{ "id": 1033957, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF MARY KAY RONEY, Petitioner-Appellee, and CHRISTOPHER J. RONEY, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Roney", "decision_date": "2002-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 4-01-0785", "first_page": "824", "last_page": "831", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 824" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "142 U.S. 547", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3557472 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1892, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563-64", "parenthetical": "'It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties[,] or forfeitures'" }, { "page": "1114", "parenthetical": "'It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties[,] or forfeitures'" }, { "page": "198", "parenthetical": "'It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties[,] or forfeitures'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/142/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 U.S. 616", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3516335 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" }, { "page": "751" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/116/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 So. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9543915 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/392/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 U.S. 201", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1775233 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "2347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/487/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 27", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413147 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "2043" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "2043" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "2043" }, { "page": "51-52" }, { "page": "45" }, { "page": "2051", "parenthetical": "Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 391", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178158 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409-10" }, { "page": "55-56" }, { "page": "1580-81" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "1581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166408 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58-59" }, { "page": "903-04" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1159", "parenthetical": "father found in contempt and imprisoned until he produced child" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2646027 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "father found in contempt and imprisoned until he produced child" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 U.S. 549", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333122 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "1002" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "1002-03" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "908-09" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/493/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 1138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143", "parenthetical": "stay of civil case not appropriate where defendant not charged and merely asserted he was the subject of a criminal investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 1131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281395 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1137", "parenthetical": "stay of civil case not appropriate where defendant not charged and merely asserted he was the subject of a criminal investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/1131-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176514 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" }, { "page": "821" }, { "page": "1558" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 N.E.2d 1370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1379" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317123 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1113", "parenthetical": "\"We find that once Marie filed her [petition for attorney fees] beneficial to herself, she 'became an actor, a profiteer of the judicial machinery and process' [citation] ***\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5083035 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "\"We find that once Marie filed her [petition for attorney fees] beneficial to herself, she 'became an actor, a profiteer of the judicial machinery and process' [citation] ***\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "where we refused to allow a party to put in his financial affidavits as evidence when he asserted the fifth amendment in response to questions concerning them" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159472 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659", "parenthetical": "where we refused to allow a party to put in his financial affidavits as evidence when he asserted the fifth amendment in response to questions concerning them" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3319338 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 1032", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041", "parenthetical": "therapist-recipient relationship" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385516 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "therapist-recipient relationship" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 27", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413147 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "2043" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0027-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 895, "char_count": 16952, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.446063651887353e-08, "percentile": 0.27849461493700983 }, "sha256": "7eed6729cf9fe2f96ab808ded4a0379071a34ba39134ea8617cd96405ffdd6df", "simhash": "1:c8e3a8271f1c9e9f", "word_count": 2757 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KNECHT, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF MARY KAY RONEY, Petitioner-Appellee, and CHRISTOPHER J. RONEY, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn October 2000, petitioner, Mary Kay Roney, filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to respondent, Christopher J. Roney. In January 2001, Mary Kay filed (1) a motion, seeking to require Christopher to turn over tape recordings of her'telephone conversations; and (2) a motion in limine to exclude the recordings from evidence. In May 2001, the trial court ordered Christopher to turn over all of the tape recordings Mary Kay had requested in discovery. In August 2001, the court found Christopher to be in indirect civil contempt for failing to turn over the tape recordings as ordered.