{ "id": 521995, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL MORENO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moreno", "decision_date": "2002-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201400\u20140972", "first_page": "329", "last_page": "344", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 329" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "763 N.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79463 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582-83" }, { "page": "583", "parenthetical": "possession may be joint or shared and still be exclusive" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2435916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145-46" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351233 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "\"Improper remarks require reversal only if they substantially prejudice defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 984", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411689 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993", "parenthetical": "\"Improper remarks require reversal only if they substantially prejudice defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0984-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026021 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 N.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725359 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0336-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1184, "char_count": 34882, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.262683731656366e-08, "percentile": 0.4782867649812788 }, "sha256": "d7bd6af51ac3bffea96deac945e4dfc1984bafab12be82c817b0d7a2d142a40c", "simhash": "1:9c7ed1f64407ef63", "word_count": 5896 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.005109+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL MORENO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 2000, a jury convicted defendant, Manuel Moreno, of cannabis trafficking (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000)) and manufacture or delivery of more than 5,000 grams of a controlled substance containing cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2000)). The trial court later sentenced him to 13 years in prison for cannabis trafficking and 6 years in prison for manufacture or delivery of cannabis, with those sentences to run concurrently. The court also awarded defendant 219 days\u2019 credit for time served prior to sentencing and ordered him to pay a $25 Crime Stoppers fee.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) as a matter of law, he cannot be guilty of cannabis trafficking because (a) that offense is \u201ccomplete\u201d when the cannabis enters Illinois, and (b) the State presented no evidence connecting him to the cannabis at, or prior to, that point in time; (2) the prosecutor misstated the law on accountability during rebuttal closing argument; (3) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of manufacture or delivery of cannabis; (4) he is entitled to an additional day of sentencing credit; and (5) the trial court lacked authority to order him to pay $25 to Crime Stoppers. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe evidence at defendant\u2019s July 2000 trial showed that in March 2000, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol informed the Illinois State Police that (1) in the course of a traffic stop, they had discovered approximately 450 pounds of cannabis stowed in a U-Haul truck en route to Springfield, Illinois; and (2) the couriers had agreed to cooperate in making a controlled delivery. Oklahoma authorities then transported the U-Haul, the cannabis, and the two couriers, Javier Chavez and Reuben Corona, to Illinois State Police headquarters in Springfield.\nAfter interviewing Chavez and Corona, Illinois authorities rented two adjoining rooms at the Ramada Limited hotel (Ramada) on Toronto Road in Springfield. One room was used as the couriers\u2019 hotel room and the adjoining room was used by surveillance personnel. Audio and video recorders were placed in the couriers\u2019 room, and Chavez wore a microphone. The U-Haul containing the cannabis was parked in the Ramada parking lot and was equipped with an electronic \u201ckill switch,\u201d which enabled the police to control whether it would run. /\nIllinois State Police trooper Michael Luster testified that at around 10 or 11 q.m. on March 22, 2000, Chavez called his contact in Texas and told him that he had arrived in Springfield and rented a room at the Ramada. Between 4:30 and 5 p.m., defendant and Manuel Leyva arrived at the hotel room. Luster observed the room via video monitor. After about 45 minutes of discussion, Chavez, Leyva, and defendant left the room and went to the U-Haul. Luster could not see what happened at the U-Haul, but he could hear that they were trying to start it. They then returned to the hotel room and decided that they would have to return with a different vehicle. Leyva and defendant then left together.\nLater that evening, Luster saw Leyva return to the hotel room alone and instruct Chavez and Corona to unload the cannabis from the U-Haul into a Dodge Caravan (Caravan) that was parked next to the U-Haul. After they loaded the Caravan, Chavez was to walk to a nearby McDonald\u2019s, at which point Leyva would have someone else drive the Caravan away. At some point, Corona left the room, ostensibly to get a Coke, and met with Luster, who gave him the key to the U-Haul.