{ "id": 1033929, "name": "COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors; COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The People of Cook County by Richard Devine, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors); COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The City of Chicago, Intervenor-Petitioner; Environmental Law and Policy Center et al., Intervenors); COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Environmental Law and Policy Center, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors); COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY; Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Citgo Petroleum Corporation Brands, Inc., et al., Intervenors); COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The People of the State of Illinois by the Attorney General James Ryan, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors); COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION,Respondent (Caterpillar, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Petitioners; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors)", "name_abbreviation": "Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission", "decision_date": "2002-08-05", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-01-0038, 2-01-0212, 2-01-0912, 2-01-0914 through 2-01-0917, 2-01-0923 cons.", "first_page": "1038", "last_page": "1062", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 1038" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549473 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171568 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385509 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183317 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456104 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385515 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188258 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243903 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "statute must be construed so that each word, clause, and sentence is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous" }, { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198920 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351180 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209990 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2849744 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926976 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069886 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 846", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126408 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0846-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1486, "char_count": 57606, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0189641752386648e-07, "percentile": 0.544215705239958 }, "sha256": "681604f18530074a27286e20051b34e73e0d3fc44f1e09e549b581b858371386", "simhash": "1:bf9c5498c2de1fb4", "word_count": 8875 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:45:54.915644+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BOWMAN and CALLUM, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors.\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The People of Cook County by Richard Devine, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The City of Chicago, Intervenor-Petitioner; Environmental Law and Policy Center et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Environmental Law and Policy Center, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY; Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Citgo Petroleum Corporation Brands, Inc., et al., Intervenors).-COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The People of the State of Illinois by the Attorney General James Ryan, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Caterpillar, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Petitioners; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAPALA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this consolidated appeal, petitioner, Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd), appeals directly to this court from an order of respondent, Illinois Commerce Commission (the Commission). The order approved, with modification, ComEd\u2019s proposal to collect funds from ComEd\u2019s customers to finance the future decommissioning of nuclear power plants that ComEd transferred to an entity that is not regulated by the Commission. ComEd contends that the Commission erred in reducing its proposed decommissioning rate. The intervenorspetitioners, the People of the State of Illinois by Attorney General James Ryan (State), the People of Cook County by State\u2019s Attorney Richard Devine (Cook), the City of Chicago (Chicago), Citizens Utility Board, Environmental Law and Policy Center (ELPC), Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers, which consists of A. Finkl & Sons Company, Abbott Laboratories, Inc., Acme Steel Company, Caterpillar, Inc., Daimler Chrysler Corp., Ford Motor Company, Modern Drop Forge Company, Motorola, Inc., Monsanto Company, and Nabisco Brands, Inc. (IIEC), and Chicago Area Industrial & Health Care Customers Coalition, which consists of Citgo Petroleum Corp., General Mills, Inc., R.R. Donnelly & Sons Company, and Metroplitan Chicago Health Care Council (Coalition) (intervenors-petitioners, collectively, the intervenors), were permitted to intervene in the proceedings before the Commission and have filed separate direct appeals from the Commission\u2019s order. All the intervenors challenge the Commission\u2019s authority to grant ComEd\u2019s petition, and some contend, in the alternative, that the approved decommissioning rates were excessive. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the Commission.\nI. FACTS\nThese consolidated appeals involve financing the future cost of decommissioning nuclear fission thermal power generating plants (nuclear power plants) in Illinois. According to section 8 \u2014 508.1(a)(1) of the Public Utilities Act (the Act) (220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 508.1(a)(1) (West 2000)), \u201cdecommissioning\u201d means:\n\u201cthe series of activities undertaken at the time a nuclear power plant is permanently retired from service to ensure that the final entombment, decontamination, dismantlement, removal and disposal of the plant, including the plant site, and of any radioactive components and materials associated with the plant, is accomplished in compliance with all applicable Illinois and federal laws, and to ensure that such final disposition does not pose any threat to the public health and safety.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 508.1(a)(1) (West 2000).\nThe Act establishes the framework for funding the decommissioning of nuclear power plants. First, public utilities are permitted to seek Commission approval for rate tariffs called \u201cdecommissioning rates\u201d charging ratepayers for the future costs of decommissioning a nuclear power plant. 220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 201.5 (West 2000)). Second, every public utility that owns or operates, in whole or in part, a nuclear power plant must establish decommissioning trusts to hold decommissioning funds for the eventual purpose of paying decommissioning costs. 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 508.1(b) (West 2000).\nIn the past, the Commission has determined the decommissioning rates based on detailed decommissioning cost estimates prepared by industry experts. Decommissioning cost estimates consist of an estimate of the present dollar value of the future cost to decommission each plant, adjusted by a projection of how much related costs such as radioactive waste burial will escalate in the future (escalation rate), while taking into account an estimate of the rate of return earned on the funds already collected and held in the decommissioning trusts (earnings rate). The Commission then prorates these costs over the projected life of each plant, allowing ComEd to collect an annual share of the total estimated decommissioning cost each year.