{ "id": 487123, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARC E. WHITE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. White", "decision_date": "2002-09-05", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201401\u20140481", "first_page": "777", "last_page": "782", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 777" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5149529 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 1155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279570 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1157" }, { "page": "1157" }, { "page": "1157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/1155-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58906 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58937 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58953 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0326-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 538, "char_count": 12372, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.52863661204792e-07, "percentile": 0.8122506370062502 }, "sha256": "1eae8ac700fd3897c331f9a3eb7e7e7ff9de627538ce48637f319b47c1f8c0fa", "simhash": "1:880b642f569869a4", "word_count": 2101 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:04.462910+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARC E. WHITE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue presented by this appeal is whether the monetary credit allowed by section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2000)) applies to court costs, probation fees, and lab analysis fees. Section 110 \u2014 14 provides:\n\u201cCredit for Incarceration on Bailable Offense. Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant. However, in no case shall the amount so allowed or credited exceed the amount of the fine.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2000).\nFor the reasons that follow, we hold that the monetary credit allowed by section 110 \u2014 14 does not apply to court costs, probation fees, or lab analysis fees.\nDefendant, Marc E. White, was charged with burglary in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u20141606; with burglary in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u20141969; and with possession of a controlled substance in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u20142981. The trial court consolidated the cases. Pursuant to an agreement, defendant entered a plea of guilty to all three charges. With respect to case Nos. 98 \u2014 CF\u20141606 and 98 \u2014 CF\u20142981, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of incarceration of 4\u00bd years. With respect to case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u20141969, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 months\u2019 probation to run consecutive to the terms of incarceration. This appeal involves only the sentence of probation.\nThe probation order provided that defendant was to pay various \u201ccosts, fees, [and] penalties.\u201d These monetary obligations included statutory court costs of $213; probation fees of $10 per month; a street value fine of $70; a drug assessment fee of $500; and a lab analysis fee of $50. The probation order specified that defendant was to receive 258 days of credit for time served.\nDefendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for credit for incarceration on a bailable offense. Relying on section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2000)), defendant asserted that he was entitled to a monetary credit of $5 for each of the 258 days that he was incarcerated when he could have supplied bail. Defendant also asserted that this amount should be applied against all of the monetary obligations that the probation order required him to pay. Defendant calculated the maximum amount of his entitlement under section 110 \u2014 14 to be $1,290 and the total amount of the monetary obligations imposed by the probation order to be $1,145. Based on these calculations, defendant argued that the monetary credit that he was entitled to under section 110 \u2014 14 covered all of the monetary obligations that the probation order required him to pay and should be applied against all of these monetary obligations.\nOn March 21, 2001, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered an order regarding defendant\u2019s motion. As modified, the order stated in relevant part:\n\u201c[T]he street value fine of $70.00 and the statutory drug offense assessment of $500.00 are shown to be paid by the $5 per day credit earned by the defendant for the 258 days he served in the Winnebago County Jail in this cause. The court costs, probation fee and lab fee cannot be shown as paid by credit for time served as mentioned above as they are costs and fees and not fines or assessments.\u201d\nDefendant subsequently filed a notice of appeal. The back of the notice of appeal was stamped \u201cRECEIVED\u201d by the clerk of this court on April 18, 2001. The front of the notice of appeal was stamped \u201cFILED\u201d in the trial court on May 1, 2001.\nWe initially address the State\u2019s jurisdictional challenge to defendant\u2019s appeal. The State contends that we should dismiss the appeal because defendant\u2019s notice of appeal was untimely and this court therefore lacks jurisdiction to decide the appeal. Supreme Court Rule 606(b) provides that a notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or, if a timely postjudgment motion directed against the judgment is entered, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion. 188 111. 2d R. 606(b).\nIn this case, the final judgment that defendant appealed from was entered on March 21, 2001, and defendant did not file a postjudgment motion directed against the judgment. Therefore, in order for it to be timely, defendant was required to file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after March 21, 2001. Defendant\u2019s notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of the circuit court on May 1, 2001, i.e., more than 30 days after March 21, 2001. Thus, without more, the State\u2019s contention that the notice of appeal was untimely appears to have merit.\nHowever, defendant correctly asserts that his notice of appeal should be deemed to have been timely filed under the \u201cdate of mailing\u201d rule enunciated in Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 126 Ill. 2d 326 (1989), and by Supreme Court Rules 373 (155 Ill. 2d R. 373) and 612(t) (177 Ill. 2d R. 612(t)). Under the date of mailing rule, if a notice of appeal is received after the due date, the time of mailing is deemed to be the time of filing. See Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority, 126 Ill. 2d at 341-42. Because defendant\u2019s notice of appeal was received in this court on April 18, 2001, it was obviously mailed within the 30-day period specified by Rule 606(b) and therefore was timely filed. The fact that the notice of appeal was initially received in this court rather than the circuit court is of no relevance. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 365 (appeal filed in wrong court shall be transferred to proper court and treated as if properly filed in that court).\nWe now turn to the merits of defendant\u2019s appeal. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that the monetary credit provided by section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2000)) did not apply to the court costs, probation fees, and lab analysis fee that he was required to pay by the probation order. Defendant recognizes that the language of section 110 \u2014 14 speaks of credit against a \u201cfine\u201d levied upon a conviction and is silent as to credit against monetary obligations such as those at issue here, which are labeled costs or fees. Nonetheless, defendant argues that the credit allowed by section 110 \u2014 14 should apply to the monetary obligations in question here because they should be deemed to be \u201cfines\u201d under section 110 \u2014 14.\nDefendant raises an issue of statutory construction. Well-established principles guide us in resolving an issue of statutory construction. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. To determine the legislature\u2019s intent, a court should first look to the statute\u2019s plain language and should accord the language its plain and commonly understood meaning. The court must not read into the plain language exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not intend. People v. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39 (2002). Statutory construction is a question of law. People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 118 (2002). We therefore employ a de novo standard of review with respect to an issue of statutory construction. People ex rel. Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 148-49 (2002).\nIn this case, we must construe section 110 \u2014 14. Section 110 \u2014 14 provides that the credit in question shall be allowed to a \u201cperson incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2000). Section 110 \u2014 14 also provides that \u201cin no case shall the amount so allowed or credited exceed the amount of the fineP (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2000).\nThis plain language of section 110 \u2014 14 clearly and unambiguously expresses a legislative intent to limit the applicability of the credit allowed by the statute to \u201cfines\u201d that are imposed pursuant to a conviction. We discern nothing in section 110 \u2014 14 that even remotely suggests that the credit can be applied against anything other than such a fine. Accordingly, we conclude that the credit provided by section 110 \u2014 14 may be applied only to such a fine.\nDefendant does not really contest this construction of section 110 \u2014 14. Rather, defendant asserts that the credit he is entitled to under section 110 \u2014 14 should be applied against the monetary obligations that are in question here, i.e., court costs, probation fees, and a lab fee, because these obligations should be deemed to be \u201cfines\u201d within the meaning of that term in section 110 \u2014 14.\nA \u201cfine\u201d is a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense. People v. Despenza, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1155, 1157 (2001). A \u201ccost\u201d is a charge or fee taxed by a court such as a filing fee, jury fee, courthouse fee, or reporter fee. Despenza, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1157. Unlike a fine, which is punitive in nature, a cost does not punish a defendant in addition to the sentence he received, but instead is a collateral consequence of the defendant\u2019s conviction that is compensatory in nature. People v. Terneus, 239 Ill. App. 3d 669, 672 (1992). A \u201cfee\u201d is a charge for labor or services, especially professional services. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 629 (7th ed. 1999).\nIn Terneus, the court stated that \u201c[t]he law is also well settled that imposing [court] costs does not punish a defendant in addition to the sentence he receives, but is instead a collateral consequence.\u201d Terneus, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 672. In Despenza, the court found that \u201cprobation costs\u201d were not a \u201cfine\u201d because they were not imposed as a pecuniary punishment in addition to imprisonment. Despenza, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1157. The statute that authorizes the imposition of a crime lab analysis fee as part of a sentence provides that one of the uses to which the fee may be put is to defray \u201ccosts incurred in providing analysis for controlled substances in connection with criminal investigations conducted within this State\u201d (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u2014 1.4(g)(1) (West 2000)).\nBased on these authorities, we conclude that all of the monetary obligations in question here are compensatory in nature and therefore should be deemed \u201ccosts\u201d or \u201cfees\u201d rather than \u201cfines.\u201d Defendant argues that the probation fees and the lab analysis fee should be deemed fines and not \u201cfees\u201d because there was no showing that the amount of these fees reflected the actual costs related to his case. However, even if defendant is correct, defendant\u2019s argument fails to convince us that this alters the fundamentally compensatory nature of the fees in question. Defendant also argues that the monetary obligations in question should be deemed \u201cfines\u201d because the statutes authorizing the obligations do not contain language exempting them from the credit allowed by section 110 \u2014 14. This argument is unconvincing in the face of the plain language of section 110 \u2014 14 that limits the application of the credit to \u201cfines\u201d and our conclusion that the monetary obligations in question are not fines.\nFinally, in support of his position, defendant points to cases where the court allowed the section 110 \u2014 14 credit to be applied to undifferentiated \u201cfines and costs.\u201d Based on the plain language of section 110 \u2014 14, to the extent that these cases may have applied the credit to \u201ccosts\u201d in addition to \u201cfines,\u201d we decline to follow them.\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the credit allowed by section 110 \u2014 14 did not apply to the court costs, probation fees, and lab analysis fee.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY and GROMETER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Paul Aexander Rogers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P. Moltz and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARC E. WHITE, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201401\u20140481\nOpinion filed September 5, 2002.\nG. Joseph Weller and Paul Aexander Rogers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P. Moltz and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0777-01", "first_page_order": 795, "last_page_order": 800 }