\nAfter Chavez and Corona moved the cannabis, they went back inside the hotel and gave the Caravan keys to Luster. Luster instructed Chavez to go to McDonald\u2019s. Luster was then informed via radio that as Chavez walked toward McDonald\u2019s, Justin Moon approached and entered the Caravan. At that time, the arrest signal was given.\nSpringfield police detective George T. Bonnett testified that he was conducting surveillance outside the Ramada on March 22, 2000. He saw a black Mustang and a green Yukon arrive at approximately the same time. He saw the people in the Mustang (later identified as defendant and Leyva) get out of the car and talk \u201cfor a bit\u201d with the people in the Yukon. Then defendant and Leyva went back to the Mustang and left the area.\nBonnett learned via police radio that both vehicles \u201cwent over to the Hardee[\u2019]s parking lot, met over there,\u201d and then the Mustang returned to the Ramada and the Yukon drove around the parking lot of the Ramada and the surrounding businesses.\nLeland Grove police sergeant Mark Gleason testified that he was a member of the arrest team on March 22, 2000. He identified Michael Mohan as the driver of the Yukon and Moon as the passenger. About 45 minutes after the Mustang and the Yukon arrived at the Ramada, Gleason saw Chavez and Leyva try to start the U-Haul. He did not see defendant near the U-Haul.\nChavez testified that prior to March 22, 2000, he lived in El Paso, Texas. In March 2000, he made an agreement with a man identified in the record only as \u201cManny\u201d pursuant to which Chavez would be \u201cin charge\u201d of getting 400 pounds of marijuana from El Paso to Springfield in exchange for $40,000. After Chavez and Manny made this agreement, Chavez called Corona, whom he had known for several years, and asked him to rent a U-Haul truck for him. Chavez and Corona picked up the U-Haul and met Leyva at an El Paso supermarket. Chavez turned the U-Haul over to Leyva and a couple other people who drove it away to load it. They returned the loaded U-Haul to Chavez, who left for Springfield with Corona and one other passenger, a female friend of Corona\u2019s.\nIn Oklahoma, police pulled the U-Haul over for a traffic violation and discovered the cannabis. Chavez and Corona agreed to cooperate with the police, and Chavez called his contact in Texas to explain that they were delayed in Oklahoma due to a mechanical problem with the U-Haul. Oklahoma authorities then transported Chavez and Corona to Illinois State Police headquarters in Springfield. Chavez told Illinois police that he had been instructed to rent a hotel room and call his contact in Texas when he arrived in Springfield.\nAt around 11 a.m. on March 22, 2000, Chavez called his Texas contact from the Ramada and told him that they had arrived in Springfield. Several hours later, Leyva called Chavez and told him that he was on his way to the Ramada. When Leyva arrived at the hotel room, defendant was with him. Chavez and Leyva began discussing the delivery of the contents of the U-Haul. During the conversation, Chavez referred to the contents of the U-Haul as \u201cmota,\u201d which is slang for cannabis. Chavez and Leyva disagreed on the amount Chavez was to be paid, and Leyva insisted that the amount agreed upon was $30,000. Leyva also was not satisfied with where the U-Haul was parked. Defendant was present during the entire conversation, which lasted under an hour. Corona left the room \u201cfrom time to time.\u201d\nWhile Leyva was there, Chavez went out to try to move the U-Haul. He returned to the room and told Leyva that it would not start. Leyva accused Chavez of being afraid to move the U-Haul, and they went outside together. After Leyva tried and failed to start the U-Haul, they returned to the room and discussed what to do. Chavez and Leyva ultimately agreed that they would get a \u201cCaravan\u201d and return after sundown to be less conspicuous. Chavez first testified that defendant was present during this conversation, but he later testified that he could not recall whether defendant was in the room after he and Leyva had tried to start the U-Haul.\nA couple of hours later, Leyva returned to the hotel room, handed Chavez the keys to the Caravan, which was parked outside, and told him to transfer the contents of the U-Haul into the Caravan. Leyva also told Chavez that he would be at the McDonald\u2019s across the street when everything was ready. After retrieving the padlock for the U-Haul from the police, Chavez and Corona went out to the parking lot. Chavez arrived at the U-Haul before Corona. When Corona arrived, he was carrying \u201csome drinks,\u201d and he told Chavez not to move anything because the police were at a nearby gas station.\nAfter loading the Caravan, Chavez went into the hotel, gave the Caravan and U-Haul keys to the police, and walked to McDonald\u2019s. As he reached the dining area, \u201ceverybody was arrested.\u201d\nCorona testified that on March 21, 2000, he used his father\u2019s credit card to rent a U-Haul truck with Chavez, who did not have a credit card. His testimony regarding what happened in El Paso and his cooperation with Oklahoma and Illinois police was largely consistent with that of other witnesses.