{ "id": 1033974, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD D. CAMPBELL, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Campbell", "decision_date": "2002-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 4-01-0551", "first_page": "808", "last_page": "817", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 808" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643", "parenthetical": "no remandment necessary when the trial court made a cursory comment regarding an improper aggravating factor" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 1035", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5154735 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048", "parenthetical": "no remandment necessary when the trial court made a cursory comment regarding an improper aggravating factor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/1035-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 1338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1340", "parenthetical": "where it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on an allegedly improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence, remandment is not required" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115686 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "where it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on an allegedly improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence, remandment is not required" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317111 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 U.S. 72", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177021 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "2509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/433/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5297653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 1236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the supreme court in a supervisory order directed the First District Appellate Court to vacate its judgment in People v. Gilmore, No. 1-96-3641 (November 30, 1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the supreme court in a supervisory order directed the First District Appellate Court to vacate its judgment in People v. Gilmore, No. 1-96-3641 (November 30, 1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 1230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1233" }, { "page": "1232" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477542 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229-30" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 U.S. 237", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1488083 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1895, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242-43" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/156/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229724 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544468 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591993 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 470", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476451 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-80", "parenthetical": "opportunity to appeal" }, { "page": "994-97", "parenthetical": "opportunity to appeal" }, { "page": "1034-36", "parenthetical": "opportunity to appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 F.3d 59", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11554977 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "defendant achieved several tactical advantages as a result of stipulation: rushed prosecution to trial, limited witness's testimony, allowed attack on officer who related the conversation" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/194/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 921, "char_count": 20085, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.268130496798774e-08, "percentile": 0.43308567410686877 }, "sha256": "8b3eae5a1f643161b4649f5dad796ff868e3ba6cc3a3f22662715ee696a2ffae", "simhash": "1:9ba4408077e7d742", "word_count": 3343 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McCullough, ej., concurs." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD D. CAMPBELL, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 2001, the State charged defendant, Richard D. Campbell, Jr., with residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 2000)). In May 2001, a jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of criminal trespass to a residence (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 4 (West 2000)), and the trial court later sentenced him to 364 days in jail.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) he was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him when his lawyer stipulated without defendant\u2019s knowing consent to the testimony of the key prosecution witness and (2) the trial court erred at sentencing by imposing the maximum sentence based on its finding that defendant\u2019s conduct \u201cthreatened serious harm.\u201d We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn March 2001, the State charged defendant with residential burglary, alleging that he knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling place of Blake M. Hoerr and Griff E Powell, located at 1001 South First Street in Champaign (hereinafter the residence).\nAt defendant\u2019s May 2001 jury trial, Powell testified that on March 13, 2001, he was a student at the University of Illinois (University) living at the residence with Hoerr and six other men. Spring break at the University had started a few days earlier and Powell and Hoerr both planned to leave Champaign that day.\nThe mailbox next to the front door of the residence contained four or five names, and on March 13, 2001, there were no signs on the front of the residence indicating that there was a room for rent. Around 10:15 a.m. that day, Powell was in his room on the second floor of the residence and Hoerr was sleeping on the couch in the first-floor living room when Powell heard a loud, banging noise on the front door. Powell knew Hoerr was in the living room, so Powell did not go downstairs to answer the front door. However, the loud knocking continued for a few minutes and then Powell heard talking. Powell then started down the stairs to the first floor and saw defendant speaking to Hoerr as defendant made his way out the door.