{ "id": 1034181, "name": "THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD L. HASHMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "City of Springfield v. Hashman", "decision_date": "2002-07-29", "docket_number": "No. 4-01-0002", "first_page": "748", "last_page": "760", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 748" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526-28" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505593 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870-74" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 N.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "685" }, { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2707637 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477000 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 N.E.2d 1278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1285" }, { "page": "1285" }, { "page": "1285" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383818 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0786-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1013, "char_count": 29479, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.518461695170957e-08, "percentile": 0.2828709318574172 }, "sha256": "d13901a7f162f0308c729bee7053ea3158b60774174584cd8a500b8f0ee6e15f", "simhash": "1:10a96c84697c1de3", "word_count": 4745 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD L. HASHMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn September 13, 1999, plaintiff, the City of Springfield, Illinois (City), an Illinois municipal corporation, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendants, Donald L. Hashman, Henrietta M. Hashman, and the Village of Chatham, Illinois (Village of Chatham), an Illinois municipal corporation. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants. This court reversed the trial court\u2019s judgment (City of Springfield v. Hashman, No. 4 \u2014 01 \u2014 0002 (January 17, 2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)). On April 3, 2002, defendants, Donald L. Hashman and Henrietta M. Hashman, petitioned the supreme court for leave to appeal. Defendant, Village of Chatham, did not petition the supreme court for leave to appeal. Our supreme court denied defendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal but, under its supervisory authority, directed this court to vacate our order and to reconsider our judgment \u201cin light of section 95.501 [of Chapter 95] of the [1988 City of] Springfield Code of Ordinances, and to resolve the issue of plaintiffs entitlement to injunctive relief, if any, and the parameters thereof with appropriate consideration of [section 11 \u2014 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 101 (West 1998))] and the trial court\u2019s findings of fact.\u201d Pursuant to supreme court supervisory order, we vacate our order entered on January 17, 2002. We reverse and remand with directions.\nDonald L. Hashman and Henrietta M. Hashman (Hashmans) are the developers of certain real estate, consisting of 22.408 acres of land in unincorporated Sangamon County. The Hashmans began constructing roads and other improvements on the subject property for a residential development called Wildwood Estates. This development was designed for approximately 20 single-family homesites on building lots ranging from two-thirds of an acre to one acre in size, utilizing private sewage disposal systems on each of the lots.\nThe City operates a public water system that is supplied from Lake Springfield, a 4,300-acre man-made reservoir owned and operated by the City. Lake Springfield provides drinking water to 80% of the population of Sangamon County, including seven wholesale water customers, five villages and two water districts. The subject property is contiguous to the corporate limits of the City and is located within approximately 200 feet of Lake Springfield immediately adjacent to Sugar Creek marsh, which drains directly into Sugar Creek which, in turn, feeds Lake Springfield. Section 96.019 of chapter 96 of the 1988 City of Springfield Code of Ordinances prohibits any person within the Lake Springfield drainage area from constructing or using any cesspool or other structure which is so situated that pollutants or oily liquid may reach and pollute or threaten to pollute the lake unless adequate treatment and disposal facilities are to be provided and are approved by the City.\nThe Springfield Comprehensive Plan 2010, Goals, Policies & Objectives, adopted July 2, 1991, includes the prohibition of new septic systems along the Lake Springfield shoreline and the phase-out of septic systems as sewers become available for the protection of Lake Springfield. The prior comprehensive plan, dated August 1982, states that since Lake Springfield is the city\u2019s source of drinking water, protection of the lake and its watershed is of the utmost importance. The 1982 plan states that \u201c[t]he best way to protect Lake Springfield would be to allow no further development in areas which drain into the lake. Obviously, this is not practical. Alternative solutions include: controlling the types of development, eliminating the use of septic tanks and controlling runoff from any new development.