\nCorona further testified that Leyva and defendant arrived at the hotel room at around 4:30 p.m. When Leyva came into the room, he introduced defendant to Chavez and Corona but did not explain who he was. Discussions were primarily between Chavez and Leyva. They discussed whether \u201call the mota was there.\u201d Corona heard the word \u201cmota\u201d used a couple of times. The word \u201cmarijuana\u201d was used \u201cat least once.\u201d Chavez and Leyva argued about whether Chavez was to be paid $30,000 or $40,000. Corona was not present for the entire conversation because he left the room a few times to confer with the police officers in the next room.\nAt one point, Chavez gave Leyva the keys to the U-Haul, and Leyva attempted to start it. Defendant went with them to the U-Haul and looked under the hood. Back in the hotel room, they discussed how they would transport the cannabis, and Leyva and defendant then left to get another vehicle.\nLater that evening, Leyva and defendant returned with the Caravan, and they both stopped at the hotel room before going to McDonald\u2019s. After they left, Corona left the hotel to get some chocolate milk from the convenience store, and on his way back to the hotel, defendant, who had walked back over from McDonald\u2019s, approached Corona and said, \u201cDon\u2019t move the pot right now because there is a cop car right there,\u201d referring to a patrol car at the gas station. The patrol car pulled away about five minutes later, and Corona and Chavez transferred the cannabis from the U-Haul to the Caravan. After they loaded the Caravan, Corona saw Moon get behind the wheel of the Caravan, and the arrests began.\nThe jury heard audiotape recordings of the conversations recorded by Chavez\u2019 microphone and the recording devices planted in the hotel room. The jury also watched videotape of the hotel room. Because the recordings were primarily in Spanish, the jury was allowed to follow translated transcripts of the tapes while the tapes were played. Maria Velasco and Sofia Stanford prepared the translation. Velasco and Stanford both testified that in preparing the transcripts it was sometimes difficult to determine who was speaking. Stanford testified that she was responsible for the speaker identification in the transcripts and explained that after viewing the videotape to identify each individual\u2019s voice, she was able to distinguish the voices on the audiotapes. Where she could not identify the speaker she inserted a question mark instead of a name. Although the tapes were admitted in evidence, the transcripts were not allowed in the jury room. Chavez testified that he had reviewed the transcripts and noted that many statements were attributed to defendant that were not made by him.\nThe transcript of the recorded conversation that occurred in the hotel room when Chavez, Corona, Leyva, and defendant were present is included in the record on appeal. That transcript shows that during the argument between Chavez and Leyva regarding how much Chavez was to be paid, Corona said \u201cthat in El Paso the other Manuel had said they were going to give us $40,000.\u201d\nDefendant testified that on March 22, 2000, he was living in Beardstown with his wife, her brother, and her parents. He was scheduled to work at AutoZone at around 2 p.m. and had to drop his son off with his son\u2019s mother in Springfield. Before he left for Springfield, he received a phone call from Efraim Ebarra, a former coworker. Ebarra asked defendant to \u201chelp somebody translate on some things.\u201d Ebarra \u201csaid that he had a friend that \u2014 that was coming to Springfield that had some problems with the truck on the way up\u201d and Ebarra\u2019s friend did not speak English. When asked if he was given any other instructions regarding helping Ebarra\u2019s friend, defendant replied, \u201cHe just asked me to help him give him a ride maybe if needed.\u201d Ebarra told defendant that the man\u2019s name was Manuel Leyva and that Leyva would meet him at the home of defendant\u2019s brother, Mike Moreno. Ebarra told defendant that he would be paid \u201csomewhere in the vicinity of $10, $15 an hour maybe.\u201d At some point in the morning, defendant called in sick to work because he was not feeling well.\nAfter defendant dropped off his son, he went to Mike\u2019s house, where he met Leyva for the first time. Leyva told him that he wanted defendant to take him to the Ramada. Leyva did not know his way around Springfield very well. They did not discuss what they would do at the Ramada, whether defendant would be paid, or whether defendant was a mechanic.\nThey left Mike\u2019s house in Leyva\u2019s black Mustang and proceeded to Mohan\u2019s house. When asked why, defendant testified, \u201cHe just said to ask him to translate I guess.\u201d When they arrived, Moon was also there. Defendant did not know either Moon or Mohan well, although he had gone to school with Mohan. Defendant translated a conversation in which Leyva told Moon and Mohan to follow them to the Ramada to help unload something. Defendant then drove Leyva (in Ley-va\u2019s Mustang) to the Ramada, and Moon and Mohan followed in a green Yukon. Leyva and defendant did not converse much on the way to the Ramada. When they arrived, Leyva told Moon and Mohan to wait and asked defendant to go inside with him.