\nIn the 1994 rate case, the Commission allowed ComEd to recover $112,736,000 in decommissioning costs as part of its base rates for that year and established an annual review of decommissioning rates in a proceeding designated as a \u201cRider 31\u201d proceeding to determine whether adjustments to that amount should be made in the future. ComEd\u2019s decommissioning recoveries have been reviewed and adjusted annually since 1994. The collections that have been authorized in the past have been based on the assumption that ComEd will continue to make collections throughout the terms of the nuclear plants\u2019 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) operating licenses. NRG operating licenses are typically 40 years in duration.\nArticle XVI of the Act, titled the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of 1997 (Customer Choice Law) (220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)), was enacted to introduce competition into the Illinois electricity market. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 101A(b) (West 2000). The General Assembly found that competition would result in lower prices for consumers and increased efficiency and innovation on the part of the power industry. See 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 101A (West 2000). The Customer Choice Law authorizes electric utilities to transfer nuclear power plants to affiliated or unaffiliated entities and to enter into service agreements and power purchase agreements with the transferee. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 111(g)(3) (West 2000).\nOn May 18, 2000, in contemplation of a sale of ComEd\u2019s nuclear power plants to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Genco), ComEd filed a petition for approval of a revised Rider 31 which would limit ComEd\u2019s recovery of decommissioning costs to a fixed amount over a six-year period. Genco was created in connection with the merger of Chicago-based Unicom Corporation, the parent company for ComEd, and Philadelphia-based PECO Energy Company. This merger spawned an entity known as Exelon Corporation. Genco is a wholly owned subsidiary of Exelon Corporation. In connection with the transfer of the nuclear power plants, ComEd stated that it intended to enter into a power purchase agreement (PPA), a contribution agreement, and an interconnection agreement with Genco.\nUnder the PPA, ComEd would obtain all its power supply from Genco through 2004. Up until January 1, 2005, base rates are frozen during the mandatory transition period pursuant to the Customer Choice Law. In 2005 and 2006, ComEd would obtain all its power from Genco, up to the capacity of the nuclear power plants.\nUnder the terms of the contribution agreement, ComEd would transfer the assets in the decommissioning trusts to Genco, and Genco would be responsible for decommissioning the nuclear power plants. ComEd would be responsible for decommissioning costs in such amounts as shall be approved by the Commission and is obligated to collect those decommissioning costs from its ratepayers and to transfer the funds to Genco.\nIn its petition, ComEd proposed to collect an annual decommissioning rate of $120,933,333 (rounded for purposes of our discussion to $121 million) which would be assessed to its ratepayers during the years 2001 through 2006. ComEd proposed to collect the same annual share of the total decommissioning cost that it would have sought had it continued to own and operate the nuclear power plants. Under its proposal, after six years ComEd would cease charging decommissioning costs to its ratepayers. While omitting the basis for its calculations, ComEd asserted that its proposal would reduce decommissioning collections from ratepayers by approximately 55%, or $1 billion. ComEd also asserted that its proposal would transfer the risks of increasing decommissioning costs from ComEd and its ratepayers to Genco.\nShortly after ComEd filed its petition, the Commission granted the interveners\u2019 petitions to intervene. Two hearing officers appointed by the Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 24, 2000, through August 29, 2000, at which ComEd, the Commission\u2019s staff, and the intervenors presented testimony from a number of experts. This testimony focused on the amount of \u201cjust and reasonable\u201d (220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 101 (West 2000)) decommissioning costs.\nDuring the proceeding, in response to four issues raised by the Commission staff, ComEd modified its proposal in four ways. The Commission\u2019s order discloses:\n\u201c(1) ComEd agreed to obligate Genco to refund to ratepayers any funds that remain in the decommissioning trusts in the unlikely event that there is a surplus after all the nuclear power plants are decommissioned. (2) ComEd has agreed to the inclusion of a requirement in the trust agreements governing Genco\u2019s use of decommissioning funds that, to the extent money is available after radiological decommissioning is completed, nonradiological decommissioning will be performed. (3) ComEd has agreed to a condition making collection of Revised Rider 31 monies from ratepayers in 2005 and 2006 dependent upon ComEd and Genco reaching agreement on a market price and purchasing ComEd\u2019s requirements up to the available capacity of the nuclear stations in those years. (4) ComEd has agreed to forever waive any right to seek additional decommissioning collections after the expiration of the six-year decommissioning collection period and to accept this condition in writing.\u201d\nComEd moved to stay its 1999 and 2000 Rider 31 cases pending the resolution of this petition. If the merger and transfer of assets to Genco occurred, ComEd committed that it would move to withdraw the petitions filed in those cases.\nThe parties filed briefs in support of their positions on the question of whether ComEd should be permitted to continue to collect decommissioning costs on behalf of Genco and, if so, the amount of those decommissioning costs.\nThe hearing examiners filed a proposed order on October 25, 2000, which denied ComEd\u2019s petition, concluding that the collection of decommissioning costs from ratepayers after the sale of the nuclear power plants to an unregulated entity was not authorized by the Act.\nOn December 20, 2000, the Commission disregarded the hearing examiners\u2019 proposed order and entered an order granting ComEd\u2019s petition as modified. The Commission concluded that ComEd was entitled to recover decommissioning costs each year for six years commencing January 1, 2001. However, instead of the $121 million requested, the Commission adopted certain recommended reductions and authorized ComEd to collect $73 million in decommissioning costs annually for the years 2001-2004. For the years 2005 and 2006, ComEd was permitted to collect an annual amount of decommissioning costs equal to $73 million multiplied by the percentage of the actual energy production of Genco\u2019s nuclear power plants that is purchased by ComEd each year.\nOn December 29, 2000, ComEd filed an application for rehearing (220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 113(a) (West 2000)) requesting that the Commission reconsider its reduction of the proposed decommissioning rate. ComEd also requested the Commission to reopen the record to add certain assumptions that were used to determine the decommissioning costs and to include these assumptions in its order. On January 10, 2001, the Commission granted the motion to reopen the record for the limited purpose of examining whether to amend the order to include a statement of assumptions, but it denied the remainder of ComEd\u2019s application for rehearing. On January 12, 2001, ComEd filed a notice of appeal to this court that was docketed as case No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0038. Subsequently, the various intervenors filed applications for rehearing. On February 7, 2001, the Commission denied all of the intervenors\u2019 applications for rehearing. The Commission entered an amended order on February 21, 2001, that included a statement of assumptions used to calculate the approved decommissioning rate, but its order otherwise remained unchanged. Thereafter, the State, Chicago, Cook, ELPC, IIEC, and the Coalition filed notices of appeal to the First District (IIEC and the Coalition have filed a joint brief and therefore they will be hereinafter referred to as IIEC/Coalition). On February 23, 2001, ComEd filed a second notice of appeal to this court docketed as No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0212. In an order entered on April 19, 2001, this court dismissed ComEd\u2019s appeal in No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0038, finding that we lacked jurisdiction over that appeal. In a supervisory order entered on June 29, 2001, our supreme court directed the vacation of this court\u2019s order dismissing ComEd\u2019s appeal in No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0038. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 195 Ill. 2d 576 (2001). This court reinstated No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0038. On September 19, 2001, our supreme court directed this court to accept a transfer of the intervenors\u2019 appeals from the First District. Thereafter, appeal No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0212 and the intervenors\u2019 appeals were consolidated with appeal No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0038.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Motions Taken With the Case\nThe material in this section is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23).\nB. Authority Under the Act\nThe threshold question in this appeal is whether the Commission had the legal authority to allow ComEd to impose nuclear decommissioning rates on its ratepayers to contribute toward the cost of decommissioning nuclear power plants that are no longer owned by ComEd but, rather, by the unregulated Genco.\nAn order of the Commission is prima facie reasonable, and the party appealing the decision bears the burden of overcoming this presumption of reasonableness. 220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 201(d) (West 2000). The scope of our review of an order of the Commission is limited to determining whether the Commission (1) acted within the scope of its authority; (2) made adequate findings in support of its decision; (3) made a decision that was supported by substantial evidence; and (4) infringed on state or federal constitutional rights. 220 ILCS 5/10\u2014 201(e)(iv)(A) through (e)(iv)(C) (West 2000); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 322 Ill. App. 3d 846, 849 (2001).\nOur supreme court has stated that \u201c[t]he Commission, because it is a creature of the legislature, derives its power and authority solely from the statute creating it, and its acts or orders which are beyond the purview of the statute are void.\u201d City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 79 Ill. 2d 213, 217-18 (1980). The Commission\u2019s authority to enter the order appealed in this case must, therefore, find its source in the Act. The Commission\u2019s interpretation of a legal issue is not binding on a court of review. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 184 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1998). \u201cHowever, because of an agency\u2019s experience and expertise, courts will generally give substantial weight and deference to the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute.\u201d Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 266, 273 (1994).\nIn its order, the Commission determined that \u201cthe legislature has authorized the sale of ComEd\u2019s nuclear plants and the collection of decommissioning expense from ratepayers after the sale.\u201d The Commission implicitly concluded that, if the legislature authorized the postsale collection of decommissioning expenses, it, by virtue of its supervisory powers over public utilities, had the authority to grant ComEd\u2019s petition. In doing so, the Commission referenced two sections of the Act. The first, section 9 \u2014 201.5 (220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 201.5 (West 2000)), provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c\u00a7 9 \u2014 201.5. Decommissioning nuclear power plants; rates.\n(a) The Commission may after hearing, in a rate case or otherwise, authorize the institution of rate provisions or tariffs that increase or decrease charges to customers to reflect changes in, or additional or reduced costs of, decommissioning nuclear power plants, including accruals for estimates of those costs, irrespective of any changes in other costs or revenues; provided the revenues collected under such rates or tariffs are used to recover costs associated with contributions to appropriate decommissioning trust funds or to reduce the amounts to be charged under such rates or tariffs in the future. These provisions or tariffs shall hereinafter be referred to as \u2018decommissioning rates.\u2019 \u201d 220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 201.5 (West 2000).\nAlthough the Commission found \u201csomewhat persuasive\u201d ComEd\u2019s argument that section 9 \u2014 201.5 authorizes the Commission to approve decommissioning collections after the sale of its nuclear power plants, the Commission recognized that section 9 \u2014 201.5 does not explicitly mention postsale decommissioning collections. The Commission principally relied upon section 16 \u2014 114 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/16\u2014 114 (West 2000)), which, in the words of the Commission\u2019s order, \u201ccreates a substantive right in the described entities to recover decommissioning costs after the transfer of nuclear generating units to a third party.\u201d Section 16 \u2014 114 provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c\u00a7 16 \u2014 114. Recovery of decommissioning charges. On or before April 1, 1999, each electric utility owning an interest in, or having responsibility as a matter of contract or statute for decommissioning costs as defined in Section 8 \u2014 508.1 of, one or more nuclear power plants shall file with the Commission a tariff or tariffs conforming to the provisions of Section 9 \u2014 201.5 of this Act, to be applicable to each and every kilowatt-hour of electricity delivered or sold at retail in the electric utility\u2019s service area, including, but not limited to, sales by the electric utility to tariffed services retail customers, sales by the electric utility to retail customers pursuant to special contracts or other negotiated arrangements, sales by alternative retail electric suppliers, and sales by an electric utility other than the electric utility in whose service area the retail customer is located ***.\nThe Commission shall determine whether the tariff meets the requirements of Sections 9 \u2014 201 and 9 \u2014 201.5 and of this Section, and shall permit the electric utility\u2019s tariff together with any modifications made after hearing to become effective no later than October 1, 1999. In making its determination, the Commission shall retain the authority it possessed prior to the effective date of this amendatoiy Act of 1997 to make jurisdictional allocations of decommissioning expense recovery.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114 (West 2000).\nThe Commission adopted ComEd\u2019s argument that \u201cthe language in section 16 \u2014 114 authorizing \u2018each electric utility owning an interest in, or having responsibility as a matter of contract or statute for, decommissioning costs,\u2019 must be read to contemplate decommissioning recoveries when the utility no longer owns the plant for which it is collecting.\u201d The Commission also accepted the argument that any other conclusion would render the \u201cresponsibility as a matter of contract\u201d language superfluous and meaningless. The Commission also concluded that although the statute provides that electric utilities seeking recovery of decommissioning charges under section 16 \u2014 114 shall file with the Commission a tariff on or before April 1, 1999:\n\u201c[Tjhere was no intent on the part of the legislature to put a moratorium on those utilities entitled to collect decommissioning charges and their ability to enter into different arrangements with nuclear units.