claimant filed a motion to vacate the order setting the hearing on the ground that the Commission had no authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Commission conducted the hearing and denied claimant\u2019s petition to disqualify Commissioner Stevenson in an order entered February 11, 1999. The record on appeal contains other petitions to disqualify and transcripts relative to those petitions in other cases before the Commission wherein claimant\u2019s attorney sought to disqualify commissioners. Those records were before the Commission at the hearing to disqualify in this case.\nClaimant argues that the Commission\u2019s denial of additional compensation and attorney fees is void because of Stevenson\u2019s participation, contending that the decision in this case was entered without statutory authority. In Siddens v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, this court recognized that the Commission can entertain a petition for additional compensation and attorney fees based on an alleged unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment of an award. See Siddens v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 304 Ill. App. 3d 506, 513, 711 N.E.2d 18, 23 (1999). Claimant further contends that the Commission does not have the statutory authority to act in violation of due process. Section 19 of the Act does not authorize the entry of a decision by the Commission in violation of due process. Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 81 Ill. 2d 434, 438, 410 N.E.2d 837, 839 (1980); Goiter v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 152 Ill. App. 3d 822, 826, 504 N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (1987). Claimant argues there was a violation of his right to due process because Commissioner Stevenson was not disqualified. The parties agree that the Act does not provide for the procedure employed by the Commission in this case, i.e., an evidentiary hearing on a motion to disqualify filed prior to a Commission review proceeding.\nThe Act is a purely statutory remedy. See Elles v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 375 Ill. 107, 113, 30 N.E.2d 615, 618 (1940). The Code and supreme court rules do not apply to workers\u2019 compensation proceedings where the Act or the Commission\u2019s rules regulate the area or topic. Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 149, 154, 731 N.E.2d 795, 800 (2000). However, they may be relied on for guidance without finding that they are applicable to workers\u2019 compensation proceedings. Mora v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 266, 274, 726 N.E.2d 650, 656 (2000) (discussing amendment of an application for adjustment of claim).\nWhen a party requests oral argument in a Commission review proceeding, such argument is to be heard by a panel of three commissioners comprised of no more than one from the employing class and one from the employee class, and a decision of the Commission is to be approved by a majority of that panel. 820 ILCS 305/19(e) (West 1998); Alexander v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085 (1999). Commission rules require that an arbitrator or commissioner with a financial or other interest in the outcome of any litigation or any question connected therewith shall not participate in the adjudication of the cause. 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 7030.30(a) (1999). The Commission\u2019s rule then gives examples of when disqualification should occur. 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 7030.30(b) (1999). If the arbitrator or commissioner discloses the basis for disqualification, the parties and attorneys may agree in writing that the arbitrator\u2019s or commissioner\u2019s interest is immaterial, and then the arbitrator or commissioner may thereafter participate in the proceeding. 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 7030.30(c) (1999). Otherwise, the case is reassigned. 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 7030.30(d) (1999). When a commissioner withdraws from a case on review, that commissioner is to be replaced by a representative from the same statutorily designated class. 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 7030.30(d)(2) (1999). Here, claimant sought to disqualify both of the employing class representatives on the Commission.\nThe Act and the Commission rules do not provide for the substitution of a commissioner as of right. See 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1001(a)(2) (West 2000) (providing for substitution of judge as of right). The Commission has adopted a substitution-for-cause system. There is nothing in the Act that prevents the Commission from conducting a hearing on a petition for disqualification of a commissioner. Claimant has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion by the Commission in conducting a hearing on his petition to disqualify commissioner Stevenson. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001(a)(3)(iii) (West 2000).\nThe Commission determined, based on the history of cases in which claimant\u2019s attorney attacked the impartiality of employing-class commissioners and the other evidence presented, that there was no merit to the petition to disqualify commissioner Stevenson. In addition, claimant provided no evidence at the hearing before the Commission to support his allegation of the petition to disqualify. Instead, the claimant relied on the legal argument that the Commission could not hear any evidence or rule on his allegation of fraud. The claimant\u2019s petition was not verified and no affidavit in support of the petition was submitted therewith. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001(a)(3)(ii) (West 2000). Indeed, claimant argued to the Commission that the truth or falsity of the allegations of his petition to disqualify was irrelevant at the disqualification stage in the Commission proceedings.\nClaimant failed to establish that commissioner Stevenson was financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the case. The Commission\u2019s finding that he was not so interested was not against the manifest weight of the evidence or an abuse of discretion. Claimant has failed to establish a violation of due process that would render the Commission\u2019s decision a nullity.\nAlthough we find no error in the handling of the petition to disqualify in this case, in reaching that result, we are cognizant of the fact that two commissioners, neither of whom was the subject of the petition to disqualify, concurred in the denial of the petition to disqualify. In the future, we suggest that a hearing on a petition to disqualify a commissioner not be conducted before a commissioner who is the subject of the petition. We further recommend that the commission promulgate a rule to address the procedural handling of petitions to disqualify commissioners.\nWe summarily reject claimant\u2019s argument that the record was not sufficient to enable the Commission to rule on the merits of his petition. The Commission\u2019s decision specifically found the dates when relevant events occurred beginning with when the arbitrator\u2019s award was filed with the Commission. Claimant does not argue that this chronology of events found by the Commission did not occur as the Commission found. Claimant does not argue that or explain how the documents relating to the underlying worker\u2019s compensation claim are material to the issues before this court or the Commission. Claimant has failed to identify how the absence of the earlier documents from the record on appeal negatively affects the ability of the Commission to make a reasoned and fair decision; prejudices his ability to argue his points on appeal; or affects this court\u2019s ability to review the Commission\u2019s decision denying additional compensation and attorney fees. The facts relevant to the issues before this court all arose subsequent to the arbitrator\u2019s award.\nThe final issue is whether the Commission\u2019s denial of additional compensation and attorney fees was contrary to law or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Within this issue, the claimant presents a number of contentions.\nAs to the amended petition seeking section 19(7) penalties, this court has determined that a two-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 1998)) applies to petitions for additional compensation under sections 19(k) and 19(Z) of the Act. Blacke, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 30, 644 N.E.2d at 26. Claimant does not dispute that. Claimant also does not dispute that the petition for additional compensation under section 19 (Z) was filed more than two years after the arbitrator\u2019s decision on January 29, 1996. Blache did not discuss when a cause of action for additional compensation under sections 19(k) and 19(Z) accrued.\nClaimant argues that his section 19(Z) petition was timely because it related back to the original petition for additional compensation filed in April 1996. It is clear that the April 1996 petition was filed before the arbitrator\u2019s award. It could not have alleged facts that occurred subsequent to the arbitrator\u2019s award. As such, the April 1996 and October 19, 1998, petitions relate to different factual allegations, i.e., two separate causes of action arising at different times. Whether an amended pleading relates back to an earlier filed pleading depends on whether the later pleading arises out of the same facts or occurrences so as to put the defendant on notice. See Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 107-08, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1222-23 (1996); Vincent v. Williams, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8, 664 N.E.2d 650, 655 (1996), quoting Weber v. Cueto, 253 Ill. App. 3d 509, 516, 624 N.E.2d 442, 448 (1993). The Commission\u2019s determination that claimant was not entitled to additional compensation and attorney fees under the facts of this case is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nMoreover, by instituting a section 19(g) proceeding, claimant was precluded from pursuing additional compensation and attorney fees under sections 19(k) and 16. The existence of a final arbitrator\u2019s award or Commission decision is a prerequisite to initiating a section 19(g) action. 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 1998).