\nLeyva and defendant went to a room number that Leyva had written on a piece of paper. Leyva knocked a couple of times, but no one answered. Leyva tried to make a call on his cell phone but was unable to make a connection. They left the hotel and went to Hardee\u2019s so that Leyva could use a pay phone. Moon and Mohan also went to Hardee\u2019s. Defendant was not present when Leyva made his phone call. After the call, Leyva asked defendant to take him back to the Ramada. They went back to a different room at the Ramada, Leyva knocked on the door, and they were let in.\nOnce inside the hotel room, defendant saw Corona and Chavez, whom he had never met before. Leyva did not introduce defendant to Corona, and Chavez and did not explain to defendant why defendant was there. Leyva started talking to Chavez. When asked what they talked about, defendant testified as follows:\n\u201cA. *** [T]hey were talking about 40 and 30 and 40 and 30 and something to do with the truck. I really \u2014 I was kind of paying attention but yet I wasn\u2019t. I was trying to figure out\u2014\nQ. Did the conversation strike you as odd?\nA. Yes it did.\nQ. Did it make any sense to you?\nA. At times it did and times it didn\u2019t.\nQ. What did you think they were talking about?\nA. Furniture.\nQ. Okay. And did it strike you as odd that they would have this weird discussion about furniture?\nA. Not really. Not at the time.\nQ. Okay. The \u2014 While they were having this discussion, did you say anything?\nA. I might have said a couple of things.\nQ. And what \u2014 what did you say when you said anything?\nA. I told them to do whatever he was going to do so I could get out of the room.\n* * *\nQ. How did you feel at that point?\nA. Mostly nervous really.\nQ. Okay, why were you nervous?\nA. It was just odd being in the hotel room with three other people and then discussing things that I wasn\u2019t understanding.\u201d\nDefendant further testified that during the time he was in the room, he did not hear anyone mention the word \u201cmarijuana\u201d or \u201cmota.\u201d Defendant \u201chad suspicion that something was going on. [He] wasn\u2019t for sure whether it would be marijuana or some kind of drug or something.\u201d After about 25 minutes, defendant, Leyva, and Chavez left the room. Because defendant felt \u201codd,\u201d he told Leyva he was going to sit in the Mustang and he did not \u201cwant to do whatever [Leyva] was doing.\u201d Leyva said \u201cfine,\u201d and defendant waited in the Mustang for 20 to 25 minutes. During that time, he could \u201ckind of hear\u201d that Leyva and Chavez were trying to start a vehicle. Leyva then went to the Mustang to get something, left, and returned 5 or 10 minutes later. Leyva said \u201cthat he needed a vehicle, a truck or van of some sort.\u201d Defendant told Leyva that he did not personally have a truck or a van but that his sister owned a van.\nThey then drove to Mike\u2019s house. There, defendant asked Amber Welinski (a friend of Mike\u2019s) if they could borrow her green Mazda because Leyva did not want to go back to the Ramada in the same car. Defendant admitted that he thought that was \u201codd.\u201d Defendant then testified as follows:\n\u201cQ. But you went ahead and asked her?\nA. Well, there was four other people. There was three other guys with them.\nQ. That were with Mr. Leyva?\nA. When I pulled into the house, Mr. Leyva was there, and when I got out, exited my vehicle, there was Mr. Leyva and four other Hispanic males.\u201d\nDefendant later testified that once they were at Moreno\u2019s house, he went along with Leyva\u2019s suggestions because he was \u201cafraid [of] something maybe happening to [him] or something.\u201d\nMoon and Mohan arrived about an hour later. After that, defendant called his sister and asked to borrow the Caravan. She agreed. Defendant and Leyva drove to defendant\u2019s sister\u2019s house in someone else\u2019s car, and Moon and Mohan took Welinski\u2019s Mazda. When they got there, defendant\u2019s sister gave him the key to the Caravan, and he drove it to the Ramada. At the Ramada, defendant got out of the Caravan, left the keys in the ignition, and told Leyva he did not want anything to do with what he was doing. He then walked over to McDonald\u2019s, where Moon and Mohan were already waiting. They did not discuss what was happening at the Ramada. About 10 minutes after defendant left Leyva at the Ramada, Leyva arrived at McDonald\u2019s. Defendant translated for Leyva when he asked Moon to drive the Caravan over to McDonald\u2019s. Moon walked over to the hotel, and everyone was arrested.\nDuring cross-examination, defendant admitted that he used to own Mike\u2019s home, lived there \u201coff and on,\u201d and received his mail there. He also admitted that (1) Leyva, Corona, and Chavez all spoke Spanish and there was no need for a translator in the hotel room; and (2) before defendant volunteered the information, Leyva did not know that defendant\u2019s sister had a minivan.\nWelinski testified that on March 22, 2000, she was at Mike\u2019s house at around 5 p.m. When she arrived, Mike and \u201cthree other guys\u201d were present. They were Mexicans who did not speak English, and she had never met them before. Later, defendant and Leyva arrived, and shortly thereafter, Mohan and Moon arrived. Defendant asked Welin-ski if he could borrow her car, and she agreed.