\u201d\nThe Commission further concluded in its order that when sections 9 \u2014 201.5 and 16 \u2014 114 are read together they clearly provide authority for the Commission to approve decommissioning collections when a utility has responsibility as a matter of contract for decommissioning costs. Noting that section 16 \u2014 114 provides that a utility that has the responsibility as a matter of contract for decommissioning costs \u201c \u2018shall file with the Commission a tariff or tariffs conforming to the provisions of section 9 \u2014 201.5,\u2019 \u201d the Commission reasoned that, if section 9 \u2014 201.5 limited decommissioning recoveries to utilities that owned or operated nuclear power plants, \u201cthere would be no way for any tariff filed by a utility having responsibility as a matter of contract for decommissioning costs to comply with the requirements of section 16 \u2014 114.\u201d\nOn appeal, Cook and IIEC/Coalition claim that the Commission, after acknowledging that section 9 \u2014 201.5 does not explicitly mention postsale decommissioning collections, engaged in an inappropriate construction of section 9 \u2014 201.5. Citing Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1998), these intervenors contend that when the language of the statute is unambiguous it is to be given effect without resorting to other tools of construction. They argue that the statute does not explicitly confer upon the Commission the power to approve postsale decommissioning collections; therefore, that power lies beyond the Commission\u2019s authority.\nWe agree that section 9 \u2014 201.5 does not speak to the recovery of decommissioning costs after a public utility has sold its nuclear power plants. However, we, like the Commission, find authority in the language of section 16 \u2014 114, read together with section 9 \u2014 201.5, for the Commission to permit' an electric utility, under certain circumstances, to charge its customers for the future costs of decommissioning nuclear power plants it no longer owns. A statutory provision must not be read in isolation but, rather, must be read in conjunction with other relevant provisions. Holland v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill. App. 3d 682, 687 (1997).\nSection 16 \u2014 114 of the Act authorizes electric utilities that (1) own an interest in one or more nuclear power plants, or (2) have responsibility as a matter of contract for decommissioning costs, as defined in section 8' \u2014 508.1, of one or more nuclear power plants, to file tariffs conforming to the provisions of section 9 \u2014 201.5. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114 (West 2000). Section 16 \u2014 114 allocates decommissioning cost recovery, in a Customer Choice Law environment, between customers who are being served by the public utility using nuclear power and customers who have switched to an alternative retail supplier. It also expressly recognizes that decommissioning responsibility can arise by contract. The Commission interpreted section 16 \u2014 114\u2019s \u201cresponsibility as a matter of contract\u201d language to authorize decommissioning cost collection by ComEd even after the transfer of its nuclear power plants. Although this court is not bound by the Commission\u2019s conclusion, its interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference. See Citizens Utility Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 166 Ill. 2d 111, 121 (1995). We agree with the Commission that any other reading of section 16 \u2014 114 would render the words \u201cresponsibility as a matter of contract\u201d meaningless. See A.P. Properties, Inc. v. Goshinsky, 186 Ill. 2d 524, 532 (1999) (statute must be construed so that each word, clause, and sentence is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous).\nTherefore, we decline the invitation of Cook and IIEC/Coalition to find that the absence of language in section 9 \u2014 201.5 explicitly addressing postsale decommissioning collections deprives the Commission of the authority to approve such collections.\nCook and the IIEC/Coalition also argue that because section 9 \u2014 201.5 was enacted almost three years before section 16 \u2014 114, the Commission improperly read sections 16 \u2014 114 and 9 \u2014 201.5 together. We note, however, that section 16 \u2014 114 specifically references section 9 \u2014 201.5; accordingly, we reject this argument.\nBecause we are dealing with ComEd\u2019s postsale proposal regarding decommissioning costs, we must prefatorily decide if ComEd has \u201cresponsibility as a matter of contract\u201d for the decommissioning costs of the nuclear power plants it will transfer to Genco. \u201cThe construction of a contract and the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract are questions of law, the determination of which rests exclusively with the court.\u201d Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 58 (1987).\nThe State and ELPC claim that ComEd has no such responsibility. As ELPC\u2019s argument on this issue mirrors that of the State, we will resolve both by specifically addressing the State\u2019s contentions.\nThe State asserts that the Commission\u2019s order fails to acknowledge the difference between contractual liability for the actual \u201cdecommissioning costs\u201d of the nuclear power plants and contractual obligation to collect \u201cdecommissioning charges\u201d on behalf of Genco. The State concludes that ComEd does not retain any responsibility for \u201cdecommissioning costs\u201d under the contribution agreement but, rather, transfers all the decommissioning liability to Genco, and ComEd is only contractually obligated to collect decommissioning charges on behalf of Genco and remit them to Genco.\nComEd responds by asserting that under the contribution agreement it retains a contractual obligation to pay a portion of the full liability for decommissioning the nuclear power plants. We agree with ComEd and believe that the State mischaracterizes the contribution agreement.\nThe contribution agreement states:\n\u201c(c) Decommissioning. [Genco is responsible] for decommissioning the Stations in compliance with all Requirements of Laws, including responsibility for establishing, maintaining and funding (except to the extent, and only to the extent, otherwise provided in Section 6.6 (Decommissioning Costs)) such financial assurance mechanisms as shall be required to provide for such decommissioning under such Requirements of Laws.\n\u00ed\u00a1\u00ed if;\n6.6 Decommissioning Costs. Transferor will remain liable as a matter of contract pursuant to this agreement for Decommissioning Costs in respect of the Stations in such amounts as shall be approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission and shall be actually collected by Transferor. Transferor will also retain the obligation to collect unfunded Decommissioning Cost charges in the manner provided in 220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 201.5 and 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114 and any other applicable laws, regulations or tariffs, including Rider 31\u2014 Decommissioning Expense Adjustment Clause, to the extent that the Illinois Commerce Commission approves such collections and Transferor actually collects such charges. Transferor will forward the funds so collected to Transferee at least annually for deposit to decommissioning trust funds maintained by Transferee.\u201d\nComEd contracted to transfer its nuclear plants, as well as the $2.5 billion in the decommissioning trusts, to Genco. There is no question that the parties intended to transfer the ultimate decommissioning obligation to Genco. However, pursuant to section 6.6 of the contribution agreement, ComEd agreed to \u201cremain liable\u201d for the future decommissioning costs in an amount equal to that approved by the Commission to be collected over the six years of the PPA. ComEd\u2019s petition proposed an amount of $121 million annually for six years. The Commission thought a different amount was appropriate and so ordered. Under the contribution agreement, ComEd actually transferred to Genco the responsibility for the amount of decommissioning costs that exceeded the sum of $2.5 billion in the trust funds and the $73 million annual decommissioning rate collections for four to six years.\nThe State points out that ComEd has referred to its obligation regarding decommissioning costs as a collection agency agreement in various documents, including the \u201cComEd Decommissioning Funding \u2014 Special Decommissioning Rider.\u201d The contribution agreement, however, is the legally operative document, and it specifically addresses the allocation of the liability for decommissioning costs.