{ "id": 485913, "name": "DAWN T., as Mother and Next Friend of D.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUDELSON BAPTIST CHILDREN'S HOME, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Dawn T. v. Hudelson Baptist Children's Home", "decision_date": "2002-08-20", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201401\u20140057", "first_page": "445", "last_page": "452", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 445" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1265" }, { "page": "1265" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511405 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257179 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 1166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725365 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "764 N.E.2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1125-26" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58955 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" }, { "page": "25-26" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "25-26" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "741 N.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026001 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "994-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 F. Supp. 1449", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 11649488 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/730/1449-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533168 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596413 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381838 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 813, "char_count": 16765, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.01741935533693277 }, "sha256": "a976c0f1c33de4e0ed2dca5ddc8958578a906a350202494d7622ba4b58a01190", "simhash": "1:a16c9d193bf72b6a", "word_count": 2697 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:04.462910+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAWN T., as Mother and Next Friend of D.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUDELSON BAPTIST CHILDREN\u2019S HOME, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MELISSA CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the circuit court\u2019s grant of a motion to dismiss filed by Hudelson Baptist Children\u2019s Home (Hudelson) pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2000)). Dawn T. (plaintiff), as mother and next friend of D.D., brought this action for negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. She alleged that Hudelson caused her son to be the victim of sexual abuse while in its care and custody. The circuit court held that Hudelson was immune from suit pursuant to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)). The primary issue for review is whether Hudelson, a not-for-profit charitable institution providing residential treatment to disturbed children, is a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of section 1 \u2014 206 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000)). We reverse and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn April 27, 1997, D.D., a minor, entered Hudelson\u2019s residential treatment program. On September 10, 1997, one of Hudelson\u2019s employees filed a report indicating that D.D. had been the victim of repeated sexual abuse while in Hudelson\u2019s care. The report indicated that two other male children (minors A and B), also in Hudelson\u2019s care, had perpetrated the abuse.\nHudelson is a residential treatment facility providing counseling and education to children exhibiting emotional and behavioral disorders. The children receiving treatment at Hudelson are all referrals from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and each child either is a ward of DCFS or is in the custody of DCFS. The referrals are made pursuant to a fees-for-services contract with DCFS, which sets out a per diem rate per child and additional rates for a schedule of services.\nHudelson was founded in 1903 as a private facility for orphaned and needy children and has operated in affiliation with the Baptist Church since 1911. It is a not-for-profit corporation, as well as a charitable organization and a tax-exempt entity under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. \u00a7 501(c)(3) (1994)). Hudel-son\u2019s 1973 amended articles of incorporation state that it is \u201corganized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational^] and scientific purposes.\u201d Further, Hudelson\u2019s mission statement explains that its purpose is to \u201cpromote, in Christian love, the physical, social, emotional, intellectual^] and spiritual development of children and their families in need through a variety of exemplary family-focused child welfare services.\u201d Hudelson\u2019s contract states that the program is designed to serve \u201cfemales between the ages of 10 and 18 years who have at some point in their history been victims of sexual abuse and for whom the abuse experience has not been successfully resolved and males between the ages of 6 and 12 years who display behavioral or emotional problems which prevent them from residing in a less restrictive setting[,] therefore requiring residential treatment.\u201d Hudelson receives its revenue through a contract with DCFS, along with supplemental charitable contributions from the Baptist Church. The management and control of Hudelson is through a Baptist Church board of directors.\nOn July 18, 2000, plaintiff filed \u00e1 two-count amended complaint alleging that Hudelson\u2019s conduct was negligent and willful and wanton. The complaint alleged that prior to the placement of minors A and B with Hudelson, DCFS had identified these minors as sexually aggressive children and at a high risk to offend sexually. Further, plaintiff alleged that Hudelson knew that an evaluation of minors A and B had recommended that they be placed in a well-supervised environment. Plaintiff further claimed that, despite Hudelson\u2019s knowledge of the propensities of minors A and B, Hudelson failed to protect D.D. from these sexually aggressive children. Plaintiff claimed that because of Hudelson\u2019s negligence, D.D. was sexually attacked, sodomized, and forced to engage in oral sex with minors A and B on a repeated basis from July 7, 1997, through September 10, 1997.