{ "id": 487244, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARTH D. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Collins", "decision_date": "2002-08-23", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201401\u20140091", "first_page": "20", "last_page": "28", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 20" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 1108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980687 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/1108-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511344 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5677346 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596989 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29950 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186511 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383050 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 780, "char_count": 20475, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.822570971527672e-08, "percentile": 0.5333517513955447 }, "sha256": "88cee8db03eb40042542476e7e2b11c464226ee1340eace9974c5e6dfdcc45c7", "simhash": "1:2e68146f3ac3a477", "word_count": 3454 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:04.462910+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARTH D. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Garth D. Collins, appeals from his conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2000)). We reverse and remand.\nDefendant was charged with multiple drug and weapon offenses after police executed a search warrant on his residence on February 16, 2000. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the charge of possession with intent to deliver and several lesser drug-possession charges. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and sentenced defendant to a term of six years in prison. This appeal followed.\nDefendant first contends that he was denied a fair trial by the State\u2019s failure to disclose material information regarding Muriel Spencer, one of the State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant raised an entrapment defense, contending that Spencer was an agent of the police and provided the drugs that were found during the search of defendant\u2019s residence.\nDue process and Supreme Court Rule 412(c) require the State to disclose to a defendant any material or information within its possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); People v. Preatty, 256 Ill. App. 3d 579, 589 (1994); 188 Ill. 2d R. 412(c). To establish a violation of this rule, the evidence not disclosed to the defendant must be both favorable to the defendant and material. People v. Vasquez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 82, 98 (2000). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Vasquez, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 98. The question is not whether the accused more likely than not would have received a different verdict had the evidence been disclosed but, whether, in the absence of the evidence, he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Vasquez, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 98.\nDefendant filed motions to quash and suppress the manner of entry and to compel the disclosure of a confidential informant, alleging in both that an unidentified man knocked at defendant\u2019s door and entered his residence at the time the police entered the residence and executed the search warrant. A hearing on the motions was held on June 13, 2000. Defendant testified that on February 16 he received a telephone call from Muriel Spencer at about 6 p.m. or 7 p.m. Defendant had purchased some items from Spencer in the past and knew who Spencer was. About 25 minutes later, defendant heard a knock at his back door. Seeing Spencer standing there, defendant opened the door and allowed Spencer into his kitchen. Several police officers rushed in behind Spencer and executed the search warrant. Defendant lost sight of Spencer at that time. Defendant testified that a plastic bag of drugs was found on a countertop in his kitchen, about seven feet from his back door. Spencer was never handcuffed while he was in defendant\u2019s kitchen, and no one ever asked his name or what he was doing there. Defendant never heard the police knock or announce their office before they entered his home. Defendant also stated that Spencer had placed the drugs in the kitchen earlier that day. On cross-examination, defendant stated that he was aware that cocaine was also found on some plates in a cabinet. He stated that Spencer had been to his house approximately one hour before the search warrant was executed and that \u201cit had to be\u201d Spencer who put the drugs in his apartment. He did not see Spencer put the drugs in the apartment, and he did not know that the drugs were there before the police arrived.\nAfter defendant\u2019s testimony, the court asked the assistant State\u2019s Attorney if Spencer were the confidential informant referred to in the search warrant. The assistant stated that she did not know the name of the informant.\nOfficer George McClary, Jr., of the North Chicago police department testified that he was present at the execution of the warrant and that the black male who knocked at defendant\u2019s back door never entered defendant\u2019s residence. On cross-examination, McClary testified that he had had contact with the black male before and that the man was \u201can integral part\u201d of the plan for the execution of the warrant.