{ "id": 1034212, "name": "In re M.B., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Yvette Neal, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Neal", "decision_date": "2002-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-1289", "first_page": "996", "last_page": "1008", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 996" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182739 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3373841 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560214 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "rejecting parent's challenge to the court's dispositional order in light of State's failure to allege unfitness where, inter alia, she failed to demonstrate how she was prejudiced thereby" }, { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293563 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062", "parenthetical": "rejecting parent's challenge to the court's dispositional order in light of State's failure to allege unfitness where, inter alia, she failed to demonstrate how she was prejudiced thereby" }, { "page": "1061" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" }, { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 1092", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872472 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1100" }, { "page": "1101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/1092-01" ] }, { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281446 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 N.E.2d 1004", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 1122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980733 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/1122-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" }, { "page": "835" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "839" }, { "page": "836" }, { "page": "836", "parenthetical": "noting the circuit court's selection of a particular disposition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910179 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992" }, { "page": "992-93" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "994" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0985-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 995, "char_count": 29261, "ocr_confidence": 0.8, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.9503341067800256e-08, "percentile": 0.37077219559904845 }, "sha256": "daad93ac5be9557ae9e66536ec8453ca649eb93c06aa0328ea02c1d3ef3dbb54", "simhash": "1:cf37bc8e784f46d3", "word_count": 4719 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HALL, EJ, and SOUTH, J, concur." ], "parties": [ "In re M.B., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Yvette Neal, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing an adjudicatory hearing upon the petition of petitioner, the People of the State of Illinois (State), the circuit court found respondent M.B., the minor daughter of respondent, Yvette Neal, and Mark B., who is not party to this appeal, neglected and abused pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3 (West 2000)). At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the court adjudicated M.B. a ward of the court, found respondent unfit and unable as a parent, and directed M.B. placed with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Respondent now appeals, challenging the circuit court\u2019s finding of unfitness. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nState\u2019s Petition\nOn May 16, 2000, the State filed a petition seeking an order adjudicating M.B. a ward of the court on the grounds she had been neglected and abused and was dependent pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 3 and 2 \u2014 4 of the Act, respectively. The State\u2019s petition specifically asserted M.B. had been physically abused by her natural father Mark B. on or about May 12, 2000, when Mark B. repeatedly struck M.B. with a belt, causing significant bruising over a majority of M.B.\u2019s body. The petition further alleged: M.B. was neglected as her living environment \u201cwas injurious to her welfare\u201d in that she had been in prior DCFS custody following a finding of abuse or neglect against respondent; that Mark B. was no longer willing to care for his child; and that the whereabouts of respondent were unknown.\nFollowing a temporary custody hearing, the circuit court found probable cause to conclude that M.B. was abused, neglected and dependent as alleged in the State\u2019s petition. M.B. was ordered removed from the custody of her father and placed in the temporary custody of DCFS, which was directed to prepare a case plan regarding M.B.\u2019s situation.\nRespondent\u2019s whereabouts were eventually ascertained, and following the appointment of counsel, respondent\u2019s appearance in the matter was filed on May 24, 2000.\nDCFS\u2019 Initial Service Plan and Family Case Conference\nCaseworker Melba Mars issued the initial service plan on July 17, 2000. The plan recited the underlying allegations of the State\u2019s petition and disclosed that Mark B., as well as his paramour, had pleaded guilty to criminal charges in connection with the incident.\nMars\u2019 report additionally noted the past incident of abuse upon M.B. by respondent in late 1995. In this regard, the report stated respondent had been alleged, along with her then-boyfriend and now husband Lamone Neal, of physically abusing M.B. by dragging M.B. on a carpet and striking the child with a brush and belt. Respondent was further alleged to have exposed M.B. to a risk of harm in connection with allegations that Mr. Neal had sexually abused M.B.