\nMoreover, even if we were to accept the State\u2019s characterization of ComEd\u2019s responsibility under the contribution agreement as a collection agreement, we do not agree that this distinction voids ComEd\u2019s legal authority to charge its ratepayers during the six-year period from 2001 to 2006 for decommissioning costs. The State concedes that the Act authorizes a utility to collect decommissioning costs from ratepayers where that utility has the responsibility as a matter of contract. In the context of this case, the legal significance of ComEd\u2019s contractual responsibility is, as a practical matter, the same whether we label that responsibility a liability to pay a portion of the ultimate decommissioning costs or an agreement to collect the decommissioning costs for Genco. Additionally, to the extent that the contribution agreement language could be interpreted as making ComEd either liable for collection only or liable for the actual costs, there is a preference for construing a contract so that it is rendered enforceable rather than void (Liccardi v. Stolt Terminals, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 540, 549 (1997)).\nIn summary, we believe that ComEd has the responsibility as a matter of contract for decommissioning costs as defined in section 16 \u2014 114.\nThe State also argues that, on the issue of ComEd\u2019s responsibility for decommissioning under the contribution agreement, the Commission\u2019s order lacks the analysis necessary to withstand judicial scrutiny as required by section 10 \u2014 201(e)(iii) of the Act (220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 201(e)(iii) (West 2000)). We disagree.\nThe Act obliges the Commission to provide \u201cfindings or analysis sufficient to allow an informed judicial review.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/10\u2014 201(e) (iii) (West 2000). The Commission must set forth more reasoning and analysis than would be acceptable from a circuit court. Citizens Utility Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 291 Ill. App. 3d 300, 309 (1997). The portion of the Commission\u2019s order dealing with its power to authorize ComEd to collect decommissioning rates pursuant to section 16 \u2014 114 and 9 \u2014 201.5 is approximately three pages long. The order adopts ComEd\u2019s argument that section 16 \u2014 114 contemplates decommissioning recoveries even after the utility no longer owns the plant for which it is collecting. The Commission also wrote, \u201cThe position of both ComEd and Staff about the meaning of the \u2018responsibility as a matter of contract\u2019 language is reasonable and grounded in a straightforward reading of Section 16 \u2014 114.\u201d In addition, the contribution agreement, which creates ComEd\u2019s liability for decommissioning costs, is in the record and speaks for itself. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission\u2019s analysis is sufficient for our informed review.\nThe State and ELPC argue that ComEd cannot be responsible for decommissioning costs under the terms of the contribution agreement because decommissioning costs are \u201creasonable costs and expenses incurred *** at the time of decommissioning\u201d (220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 508.1(a)(2) (West 2000)) and, under the terms of the contribution agreement, ComEd will have no liability at the time decommissioning actually occurs.\nComEd points out that section 16 \u2014 114 refers to a utility \u201chaving responsibility as a matter of contract or statute for decommissioning costs as defined in Section 8 \u2014 508.1\u201d and not to a utility having liability for the full expense of decommissioning at the time decommissioning actually occurs. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114 (West 2000). ComEd argues that, because the funds ComEd collects for deposit into the decommissioning trusts will ultimately be spent for \u201cexpenses incurred in connection with the entombment, decontamination, dismantlement, removal and disposal of the structures, systems and components of a nuclear plant at the time of decommissioning,\u201d these funds are decommissioning costs within the meaning of sections 16 \u2014 114 and 8 \u2014 508.1. We agree.\nSection 8 \u2014 508.1(a)(2) of the Act defines \u201cdecommissioning costs\u201d as follows:\n\u201c(2) \u2018Decommissioning costs\u2019 means all reasonable costs and expenses incurred in connection with the entombment, decontamination, dismantlement, removal and disposal of the structures, systems and components of a nuclear power plant at the time of decommissioning, including all expenses to be incurred in connection with the preparation for decommissioning, such as engineering and other planning expenses, and to be incurred after the actual decommissioning occurs, such as physical security and radiation monitoring expenses, less proceeds of insurance, salvage or resale of machinery, construction equipment or apparatus the cost of which was charged as a decommissioning expense.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/8\u2014 508.1(a)(2) (West 2000).\nClearly, an entity can have responsibility for future decommissioning costs and satisfy that responsibility before decommissioning actually occurs. In fact, the statute specifically contemplates prospective expenses by using the words \u201cto be incurred.\u201d The purpose of these statutes is to ensure that funds are available to pay the decommissioning costs when a nuclear power plant is closed. In construing statutes, we must examine the entire statute as a whole and consider the objective and purpose of the statute. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 328 Ill. App. 3d 937, 942 (2002). Consequently, we reject this contention of the State and ELPC.\nIn its order, the Commission found that even though section 16 \u2014 114 required that the tariffs it authorized be filed on or before April 1, 1999, there was no legislative intent to disregard petitions to collect decommissioning charges filed after that date.\nCook argues that the dates contained in section 16 \u2014 114 place a limitation on the contracts that can be recognized for recovery of decommissioning expenses. ELPC argues that by holding that section 16 \u2014 114 somehow authorizes ComEd\u2019s petition, which was filed in May 2000 and granted in December 2000, the Commission rendered the date limitations in section 16 \u2014 114 superfluous and thereby violated a rule of statutory construction (A.P. Properties, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d at 532).\nAs stated previously, the purpose of section 16 \u2014 114 is to allocate decommissioning cost recovery between customers purchasing power from a utility employing nuclear power and customers who have switched to an alternative electric supplier. However, section 16 \u2014 114 also recognizes a utility\u2019s ability to collect decommissioning charges from ratepayers when it has the responsibility for decommissioning costs as a matter of contract. Several parties concede that ComEd complied with the required filing date with respect to its existing Rider 31 tariff. Further, section 16 \u2014 114 does not prohibit ComEd from entering into an agreement after April 1, 1999, that transfers ownership of the nuclear power plants but under which ComEd retains the responsibility for some of the decommissioning costs. In our view, April 1, 1999, is the date by which the tariff contemplated in section 16 \u2014 114 must be filed in order to become effective on or before October 1, 1999. We read the April 1, 1999, limitation to be inapplicable to section 16 \u2014 114 tariffs that are to take effect after October 1, 1999. To characterize April 1, 1999, as an absolute deadline would create a brief window to implement decommissioning rate tariffs at any time in the future. This would be inconsistent with the intent of the statute and frustrate one of its major purposes, which is to assure that sufficient funds are being set aside to fully decommission all nuclear plants within Illinois. We will presume that the General Assembly did not intend to create an absurd result. Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474, 479 (1997). Therefore, we affirm the Commission\u2019s interpretation that the April 1, 1999, date in section 16\u2014 114 was not intended to put a moratorium on the ability to enter into different ownership arrangements beyond that date.\nThe State, the ELPC, and the IIEC/Coalition argue that the Commission\u2019s order violates the Act by allowing ComEd to act as an agent for Genco. They contend that, under the Act, only a utility can collect decommissioning rates and Genco is not a utility. They conclude that by allowing ComEd, acting as Genco\u2019s agent, to collect decommissioning rates pursuant to the collection agency agreement, the Commission\u2019s order allows ComEd to do for Genco what Genco cannot under the Act legally do for itself. Relying on a tenet of agency law that provides that an agent\u2019s authority to act can be no greater than the authority of its principal (3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency \u00a7 68, at 483 (2002)), the intervenors further contend that ComEd, as an agent, labors under the same restrictions as its principal, Genco. They assert that because Genco is not a utility and cannot collect a decommissioning cost tariff, neither then can ComEd.\nThese arguments fail because ComEd is not Genco\u2019s agent. As we concluded above, ComEd is collecting decommissioning charges on behalf of itself to meet its obligation to pay decommissioning costs under the contribution agreement. Sections 9 \u2014 201.5 and 16 \u2014 114 of the Act provide authority for the Commission\u2019s approval of ComEd\u2019s plan to collect decommissioning costs from its ratepayers in order to satisfy its obligation under the contribution agreement. Therefore, ComEd\u2019s tariff is authorized by law and does not, by the way of an agency arrangement, violate the Act.\nChicago argues that the Commission\u2019s order violates section 9 \u2014 201.5 of the Act. The tariffs authorized under section 16 \u2014 114 must conform to the provisions of section 9 \u2014 201.5. 220 ILCS 5/16\u2014 114 (West 2000). Section 9 \u2014 201.5 authorizes the Commission to allow the institution of rate provisions or tariffs for the costs of decommissioning nuclear power plants provided the revenues collected are used (1) to recover costs associated with contributions to appropriate decommissioning trust funds, or (2) to reduce the amounts to be charged under such rates or tariffs in the future. 220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 201.5 (West 2000).\nChicago contends that neither of these circumstances is present in this case. First, Chicago contends that the funds from the decommissioning rates that ComEd proposes to collect cannot be used to recover costs associated with contributions to appropriate decommissioning trust funds. Chicago claims that because decommissioning trust funds, as described in section 8 \u2014 508.1(b) (220 ILCS 5/8\u25a0 \u2014 508.1(b) (West 2000)), are established by public utilities that own nuclear power plants, ComEd, no longer owning or operating any nuclear power plants, could not use the funds collected to recover costs associated with contributions to appropriate decommissioning trust funds. We disagree.\nSection 8 \u2014 508.1(a)(3) defines \u201cdecommissioning trust\u201d as:\n\u201c[A] fiduciary account in a bank or other financial institution established to hold the decommissioning funds provided pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this Section for the eventual purpose of paying decommissioning costs, which shall be separate from all other accounts and assets of the public utility establishing the trust.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 508.1(a)(3) (West 2000).\nIn turn, section 8 \u2014 508.1(b)(2) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c[E]very public utility that owns or operates, in whole or in part, a nuclear power plant shall:\n***\n(2) establish 2 decommissioning funds for each such plant, each of which shall be held for a plant as a separate account in a decommissioning trust[.]\u201d 220 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 508.1(b)(2) (West 2000).\nWe do not believe that these definitions limit the source of the funds going into the decommissioning trust funds to owners and operators of nuclear power plants. The statutes do not prohibit the deposit of funds into the decommissioning trusts from sources other than owners and operators of nuclear power plants. Also, section 8 \u2014 -508.1 requires only that public utilities establish the decommissioning trusts; it does not prohibit other business entities from maintaining or collecting money for them.\nAt oral argument, counsel for Chicago took the position that, as a result of the transaction between ComEd and Genco, those trust funds that were established under section 8 \u2014 508.1 were dissolved and only the assets that were in the trust funds were transferred to Genco. We disagree.\nUnder section 2.1(j) of the contribution agreement, ComEd is required to transfer to Genco \u201cdecommissioning trust assets,\u201d which are defined as:\n\u201c(1) All assets (including investments) held in Decommissioning Trusts and (2) all funds collected, or to be collected, from ratepayers in Respect of Decommissioning Costs as provided in Section 6.6 (Decommissioning Costs).\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nWe conclude that this language contemplates that the assets remain subject to the terms of the trusts. This conclusion is supported by reading sections 6.6 and 1.1 of the contribution agreement.\nUnder section 6.6 of the contribution agreement, ComEd is required to pay decommissioning costs as determined by the Commission and to forward the funds to Genco at least annually for deposit into decommissioning trust funds maintained by Genco. Section 1.1 of the contribution agreement defines \u201cdecommissioning trusts\u201d as follows:\n\u201cthe trusts .established under the Trust Agreement dated December 8, 1988, as amended (Tax Qualified Decommissioning Trust) between [ComEd] and the Northern Trust Company and the Trust Agreement dated December 8, 1988, as amended (Non-Tax Qualified Decommissioning Trust) between LComEd] and the Northern Trust Company.\u201d\nWe can conclude only that the trusts referred to were those established in accordance with all the requirements of section 8 \u2014 508.1. Therefore, contrary to Chicago\u2019s position, the section 8 \u2014 508.1 decommissioning trust funds remain intact.\nWe also note that section 16 \u2014 114 recognizes a public utility\u2019s ability to file a tariff to collect decommissioning rates where it has responsibility as a matter of contract for decommissioning costs. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114 (West 2000). It would be illogical for provisions of the Act to allow ComEd to collect decommissioning rates to satisfy its obligation under the contribution agreement and then seal those funds off from deposit into the accounts established to hold funds for the eventual purpose of paying decommissioning costs. We will presume that the General Assembly did not intend to create an absurd or unjust result. Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474, 479 (1997).\nChicago also argues that the second purpose to which decommissioning rates must be applied pursuant to section 9 \u2014 201.5 is inapplicable in this case. Chicago takes the position that the hearings before the Commission focused on determining the likely total cost of decommissioning, the likely escalation in decommissioning costs over the years before decommissioning actually takes place, the likely growth through investment income of the decommissioning trusts over those same years, and the likely number of years remaining before decommissioning. Considering all of this, the Commission approved the collection of $73 million per year for four to six years based on the Commission\u2019s best estimate of what would be needed to pay all the decommissioning costs of all 13 nuclear power plants. Chicago contends that the Commission did not identify any actual savings to ComEd\u2019s ratepayers that will flow from its order and concludes that a tariff that simply raises a sum that is equal to expected future decommissioning expenses does not, by definition, reduce those amounts.