\nBased on this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty, and the trial court later sentenced him as stated. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Defendant\u2019s Cannabis Trafficking Conviction\nDefendant first argues that as a matter of law, he cannot be guilty of cannabis trafficking because (1) that offense is complete when cannabis enters Illinois; and (2) the State presented no evidence connecting him to the cannabis at or before that point in time. We disagree.\nBecause the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348, 747 N.E.2d 339, 346 (2001). The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation requires us to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The language of the statute itself is the best indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent and thus we look first to the language of the statute to determine its meaning. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348, 747 N.E.2d at 346.\nSection 5.1(a) of the Cannabis Control Act (Act) defines the offense of cannabis trafficking as follows:\n\u201cExcept for purposes authorized by this Act, any person who knowingly brings or causes to be brought into this State for the purpose of manufacture or delivery or with the intent to manufacture or deliver 2,500 grams or more of cannabis in this State or any other state or country is guilty of cannabis trafficking.\u201d 720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000).\nWe reject defendant\u2019s contention that the offense of cannabis trafficking is absolutely complete when the cannabis crosses Illinois state lines. Rather, we hold that the delivery of cannabis to a recipient within Illinois is a contemplated part of the offense of cannabis trafficking.\nTo be clear, we recognize that delivery is not required to sustain a conviction for cannabis trafficking. If authorities apprehended cannabis couriers after they crossed state lines but before they reached their intended destination or transferred the cannabis to an intended recipient or distributor, they would still be guilty of cannabis trafficking under section 5.1(a) of the Act (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000)). However, when law enforcement authorities allow such a criminal endeavor to play out, the delivery to the intended recipient does not constitute a separate criminal offense. Rather, it constitutes the completion of the cannabis trafficking enterprise.\nThis construction of the cannabis trafficking statute reflects the legislative intent behind its enactment. Put bluntly, the evil the legislature sought to address by enacting that statute was not preventing persons from entering Illinois with large quantities of cannabis and, once over the state line, dropping it in some garbage dump or culvert, never to be found or used by anyone. Instead, the legislature wanted to prohibit people from entering Illinois \u201cwith the intent to manufacture or deliver\u201d (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000)) large quantities of cannabis and, in fact, delivering it, as occurred in the present case.\nResolution of this case requires that we further consider the interplay between the criminal accountability statute, section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2000)), and section 5.1(a) of the Act (720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 2000)). Under section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code, a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another if \u201c[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2000).\nFor the sake of analysis, consider the following hypothetical. An individual in El Paso (the loader) loads a large quantity of cannabis onto a truck bound for Springfield. Although the loader did not make any of the arrangements for the shipment, he knew he was loading cannabis, that it would be driven to Illinois, and that someone in Illinois would be receiving this shipment. Clearly, once the cannabis crossed the Illinois state line, the loader would be guilty of cannabis trafficking in Illinois under sections 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Code and 5.1 of the Act even though he was at all times 1,000 miles away from this state. He would be guilty of that offense because, with the intent to facilitate its commission, he knowingly aided others in the commission of cannabis trafficking by assisting the shipper who caused the cannabis to be brought to Illinois.\nLet us further assume that the truck is driven from El Paso to Springfield by a third individual (the driver). After the driver enters Illinois, he stops for lunch and then proceeds to Springfield, where the truck is unloaded by another individual (the off-loader). The off-loader knows he is unloading cannabis from outside Illinois but is doing it at \u25a0 the request of another (the recipient) and did not make any of the arrangements for the shipment or delivery. Under defendant\u2019s theory that the offense of cannabis trafficking is complete when the cannabis enters Illinois, the off-loader cannot be guilty of cannabis trafficking. We conclude that this is an absurd result and one not intended by the legislature. The reasonable result \u2014 and what we conclude the legislature intended \u2014 would be for the individual who knowingly and intentionally assists in the completion of the criminal enterprise to be guilty, just as is the person who knowingly and intentionally assists at its inception.