\nAfter defendant left, Powell and Hoerr both thought it would be a good idea to call the police because they both planned to leave town that day and \u201cthese empty houses are easy to break into.\u201d Powell and Hoerr both thought that defendant\u2019s entry into the residence was strange. Powell did not authorize defendant to come into the residence and had never seen him before.\nDennis Thomas testified that he had been a Champaign police officer for 27 years and in March 2001, he was assigned to the University campus area. Spring and winter breaks are significant to police officers working that area because, due to the absence of students, the burglary rate goes up tremendously. Around 10:17 a.m. on March 13, 2001, he was dispatched to the area near the residence, and based upon the description he received, he stopped defendant a few blocks away.\nDefendant first told Thomas that he had not been in the residence. When Thomas informed defendant of a report that a person fitting his description had been there, defendant said that he had been there and was looking for someone. However, when Thomas asked whom he was looking for, defendant could not provide a name. Thomas then arrested defendant.\nPowell and Thomas were the only witnesses for the State on the first day of trial. After -they testified, the prosecutor requested a continuance until the following day because the State\u2019s third and last witness, Hoerr, who was under subpoena, had not appeared that morning for trial as he had promised. The trial court agreed to continue the case until the following morning.\nWhen court reconvened the next day, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the parties had reached a stipulation regarding Hoerr\u2019s testimony and that after the court accepted the stipulation, the State would rest. The attorneys then presented the court with a written stipulation signed by each of them. The stipulation the court read to the jury stated as follows:\n\u201cBlake Hoerr currently lives in Maryland pursuant to his employment and is not present to testify. It is stipulated by the parties that if called as a witness, Blake Hoerr, would testify as follows: That on March 3, [sic] 2001[,] at approximately 10:15 a.m., he was sleeping on a couch in the living room when he was awakened by someone knocking on the front door. After hearing several knocks, he heard the interior wooden front door open. He sat up and looked over the back of the couch and saw the defendant, Richard D. Campbell, Jr., in the hallway. When the [defendant saw him, the defendant asked him if he had a room for rent. He would testify that he told the defendant that he did not and the defendant then left the residence. The defendant did not have his permission to enter the residence. After the defendant left the residence, Blake Hoerr called 911 and reported that a white male had entered the residence without authority. He provided a description of the defendant to the 911 dispatcher.\nBlake Hoerr would testify that he was transported to the intersection of First Street and Springfield Avenue at 10:30 a.m. and positively identified the defendant as the person who entered his residence.\nThe [p]arties agree to the above [stipulation.\u201d\nBoth parties then rested, and the trial court, at defendant\u2019s request, instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass to a residence. The jury convicted defendant of that offense, and the court sentenced defendant as stated. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Must a Defendant Knowingly and Personally Consent to His Lawyer\u2019s Agreement To Stipulate to the Testimony of a Prosecution Witness?\nDefendant first argues that he was denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him because his lawyer stipulated to the testimony of a key prosecution witness, Hoerr, without defendant\u2019s knowing consent. Specifically, he contends that because the record is devoid of any personal, knowing, and voluntary waiver by him of his confrontation rights, the stipulation regarding Hoerr\u2019s testimony was improper and violated his confrontation rights.\nIn support of his argument, defendant cites People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 138, 729 N.E.2d 470, 477 (2000), for the proposition that \u201c[tjrial by affidavit is the primary evil that the confrontation clause was designed to prevent.\u201d Defendant also cites Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 39 L. Ed. 409, 411, 15 S. Ct. 337, 339 (1895), which held that the primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation was to prevent the use of depositions or affidavits.\nWe disagree with defendant\u2019s arguments and conclude that the authority he cites is inapposite to the question he raises on appeal\u2014 namely, when a defense counsel stipulates to prosecution testimony, may he do so without the defendant\u2019s knowing consent? We hold that the answer is yes.\nResolution of this issue requires examination of the role played by defense counsel and the extent to which a defendant must personally be involved in decisions affecting his defense or trial. In People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (1992), the supreme court discussed four decisions that are ultimately for a criminal defendant to personally make after consulting with his attorney: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify in his behalf; and (4) whether to appeal. The supreme court discussed those decisions in the context of the defense counsel\u2019s authority and wrote as follows:\n\u201cBeyond these four decisions, however, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54, 604 N.E.2d at 281.\nAt issue in Ramey, a capital murder case, was the defendant\u2019s claim that he was denied his constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel presented a defense of self-defense against defendant\u2019s wishes. The supreme court rejected that argument, concluding that defense counsel\u2019s assertion of self-defense did not deny defendant due process. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54, 604 N.E.2d at 281.\nA few years after Ramey, in People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 229-30, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (1994), the supreme court added a fifth decision to the list of those which a criminal defendant must personally make. In that case, the supreme court concluded that a defendant in a criminal case, not his counsel, must make the ultimate decision whether to tender a lesser included offense instruction to the trial court with the request that the jury be so instructed. The court explained:\n\u201cBecause it is defendant\u2019s decision whether to initially plead guilty to a lesser charge, it should also be defendant\u2019s decision to submit an instruction on a lesser charge at the conclusion of the evidence. In both instances the decisions directly relate to the potential loss of liberty on an initially uncharged offense.\u201d Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d at 229, 642 N.E.2d at 1232.\nSee also People v. Gilmore, 183 Ill. 2d 579, 707 N.E.2d 1236 (1999) (where the supreme court in a supervisory order directed the First District Appellate Court to vacate its judgment in People v. Gilmore, No. 1\u201496\u20143641 (November 30, 1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), and remand the case to the trial court \u201cfor an evidentiary hearing on whether defendant consented to defense counsel\u2019s strategy of not requesting an instruction for second degree murder\u201d).\nThus, the law remains essentially as this court described it in People v. Pondexter, 214 Ill. App. 3d 79, 87, 573 N.E.2d 339, 345 (1991), in which we explained that \u201c[a]n accused has either the right to have counsel represent him or the right to represent himself; however, a defendant has no right to both self-representation and the assistance of counsel.\u201d In Pondexter, we explained that an election between these two rights must be made at the proper time and in the proper manner, with the following effects:\n\u201cOnce this election is made, the roles of attorney and client are defined. Defendant retains the right to make decisions involving \u2018fundamental rights,\u2019 while those strategic matters involving \u2018the superior ability of counsel\u2019 are left to the attorney. [Citation.] *** On the other hand, if a defendant retains counsel, that counsel has control over the day-to-day conduct of the defense. He has the responsibility to determine when and whether to object, what witnesses to call and what defenses to develop. These decisions, practically speaking, must be done without consulting the client. Wainwright v. Sykes (1977), 433 U.S. 72, 91, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594, 611, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2509 (Burger, C.J., concurring).\u201d Pondexter, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 87, 573 N.E.2d at 345.\nConsistent with the foregoing authority, we hold that in a criminal case, (1) the decision whether to stipulate to the testimony of a prosecution witness remains with defense counsel, not the defendant; and (2) the defendant need not be personally consulted about the matter. We further hold that because a decision to stipulate to certain State evidence remains one of trial strategy within defense counsel\u2019s sound judgment, just as \u201cwhether and how to conduct cross-examination\u201d (see Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54, 604 N.E.2d at 281), defense counsel\u2019s agreement to stipulate does not implicate the defendant\u2019s right under either the federal or state constitution to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. See U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8.\nThe only exception to our holding is when (1) the State\u2019s entire case is to be presented by stipulation; and (2) the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant. Under these circumstances, the stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea, and the supreme court has made clear by its recent amendment to Supreme Court Rule 402 that before the trial court may accept such a stipulation, a defendant must (1) be personally admonished about such a stipulation, including the fact that by pleading guilty he is giving up his right \u201cto be confronted with any witnesses against him\u201d and (2) agree to it. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(4).\nAccordingly, we conclude that in this case, the stipulation regarding Hoerr\u2019s testimony was entirely proper and did not implicate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights.\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Finding That Defendant\u2019s Conduct \u201cThreatened Serious Harm\u201d\nLast, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s finding at sentencing that his conduct \u201cthreatened serious harm,\u201d a statutory factor in aggravation under section 5 \u2014 5 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West 2000)), was erroneous. Defendant further contends that because the court imposed the maximum sentence (364 days in jail), this court must reverse his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.\nIn response, the State argues that (1) defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal; and (2) even if the trial court\u2019s remark was erroneous, reversal is not required on this record. We agree with the State.\nFirst, we note that defendant did not file a postsentencing motion. Section 5 \u2014 8 \u2014 1(c) of the Unified Code requires a defendant to file a written postsentencing motion in the trial court to preserve sentencing issues for appellate review (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8 \u2014 1(c) (West 2000)). People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393, 686 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1997). Thus, we conclude that defendant has forfeited on appeal any alleged irregularities that occurred at the sentencing hearing by his failure to present those matters to the trial court in a postsentencing motion.