\nThe record establishes that an adjudicated finding of neglect and physical abuse was entered against respondent in March 1996. The case was ultimately closed on June 26, 1997, when M.B. was placed in the custody of her father. DCFS\u2019 investigation did not disclose whether any adjudicated findings of sexual abuse were made against Mr. Neal.\nMars\u2019 report recommended the family undergo services to provide M.B. with a safe and stable living environment and stated a goal of returning M.B. to respondent\u2019s custody by the end of July 2001. The report opined M.B., who is in the present custody of a maternal aunt and receiving weekly counseling, needs continued individual counseling to address separation and loss, physical and sexual abuse issues, and defiant behavior. M.B. additionally requires psychological evaluation and family therapy.\nRespondent, according to the report, was involved in counseling and requires continued individual counseling, family counseling, and parenting classes. The plan reported respondent has been very involved with her daughter\u2019s therapy and has expressed a desire for reunification.\nWith respect to Mr. Neal, the report suggested a psychological evaluation, individual and family counseling, a substance abuse evaluation, and parenting classes.. While Mr. Neal initially declined to participate in the recommended services, he later informed caseworkers he was engaged in individual counseling.\nDCFS\u2019 Supplemental Report\nIn a follow-up report prepared on November 1, 2000, Mars indicated the recommended services for the parties had not significantly changed from those listed in the initial service plan. M.B., respondent and Mr. Neal were each stated to be in need of continued individual counseling, and family counseling and parenting classes were specifically recommended for respondent and Mr. Neal. Mars noted respondent continues to be very involved with M.B.\u2019s therapy and has reaffirmed her desire to have M.B. returned to her custody.\nIn light of the need for ongoing counseling for respondent, as well as Mark B.\u2019s desire to surrender his parental rights, Mars concluded there had been unsatisfactory progress toward the service plan\u2019s goal of reunification. Mars specifically noted that while respondent had been cooperative and that her visits with M.B. were satisfactory, she had been unable to engage in the required services due to a complicated pregnancy and recent birth of a child. Consequently, respondent\u2019s progress in her individual, parenting and family counseling was reported to be unsatisfactory. Mr. Neal\u2019s progress in the foregoing areas of counseling was likewise deemed unsatisfactory.\nWhile the plan\u2019s goal remained reunification, the time for achievement of that goal was delayed until November 30, 2001. According to Mars, M.B.\u2019s reunification was dependent upon respondent and Mr. Neal engaging in further individual, parenting and family counseling sessions to specifically address those issues that led to M.B. being removed from respondent\u2019s home back in 1996.\nAdjudicatory Hearing\nThe adjudicatory hearing was conducted on December 6, 2000. At the hearing, respondent, through counsel, stipulated, in relevant part, that: M.B. had been in the primary custody of her father since June 1997; on May 12, 2000, M.B. reported to investigative authorities that she had been beaten by her father and stepmother after \u201cshe got smart with her grandmother\u201d; on the above date, M.B. arrived at the University of Chicago Hospital with a primary diagnosis of physical abuse; hospital personnel reported that M.B. suffered from significant bruising that was consistent with being repeatedly struck with a belt; and Mark B. acknowledged he had beaten M.B. and had pled guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic battery for which he received one year\u2019s conditional discharge. The parties further stipulated that M.B., if called to testify, would detail the nature of her father\u2019s attack.\nWith respect to respondent\u2019s 1995 incident of abuse and neglect upon M.B., it was stipulated that: in early 1996, respondent was alleged to have struck M.B. with a brush and dragged her across a carpeted floor, causing M.B. various cuts, welts and bruises; the case was closed in mid-1997, when M.B.\u2019s custody was transferred from respondent to Mark B.; and around the foregoing time period, respondent was further cited for risk of harm in light of charges of sexual abuse filed against her husband, Mr. Neal. A certified copy of the March 1996 adjudication of neglect and abuse against respondent was accepted into evidence by the circuit court.\nAt the close of the evidence, M.B. was found to be both abused and neglected by her father within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 3 of the Act. Respondent was not found to have shared any responsibility for M.B.\u2019s mistreatment.\nDispositional Hearing\nThe matter proceeded for disposition in March 2001. Respondent was present with counsel, as was Mr. Neal, who identified himself to the court as respondent\u2019s husband.\nAt the hearing, Mars testified to the indications of physical and sexual abuse, respectively, made against respondent and Mr. Neal in early 1996, and additionally discussed her efforts to offer respondent and Mr. Neal reunification services. With respect to the latter matter, Mars indicated respondent has cooperated with her agency regarding all requests for services; has attended all required counseling sessions; and attends supervised visits with M.B. once a week, which M.B. enjoys and during which no unusual incidents have been reported.