\nChristopher appeals, arguing that the trial court\u2019s order violates his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., amend. V) because the act of turning over the recordings would constitute a testimonial communication incriminating him in the criminal offense of eavesdropping (720 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 2(a)(1) (West 2000)). We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.\nI. BACKGROUND\nMary Kay and Christopher married in November 1983. As stated, Mary Kay initiated dissolution proceedings, and in January 2001, she filed a motion in limine and sought a turnover order.\nA. Proceedings Leading to the Turnover Order\nAlong with her motion requesting a turnover order, Mary Kay filed an affidavit in which she stated that (1) she discovered wiretapping equipment in the attic of the marital residence; (2) Christopher admitted taping her telephone conversations; (3) she did not consent to the taping; and (4) she understood that approximately 30 tapes existed. In response to Mary Kay\u2019s motion, Christopher asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.\nAt a March 2001 hearing on Mary Kay\u2019s motions, Thad Trimble, a Champaign County sheriff\u2019s department evidence officer, testified regarding the items that Mary Kay had submitted to the police. Trimble stated that he took possession of \u201cthe GE tape recorder and plug-in, the white Radio Shack eavesdropping device, the Gemini phone modular plug, [a] crimping tool, seven cassette tapes with tape recorder, [and] three white cassette tapes with storage cases.\u201d\nMary Kay testified that on October 16, 2000, she went into the attic because she suspected that Christopher was storing pornography there. She explained that she had heard him going into the attic on a daily basis over the past eight months. The attic did not have a floor, and insulation covered most of the area. After a half hour poking around with a mop handle and lifting insulation, Mary Kay found the telephone recording device. In mid-November 2000, Mary Kay confronted Christopher about splicing the phone line, and Christopher admitted doing it and said that he did it to protect her.\nThe trial court allowed Mary Kay\u2019s counsel to play two of the tapes, only one of which contained recordings of Mary Kay\u2019s telephone conversations. Mary Kay called Christopher as an adverse witness, but he refused to answer questions and asserted his fifth amendment rights.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Mary Kay\u2019s motion in limine after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the tape containing recorded telephone conversations was obtained illegally. The court continued the hearing on Mary Kay\u2019s request for a turnover order until May 2001. At that hearing, Chase Leonard, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, testified that a criminal prosecution of Christopher was unlikely. The trial court found that the fifth amendment privilege did not apply because turning over the tape recordings was not testimonial in nature. The court ordered Christopher to turn over the tapes by May 29, 2001. Christopher filed a motion for rehearing, but never called it for a hearing.\nB. Contempt Proceedings\nAt the August 2001 hearing on Mary Kay\u2019s petition for adjudication of indirect civil contempt, Christopher testified as an adverse witness that he did not turn over any tapes. He then asserted his fifth amendment rights when asked if he had the tapes or knew of their location.\nWhen Christopher testified on his own behalf, his counsel asked him, \u201cDo you have a reason that you did not turn over any tapes that might be in your possession?\u201d He responded, \u201cWhat tapes? Are you asking \u2014 what makes them think I have any tapes?\u201d Mary Kay\u2019s counsel objected to the answer and moved to strike it as nonresponsive, and the trial court ordered the volunteered portion stricken.\nFollowing the hearing, the trial court found Christopher in indirect civil contempt for having willfully disobeyed the court\u2019s order to turn over all tape recordings to Mary Kay. The court ordered Christopher to be incarcerated in the county jail until he (1) turned over all tapes as ordered, and (2) filed an affidavit stating that the materials turned over constituted all of the tapes in his possession or control or both. Alternatively, the court ordered that Christopher could file an affidavit stating that no tapes were in his possession or control.\nThis appeal followed, and the trial court granted Christopher\u2019s motion for a stay pending appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe sole issue before us is whether the act of turning over tape-recorded telephone conversations, which were obtained by eavesdropping in violation of criminal law, constitutes an incriminating testimonial communication protected by the fifth amendment privilege. We conclude that it does.