\nWe also agree with the State that even if the trial court erred by mentioning that defendant\u2019s conduct threatened serious harm, the mere mention of that aggravating factor does not require reversal. Defendant possesses an astonishing record of criminality. At the time of his June 2001 sentencing for criminal trespass to a residence, he was 44 years old and had acquired 10 prior felony convictions going back 25 years. He had served seven separate prison sentences in Illinois and committed this offense while on parole. He also had four prior misdemeanor convictions. On this record, we are convinced that the trial court would have imposed \u2014 and the defendant would have deserved \u2014 the maximum sentence possible no matter what the court may have thought about other aggravating or mitigating factors. See People v. Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d 327, 332, 449 N.E.2d 1338, 1340 (1983) (where it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on an allegedly improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence, remandment is not required); see also People v. Place, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1048, 605 N.E.2d 634, 643 (1992) (no remandment necessary when the trial court made a cursory comment regarding an improper aggravating factor).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMcCullough, ej., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent.\nEven if we assume that the decision to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness is a matter of trial strategy, such as what witnesses to call and whether and how to conduct cross-examination, defense counsel may make such decisions only \u201cafter consulting with his client.\u201d Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54, 604 N.E.2d at 281. There is no support for the majority\u2019s holding that \u201cdefendant need not be personally consulted about the matter.\u201d 332 Ill. App. 3d at 814.\nDefense counsel\u2019s stipulation to the testimony of a witness can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel in a criminal case may waive his client\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence, so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorney\u2019s decision, and so long as it can be said that the attorney\u2019s decision was part of a prudent trial strategy. United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999) (defendant achieved several tactical advantages as a result of stipulation: rushed prosecution to trial, limited witness\u2019s testimony, allowed attack on officer who related the conversation). The argument that defendant\u2019s failure to object to actions taken by his counsel at trial constitutes a waiver has been rejected on the basis defendant may have been surprised by the action and may not have been aware he had any right to complain. 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 11.6(a), at 54-55 & n.62.9 (2d ed. Supp. 2002). The failure to consult with defendant may constitute ineffective assistance if it deprives defendant of an opportunity he otherwise would have taken advantage of. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-80, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985, 994-97, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1034-36 (2000) (opportunity to appeal).\nIs the decision to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness a decision involving fundamental rights, such as the decision to plead guilty, which defendant has the right to make? Or is it a matter involving trial strategy, the day-to-day conduct of the trial, which must in practice be made by counsel? The answer is that the decision to stipulate is not only similar to a guilty plea, it often is a guilty plea. A defendant may dispute a particular issue, a ruling on a motion to suppress, for example, but otherwise stipulate that he does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. If the disputed issue is resolved against him, defendant may be convicted without a trial. See People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 16, 570 N.E.2d 320, 322 (1991); People v. Davis, 286 Ill. App. 3d 686, 688, 676 N.E.2d 675, 677 (1997).\nThe majority recognizes that the rule it announces today cannot be applied where there is \u201ca stipulation that the evidence is sufficient to convict.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a). In that situation, the defendant must be advised by the court that he has the right to plead guilty or not guilty and that by stipulating the evidence is sufficient to convict he waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with any witnesses against him who have not testified. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(4). Even where the stipulation does not rise to the level of Rule 402, even where there is no stipulation \u201cthat the evidence is sufficient to convict,\u201d it should be recognized that the decision to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness is more like the decision to plead guilty, a fundamental right, than it is like a matter of trial strategy.\nAs a result of today\u2019s decision, if counsel stipulates at trial to the testimony of a witness without discussing it with defendant, and defendant stands up and says \u201cI object, that witness is lying and would admit it if he were on the stand,\u201d the court may properly respond, \u201csit down, this isn\u2019t your call.\u201d I recognize there are concerns of judicial administration here, but the solution is not to suggest to counsel that defendant be excluded from important decisions in the case. See 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 11.6(b), at 55 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (balancing of interests). I suggest that the decision whether to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness belongs to the defendant, after consultation with defense counsel.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD D. CAMPBELL, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01 \u2014 0551\nOpinion filed July 17, 2002.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0808-01", "first_page_order": 826, "last_page_order": 835 }