{ "id": 487104, "name": "DARRELL COURSON, a Minor, by Paula Courson, His Mother and Next Friend, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DANVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 118, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Courson v. Danville School District No. 118", "decision_date": "2002-08-14", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201400\u20140192", "first_page": "86", "last_page": "94", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 86" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "755 N.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256324 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257179 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" }, { "page": "809" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "758 N.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259095 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1181-82" }, { "page": "1182" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821401 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260380 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 972", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974", "parenthetical": "whether defendant would be entitled to invoke a sovereign immunity defense is a separate question" }, { "page": "974" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2435400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40", "parenthetical": "whether defendant would be entitled to invoke a sovereign immunity defense is a separate question" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2553970 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 Ill. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2618043 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/402/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 988", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992", "parenthetical": "overruling Mower v. Williams, 402 Ill. 486, 84 N.E.2d 435 (1949)" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "992" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222800 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "overruling Mower v. Williams, 402 Ill. 486, 84 N.E.2d 435 (1949)" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474" }, { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" }, { "page": "980" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "981" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283190 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159-60" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "purchase of poles used in physical education class may have involved a mere failure to inspect, not an exercise of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026051 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154", "parenthetical": "purchase of poles used in physical education class may have involved a mere failure to inspect, not an exercise of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 N.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "768", "parenthetical": "Kilbride, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "760" }, { "page": "762", "parenthetical": "School Code and Tort Immunity Act are separate enactments" }, { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "a judicially created exception cannot override a statutory immunity" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29959 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "480" }, { "page": "483" }, { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "758 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570788 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257133 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757-58" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "757" }, { "page": "757" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86", "parenthetical": "whether to put railing on an accessability ramp, install lighting, and warn of a drop-off were maintenance decisions (in contrast to policy decisions)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186467 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715", "parenthetical": "whether to put railing on an accessability ramp, install lighting, and warn of a drop-off were maintenance decisions (in contrast to policy decisions)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1109" }, { "page": "1109" }, { "page": "1109", "parenthetical": "municipal traffic planner's decisions constituted policy" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278377 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "758 N.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259095 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1181" }, { "page": "1181" }, { "page": "1182", "parenthetical": "City of Chicago fire marshal's decisions constituted policy" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821401 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257133 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0752-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 895, "char_count": 20437, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.880468659379446e-08, "percentile": 0.46008763445281947 }, "sha256": "52e10a9eddb9825d01a68052955c8bf8af927aa72bfbed692f5255f1b0fdfa41", "simhash": "1:bbb8bdd857f5add0", "word_count": 3396 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:04.462910+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DARRELL COURSON, a Minor, by Paula Courson, His Mother and Next Friend, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DANVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 118, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1994, plaintiff, Darrell Courson, an eighth-grade student, was injured while using a table saw during shop class. The case was previously before us on the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to defendant, Danville School District No. 118 (District). Courson v. Danville School District No. 118, 301 Ill. App. 3d 752, 704 N.E.2d 447 (1998). The trial court had held that the actions of the District and its employees in failing to provide a safety shield on the saw were discretionary actions which came within the immunity afforded by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 2000)). We reversed the summary judgment, noting that the deposition of the shop teacher had not been taken and that not every action taken by a public employee is immunized by the Act. Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 757-58, 704 N.E.2d at 451.