\nMars stated that while respondent is involved in parenting classes and also receiving individual counseling, those sessions had been suspended due to an unspecified illness with respondent\u2019s counselor. Mars further explained family counseling is necessary for respondent, but that respondent would not be able to participate in such counseling until she had successfully completed the parenting classes. In addition, according to Mars, discussions with M.B.\u2019s therapists suggest respondent needs to undergo a parenting assessment, which would commence only after completion of the parenting classes.\nMars specifically discussed M.B.\u2019s present needs and placement with her maternal aunt. According to Mars, M.B.\u2019s placement is both safe and appropriate. M.B. is currently receiving individual counseling to address issues of separation, loss, and past incidents of physical and sexual abuse. Mars indicated that while M.B. is making \u201csome\u201d progress with therapy, that progress has been \u201cvery, very slow.\u201d \u201cBecause right now [M.B.] is in a stable home and *** is unable to go back with her mom or dad at this time,\u201d Mars opined it would be in M.B.\u2019s best interests to be adjudged a ward of the court\nWith respect to M.B.\u2019s father, Mars stated Mark B. has refused all requests to participate in reunification services and has expressed a desire to have his parental rights terminated.\nAt the close of Mars\u2019 testimony, the public guardian, representing the interests of M.B., requested the court to take judicial notice of the March 1996 adjudication of neglect and abuse against respondent, as reflected by the certified copy of adjudication presented at the adjudicatory hearing. Counsel for respondent questioned the relevance of the prior adjudication, arguing that those findings were simply not probative of any issue before the court and, alternatively, irrelevant on grounds of remoteness. Noting the prior adjudication involved the same parties, and specifically stating the prior adjudicatory findings were not unreasonably remote, the circuit court rejected counsel\u2019s challenge and noticed the March 1996 adjudicatory order.\nIn closing, the People requested the court to adjudge M.B. a ward and further urged the court to find respondent unable and unfit based on respondent\u2019s prior neglect and physical abuse of her daughter. The public guardian concurred in the State\u2019s proposed findings and likewise asked the court to declare respondent unfit, unable and unwilling not only in light of respondent\u2019s previous adjudicated findings, but also in light of the fact that respondent continues to be married to a man who had allegations of sexual abuse made against him.\nCounsel for respondent followed by requesting a finding of inability only. According to counsel, the court had no basis to find respondent unfit \u201cbased on what happened in a case that was opened five years ago.\u201d Counsel also noted that while respondent and Mr. Neal remained married, they were separated and living at different addresses. Counsel stressed respondent has fully cooperated with the supervising agency, has participated in all recommended services and counseling, and has enjoyed visitation with her daughter.\nUpon reviewing the evidence, and after a brief discussion with the parties regarding whether respondent and Mr. Neal were truly separated, the court found M.B.\u2019s interests would best be served by adjudicating her a ward of the court. The court additionally found respondent unfit and unable to have custody of M.B. In finding respondent unfit and unable, the court, both at the December 6 hearing and in the formal dispositional order, noted that reasonable efforts aimed at reunification between respondent and her daughter had not been satisfied. The court, however, made it a point to stress reunification efforts were presently ongoing as to respondent. The court terminated its prior temporary custody order and directed M.B. to be placed under DCFS guardianship.\nRespondent\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nPursuant to section 2 \u2014 13 of the Act, the State may file a petition on behalf of any minor child who is alleged to be neglected, abused or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13 (West 2000). The petition must allege, with sufficient factual detail, the abuse, neglect and/or dependency of the minor and, in cases where the State seeks an adjudication of wardship, as the State did in this case, the petition shall assert that the interests of the minor and public would best be served by having the minor adjudged a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(2), (3) (West 2000). The petition, notably, need not specify any proposed disposition of the matter upon an adjudication of wardship. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(3) (West 2000).\nFollowing the filing of such a petition, the circuit court must hold an adjudicatory hearing solely to determine whether the State\u2019s allegations of neglect, abuse and/or dependency are supported by relevant evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(1), 2 \u2014 18 (West 2000). If, after consideration of the evidence, the court finds the minor abused, neglected and/or dependent (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(1) (West 2000)), the court must schedule a dispositional hearing to be conducted in accordance with section 2 \u2014 22 of the Act to determine whether a declaration of wardship is appropriate. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 21(2) (West 2000). \u201cAt the dispositional hearing, the court shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public\u201d that the minor be made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 22(1) (West 2000). If such a determination is made, the court must then determine the proper disposition of the matter in light of the health, safety and best interests of the minor and the community. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 22(1) (West 2000).\nSection 2 \u2014 23 of the Act authorizes the circuit court to enter dispositional orders for the custody or placement of abused and neglected minors. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23 (West 2000). Of the particular kinds of dispositional orders authorized, a minor found abused, neglected or dependent may be kept in the custody of her parents. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(l)(a) (West 2000). However, \u201ccustody of the minor shall not be restored to any parent *** whose acts or omissions or both have been identified, pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 2 \u2014 21, as forming the basis for the court\u2019s finding of abuse or neglect, until such time as a hearing is held on the issue of the best interests of the minor and the fitness of such parent *** to care for the minor without endangering the minor\u2019s health or safety, and the court enters an order that such parent *** is fit to care for the minor.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 23(a)(1) (West 2000).\nAs an alternative to ordering the minor kept in parental custody, the court may place the minor in accordance with section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act. Section 2 \u2014 27 provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIf the court determines and puts in writing the factual basis supporting the determination of whether the parents *** of a minor adjudged a ward of the court are unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his or her parents *** the court may at this hearing and at any later point:\n^ ^\n(d) commit the minor to the Department of Children and Family Services for care and service!.]\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27(l)(d) (West 2000).\nRespondent\u2019s primary contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred in finding her unfit under section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act. Significantly, respondent does not challenge the circuit court\u2019s determination that she was also unable to care for M.B. Indeed, respondent acknowledged at the dispositional hearing her inability to effectively care for her daughter.\nAs the State notes, respondent\u2019s concession of being unable to care for M.B. and her failure to challenge the circuit court\u2019s determination in that respect renders the issue of whether the court properly found her unfit moot. As explained by this court in In re Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 992, 697 N.E.2d 830, 835 (1998), the plain language of section 2 \u2014 27 provides that a minor can be taken away from a natural parent \u201cif that parent is adjudged to be either unfit or unable or unwilling.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) In that case, the natural mother of a minor adjudged a ward of the court challenged the circuit court\u2019s finding of unfitness but did not attack the court\u2019s additional determination that she was unable to care for her minor children. In light of the mother\u2019s position on appeal, this court held \u201c[bjecause respondent *** concedes that the trial court properly found her unable pursuant to section 2 \u2014 27, this factor alone as a basis for the trial court\u2019s judgment is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s judgment and, therefore, the issue of the trial court\u2019s additional finding that respondent was unfit is moot.\u201d Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 992-93, 697 N.E.2d at 835.\nSimilarly, here, respondent challenges the circuit court\u2019s finding of unfitness only and does not assert error in the court\u2019s determination that she was unable. Because the court\u2019s finding of inability, alone, is sufficient to support the court\u2019s judgment, the issue of whether the court\u2019s finding of unfitness was proper is mooted.\nAssuming arguendo the issue of respondent\u2019s fitness is not moot, the evidence was nonetheless sufficient to support the circuit court\u2019s determination. In gauging one\u2019s fitness to act as a parent, the child\u2019s best interests are not to be considered. Rather, the focus must be on the parent in question. See In re Latifah P., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1128, 735 N.E.2d 1004 (2000). Because a determination of unfitness pursuant to section 2 \u2014 27 does not result in a termination of parental rights, the standard of proof is the less rigorous preponderance of the evidence, and the court\u2019s determination of unfitness under that section will be disturbed on review only when found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 994, 697 N.E.2d at 836. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where a review of the record clearly demonstrates that the opposite conclusion is proper. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 994, 697 N.E.2d at 836.