\nWe therefore hold that (1) the offense of cannabis trafficking can encompass the delivery of the cannabis; and (2) when the requirements of section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code are otherwise satisfied, one who (with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of cannabis trafficking) solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another person in the commission of that offense at any point in that enterprise, including its delivery component, is guilty of cannabis trafficking.\nIn support of our conclusion that defendant is criminally accountable for cannabis trafficking under section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code, we note again that the conversation in the Ramada Inn in which defendant either participated or was present contained Corona\u2019s statement \u201cthat in El Paso the other Manuel had said they were going to give us $40,000.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This statement shows that defendant either knew \u2014 or was chargeable with knowing\u2014 that the marijuana originated from out of state.\nB. The State\u2019s Closing Argument\nDefendant next argues that the prosecutor misstated the law of accountability during rebuttal closing argument when he stated that defendant was accountable for the criminal acts Leyva committed prior to collaborating with defendant in Illinois. We disagree.\nDuring rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cI told you in opening statements the [defendant didn\u2019t do anything personally, he didn\u2019t drive it across state lines. He wasn\u2019t the one down in Texas. [Leyva] was the one down in Texas. He is accountable, he is responsible for [Leyva] because he is [Leyva\u2019s] accomplice. They are working together, consequently he is responsible for the things that [Leyva] has done.\n\u2756 sfc >!\u00ab\nSince he\u2019s involved during the commission of the offense, he\u2019s responsible for the whole thing, just like every other defendant. That\u2019s the law. It\u2019s very simple. It\u2019s very simple. Simply look at the accountability statute. If the [defendant knowingly participated during the course of events, he\u2019s responsible for his codefendants.\nIn this case it\u2019s [Leyva], [Leyva] is the person responsible for causing those drugs to be brought into Illinois.\n* * *\nEl Paso to Justin Moon, if the [defendant knowingly participates during that time period, he\u2019s on the hook for what his accomplices do. That\u2019s what accountability law is all about.\u201d\nDefendant concedes that by failing to raise a timely objection at trial, he has forfeited this issue on appeal. Nevertheless, he urges us to review it under the plain error rule, which allows for review of issues that are otherwise forfeited when either (1) the evidence is closely balanced; or (2) the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v. Johnson, 317 Ill. App. 3d 666, 668-69, 740 N.E.2d 457, 459 (2000), appeal pending, No. 90678.\nIn light of our previous conclusion \u2014 that one who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of cannabis trafficking, aids another in the commission of any aspect of that criminal enterprise is also guilty of cannabis trafficking \u2014 we further conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks in rebuttal were not error at all. As earlier stated, Leyva was still committing the offense of cannabis trafficking when he accepted delivery of the cannabis from Chavez and Corona. Thus, the prosecutor\u2019s inartful statement of the law of accountability did not unfairly prejudice defendant. See People v. Terry, 312 Ill. App. 3d 984, 993, 728 N.E.2d 669, 677 (2000) (\u201cImproper remarks require reversal only if they substantially prejudice defendant\u201d).\nC. Defendant\u2019s Manufacture or Delivery of Cannabis Conviction\nDefendant next argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of manufacture or delivery of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2000)) because neither he, nor anyone for whom he was accountable, ever possessed the cannabis. Specifically, he contends that once the cannabis was confiscated in Oklahoma, it was in the possession and control of the police, not defendant\u2019s accomplices. We disagree.\nThis court will not set aside a criminal conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence unless \u201cthe proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 353, 747 N.E.2d at 349. \u201c[T]he relevant question is whether, after reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime.\u201d Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 353, 747 N.E.2d at 349. It is the jury\u2019s responsibility to \u201cdetermine the witnesses\u2019 credibility and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.\u201d People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 752 N.E.2d 410, 425 (2001).\nPursuant to section 5 of the Act, \u201c[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture, cannabis.