\nClaimant acknowledges that a pending petition for additional compensation and attorney fees is equivalent to a petition for review by the Commission for the purpose of preventing the institution of a section 19(g) action. See Keystone Steel & Wire v. Cooksey, 228 Ill. App. 3d 429, 432, 592 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (1992) (finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction). In instituting the section 19(g) proceeding, claimant made a binding judicial admission that the Commission decision was final, meaning no petition for additional compensation and attorney fees was pending. Under section 19(g), the plaintiff seeks entry of a judgment and may ask for costs and attorney fees in the arbitration proceedings and in the court upon a finding that the respondent refused to pay compensation. Section 19(g) is a method for enforcing a Commission decision or arbitrator\u2019s award alternative to sections 19(Z), 19(k), and 16.\nThe purpose of enrolling a Commission decision or an arbitrator\u2019s award as a judgment is to enable enforcement of the award in the courts (see 735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)), including the collection of interest on the judgment (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 109 (West 2000)). The doctrine of election of remedies applies when double compensation is threatened, the opposing party changes position in reliance on it, or res judicata applies, so that the election of a remedy is deemed an abandonment of another remedy. SJS Investments, Ltd. v. 450 East Partnership, 232 Ill. App. 3d 429, 432, 597 N.E.2d 1213, 1215 (1992). Whether an election of remedies has occurred is a question of law. See SJS Investments, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 432, 597 N.E.2d at 1215. Here, double compensation was threatened.\nIn this case, claimant elected his remedy by proceeding under section 19(g) and was therefore foreclosed from returning to the Commission in an attempt to reopen an already final Commission decision. It is unnecessary to discuss claimant\u2019s contentions regarding law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.\nFinally, we note that a review of the record in this case shows that the issues presented in this appeal, relating to section 19(g), section 19(k), and section 16 attorney fee sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375, were issues discussed in the Third District Appellate Court decision of Preston v. Bell Trucking and in a decision of the United States District Court, Central Division of Illinois, Preston v. Bell Trucking, No. 01 \u2014 1101 (C.D. Ill. 2001).\nThe order of the circuit court of Stark County confirming the Commission\u2019s decision is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, HOLDRIDGE and RARICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY,\ndissenting:\nThe majority correctly states that the Code of Civil Procedure may provide guidance as to how the Commission should address a motion for substitution of a commissioner. Under the Code, a petition for the substitution of a trial judge for cause is to be heard \u201cby a judge other than the judge named in the petition.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001 (a)(3)(iii) (West 2000). A similar provision governs motions for substitution of a trial judge for cause in a criminal case. See 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 5(d) (West 2000) (\u201cUpon the filing of [a motion for substitution for cause] a hearing shall be conducted *** by a judge not named in the motion ***\u201d). My research has uncovered no published authority in Illinois indicating the proper procedure for the disposition of a motion for substitution of an appellate or supreme court justice. Foreign jurisdictions are divided over whether an appellate judge may participate in the determination of a motion for substitution filed against him. Compare In re Estate of Carlton, 378 So. 2d 1212, 1216 (Fla. 1980) (motion for disqualification of appellate justice left \u201cto the discretion of the justice sought to be disqualified\u201d), with Tex. R. App. E 16.3(b) (precluding appellate judge from participating in disposition of motion for disqualification filed against him). I believe the impartiality that insures the fairness of adjudication is not preserved when the adjudicator whose impartiality is challenged himself decides whether he is impartial.\nWithout passing on the form or merit of claimant\u2019s petition, I conclude that a commissioner is not the proper party to determine whether he, himself, should be removed from a workers\u2019 compensation case for cause. As Commissioner Stevenson was on the panel that sat in judgment of Stevenson\u2019s potential disqualification, I would remand the cause for a determination of claimant\u2019s petition by someone other than Commissioner Stevenson. The majority\u2019s suggestion as. to what procedures the Commission should follow in the future does not remedy the prejudice that has already occurred. Therefore, I dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY," } ], "attorneys": [ "Diane E. Greanias, of Peoria Heights, for appellant.", "Mark M. Flannery, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT PRESTON, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Bell Trucking, Appellee).\nThird District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 3 \u2014 01 \u2014 0697WC\nOpinion filed July 8, 2002.\nDiane E. Greanias, of Peoria Heights, for appellant.\nMark M. Flannery, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0708-01", "first_page_order": 726, "last_page_order": 734 }