\nComEd argues that the decommissioning costs are reduced because ComEd customers will not have to pay a decommissioning tariff after 2006.\nWe believe that Chicago misconstrues section 9 \u2014 201.5 as requiring that decommissioning rates collected now must somehow reduce the total amount of the price for decommissioning as of the time it actually takes place. In our view, section 9 \u2014 201.5 requires only that funds collected pursuant to decommissioning rates must be applied so as to reduce the amounts that customers will have to pay later.\nThe proposal in the petition, approved as modified, eliminates ratepayers\u2019 liability for decommissioning costs after four to six years. The $121 million per year in decommissioning rates proposed by ComEd was based on the amount requested by ComEd in its 1999 decommissioning rate case (In re Commonwealth Edison, Ill. Com. Comm\u2019n Rep. No. 99 \u2014 0115). That amount was calculated by TLG Services, Inc. (TLG), assuming that decommissioning rates would be collected for the operating life of the nuclear power plants. The operating life was assumed to be equal to the length of the nuclear power plants\u2019 NRC operating licenses. The Commission reduced the $121 million per year to $73 million per year, but the amount will be collected for only 4 to 6 years, not the 27 years based on the expiration of the last NRC operating license. Also, the decommissioning cost estimates calculated in year 2000 dollars prepared by TLG totaled $5,649 billion (rounded for purposes of our discussion to $5.6 billion), or $3.1 billion more than the amount in the decommissioning trusts at the time the petition was filed. ComEd\u2019s proposed decommissioning rate was $121 million per year, with a maximum of $726 million. The approved decommissioning rate was $73 million for four to six years, or a maximum total of $438 million in decommissioning rates, which is significantly less than the estimated deficit in the decommissioning trusts of $3.1 billion. Ratepayers are liable for decommissioning costs in years five and six of the purchase power agreement only to the extent that ComEd buys power from Genco. Absent this plan, ComEd\u2019s ratepayers would have to pay all the decommissioning costs with respect to ComEd\u2019s nuclear power plants. Clearly, the Commission\u2019s order works to reduce the amount of decommissioning rates ComEd customers will be required to pay in the future.\nMoreover, decommissioning costs have to be paid at some point in the future. All of the money ComEd collects for decommissioning purposes is applied to those costs. Money collected now will not have to be collected later. It follows then that the money collected pursuant to the Commission\u2019s order reduces the amounts necessary to be charged by ComEd in future years.\nEven though decommissioning rates authorized by the Commission must satisfy only one of the requirements of section 9 \u2014 201.5, as we have explained, the decommissioning rates authorized in this case satisfy both requirements. Therefore, we reject Chicago\u2019s arguments that section 9 \u2014 201.5 has been contravened by the Commission\u2019s order.\nOn appeal, the intervenors make assorted arguments that were rejected by the Commission, contending that section 16 \u2014 114.1 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114.1 (West 2000)) bars ComEd\u2019s postsale collection of decommissioning rates. The Commission\u2019s order references section 16 \u2014 114.1, which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c\u00a7 16 \u2014 114.1. Recovery of decommissioning costs in connection with nuclear power plant sale agreement.\n(a) An electric utility owning a single-unit nuclear power plant located in this State which enters into an agreement to sell the nuclear power plant and as part of such agreement agrees: (i) to make contributions to a tax-qualified decommissioning trust or non-tax qualified decommissioning trust, or both, as defined in Section 8 \u2014 508.1 for the nuclear power plant, in specified amounts or for a specified period of time, after the sale is consummated, or (ii) to purchase an insurance instrument which provides for the payment of all or a specified amount of the decommissioning costs of the nuclear power plant, shall be entitled, in the case of item (i), to maintain such decommissioning trusts for the purpose of receiving such contributions after the consummation of the sale, to implement revisions to its decommissioning rate in accordance with subsection (b) of this Section, and to transfer such decommissioning trusts, or the balance in the trusts, to the buyer of the nuclear power plant in accordance with the agreement of sale, and in the case of item (ii), to implement revisions to its decommissioning rate in accordance with subsection (c) of this Section.\n(b) An electric utility entering into an agreement of sale described in subsection (a)(i) of this Section shall be entitled to file a petition with the Commission for entry of an order authorizing the electric utility (i) to amortize its liability for decommissioning costs pursuant to the agreement of sale over the period of time in which the electric utility is required by such agreement to make additional contributions to the tax-qualified decommissioning trust, the non-tax qualified decommissioning trust, or both, and (ii) to revise its decommissioning rate to a level that will recover, over the time period specified in the agreement of sale, an annual amount equal to the electric utility\u2019s annual contributions to the decommissioning trusts which are required by the agreement of sale multiplied by the percentage of the output of the nuclear power plant which the agreement of sale obligates the electric utility to purchase in each such year.\n(c) An electric utility entering into an agreement of sale described in subsection (a)(ii) shall be entitled to file a petition with the Commission for entry of an order authorizing the electric utility to revise its decommissioning rate to a level that will recover, over 5 years, the electric utility\u2019s cost of purchasing the insurance instrument multiplied by the percentage of the output of the nuclear power plant which the agreement of sale obligates the electric utility to purchase in each such year.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114.1 (West 2000).\nIIEC/Coalition submits that the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies, pursuant to which a court may find that, when certain things are listed or specified in a statute, the legislative intent to exclude all other things from the statute\u2019s operation may be inferred (see In re Consensual Overhear, 323 Ill. App. 3d 236, 240 (2001)). IIEC/Coalition contends that, because section 16 \u2014 114.1 grants authority for the Commission to approve an electric utility selling only one nuclear power plant to collect postsale decommissioning rates, but does not give the Commission the authority to approve the same act by a utility selling more than one nuclear power plant, ComEd is prohibited from doing so in this case. However, because we have concluded that sections 9 \u2014 201.5 and 16 \u2014 114 provide authority for ComEd\u2019s collection of decommissioning rates in this case, the inference created by expressio unius est exclusio alterius is inapplicable here.\nChicago also notes that section 16 \u2014 114.1 gives electric utilities owning a single-unit nuclear power plant the authority to collect post-sale decommissioning costs. Chicago reasons that if ComEd, owning more than one nuclear power plant, has this same authority under the Commission\u2019s interpretation of sections 9 \u2014 201.5 and 16 \u2014 114, then section 16 \u2014 114.1 is rendered meaningless. Chicago concludes, therefore, that the Commission\u2019s interpretation of sections 9 \u2014 201.5 and 16 \u2014 114 must be erroneous. Chicago\u2019s argument on this issue mirrors like arguments of other intervenors; therefore, we will resolve all of the intervenors\u2019s arguments on this issue by specifically addressing Chicago\u2019s contentions.