\u201d\nIn 1986, 1988, and 1989, the Hashmans submitted their subdivision plans for development of the subject property to the City for review pursuant to the City\u2019s land subdivision ordinance. On July 14, 1986, the Hashmans were advised by the Springfield Sangamon County Regional Planning Commission (Planning Commission) that their property was not suitable for subdividing because the property drained directly into Sugar Creek, which in turn feeds into Lake Springfield. According to the Planning Commission, the soils are rated as having moderate to severe limitations for septic tank seepage fields and the probability of effluent drainage into Sugar Creek is great. On April 17, 1990, the Springfield city council denied the Hashmans\u2019 request for reconsideration of the Planning Commission\u2019s October 18, 1989, recommendation.\nOn October 25, 1991, the Hashmans, and others, filed a petition in the circuit court of Sangamon County to annex certain unincorporated territory, including the Wildwood Estates development, to the Village of Chatham pursuant to article 7, division 1, of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 24, pars. 7 \u2014 1 \u2014 1 through 7 \u2014 1 \u2014 48). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order on May 14, 1992, denying annexation. The trial court determined that \u201cthe territory in question *** is simply not a natural and gradual extension of the Village [of Chatham] boundaries to areas which adjoin one another in a substantial physical sense.\u201d On appeal, this court affirmed the order dismissing the petition to annex, finding that \u201cthe nature of the territory sought to be annexed does not meet the requirements of section 7 \u2014 1 \u2014 1 of the [Municipal] Code.\u201d In re Annexation of Certain Territory to the Village of Chatham, Illinois, 245 Ill. App. 3d 786, 796, 614 N.E.2d 1278, 1285 (1993).. On January 29, 1996, the Hashmans entered into an annexation agreement with the Village of Chatham pursuant to the Municipal Code.\nOn December 11, 1998, the Hashmans were advised by the Sangamon County Zoning Board that any home construction on the property would require a certificate of zoning compliance and that the current zoning classification for the property was \u201cA,\u201d agricultural, requiring one-acre lots. On June 15, 1999, the Hashmans filed a petition with the Sangamon County Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning Board of Appeals) requesting rezoning of the subject property from \u201cA,\u201d agricultural district, to \u201cR-l,\u201d single-family-residence district, which would allow lots of less than one acre in size. On July 15, 1999, a public hearing on the Hashmans\u2019 petition was held before the Zoning Board of Appeals, which recommended that the Sangamon County Board deny the rezoning:\n\u201cdue to proximity to Lake Springfield and lack of public sewers, the smaller lot area under R-l zoning would allow a higher density of private septic systems which would be potentially detrimental to the lake.\u201d\nOn September 14, 1999, the Sangamon County Board accepted the recommendation of the Zoning Board of Appeals and denied the Hash-mans\u2019 petition to rezone the subject property. On September 15, 1999, the Village of Chatham adopted Ordinance No. 99 \u2014 43, zoning the subject property R-l single-family residence.\nOn September 13, 1999, the City filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Hashmans and the Village of Chatham, and on October 21, 1999, it filed an amendment to the complaint. The matter proceeded to a bench trial. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, finding:\n\u201c(a) Wildwood Estates is within the drainage area of Lake Springfield.\n(b) Septic systems, without regular maintenance, may fail and release human waste into the environment.\n(c) The City has approved the installation of private sewage systems within the drainage area of Lake Springfield for \u2018major\u2019 and \u2018minor\u2019 subdivisions, while at the same time denying approval of Wildwood Estates Subdivision.\n(d) Plaintiff\u2019s evidence fails to satisfactorily persuade or prove that septic systems are polluting or will pollute Lake Springfield. The possibility that a septic system may fail, that human waste may be released into the environment, that said waste may enter Sugar Creek, and that said waste may enter Lake Springfield fails to sustain Plaintiffs burden of proof.\n(e) Sangamon County has the power to regulate septic systems installed in Wildwood Estates.\n(f) In order to extend the corporate limits of the Village [of Chatham] to the South and East, Wildwood Estates presents a necessary addition to the Village [of Chatham], Therefore, the addition of said subdivision was a natural and gradual extension of the Village [of Chatham] boundaries.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nThe supreme court asks that we reconsider our judgment in light of section 95.501 of the 1988 City of Springfield Code of Ordinances. We have reviewed each of the briefs filed in this court by plaintiff, defendants, and amicus curiae. We do not find a reference to section 95.501. We do find, in defendants\u2019 petition for rehearing, filed February 5, 2002, the following:\n\u201cSection 96.019 of the City Code cannot be viewed in a vacuum. The City ordinances which govern septic systems, \u00a7\u00a7 95.500 et seq. of the City Code, were also in evidence in this case (PI. Ex. 24). Section 95.501 of the City Code plainly gives jurisdiction over sewage issues in Wildwood Estates Subdivision to the County.