\nThe parties have now deposed the shop teacher, Paul Liddle. Liddle testified that the saw\u2019s safety shield was not functioning properly; it would catch on wood being pushed through the saw. He therefore deemed the saw more safe to operate without the shield. Thus, he permanently removed the shield sometime before plaintiff was injured. Liddle also testified that he was given authority by the District to operate the woodshop in the manner he saw fit. He did not contact any school official or the manufacturer of the saw before or after removing the safety shield. Based on Liddle\u2019s deposition, the trial court again entered summary judgment in favor of the District. Plaintiff appeals. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Warren v. Burris, 325 Ill. App. 3d 599, 603, 758 N.E.2d 889, 892 (2001).\nThe conflicting provisions and meaningless intricacies of the Act have presented problems for the courts. The application of section 2 \u2014 201 has been particularly difficult. Section 2 \u2014 201 provides as follows:\n\u201cExcept as otherwise provided by [s]tatute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not hable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining polity when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 2000).\nApplying this language, the supreme court has stated that the employee\u2019s position may involve either (1) determining policy or (2) exercising discretion, but the employee\u2019s act or omission must be both a (3) determination of policy and an (4) exercise of discretion. Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 484, 763 N.E.2d 756, 763 (2002). The key question under section 2 \u2014 201 is accordingly not so much the position of the employee but the determination made by the employee, whether that determination was a \u201cdiscretionary policy determination.\u201d Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763 N.E.2d at 764.\nIn our previous decision, we focused on the determination made by the employee and concluded there were three possibilities in these cases:\n(1) The act or omission could constitute a discretionary action, where the public employee taking the action would be immune from liability, under section 2 \u2014 201, and the local public entity would then be immune under section 2 \u2014 109 if the only basis for its liability was vicarious liability. Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 756, 704 N.E.2d at 450.\n(2) The act or omission could be ministerial, in which event the local public entity may be liable, but the public employee will not be liable under section 2 \u2014 202, absent willful and wanton conduct. Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 756, 704 N.E.2d at 450.\n(3) The act or omission might be neither an exercise of discretion nor a ministerial act, but simply an oversight, in which event there would not be immunity under section 2 \u2014 201. Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 704 N.E.2d at 451; see also Catberro v. Naperville School District No. 203, 317 Ill. App. 3d 150, 154, 739 N.E.2d 115, 119 (2000) (purchase of poles used in physical education class may have involved a mere failure to inspect, not an exercise of discretion).\nOne of the rationales for sovereign immunity is that allowing a suit could operate to control the actions and policies, the discretion, of the sovereign. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 159-60, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (1992). In our previous decision, we noted that although many activities may be said to involve discretion, some cases have narrowed the definition. The operation of a snowplow is neither a ministerial nor a discretionary action. Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 473, 657 N.E.2d 988, 992 (1995) (overruling Mower v. Williams, 402 Ill. 486, 84 N.E.2d 435 (1949)). \u201c \u2018[D]iscretionary acts are those that are unique to a particular public office.\u2019 \u201d Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484-85, 763 N.E.2d at 763, quoting Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474, 657 N.E.2d at 993. It would be difficult to conceive of any official act that did not admit of some \u201cdiscretion\u201d in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail. Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474, 657 N.E.2d at 993.\nAlong those lines, the rule has evolved that claims based on the negligent operation of an automobile by a state employee are generally outside the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 160, 592 N.E.2d at 980.\n\u201cLao\u2019s decisions, as he proceeded to the alleged call, regarding when to execute turns were not \u2018discretionary\u2019 acts, as that term is used in the analysis of this issue. While Lao did in fact make decisions regarding what route to follow, the choices he made were not an exercise of his official discretion. To the contrary, Lao\u2019s deciding when and where to turn was an activity of a non-official nature. These same choices are made by all drivers of motor vehicles. This was not an activity that is uniquely related to Lao\u2019s official duties as a State trooper.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 167, 592 N.E.2d at 984.\n\u201cThis rule is, of course, not without exceptions: in some circumstances, a State employee\u2019s manner of operating a vehicle may be so unique to his employment that a lawsuit aimed at his negligent driving could operate to control the actions and policies of the State. See, e.g., Campbell v. White (1991), 207 Ill. App. 3d 541[, 552, 566 N.E.2d 47, 54] (sovereign immunity applies where a State law enforcement officer is engaged in a high-speed chase of a suspect and he negligently causes the death of the suspect).\u201d Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 160, 592 N.E.2d at 981.\nCurrie involved a state employee and not a local government employee to whom section 2 \u2014 201 might apply. Currie considered whether an action against a state trooper based on an automobile collision was really a claim against the State which had to be brought in the Court of Claims, and whether the trooper was immune under the common-law doctrine of public officials\u2019 immunity. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 166, 592 N.E.2d at 983. Nevertheless, in construing section 2 \u2014 201, the cases have employed common-law definitions of discretionary and ministerial functions. Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 473, 657 N.E.2d at 992.\nAre some actions of a school district employee so standard, so routine, or so independent of the office that they do not amount to a discretionary policy determination? Is, for example, the operation of a school bus by an employee of a local school district outside the immunity afforded by section 2 \u2014 201? The Act\u2019s shortened statute of limitations has been applied to school bus drivers. Racich v. Anderson, 241 Ill. App. 3d 336, 339-40, 608 N.E.2d 972, 974 (1993) (whether defendant would be entitled to invoke a sovereign immunity defense is a separate question). Racich did comment that only where a judgment against the employee could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability does sovereign immunity encompass the employee\u2019s actions. Racich, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 608 N.E.2d at 974. Currie was applied in a case involving a school bus driver employed by the State, the court finding that the duty defendant allegedly breached is a duty that every school bus driver owes to his minor passengers, and the duty allegedly breached was not unique to defendant\u2019s state employment but was independent of that employment. Thomas v. Garner, 284 Ill. App. 3d 90, 95, 672 N.E.2d 52, 55-56 (1996).