\nRespondent argues the circuit court\u2019s determination of unfitness is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence where the record establishes she has been compliant with all agency requests and, further, has been greatly involved in her daughter\u2019s life and treatment. Indeed, the evidence presented at the dispositional hearing establishes respondent\u2019s regular participation in all reunification services as well as her genuine concern for M.B.\u2019s well-being. Notwithstanding, the evidence also establishes that the services deemed necessary for achieving reunification have not been successfully fulfilled by respondent. According to the plan devised by DCFS, the stated goal of reunification is dependent upon respondent, as well as her husband, Mr. Neal, and her daughter, making sufficient progress in designated therapy and counseling sessions that are specifically aimed at rectifying those issues that prompted M.B.\u2019s initial removal from respondent\u2019s custody in 1996. As of the date of the dispositional hearing, respondent had yet to complete those sessions. Moreover, the parenting assessment deemed necessary by caseworker Mars has not been conducted.\nRespondent claims the circuit court improperly gave weight to the prior adjudicated findings of abuse and neglect issued against her in March 1996. While the court judicially noticed the adjudicated findings, the record indicates the court relied solely on respondent\u2019s unsatisfactory progress to buttress its findings. Both at the dispositional hearing and in its formal dispositional order, the court stressed that services aimed at family preservation and reunification have been unsuccessful. Hence, the basis of the court\u2019s findings of unfitness and inability was predicated upon respondent\u2019s failure to successfully complete the recommended services and not, as respondent asserts, upon her prior adjudicated findings.\nSignificantly, the record indicates that the prior case for abuse and neglect against respondent was not closed as a result of respondent completing services considered imperative to address and rectify the reasons for her prior mistreatment of M.B. Rather, the case was closed when custody of M.B. was transferred from respondent to the child\u2019s natural father. In light of the disposition of the foregoing matter, and upon assessment of the situation, caseworker Mars concluded that custody of M.B. should be reestablished with respondent only upon respondent undergoing and successfully completing certain recommended services geared specifically at addressing respondent\u2019s past mistreatment of her child. While respondent has participated in such counseling, for which respondent should be commended, respondent\u2019s involvement has not progressed to that level deemed necessary for reunification. The fact a parent exhibits compliance with recommended services and a willingness to be a good parent is not dispositive and has been held not to warrant reversal of an unfitness or inability finding where the record contains evidence otherwise supporting the circuit court\u2019s determination. See In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245, 259-60, 760 N.E.2d 101, 113 (2001) (\u201c[t]he fact that respondent participated in various recommended services does not persuade us that the trial court\u2019s decision [that respondent was unable, unwilling and unfit] was against the manifest weight of the evidence where there was ample evidence that respondent continues to be a threat to the children\u2019s safety and has not made sufficient progress in a number of areas\u201d); Lakita B., 297 111. App. 3d at 998, 697 N.E.2d at 839 (upholding circuit court\u2019s finding of inability and unfitness, despite evidence that the parent had been voluntarily attending therapy sessions and had displayed both a willingness to improve parenting and a desire of reunification, where the parent continued to deny the seriousness of her acts or omissions toward her children and where testimony from DCFS professionals demonstrated that the parent had serious and significant issues to be resolved).\nRespondent claims reversal is warranted for the failure of the State\u2019s petition to allege her unfitness or to seek an unfitness determination. However, as noted, the Act does not require a petition seeking an adjudication of wardship to specify the proposed disposition of the matter. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(3) (West 2000). Moreover, a parent\u2019s fitness may be placed in issue a number of ways under the Act. Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 993, 697 N.E.2d at 836; In re P.F, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1100, 638 N.E.2d 716, 722 (1994). As explained, custody of a child found to be abused or neglected may not be restored to the parent whose acts form the basis of the court\u2019s abuse or neglect determination \u201cuntil such time as a hearing is held on the issue of the best interests of the minor and the fitness of such parent *** to care for the minor.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(a)(1) (West 2000). By virtue of section 2 \u2014 23, a parent found to have abused or neglected her child, and who seeks to maintain or, as here, reestablish custody, is placed on notice that her parental fitness will be at issue during the circuit court\u2019s dispositional hearing. Thus, the parent seeking custody is constructively apprised that her fitness to care for her child will have to be determined.