\u201d\nWe note a point not argued shall not be raised in a reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing. 177 Ill. 2d R 341(e)(7). Further, at trial, defense counsel stated in reference to section 95.501:\n\u201c[T]his ordinance clearly does not apply to the Hashman property. This ordinance applies to places that are within the corporate limits of the City and to marginal lands. Marginal lands are defined elsewhere in the ordinance book as lands which are immediately adjacent to Lake Springfield. The Hashman property is not within that definition.\nSo, this ordinance is not relevant to any issue in dispute.\u201d\nDefendants cannot now present argument that is contrary to their position at trial.\nSection 95.501, as amended, provides:\n\u201cThis article shall apply within the corporate limits of the city and in order to protect the public water supply, shall apply to the marginal lands of Lake Springfield, in a manner consistent with the provisions of Chapter 96 of this Code. Properties which are included in the marginal lands of Lake Springfield, but are outside the corporate limits of the City of Springfield[,] shall be permitted and inspected by the Sangamon County Department of Public Health pursuant to the Illinois Private Sewage Disposal Licensing Act and Code of 1996 and the extra requirements of the 1988 Springfield Code of Ordinances, as amended.\u201d (Emphasis added.) City of Springfield Code of Ordinances \u00a7 95.501 (1988) (amended October 6, 1998).\nSection 96.019 provides for \u201cadequate treatment and disposal facilities\u201d to be provided and approved by the City. City of Springfield Code of Ordinances \u00a7 96.019 (1988). Should the City approve a subdivision plan that utilizes private sewage disposal systems on marginal land outside the corporate limits of the City of Springfield, section\n95.501 mandates that the Sangamon County Department of Public Health will permit and inspect those private sewage disposal systems. We note that not all properties that utilize private sewage disposal systems are the result of the subdivision of land or are properties subject to the land subdivision ordinance. Those private sewage disposal systems, if on marginal land outside the corporate limits of the City of Springfield, will also be permitted and inspected by the Sangamon County Department of Public Health.\nIn sum, although we do not find reference to section 95.501 in the briefs before this court, and defense counsel, at trial, opined that \u201cthis ordinance is not relevant to any issu\u00e9 in dispute,\u201d we have reconsidered our judgment in light of section 95.501 of the 1988 City of Springfield Code of Ordinances. Although section 95.501 mandates that the Sangamon County Department of Public Health permit and inspect those private sewage disposal systems on marginal land and land outside the corporate limits of the City of Springfield, section 95.501 does not provide for the Sangamon County Department of Public Health to approve a plan for the subdivision of land pursuant to the City\u2019s land subdivision ordinance. As noted above, should the City approve a subdivision plan that utilizes private sewage disposal systems on marginal land outside the corporate limits of the City of Springfield, section 95.501 mandates that the Sangamon County Department of Public Health will permit and inspect those private sewage disposal systems.\nThe supreme court has also asked that we \u201cresolve the issue of [the City\u2019s] entitlement to injunctive relief, if any, and the parameters thereof with appropriate consideration of [section 11 \u2014 101 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 101 (West 1998))] and the trial court\u2019s findings of fact.\u201d We will not disturb the trial court\u2019s findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215, 647 N.E.2d 273, 277 (1995).\nSection 11 \u2014 101 provides that \u201c[e]very order granting an injunction *** shall set forth the reasons for its entry; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 101 (West 1998).\nSection 11 \u2014 125 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code provides:\n\u201cThe jurisdiction of the city or village to prevent or punish any pollution or injury to the stream or source of water, or to waterworks, extends 20 miles beyond its corporate limits, or so far as the waterworks may extend.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 125 \u2014 2 (West 1998).\nFurther, under section 11 \u2014 125 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code, the City has an express statutory power \u201cto prevent or punish any pollution or injury\u201d to its public water supply \u201c20 miles beyond its corporate limits.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 125 \u2014 2 (West 1998).\nIn City of West Frankfort v. Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d 609, 613, 129 N.E.2d 682, 685 (1955), the supreme court stated:\n\u201cThe police power resides in the State, is asserted by the legislature, and embraces all matters reasonably related to the public health and safety, [citation] including the power to protect a public water supply against pollution. [Citations.] It may be delegated to cities regarding public water matters ***.