\nDo the provisions of the Act make much sense when applied to school teachers? Is a shop teacher\u2019s operation of a table saw without the guard really a \u201cdiscretionary policy determination\u201d (Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763 N.E.2d at 764), or is it more like a state trooper\u2019s operation of his motor vehicle, an act which is not unique to his particular office (Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 167, 592 N.E.2d at 984)? The more recent cases seem to favor a finding of discretionary policy determination. A school district\u2019s decision not to provide roller-blade safety equipment is a discretionary policy determination. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763 N.E.2d at 764. A fire marshal\u2019s direction to an office worker to stand near a door during a fire drill involved a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion because in planning and conducting fire drills, the fire marshal had to balance various interests that might compete for the time and resources of the fire department, including the interests of efficiency and safety. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 342, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1181-82 (1998). A principal who refuses a student\u2019s request to leave school early because of inclement weather is making a policy decision. Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 474, 758 N.E.2d 848, 853 (2001). A tumbling coach in warning participants and providing safety equipment has to consider each tumbler\u2019s abilities, balance these interests against the resources available, and make a judgment as to how best to perform his coaching duties. This qualifies as the making of policy. Johnson v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798, 809, 704 N.E.2d 416, 424 (1998).\nWere we correct when we said that \u201c[n]ot every discretionary action taken by a public employee is immunized by section 2 \u2014 201\u201d? Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 704 N.E.2d at 451; see Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 493, 763 N.E.2d at 768 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (\u201cAny decision made by a municipal employee whose responsibilities include the determination of policy will be automatically immune from liability\u201d). Does every employee of a school district make \u201cdiscretionary policy determinations\u201d? If a janitor scrubbing a floor trips a student with a mop, is the janitor\u2019s action immunized under section 2 \u2014 201? Does not the janitor have to balance the various interests that might compete for his time and resources, and make a judgment as to whether to rope off the area or stop mopping as students are walking by? Discretionary acts are those that are unique to a particular public office. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 484-85, 763 N.E.2d at 763. It is hard to accept that mopping a floor is a unique activity, but certainly the decision how to accomplish that task is generally left to the janitor.\nUnder the cases, it appears, based on Liddle\u2019s deposition, that the decision to remove the safety shield here was a decision unique to the particular public office. Apparently the \u201cpublic office\u201d here was that of shop teacher, like that of sports director or tumbling coach. The shop instructor was charged with balancing various interests that might compete for the time and resources of the shop class, including the interests of efficiency and safety. See Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342, 692 N.E.2d at 1182. A shop teacher in warning students and providing safety equipment has to consider each student\u2019s abilities, balance these interests against the resources available, and make a judgment how best to perform his teaching duties. See Johnson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 809, 704 N.E.2d at 424. Under the cases, we conclude that a discretionary policy determination was involved here and that the immunity of section 2 \u2014 201 applies. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nIt is troublesome that a shop class instructor can decide that a safety shield should be removed from a table saw being used by students, perhaps a shield whose use is required by the manufacturer for some operations. Could a driver training instructor determine that student drivers should not wear safety belts, that the students were safer without the belts? As unattractive as these conclusions are, section 2 \u2014 201 would apparently provide immunity, just as \u201ca school district would enjoy immunity if, for example, it provided its football players with leather helmets or, worse yet, no helmets at all.\u201d Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763 N.E.2d at 764.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged that the District failed to properly maintain the saw. We questioned in our original decision whether section 3 \u2014 102 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 102 (West 1994)), which provides in relevant part that \u201ca local public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property,\u201d was an exception to section 2 \u2014 201. Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 758, 704 N.E.2d at 451. Section 2 \u2014 201 applies only \u201c[e]xcept as otherwise provided by [s]tatute.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 1994). Despite that language, the supreme court has held that whether a local public entity owed a duty of care and whether that entity enjoyed immunity are separate inquiries. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 480, 763 N.E.2d at 760, citing Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388, 665 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996). Although there are a number of cases (\u201cGerrity and its progeny\u201d) holding \u201cthat school districts have a duty to provide safety equipment, and the School Code offers no immunity from allegations of negligent failure to provide such equipment,\u201d the supreme court has refused to extend those cases to prevent immunity under section 2 \u2014 201. Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 483, 763 N.E.2d at 762 (School Code and Tort Immunity Act are separate enactments). It may also be that the rule of \u201cGerrity and its progeny\u201d is not a rule \u201cotherwise provided by [sjtatute.