\nThe Commission recognized that there was an \u201coverlap of authority\u201d between the authority granted in section 16 \u2014 114.1 permitting postsale decommissioning rates and the general authority available under sections 9 \u2014 201.5, 8 \u2014 508.1, and 16 \u2014 114 to do the same thing. The Commission, however, also noted that section 16 \u2014 114.1 \u201cprovides detailed guidance regarding post nuclear plant sale decommissioning trusts and future collections for utilities owning one nuclear power plant. Section 16 \u2014 114.1 does not restrict the Commission in evaluating post-plant sale decommissioning cost proposals for utilities owning more than one plant\u201d and concluded that \u201c[s]ection 16 \u2014 114.1 of the Act is not a bar to post-plant sale decommissioning collection by ComEd.\u201d We agree with the Commission\u2019s conclusion for the reason that section 16 \u2014 114.1 contains provisions that are not in sections 9 \u2014 201.5 and 16 \u2014 114.\nSection 16 \u2014 114.1 gives an electric utility owning a single-unit nuclear power plant an option in the event of a sale to purchase an insurance instrument to pay decommissioning costs. 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 \u25a0 114.1(a) (ii) (West 2000). Sections 9 \u2014 201.5 and 16 \u2014 114 carry no such option. Additionally, the Commission\u2019s discretion is greatly limited in the approval of the postsale petition to collect a decommissioning tariff meeting the requirements of section 16 \u2014 114.1. Subsection (d), inter alia, illustrates this point by providing, \u201cThe Commission shall issue an order granting the petition within 30 days after the petition is filed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 114.1(d) (West 2000). The word \u201cshall\u201d in a statute is generally indicative of mandatory intent. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 85 (1988). On the other hand, the Commission has broad authority to grant, modify, or deny a petition to file a decommissioning rate tariff pursuant to section 9 \u2014 201.5. Section 9 \u2014 201.5(a) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) The Commission may after hearing, in a rate case or otherwise, authorize the institution of rate provisions or tariffs that increase or decrease charges to customers to reflect changes in, or additional or reduced costs of, decommissioning nuclear power plants ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 201.5(a) (West 2000).\nThe authority for the postsale collection of decommissioning rates granted in section 16 \u2014 114.1 alters those provisions in sections 16\u2014 114 and 9 \u2014 201.5 giving like authority. Accordingly, we reject Chicago\u2019s argument that the Commission\u2019s interpretation of the Act renders section 16 \u2014 114.1 meaningless and its consequent argument that section 16 \u2014 114.1 vitiates the Commission\u2019s authority to approve ComEd\u2019s postsale collection of decommissioning rates.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Commission\u2019s conclusion that sections 16 \u2014 114 and 9 \u2014 201.5 of the Act provide the statutory authority to grant ComEd\u2019s petition as modified.\nC. Challenges to the Amount of the Approved Decommissioning Rate\nThe material in this section is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nBased on the foregoing, we affirm the Commission\u2019s order.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KAPALA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul F. Hanzlik, John L. Rogers, Robert C. Feldmeier, Bryan S. Anderson, and David B. Goroff, all of Foley & Lardner, and Paul R. Bonney and Anastasia M. O\u2019Brien, both of Exelon Business Services Company, both of Chicago, and David W DeBruin, of Jemier & Block, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (James E. Weging, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondent.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Mark N. Pera, Marie D. Spicuzza, Leijuana Doss, and Mitchell Levin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for County of Cook.", "Howard A. Learner, Albert F. Ettinger, and Shannon Fisk, all of Environmental Law & Policy Center, of Chicago, for Environmental Law & Policy Center.", "Eric Robertson, Randall Robertson, and Edward C. Fitzhenry, Jr., all of Lueders, Robertson & Konzen, of Granite City for Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers, Northwestern Steel & Wire Company, and Caterpillar, Inc.", "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, David A. Graver, and Benna Ruth Solomon, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for City of Chicago.", "Robert J. Kelter, of Citizens Utility Board, of Chicago, for Citizens Utility Board.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Janice A. Dale, Mark G. Kaminski, and R. Lawrence Warren, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.", "Christopher J. Townsend, David I. Fein, and Michael S. Mo, all of Piper Rudnick, of Chicago, for Citgo Petroleum Corp., General Mills, Inc., Metropolitan Chicago Healthcare Council, and R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company.", "Conrad R. Reddick and Julie M. Hextell, both of Chicago, and Susan M. Landwehr, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Enron Energy Services, Inc., and New Energy Midwest, L.L.C." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors.\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The People of Cook County by Richard Devine, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The City of Chicago, Intervenor-Petitioner; Environmental Law and Policy Center et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Environmental Law and Policy Center, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY; Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Citgo Petroleum Corporation Brands, Inc., et al., Intervenors).-COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (The People of the State of Illinois by the Attorney General James Ryan, Intervenor-Petitioner; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors).\u2014COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Respondent (Caterpillar, Inc., et al., Intervenors-Petitioners; The City of Chicago et al., Intervenors).\nSecond District\nNos. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0038, 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0212, 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0912, 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0914 through 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0917, 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0923 cons.\nOpinion filed August 5, 2002.\nPaul F. Hanzlik, John L. Rogers, Robert C. Feldmeier, Bryan S. Anderson, and David B. Goroff, all of Foley & Lardner, and Paul R. Bonney and Anastasia M. O\u2019Brien, both of Exelon Business Services Company, both of Chicago, and David W DeBruin, of Jemier & Block, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (James E. Weging, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondent.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Mark N. Pera, Marie D. Spicuzza, Leijuana Doss, and Mitchell Levin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for County of Cook.\nHoward A. Learner, Albert F. Ettinger, and Shannon Fisk, all of Environmental Law & Policy Center, of Chicago, for Environmental Law & Policy Center.\nEric Robertson, Randall Robertson, and Edward C. Fitzhenry, Jr., all of Lueders, Robertson & Konzen, of Granite City for Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers, Northwestern Steel & Wire Company, and Caterpillar, Inc.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, David A. Graver, and Benna Ruth Solomon, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for City of Chicago.\nRobert J. Kelter, of Citizens Utility Board, of Chicago, for Citizens Utility Board.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Janice A. Dale, Mark G. Kaminski, and R. Lawrence Warren, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.\nChristopher J. Townsend, David I. Fein, and Michael S. Mo, all of Piper Rudnick, of Chicago, for Citgo Petroleum Corp., General Mills, Inc., Metropolitan Chicago Healthcare Council, and R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company.\nConrad R. Reddick and Julie M. Hextell, both of Chicago, and Susan M. Landwehr, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Enron Energy Services, Inc., and New Energy Midwest, L.L.C." }, "file_name": "1038-01", "first_page_order": 1056, "last_page_order": 1080 }