\nInstances of such city regulation protecting a public water supply have been held to include the prohibition of boating or fishing, [citation] the prohibition of seaplane operations, [citation] the driving out of trespassing cattle on watershed lands, [citation] and the addition of fluorides.\u201d\nThis power to regulate must be so exercised as to not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the freedom granted by the constitution. Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d at 614, 129 N.E.2d at 686. Attempted regulation having no clear and present relation to the public safety, or imposed where the threat to the public health and safety is remote, may be voided. Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d at 613, 129 N.E.2d at 685. \u201cThere is no question but that a municipal water supply is vital to public health and safety; thus, an ordinance preventing and punishing the pollution of the supply could readily be upheld as a reasonable exercise of the delegated police power.\u201d Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d at 614, 129 N.E.2d at 686.\nThe legislature has delegated to the City the police power to protect the public health with respect to certain waters. The City is authorized by statute to prevent the pollution of Lake Springfield and other waters within its jurisdiction.\nSection 96.019 of chapter 96 of the 1988 City of Springfield Code of Ordinances, as amended, prohibits any person within the Lake Springfield drainage area from constructing or using any cesspool or other structure which is so situated that pollutants or oily liquid may reach and pollute or threaten to pollute the lake unless adequate treatment and disposal facilities are to be provided and are approved by the City. Section 96.019 states, in relevant part:\n\u201cNo person shall within zone F, or in any other part of the drainage area, place, throw, discharge, or cause to be discharged, any sewage, garbage, decayed or fermented fruit or vegetables, offal, dead body, manure, polluted, filthy, decaying, fermenting, putrescible, or oily matter or liquid or industrial waste, or any substance defined as a water pollutant by the regulations of the state pollution control board into, or so as to reach, any natural or artificial watercourse or open or covered sewer, ditch, tile, or drain flowing directly or indirectly, continuously or intermittently, into and so as to pollute or tend to pollute the reservoir or other waters from which the city obtains a water supply. No person shall construct in zone F or in any other part of the drainage area any open or covered sewer, ditch, tile, or drain, or make any change or connection so as to cause any pollution or polluted or oily water to flow into or reach more quickly, such reservoir or water supply of the city. No person shall within zone F or in any other part of the drainage area construct or cause to be constructed or use any toilet, water closet, urinal, sink, cesspool, privy, garage, slaughterhouse, or other structure, establishment, or place, which is so situated that polluted or oily liquid therefrom may continuously or intermittently so flow as to ultimately reach and pollute the waters of such reservoir or other waters from which the city obtains or may obtain a water supply unless there is constructed, maintained, and operated sewage treatment and disposal units and facilities for the treatment or disposal thereof, approved by the city, whereby such polluted or oily liquid is treated, or cause to be treated, so as not to pollute or tend to pollute or threaten pollution of the waters of the reservoir or water supply of the city.\u201d City of Springfield Code of Ordinances \u00a7 96.019 (1988).\nSection 96.001 of chapter 96 defines \u201czone F\u201d as follows:\n\u201cAll land located within ten miles of the limits of the city-owned land and within the drainage area and includes all of zones A, B, C, D, and E, except that part of zone E which is outside the drainage area.\u201d City of Springfield Code of Ordinances \u00a7 96.001 (1988) (amended March 20, 1996).\nThe subject property is within the drainage area of Lake Springfield and zone F as defined above. So far as the record shows, the Hash-mans have not, at any time before or after commencing construction, submitted any plans for the City\u2019s approval showing that the public water supply will be adequately protected. The record reflects that for more than 15 years, the Hashmans have been advised that their property is not suitable for a subdivision containing approximately 20 single-family homesites utilizing private sewage disposal systems. The property drains directly into Sugar Creek, which in turn feeds into Lake Springfield. The Springfield Planning Commission opined that the soils are rated as having moderate to severe limitations for septic tank seepage fields and that the probability of effluent drainage into Sugar Creek is great. Henrietta Hashman testified that, presently in Wildwood Estates, there are five properties that have been developed with a home, all served by septic systems. Of those five properties, two have already had some problem with leakage in their septic systems.