\nThe trial court found that Muriel Spencer was the black male that knocked at defendant\u2019s door and that, because he had actively participated in the execution of the warrant, his identity had to be disclosed, although it was apparent that defendant already knew Spencer\u2019s identity. The court ordered the State to disclose Spencer\u2019s name, address, prior convictions, and \u201canything that goes to his bias or his credibility.\u201d The court also denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash and suppress the method of entry.\nOn June 29, defendant moved for the reconsideration of the court\u2019s ruling on the motion to quash and suppress and presented the testimony of Muriel Spencer as an offer of proof. Spencer testified that he was forced by the North Chicago police department to go to defendant\u2019s residence on February 16. Some member of the department put a gun to his head and told him to knock on defendant\u2019s door. He never entered defendant\u2019s residence but was handcuffed and placed in a car. He had been arrested prior to February 16 for \u201cspeeding tickets, a bunch of junk,\u201d but there was no criminal charge arising from the arrest. He was taken to defendant\u2019s residence by police two different times. He was under no agreement with the North Chicago police department prior to February 16. After the offer of proof, the court struck the motion to reconsider, finding that no new facts would have been presented. The court also found that there was no agreement between Spencer and the police.\nOn that same date, the State presented Spencer\u2019s testimony in relation to its motion to revoke defendant\u2019s bond. Spencer testified that, since February 16, he had been shot at by someone in a car who stated that \u201cthey\u201d would kill him because he \u201crat out [sic] on our friends.\u201d His car had been vandalized and he had also been threatened by a man named Tracie O\u2019Brian. On cross-examination, when asked if he were a confidential informant, Spencer replied, \u201cNo, I\u2019m not. Hell no I\u2019m not. No, I\u2019m not. Hell no.\u201d When asked again, he stated, \u201cNo, I\u2019m not. I said no, hell no.\u201d He denied being under any agreement with the North Chicago police department, and he denied having any arrangement with the police regarding the entry into defendant\u2019s home. Although a police officer had placed a gun to his head to make him knock at defendant\u2019s door, he had not been threatened by the police department, as placing the gun to his head was not a threat. The court found Spencer\u2019s credibility \u201cquestionable to say the least\u201d and denied the motion.\nOn July 19, during argument on various motions filed by defendant, the following colloquy on disclosure of information regarding Spencer took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: If there is anything that would go and [sic] towards bias, et cetera, et cetera, anything that should be discoverable, deemed to be discoverable I think that should be disclosed by the State.\nMS. [MEISTER] FALBE [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Your Honor, I guess I need more specific clarification because we did have a hearing on whether or not the confidential informant should be revealed and the Court\u2019s ruling was that it was not[,] that the name of the person at the house when the search warrant was executed should be revealed.\nTHE COURT: The fact could be revealed, though.\nMS. [MEISTER] FALBE: But the Court never ruled that the confidential informant\u2014\nTHE COURT: But there is some monetary or pecuniary interest that he has I think that it should be exploited by the defense and perhaps if the witness has some bias I think \u2014 if the State knows, if the State knows.\nMS. [MEISTER] FALBE: So if it\u2019s your Honor\u2019s ruling that if Mr. Spencer had been paid or had a bias regarding going to the house when the execution of the search warrant [sic], then that should be revealed.\nTHE COURT: I think it should.\nMS. [MEISTER] FALBE: Okay.\u201d\nOn August 9, defendant asked leave of the court to file a motion for supplemental discovery and alleged that the North Chicago police department had background information on the confidential informant. When the court granted the motion, the following colloquy took place:\n\u201cMS. MEISTER FALBE: I do have an objection. I don\u2019t think the record has been clear as to determining if the confidential informant has been revealed. The Court has ordered in the past that we disclose information pertaining to Mr. Spencer and any contracts that he had pertaining to his going to the house during the execution of the search warrant, which I have tendered everything, because there are none.\nTHE COURT: Well, Mr. Spencer has already testified. Mr. Spencer has already been revealed. And Mr. Spencer had admitted during his testimony that he was there pursuant to the police\u2019s request.\nMS. MEISTER FALBE: During the execution of the search warrant, correct, and there were no agreements with the police regarding that.\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t know about that.\nMS. MEISTER FALBE: Well, I do know and I\u2019m indicating that there aren\u2019t any.\u201d\nOn August 23, the court heard argument on defendant\u2019s petition for a hearing to quash and suppress the search warrant pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978). At that time, the court stated:\n\u201cI ordered the State to disclose the identity of the person that was present at the time of the execution of the search warrant. I don\u2019t know if he was the one that made the [controlled] buy [that was the basis for the search warrant], I don\u2019t think I did order the State to disclose that.