\u201d 720 ILCS 550/5 (West 2000).\n\u201cTo support a conviction for unlawful possession of cannabis, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the substance and that it was under his immediate and exclusive control. [Citation.] Possession may either be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Constructive possession exists when there is no personal present dominion over the drugs, but there is an intent and a capacity to maintain control and dominion over them. [Citation.] Possession may be joint or shared and yet still be exclusive. [Citation.]\u201d People v. Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3d 141, 145-46, 608 N.E.2d 578, 582-83 (1993).\nOur review of the record shows that the State presented sufficient evidence of Leyva\u2019s possession of the cannabis. The State\u2019s evidence showed that (1) Leyva orchestrated the loading of the cannabis onto the U-Haul in El Paso; (2) Leyva was the intended recipient of the cannabis and was responsible for arranging the transfer of the cannabis from the Ramada to another location; and (3) Leyva attempted to drive the loaded U-Haul when it was parked at the Ramada. Although the cannabis was not always in Leyva\u2019s actual physical possession, the evidence clearly showed he had the \u201cintent and capacity\u201d to maintain control over it. The fact that law enforcement authorities also had the intent and capacity to maintain control over the cannabis does not negate Leyva\u2019s culpability. See Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 608 N.E.2d at 583 (possession may be joint or shared and still be exclusive).\nThe State also presented sufficient evidence of defendant\u2019s culpability as Leyva\u2019s accomplice. Pursuant to section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Code, defendant\u2019s conviction of manufacture or delivery of cannabis must be sustained if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant aided Leyva in the planning or commission of the offense either before or during Leyva\u2019s commission of the offense, and (2) defendant intended to promote or facilitate Leyva\u2019s commission of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2000). We emphasize that when, as here, we are confronted with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we need not accept all of the evidence that constitutes the defendant\u2019s innocent explanation. Rather, given the jury\u2019s guilty verdict, we look to the evidence in the record supporting that conclusion.\nThe evidence that defendant aided Leyva in possessing the cannabis is overwhelming. Thus, the only colorable challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence lies in the element of defendant\u2019s intent. Evidence of criminal intent is not usually direct; rather, intent is proved circumstantially by inferences reasonably drawn from the circumstances of the defendant\u2019s conduct. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 354, 747 N.E.2d at 349. While the record contains some conflicting evidence and defendant\u2019s denials, the following evidence was before the jury and serves sufficiently as a basis for its conclusion that defendant intentionally aided Leyva: (1) defendant drove Leyva to the Ramada and accompanied him to meet with Chavez and Corona; (2) there was no need for a translator in the hotel room; (3) Leyva and defendant reconnoitered with Mohan and Moon at Mike\u2019s home, which was also defendant\u2019s home \u201coff and on\u201d; (4) defendant asked Welinski if he could borrow her car; (5) defendant volunteered the use of his sister\u2019s Caravan; (6) defendant drove the Caravan back to the Ramada; and (7) defendant warned Corona not to unload the \u201cpot\u201d while a police car was parked nearby.\nD. Sentencing Credit\nDefendant next argues that he is entitled to an additional day of sentencing credit under section 5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20147(b) (West 2000)). The State concedes that defendant was in custody for 220 days prior to sentencing and that the trial court erroneously awarded him credit for only 219 days. We accept the State\u2019s concession and remand with instructions to amend the sentencing order to reflect one additional day of credit for time served prior to sentencing.\nE. Crime Stoppers Fee\nLast, defendant argues that the trial court lacked the authority to order him to pay $25 to Crime Stoppers. Citing People v. Beler, 327 Ill. App. 3d 829, 837, 763 N.E.2d 925, 931 (2002), the State concedes that the court lacked such authority, and we accept the State\u2019s concession. Accordingly, that part of the court\u2019s sentencing order imposing the $25 fine for Crime Stoppers is void and set aside.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions to modify the sentencing order as stated.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.\nKNECHT and TURNER, JJ, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Robert N. Markfield (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL MORENO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 00\u20140972\nArgued June 26, 2002.\nOpinion filed September 4, 2002.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Robert N. Markfield (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0329-01", "first_page_order": 347, "last_page_order": 362 }