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 2000); Arteman, 198 Ill. 2d at 487, 763 N.E.2d at 764 (a judicially created exception cannot override a statutory immunity).\nSection 3 \u2014 102, however, is not a separate enactment, nor is it a judicially created exception. We conclude that section 3 \u2014 102 imposes on a school district the duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain its property (see Adamczyk v. Township High School District 214, 324 Ill. App. 3d 920, 922, 755 N.E.2d 30, 32 (2001)), and that such duty does not fall within the immunity of section 2 \u2014 201. Nevertheless, we conclude that the action here, the intentional removal of a safety shield, cannot be characterized as a failure to maintain property.\nAccordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" }, { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. Based upon the record here, summary judgment was not appropriate. I cannot find as a matter of law that Liddle\u2019s actions were a discretionary policy determination subject to section 2 \u2014 201 immunity. Liddle\u2019s actions here were discretionary, for Courson refers us to no statute, rule, regulation, or similar provision of law that would have compelled Liddle to take a different course of action on these facts. However, simply saying that Liddle\u2019s actions were discretionary does not end the matter. We noted in Courson that not every discretionary action taken by a public employee is immunized by section 2 \u2014 201 of the Act. Only acts or omissions in determining policy are immunized. Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 704 N.E.2d at 451.\nWhen determining whether an employee\u2019s activity constitutes the determination of policy, both the position of the employee and the type of action must be considered. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 341, 692 N.E.2d at 1181. Thus, policy decisions are defined as:\n\u201c \u2018[TJhose decisions which require the municipality to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.\u2019 \u201d Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342, 692 N.E.2d at 1181, quoting West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 588 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1992).\nOne of the purposes of tort immunity is to inhibit judicial second-guessing of the executive function. West, 147 Ill. 2d at 12, 588 N.E.2d at 1109. Thus, where the decision-making process requires the special expertise of a governmental unit or involves the weighing of broad governmental objectives, immunity is more likely to be found available. See Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 343, 692 N.E.2d at 1182 (City of Chicago fire marshal\u2019s decisions constituted policy); West, 147 Ill. 2d at 11, 588 N.E.2d at 1109 (municipal traffic planner\u2019s decisions constituted policy). On the other hand, where the activity in question does not constitute a \u201cuniquely governmental function\u201d courts have held immunity unavailable (see Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 704 N.E.2d at 451); likewise, where objective standards for measuring conduct exist. Similarly, decisions regarding property maintenance might not be regarded as policy decisions. See Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201, 313 Ill. App. 3d 710, 715, 730 N.E.2d 81, 86 (2000) (whether to put railing on an accessability ramp, install lighting, and warn of a drop-off were maintenance decisions (in contrast to policy decisions)), overruled sub silentio by Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 758 N.E.2d 848.\nI conclude that immunity is not available in this case because Liddle was not determining policy in removing the safety guard from the wood saw. I recognize Liddle testified that he was given near-plenary authority over the operation of his shop class, and Courson has offered no evidence to refute this. I therefore accord that testimony its due weight. But, balanced against this is another fact \u2014 Liddle was a teacher. He did not occupy an executive or administrative position in the school district. His role was therefore less like that of the fire marshal in Harinek or the traffic planner in West.\nFurther, Liddle\u2019s specific action in removing the safety guard also is not a policy decision subject to immunity. That decision was not one requiring the unique expertise of some governmental unit. The use of power tools generally and wood saws specifically is a commonplace activity, for which objective standards of safety exist. Thus we need not be concerned that we are impinging upon the exclusive province of a coordinate branch of government or that immunity is necessary to safeguard that branch\u2019s expertise. Again, this distinguishes Liddle\u2019s actions from those of the fire marshal in Harinek or the traffic planner in West. Moreover, the removal of a malfunctioning safety guard from such equipment is better characterized as a maintenance decision, not a policy planning one similar to that found in Capps. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of the District.\nI also disagree with the majority\u2019s holding and would find that the intentional removal of the safety shield constitutes a failure to maintain property and, therefore, respectfully dissent. Section 3 \u2014 102(a) of the Act imposes on a school district the duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain its property. 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 102(a) (West 2000). Liddle testified that the saw\u2019s safety shield was not functioning properly. Instead of having the saw repaired so that the safety shield functioned properly, Liddle simply removed the safety shield. He, therefore, breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the saw, and this breach of duty does not fall within the immunity of section 2 \u2014 201.1 would, therefore, reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of the District.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederick H. Underhill (argued), of Groppi, McNamara & Underhill, of Danville, for appellant.", "John F. Martin (argued), of Meachum & Martin, of Danville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DARRELL COURSON, a Minor, by Paula Courson, His Mother and Next Friend, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DANVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 118, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201400\u20140192\nArgued November 14, 2000.\nOpinion filed August 14, 2002.\nMYERSCOUGH, J., dissenting.\nFrederick H. Underhill (argued), of Groppi, McNamara & Underhill, of Danville, for appellant.\nJohn F. Martin (argued), of Meachum & Martin, of Danville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0086-01", "first_page_order": 104, "last_page_order": 112 }