\u201d\nDefense counsel stated, \u201cThat\u2019s true.\u201d Defendant still had not received the background information on Spencer. The State assured defendant that the information was to be obtained from the police department that afternoon and would be forwarded by the next day.\nOn August 28, defense counsel stated that he had received from the State an arrest report concerning the February 8, 2000, arrest of Spencer by the North Chicago police department. The State had authorized felony charges for various drug violations at that time. However, defense counsel had checked the computer records of the clerk\u2019s office that morning before court and discovered that no charges had been filed against Spencer. According to defendant, this was evidence of consideration between the North Chicago police and Spencer that had not been tendered by the State. Defendant asked that the case be dismissed for failure to tender that information. The State denied that there was a failure to tender anything and that the State had \u201cnothing else to tender on this matter.\u201d The court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss but stated that, based on the facts, it appeared that Spencer was \u201cworking off charges\u201d and that the State must investigate the existence of any discussions with Spencer regarding his charges and cooperation with the police.\nOn September 28, the matter was in court for a hearing on the State\u2019s obligation to tender information. The State indicated that there was \u201cno information that needs to be tendered. There is nothing in writing. There [are] no written agreements\u201d regarding the lack of charges filed against Spencer after his February 8 arrest. The following colloquy then took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Assuming that you [defendant] win the motion, what do I order them to produce?\nMR. RITACCA [Defense counsel]: They \u2014 assuming I win the motion, and you determine that he is a confidential informant?\nTHE COURT: Oh, I did that a long time ago.\nMS. MEISTER[ ]FALBE: That\u2019s already been determined.\nMR. RITACCA: Well they\u2019re not \u2014 they\u2019re not saying that. You can say that, but they are not saying that.\u201d\nLater, when asked if Spencer were a confidential informant, the State replied, \u201cNo, I\u2019m not saying he\u2019s a confidential informant.\u201d The following then took place:\n\u201cMR. RITACCA: How do I know \u2014 how do we know that there is [sic] no conversations between the police and Muriel Spencer? He got arrested for 5.5 grams of cocaine.\nMS. MEISTER[ ]FALBE: I didn\u2019t say there wasn\u2019t a conversation.\nMR. RITACCA: Well, that\u2019s part of it. That\u2019s part of it judge.\nTHE COURT: All right. But for our sake \u2014 for our motions, assume that he is a confidential informant. Assume that he is cooperating with the police. It\u2019s obvious from the record that he is doing that. So \u2014 and it\u2019s obvious that he got rewarded. What else do you need?\nMR. RITACCA: I need the State to say \u2014 I need the State to say that he\u2019s a confidential informant working for North Chicago, that he was in the house with Garth Collins.\u201d\nThe court then ruled that defendant was to be allowed to view all reports that North Chicago had regarding any relationship between Spencer and North Chicago.\nThe trial began on October 4. Detective Michael Newsome of the North Chicago police department testified that he was involved in the execution of the search warrant on February 16. He observed a black male approach defendant\u2019s back door. When the door opened, New-some and other officers entered the building. Newsome believed that the black male who approached the door was a confidential informant.\nSpencer testified for the State. He stated that on February 8, 2000, police executed a search warrant on his residence and found cocaine and \u201csome other property.\u201d He was arrested and taken to the North Chicago police department, where he spoke to Detective Garagall and Sergeants Sain and Brown about helping him with his case if he would help them with some investigations. Spencer was not charged with any crime related to the February 8 search of his residence. He had been told that such would be the case if he helped the police.\nTwo or three days before the search of defendant\u2019s residence, Spencer went to defendant\u2019s home to make a controlled purchase of cocaine for the police. He met with Sain and Brown again on February 16 and was told to meet them that night at defendant\u2019s house. He was told by police already outside the house to knock on defendant\u2019s door. He did so, and when defendant answered, the police entered and executed the warrant.\nOn cross-examination, Spencer said that he had been a confidential informant for the police for a short time, only since February 8. He had an agreement with the police that they would not proceed with charges against him if he helped them. He stated that he signed a statement to the effect that he used cocaine and sold it to his friends only because he was told that he would get a break if he signed it. He denied ever going inside defendant\u2019s house. He also denied being at defendant\u2019s house more than once on February 16. The drug deal with defendant was the only deal that he had been requested to set up. He admitted that he went before a judge and swore an affidavit to get the search warrant for defendant\u2019s house, and he signed the affidavit as \u201cJohn Doe\u201d because he was asked by the police to do so.