\nThe trial court found that \u201cthe City has approved the installation of private sewage systems within the drainage area of Lake Springfield for \u2018major\u2019 and \u2018minor\u2019 subdivisions, while at the same time denying approval of Wildwood Estates Subdivision.\u201d The record reflects that, since 1983, the City has approved, on seven occasions, the subdivision of various land in the area of Lake Springfield utilizing private sewage disposal systems. However, the most significant of the seven subdivisions contained three single-family home sites on five acres of land. The Hashmans\u2019 development is designed for approximately 20 single-family home sites on 22.408 acres of land.\nDefendants argue that \u201cin 1987 *** the City did allow a so-called \u2018major\u2019 subdivision with septic system.\u201d Defendants reference a subdivision of land approved in 1976 and containing 38 lots on 22 acres. After the development of 29 lots, the subdivision lay dormant for a period of time. A representative of the developer approached the land subdivision committee in 1986 and 1988 with regard to the remaining nine lots, arguing that \u201cat one time, it had been approved by the City, work had been initiated, and lots had been sold.\u201d The land subdivision committee approved the final two plats of the subdivision, five lots on 2.91 acres in 1986, and four lots on eight acres in 1988.\nDavid Kiliman, assistant director of the Planning Commission, testified that there have been two \u201cmajor\u201d subdivisions of land in the drainage area. In both cases, approval was withheld until the developers made arrangements to have public sewers installed. Further, according to Kiliman, many other developers have been denied approval of their subdivision plans because of their proposed rebanee on septic systems.\nThe trial court found that \u201c[plaintiff\u2019s evidence fails to satisfactorily persuade or prove that septic systems are polluting or will pollute Lake Springfield.\u201d Section 11 \u2014 125 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code does not require proof of \u201cpollution or injury to the stream or source of water.\u201d In Village of Glencoe v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 23 Ill. App. 3d 868, 870-74, 320 N.E.2d 524, 526-28 (1974), the Village of Glencoe (Village) argued that the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago (District) exceeded its statutory authority by enacting its Sewage and Waste Control Ordinance. The grant of authority to the District was found in \u201cAn Act to create sanitary districts ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 42, par. 323 et seq. That statute provided:\n\u201cThe sanitary district has the power and authority to prevent the pollution of any waters from which a water supply may be obtained by any city, town or village within the district ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 42, par. 326aa.\nThe District adopted its sewage and waste control ordinance pursuant to the grant of power in the statute. The ordinance provided that no sewage, industrial wastes or other wastes of any kind may be discharged into the waters of Lake Michigan. The appellate court stated:\n\u201cThere appears to be no conflict that the Village is in violation of [the ordinance]. This is expressly admitted by the Village. It also concedes the District\u2019s authority to prevent the discharge of pollutants into Lake Michigan. The Village argues, however, that there is no statute giving the District the express power or even implied authority to prohibit a nonpolluting discharge; and that [the ordinance] is an unlawful attempt by the District to ban a discharge without regard to its reasonableness, or without a consideration of the public health, safety or welfare. In short, the Village contends that the order to cease and desist must be contingent upon actual proof of pollution.'\u201d (Emphasis added.) Village of Glencoe, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 871, 320 N.E.2d at 527.\nThroughout the proceedings, the Village had \u201cstrenuously and sincerely\u201d maintained that its discharge did not pollute the waters of Lake Michigan. The appellate court stated:\n\u201cWe are asked by the Village of Glencoe to hold that the District exceeded its statutory grant of authority by enacting [the ordinance], for it is claimed that the [ordinance] bans a discharge without regard to whether it constitutes pollution. The basic premise underlying this request is unsound.\u201d Village of Glencoe, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 320 N.E.2d at 527.\nThe board had determined that the discharge into the lake of any waste, regardless of volume or chemical composition, polluted the lake. The appellate court found that the ordinance banned a discharge without regard to whether it constituted a pollutant since the District had determined that the discharge of any waste was, per se, a pollutant. The appellate court stated:\n\u201cWhen construing a statute, the court\u2019s principle object is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. [Citation.] We note that in Illinois, the public concern with pollution has been elevated to the level of constitutional dignity. Article XI, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that, \u2018The public policy of the State *** is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations.\u2019 Viewing the statute as a whole, we believe it is clear that the legislature intended to carry through this posture by granting extremely broad powers to the District. We believe it to be equally clear that it is within the District\u2019s statutory power to ban the discharge of any waste, when in its opinion such waste pollutes or is even likely to pollute the waters of the District.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Village of Glencoe, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 873, 320 N.E.2d at 527-28.\nContrary to the trial court\u2019s finding, the possibility that a septic system may fail, that said waste may enter Sugar Creek, and that said waste may enter Lake Springfield sustains plaintiff\u2019s burden.\nThe trial court found that \u201cin order to extend the corporate limits of the Village [of Chatham] to the South and East, Wildwood Estates presents a necessary addition to the Village [of Chatham]. Therefore, the addition of said subdivision is a natural and gradual extension of the Village [of Chatham] boundaries.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAs stated, the trial court, after an evidentiary hearing, entered an order on May 14, 1992, denying the Hashmans and others\u2019 petition to annex certain territory, including the Wildwood Estates development. The trial court determined that \u201cthe territory in question *** is simply not a natural and gradual extension of the Village [of Chatham] boundaries to areas which adjoin one another in a substantial physical sense.\u201d (Emphasis added.) On appeal, this court affirmed the order dismissing the petition to annex, finding that \u201cthe nature of the territory sought to be annexed does not meet the requirements of section 7 \u2014 1 \u2014 1 of the [Municipal] Code.\u201d In re Annexation of Certain Territory, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 614 N.E.2d at 1285.\nDefendants argue that the evidence shows the Village of Chatham has extended its boundaries east and around the lake, one property at a time; and the Village of Chatham provides water and police services to the area. The Village of Chatham administrator testified that \u201cinstead of a mass annexation attempt that we are discussing here, [1993], we went back to a singular approach per landowner.\u201d While the record reflects that the Village of Chatham has entered into multiple annexation agreements with various property owners, we do not find that the Village of Chatham has extended, in a significant manner, its boundaries east and around the lake \u201cin the wake of this Court\u2019s 1993 decision.\u201d\nSection 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 (West 1998)) provides that any such annexation agreement may provide for the annexation of such territory to the municipality, \u201csubject to the provisions of Article 7.\u201d This court has already determined, in In re Annexation of Certain Territory, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 796, 614 N.E.2d at 1285, that \u201cthe nature of the territory sought to be annexed does not meet the requirements of section 7 \u2014 1 \u2014 1 of the Code.\u201d\nIn 1986, 1988, and 1989, the Hashmans submitted their subdivision plans for development of the subject property to the City for review pursuant to the City\u2019s land subdivision ordinance. On each occasion, the Hashmans were advised by the Planning Commission that (1) their property was not suitable for subdividing because the property drained directly into Sugar Creek, which in turn feeds into Lake Springfield, (2) the soils were rated as having moderate to severe limitations for septic tank seepage fields, and (3) the probability of effluent drainage into Sugar Creek was great. The Springfield city council denied the Hashmans\u2019 requests for reconsideration of the Planning Commission\u2019s recommendations. The trial court is directed to enjoin the Hashmans from developing the subject property without receiving approval by the City of a subdivision plan.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand with directions.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nKNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Karen L. Kendall, Timothy L. Bertschy (argued), and Craig L. Unrath, all of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, and Gary S. Schwab, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John M. Myers (argued) and Erin E. Wisner, both of Rabin, Myers & Han-ken, EC., of Springfield, for appellees.", "John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (J. William Roberts and D. Bradley Blodgett, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD L. HASHMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01 \u2014 0002\nOpinion filed July 29, 2002.\nKaren L. Kendall, Timothy L. Bertschy (argued), and Craig L. Unrath, all of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, and Gary S. Schwab, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn M. Myers (argued) and Erin E. Wisner, both of Rabin, Myers & Han-ken, EC., of Springfield, for appellees.\nJohn E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (J. William Roberts and D. Bradley Blodgett, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0748-01", "first_page_order": 766, "last_page_order": 778 }