\nRelying on the Act, Hudelson asserted the affirmative defense of immunity. On August 23, 2000, Hudelson filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code. In its motion to dismiss, Hu-delson claimed that it has immunity under the Act because it is a \u201clocal public entity\u201d \u201corganized for the purpose of conducting public business\u201d under section 1 \u2014 206. Hudelson further argued that section 4 \u2014 102 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/4 \u2014 102 (West 2000)) prevents it from being found negligent for failing to protect D.D. and that section 4 \u2014 102 of the Act and section 34 \u2014 84(a) of the-School Code (105 ILCS 5/34 \u2014 84(a) (West 2000)) forbid plaintiffs action for willful and wanton misconduct. Lastly, Hudelson argued that it was also shielded from liability under section 2 \u2014 201 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 2000)) because the placement of D.D. with minors A and B was an exercise of policy and discretion under the Act.\nThe trial court granted Hudelson\u2019s motion, finding that it was a \u201clocal public entity\u201d within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff appealed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it found that Hu-delson was a public entity under the Act and dismissed her complaint. She contends that Hudelson is not organized for the purpose of conducting public business but that, rather, it is a not-for-profit corporation organized for charitable purposes. Plaintiff further maintains that Hudelson is not funded by or controlled by local government and does not offer its services to the general public. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that if this court agrees with the circuit court\u2019s finding \u2014 that Hudelson is a local public entity \u2014 then section 6 \u2014 106 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/6 \u2014 106 (West 2000)) should apply to Hudelson\u2019s conduct and not sections 2 \u2014 201 and 4 \u2014 102 of the Act or section 34\u2014 84(a) of the School Code, as Hudelson contends.\nHudelson maintains that it was organized for the purpose of conducting public business as shown by its corporate history. In further support of its position, Hudelson argues that it engages in the \u201cbusiness of government,\u201d offers its services to the public at large, receives nearly all of its funding from government sources, and is heavily regulated by the State.\nWe review de novo the court\u2019s granting of a section 2\u2014619 motion to dismiss. Johnson v. Du Page Airport Authority, 268 Ill. App. 3d 409, 414, 644 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1994).\nThe main objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In order to accomplish that objective, we consider the statutory language as a whole and each provision in relation with every other section. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89, 665 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996). Because the Act is in derogation of the common law action against public entities, we must strictly construe its language against the public entity involved. Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 277-78, 583 N.E.2d 487, 490 (1991)\nThe stated purpose of the Act is \u201cto protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101.1 (West 2000). The primary issue on appeal is whether Hudelson is a \u201clocal public entity\u201d as defined by the Act. In deciding, we must interpret section 1 \u2014 206:\n\u201c \u2018Local public entity\u2019 includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school board, educational service region, regional board of school trustees, community college district, community college board, forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, museum district, emergency telephone system board, and all other local governmental bodies. \u2018Local public entity\u2019 also includes library systems and any intergovernmental agency or similar entity formed pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Illinois or the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act[,] as well as any not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business. It does not include the State or any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, university[,] or similar agency of the State.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000).\nThe term \u201cany not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public business\u201d has been the subject of analysis in a number of Illinois appellate cases. The courts have considered different factors in a variety of fact scenarios and have arrived at varying interpretations of the term\u2019s meaning.\nSeveral courts have focused on the degree of public funding the entity receives (Smith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 210 Ill. App. 3d 223, 569 N.E.2d 41 (1991); McQueen v. Shelby County, 730 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Ill. 1990); Carroll v. Paddock, 317 Ill. App. 3d 985, 741 N.E.2d 326 (2000), aff\u2019d, 199 Ill. 2d 16, 764 N.E.2d 1118 (2002)), while other courts have given greater consideration to the extent the entity benefits the public without limitation (Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass\u2019n, 306 Ill. App. 3d 13, 713 N.E.2d 616 (1999), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000); Niehaus v. Rural Peoria County Council on Aging, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 665, 732 N.E.2d 132 (2000); Johnson v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798, 704 N.E.2d 416 (1998); O\u2019Melia v. Lake Forest Symphony Ass\u2019n, 303 Ill. App. 3d 825, 708 N.E.2d 1263 (1999)). Still another factor considered by the courts has been whether the entity engages in government-like services. O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d 825, 708 N.E.2d 1263; Niehaus, 314 Ill. App. 3d 665, 732 N.E.2d 132; Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d 985, 741 N.E.2d 326; Smith, 210 Ill. App. 3d 223, 569 N.E.2d 41; Hills, 306 Ill. App. 3d 13, 713 N.E.2d 616.\nFortunately, our Illinois Supreme Court has given us guidance in navigating this confusing and conflicting body of case law, in the recently decided case of Carroll v. Paddock, 199 Ill. 2d 16, 764 N.E.2d 1118 (2002). The plaintiff in Carroll brought a wrongful-death action against two not-for-profit charitable organizations \u2014 Human Resources Center, a mental health care organization, and Paris Community Hospital. The plaintiff alleged that their negligence caused his son\u2019s death by suicide. Both defendants claimed immunity under the Act. In granting the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, the trial court found that they were both local public entities within the meaning of the Act. In determining whether the hospital and the mental health center were organized for the purpose of conducting public business, the appellate court considered both the degree of government funding and the showing of participation in the business of government. Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d 985, 741 N.E.2d 326. The appellate court concluded that neither defendant was a local public entity under the Act, and the court reversed. Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 995, 741 N.E.2d at 333. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed (after the case sub judice was briefed and argued). The court, however, found that the appellate court placed too much emphasis in its analysis on the amount of government funding: \u201cIrrespective of the degree of government funding, a not-for-profit corporation must be \u2018organized for the purpose of conducting public business\u2019 in order to satisfy the definition of a \u2018[l]ocal public entity.\u2019 \u201d Carroll, 199 Ill. 2d at 25, 764 N.E.2d at 1124, quoting 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 206 (West 2000). The court went on to adopt as its own a working definition of the term \u201cpublic business,\u201d from the O\u2019Melia opinion, wherein the court stressed that the term \u201cpublic business\u201d should have its \u201cplain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning\u201d (O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828, 708 N.E.2d at 1265):\n\u201c \u2018 \u201c \u2018Public\u2019 is defined as \u2018[p]ertaining to a state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all ***. Belonging to the people at large; *** not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community.\u2019 Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990). *** Thus, to conduct \u2018public business\u2019 under the Act, a corporation must pursue an activity that benefits the entire community without limitation. In addition, the phrase \u2018public business\u2019 is also today commonly understood to mean the business of the government.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Carroll, 199 Ill. 2d at 25-26, 764 N.E.2d at 1124, quoting Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 992, 741 N.E.2d at 331, quoting O\u2019Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828, 708 N.E.2d at 1265.\nWith this definition in mind, we now turn to the question of whether Hudelson was engaged in conducting \u201cpublic business.\u201d Hudelson was privately created and is privately controlled and managed by a Baptist Church board of directors. There is no evidence that the members of the board are anything other than private citizens. The state regulations that Hudelson claims subject it to governmental control are uniform state standards that Hudelson (or any other for-profit or not-for-profit organization) must follow if it wishes to be a service provider to the state. This is not the type of governmental control required by the supreme court in Carroll: \u201cWithout evidence of local governmental control, it cannot be said that a not-for-profit corporation conducts \u2018public business\u2019 for purposes of the Act.\u201d Carroll, 199 Ill. 2d at 26, 764 N.E.2d at 1125-26. Hudelson also argues that it qualifies as a \u201clocal public entity\u201d because, it claims, it receives almost all of its funding from the state. As discussed earlier, the supreme court in Carroll instructs us that government funding is irrelevant without other indicia that the entity conducts public business. Carroll, 199 Ill. 2d at 25, 764 N.E.2d at 1124.\nFurther, we are not convinced that Hudelson receives any funding from the state in the commonly accepted meaning of the word \u201cfunding.\u201d There was no evidence that Hudelson received any state or local government grants. The \u201cfunding\u201d Hudelson receives from the state is nothing more than payment for services rendered. If Hudelson does not provide the contractual services, it receives no money. Again, this relationship with the state is no different from a for-profit one. Hudelson also points to its mission statement and articles of incorporation as proof that its purpose is of public benefit. While there can be no question that Hudelson\u2019s purpose, like that of many other charitable organizations, is for the public good, that purpose alone does not transform it into a public business. Carroll, 199 Ill. 2d at 26, 764 N.E.2d at 1124, citing Carroll, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95, 741 N.E.2d at 333. Additionally, we do not believe that Hudelson\u2019s business purpose meets the requirement that it \u201cbenefits the entire community without limitation,\u201d since by its own program description it is designed for a very restricted segment of the public. Carroll, 199 Ill. 2d at 25-26, 764 N.E.2d at 1124.\nIn a strongly worded conclusion, the supreme court in Carroll stated:\n\u201cPublic business is the business of government[,] and a local public entity must either be owned by or operated and controlled by a local governmental unit. Immunity under the Act only attaches to liability arising from the operation of government. [Citation.] Therefore, a not-for-profit is involved in the operation of the government\u2019s public business if and only if the not-for-profit is tightly enmeshed with government either through direct governmental ownership or operational control by a unit of local government.\u201d Carroll, 199 Ill. 2d at 27, 764 N.E.2d at 1125.\nIt is clear to us under the facts of this case that Hudelson is not \u201cenmeshed with government.\u201d Applying the holding in Carroll to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that Hudelson is not a local public entity and therefore not entitled to the protection provided under the Act.\nBecause we find that the Act does not apply to Hudelson, we need not address plaintiffs alternative arguments regarding immunity.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Marion County and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nReversed; cause remanded.\nMAAG, P.J., and RARICK, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MELISSA CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Tapella II, of Hefner, Eberspacher & Tapella, of Mattoon, for appellant.", "James T. Ferrini and Ann C. Chalstrom, both of Clausen Miller P.C., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAWN T., as Mother and Next Friend of D.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUDELSON BAPTIST CHILDREN\u2019S HOME, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201401\u20140057\nOpinion filed August 20, 2002.\nWilliam R. Tapella II, of Hefner, Eberspacher & Tapella, of Mattoon, for appellant.\nJames T. Ferrini and Ann C. Chalstrom, both of Clausen Miller P.C., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0445-01", "first_page_order": 463, "last_page_order": 470 }