\nGiven the manner in which the prior case of abuse and neglect was resolved, and in light of her desire to have M.B. returned to her custody, respondent should have been aware that her fitness would be at issue at the March 2001 dispositional hearing. Respondent, notably, makes no claim that she suffered any prejudice by the State\u2019s failure to allege her unfit. In this regard, it must be noted that the State and public guardian plainly asked for a finding of unfitness and inability. In response, respondent never expressed any surprise at the requested findings but, instead, urged for a finding of inability only. See In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062, 574 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1991) (rejecting parent\u2019s challenge to the court\u2019s dispositional order in light of State\u2019s failure to allege unfitness where, inter alia, she failed to demonstrate how she was prejudiced thereby).\nLastly, we note that a petition, like the one filed by the State in the present matter, need not contain specific allegations of parental unfitness. Petitions seeking an adjudication of wardship upon allegations of abuse and neglect differ from petitions seeking a termination of parental rights on such grounds. While procedural due process requires notice of alleged unfitness in termination proceedings, such notice is not mandated in dispositional cases. In re P.F., 265 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1101, 638 N.E.2d 716, 723 (1994); In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1061, 574 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1991).\nWe are cognizant of In re B.K., 121 Ill. App. 3d 662, 664, 460 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1984), where the appellate court reversed a dispositional order finding a parent unfit for neglecting her children where the State\u2019s petition failed to allege the parent\u2019s unfitness. Citing the case of In re Westland, 48 Ill. App. 3d 172, 362 N.E.2d 1153 (1977), the court explained that in a proceeding to declare a parent unfit, \u201cdue process requires that the petition allege that the parent is unfit and set forth with particularity the specific grounds that serve as the basis for such assertion.\u201d B.K., 121 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 460 N.E.2d at 45. The court accordingly held that \u201can assertion of parental unfitness and supporting allegations of the grounds of such unfitness are material and are essential elements of a petition to have parents declared unfit.\u201d B.K., 121 Ill. App. 3d at 664, 460 N.E.2d at 45.\nWe do not share the position expressed in B.K. The B.K. court never recognized that a State\u2019s petition brought under the Act is not required to request a particular disposition. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 704 \u2014 1(3). The court similarly failed to note the provision of the Act that effectively places an abusive or neglectful parent on notice that her fitness would be at issue at the dispositional hearing in the event the parent seeks custody. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 705\u2014 2(c). Just as noteworthy is that the decision relied upon by the court in requiring specific notice of unfitness, Westland, involved a termination, not dispositional, proceeding, in which, as noted, parents are afforded greater notice rights.\nWhile respondent does not challenge M.B.\u2019s placement under DCFS guardianship, the record supports the court\u2019s dispositional order and, accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. See Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 994, 697 N.E.2d at 836 (noting the circuit court\u2019s selection of a particular disposition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the court\u2019s determination of unfitness and the judgment of the court is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, EJ, and SOUTH, J, concur.\nMark B. was similarly determined to be unfit, unable and unwilling.\nRespondent claims reversal is required because the circuit court did not disclose the factual basis of its findings as required by section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act. As indicated, the circuit court adequately revealed the basis for its ruling by citing respondent\u2019s failure to successfully finish the required services. In any event, not only has respondent waived her challenge by not objecting to the circuit court\u2019s alleged oversight, section 2 \u2014 27 does not mandate the court to state the basis of its determination. In re R.M., 283 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472, 670 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1996).\nBecause respondent\u2019s failure to successfully complete the recommended services, alone, sufficiently supports the circuit court\u2019s finding of unfitness, it matters not whether the court additionally relied on either the prior adjudicated findings of abuse and neglect or respondent\u2019s continued marriage to Mr. Neal.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bruce H. Bornstein, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Jennifer Streeter, and Nancy Grauer Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles E Golbert and Lisa D. Huge, of counsel), guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re M.B., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Yvette Neal, Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 01 \u2014 1289\nOpinion filed July 17, 2002.\nBruce H. Bornstein, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Jennifer Streeter, and Nancy Grauer Kisicki, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles E Golbert and Lisa D. Huge, of counsel), guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0996-01", "first_page_order": 1014, "last_page_order": 1026 }