\nIn Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-10, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39, 55-56, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1580-81 (1976), the United States Supreme Court explained the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as follows:\n\u201c[T]he privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications. ***\nThe act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the [witness]. It also would indicate the [witness\u2019s] belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena. [Citation.] The elements of compulsion are clearly present, but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the [witness] are both \u2018testimonial\u2019 and \u2018incriminating\u2019 for purposes of applying the [flifth [a]mendment.\u201d\nThe Court in Fisher determined that a taxpayer\u2019s implicit admission regarding the existence and possession of his accountant\u2019s papers did not rise to the level of testimony protected by the fifth amendment privilege because \u201c[t]he existence and location of the papers [was] a foregone conclusion.\u201d Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 56, 96 S. Ct. at 1581.\nIn a recent decision, however, United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36, 147 L. Ed. 2d 24, 36, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000), the United States Supreme Court more restrictively viewed its holding in Fisher as tied to the particular circumstances of that case \u2014 namely, the compulsory production of documents otherwise required by tax law to have been previously prepared. In language applicable to the present case, the Court explained the scope of fifth amendment protection as follows:\n\u201c[This Court has made clear] that the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena may have a compelled testimonial aspect. We have held that \u2018the act of production\u2019 itself may implicitly communicate \u2018statements of fact.\u2019 By \u2018producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic.\u2019 \u201d Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 36, 120 S. Ct. at 2043, quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209, 101 L. Ed. 2d 184, 196, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2347 (1988).\nThus, in the present case, compulsion exists because the trial court (1) ordered Christopher to turn over any recordings, (2) found him in contempt, and (3) sentenced him to jail until he complied with the order. Turning over any recordings would amount to compelled testimonial communication because that act would implicitly concede the existence, source, and authenticity of the materials. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 36, 120 S. Ct. at 2043; see also Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263, 267 (Fla. App. 1980) (holding that if tape recordings of telephone conversations were in a witness\u2019s possession, \u201cthe forced production of them would amount to compelled incriminating testimonial communication in that the production would serve as authentication that [the witness] had made the tape recordings\u201d). That act would also be incriminating because the recorded conversations, if any, would have been knowingly and intentionally obtained by an eavesdropping device in violation of Illinois criminal law (see 720 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 2(a)(1) (West 2000) (one commits eavesdropping by knowingly and intentionally using an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation)).\nIn support of our conclusion in this case, we quote from Justice Thomas\u2019 concurring opinion in Hubbell, as follows:\n\u201c[T]his Court has noted that, for generations before the framing, \u2018one cardinal rule of the court of chancery [was] never to decree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of a crime.\u2019 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631[, 29 L. Ed. 746, 751, 6 S. Ct. 524, 533] (1886). See also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563-64[, 35 L. Ed. 1110, 1114, 12 S. Ct. 195, 198] (1892) (\u2018It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject him to fines, penalties[,] or forfeitures\u2019).\u201d Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 51-52, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 45, 120 S. Ct. at 2051 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.).\nChristopher asserted a valid fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the trial court erred by (1) ordering him to turn over the recordings, and (2) holding him in indirect civil contempt for willfully refusing to comply with that order.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order that Christopher turn over the tape recordings, vacate the court\u2019s order finding Christopher in indirect civil contempt, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order.\nReversed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded for further proceedings.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court. The majority opinion fails to address the special rules which apply when the fifth amendment is sought to be exercised in a civil case.\nThe interests of fundamental fairness and substantial justice outweigh the protections afforded by a privilege where plaintiff seeks to utilize those protections as a sword (rather than a shield) to prevent disclosure of relevant, probative, admissible, and not unduly prejudicial evidence. D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 570, 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1041 (1997) (therapist-recipient relationship). D.C. cited Galante v. Steel City National Bank of Chicago, 66 Ill. App. 3d 476, 481, 384 N.E.2d 57, 61 (1978), where the court noted that a number of jurisdictions have overwhelmingly rejected the contention that a plaintiff in a civil action may invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination while still maintaining the lawsuit. See also In re Marriage of Kocher, 282 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659, 668 N.E.2d 651, 654 (1996) (where we refused to allow a party to put in his financial affidavits as evidence when he asserted the fifth amendment in response to questions concerning them). See also In re Marriage of Hartian, 172 Ill. App. 3d 440, 453, 526 N.E.2d 1104, 1113 (1988) (\u201cWe find that once Marie filed her [petition for attorney fees] beneficial to herself, she \u2018became an actor, a profiteer of the judicial machinery and process\u2019 [citation] ***\u201d).