\nDetective Carl Sain testified that Spencer made a deal with the North Chicago police to provide information. Spencer was their only source of information that defendant had been selling drugs from his house.\nWe conclude that defendant was denied due process by the State\u2019s subterfuge regarding Spencer\u2019s relationship with the North Chicago police department. Fairness is the core meaning of due process. People v. Hall, 198 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (2001). Throughout the pretrial proceedings, the State constantly fought defendant\u2019s attempts to learn of this relationship between Spencer and the police. On June 13, the State was ordered to turn over information on Spencer\u2019s prior convictions and \u201canything that goes to his bias or his credibility.\u201d The State presented Spencer\u2019s testimony at the hearing to revoke defendant\u2019s bond, in which Spencer adamantly denied being a confidential informant or having any deal with the North Chicago police department. The State stood before the court on several occasions and stated that there were no contracts or agreements between Spencer and the police regarding the execution of the search warrant at defendant\u2019s home and said that there was no information to tender. On August 28, defendant discovered, on his own investigation, that Spencer had never been criminally charged after the search of his home, even though felony charges had been approved. Even in the face of this revelation and the court\u2019s order that the State investigate the existence of any discussions with Spencer regarding his charges and cooperation with the police, the State again stood before the court on September 28 and stated that there was \u201cno information that needs to be tendered. There is nothing in writing. There [are] no written agreements\u201d regarding the lack of charges filed against Spencer. Later on that same date, however, when defendant questioned such a possibility of conversations between Spencer and the police, the State coyly answered, \u201cI didn\u2019t say there wasn\u2019t a conversation.\u201d All of this denial and evasion ended only six days later, when the State presented to the jury the testimony of Newsome, Spencer, and Sain, including Spencer\u2019s detailed explanation of his agreement and cooperation with the North Chicago police department. This series of evasions, obfuscations, and outright lies clearly denied defendant a fair trial and cannot be condoned.\nThe State argues that, even if it did fail to disclose information regarding Spencer\u2019s agreement with the police, defendant discovered before trial that no charges were filed against Spencer; thus, defendant suffered no prejudice at trial or in presenting his defense. This argument has no merit. Guilty or not, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial with at least the appearance of a right to prepare his defense. Discovery is not a game of hide-and-seek; the State\u2019s pretrial chicanery impinged upon the integrity of the judicial system and requires reversal regardless of the weight of the other evidence. See People v. Lambert, 288 Ill. App. 3d 450, 462 (1997); People v. Thomas, 123 Ill. App. 3d 857, 867 (1984). We would be in dereliction of our duties as a reviewing court were we to allow defendant\u2019s conviction to stand in light of such deceit. Discovery requirements are mandatory, and the State is not free to disregard them. People v. Norris, 303 Ill. App. 3d 163, 174 (1999). Defendant requested evidence, and the court ordered the production of that evidence. The State presented false testimony at a pretrial hearing and quibbled that, while there were no written agreements to turn over, \u201cI didn\u2019t say there wasn\u2019t a conversation.\u201d Due process of law cannot hinge upon such a gossamer distinction. See People v. Ellis, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1114-15 (2000). The State knew that an agreement between Spencer and the police existed, yet the State never, before trial, admitted the existence of the agreement or acknowledged its terms. It was content to parse words and make defendant discover on his own that some such agreement must exist and learn the details at trial. We need not conclude that the jury\u2019s verdict would have been different had the State disclosed this evidence prior to trial, when it was ordered to do so. See Vasquez, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 98. We do conclude, however, that defendant did not receive a fair trial that resulted in a verdict worthy of confidence. For this reason, the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nBecause of our disposition of this issue, we need not address defendant\u2019s other contention.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nBOWMAN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Timothy P. King, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P. Moltz and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARTH D. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201401\u20140091\nOpinion filed August 23, 2002.\nRehearing denied September 18, 2002.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Timothy P. King, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P. Moltz and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0020-01", "first_page_order": 38, "last_page_order": 46 }