\nIt is the prevailing rule that the fifth amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties in civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them. People v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency & One 1998 Chevrolet Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d 314, 332, 685 N.E.2d 1370, 1379 (1997), quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810, 821, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1558 (1976); Jacksonville Savings Bank v. Kovack, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 1137, 762 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (2002) (stay of civil case not appropriate where defendant not charged and merely asserted he was the subject of a criminal investigation).\nIn the present case, the trial court had the right to ask Christopher whether he had the tapes, and when Christopher invoked the fifth amendment privilege, the trial court had the right to draw the negative inference that Christopher in fact had the tapes. The court was then entitled to take steps to secure the tapes.\nThe majority relies on Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 36, 120 S. Ct. at 2043, where an indictment against Webster Hubbell was dismissed because the evidence the government proposed to use against him was derived from the testimonial aspect of Hubbell\u2019s immunized conduct in previously producing subpoenaed documents. The question before us, whether the tapes must be turned over, is not the question addressed in Hubbell. Whether Christopher\u2019s acts in turning over the tapes may be used against him in some future proceeding (the issue in Hubbell) is not an issue in this case.\nA case more on point is Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 107 L. Ed. 2d 992, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990), where a mother was ordered to produce her missing child and when she refused to do so was found in contempt and imprisoned until she complied with the court order. The Supreme Court rejected the mother\u2019s contention that the contempt order violated her privilege against self-incrimination. \u201cWhen a person assumes control over items that are the legitimate object of the government\u2019s noncriminal regulatory powers, the ability to invoke the privilege is reduced.\u201d Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 558, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 1002, 110 S. Ct. at 906; see also Sanders v. Shephard, 185 Ill. App. 3d 719, 733, 541 N.E.2d 1150, 1159 (1989) (father found in contempt and imprisoned until he produced child). The child in Bouknight was the particular object of the State\u2019s regulatory interests (Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 559, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 1002-03, 110 S. Ct. at 907).\nIf there is a prosecution of Christopher for a violation of the eavesdropping statute, and if the prosecution seeks to use the turnover of the tapes or evidence derived therefrom, Christopher may not be without a remedy. \u201cWe are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the [sjtate\u2019s ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight\u2019s act of production in subsequent criminal proceedings. But we note that imposition of such limitations is not foreclosed.\u201d Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 1004, 110 S. Ct. at 908. The attractive and apparently practical course of subsequent use restriction is not appropriate where a significant element of the regulatory requirement is to aid law enforcement, but that was not the case in Bouknight. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 562, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 1004, 110 S. Ct. at 908-09, quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58-59, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903-04, 88 S. Ct. 697, 708 (1968).\nChristopher\u2019s conduct, spying on his wife, is of particular governmental concern. His conduct, stalking, keeping his wife under surveillance, constitutes \u201charassment\u201d and \u201cdomestic violence\u201d under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/103(1), (3), (7) (West 2000)). The legislature has directed that we recognize domestic violence as a serious crime against the individual and society which produces family disharmony in thousands of Illinois families and promotes a pattern of escalating violence which frequently culminates in intrafamily homicide. 750 ILCS 60/102(1) (West 2000). Christopher\u2019s spying on his wife might enable him to determine when she would be alone or in other situations where she would be susceptible to attack. The trial court did not have to tolerate Christopher\u2019s continued possession and use of the tapes. The trial court has the power to direct respondent to promptly make personal property available to petitioner if \u201csharing it would risk abuse of petitioner by respondent.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (West 2000).", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert G. Kirchner (argued), of Lerner & Kirchner, of Champaign, for appellant.", "Darrell E. Statzer, Jr. (argued), of Decatur, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF MARY KAY RONEY, Petitioner-Appellee, and CHRISTOPHER J. RONEY, Respondent-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01 \u2014 0785\nArgued May 15, 2002.\nOpinion filed July 17, 2002.\nRobert G. Kirchner (argued), of Lerner & Kirchner, of Champaign, for appellant.\nDarrell E. Statzer, Jr. (argued), of Decatur, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0824-01", "first_page_order": 842, "last_page_order": 849 }