{
  "id": 521903,
  "name": "RAYLANA S. ANDERSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHIEF LEGAL COUNSEL, The Department of Human Rights, et al., Respondents-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Anderson v. Chief Legal Counsel",
  "decision_date": "2002-10-02",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.005109+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "RAYLANA S. ANDERSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHIEF LEGAL COUNSEL, The Department of Human Rights, et al., Respondents-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner, Raylana S. Anderson, filed a discrimination charge (775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(A) (West 1998)) with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department) against her employer, RSM McGladrey, Inc. (McGladrey). Her charge was dismissed by the Department (775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(D)(2)(a) (West 1998)). Upon administrative review, the chief legal counsel for the Department sustained the dismissal (775 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101.1(A) (West 1998)). On appeal (775 ILCS 5/8\u2014 111(A)(1) (West 1998)), Anderson argues that the chief legal counsel abused her discretion by sustaining the dismissal. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nOn September 23, 1999, Anderson filed a discrimination charge against McGladrey with the Department. In her charge, Anderson alleged that on April 1, 1999, she learned McGladrey had been paying a similarly situated male employee, John Fishel, Sr., $110,000 per year during the time McGladrey paid Anderson $68,000 per year. She submitted that she had more seniority than Fishel and that her duties and responsibilities were \u201csimilar if not identical\u201d to Fishel\u2019s duties and responsibilities. Anderson contended that McGladrey had sexually discriminated against her based on disparate pay.\nMcGladrey responded to Anderson\u2019s charge by acknowledging the disparity in pay between Anderson and Fishel. The employer admitted that Fishel was hired by McGladrey after Anderson was hired. However, McGladrey submitted that Anderson and Fishel were not similarly situated employees.\nBoth employees shared the title, \u201cSenior Manager, Consulting Services.\u201d McGladrey stated that seniority was not a factor in determining compensation for senior managers. The employer contended that Fishel\u2019s and Anderson\u2019s duties and responsibilities were not similar or identical. According to McGladrey, Anderson had eight years of experience in the field of human resources. Fishel had 12 years of experience in the fields of operations, information technology, and financial management. McGladrey submitted that Anderson\u2019s and Fishel\u2019s positions required dissimilar levels of skill, effort, and responsibility.\nOn June 5, 2000, the Department issued a notice that it was dismissing Anderson\u2019s charge for lack of substantial evidence. The notice of dismissal was accompanied by an investigation report. The report stated that it was uncontested that Fishel was paid more than Anderson.\nThe report said Anderson\u2019s prima facie allegations were that (1) she is female; (2) she performed her duties consistently with McGlad-rey policy; (3) she was compensated at $68,000 per year; and (4) Mc-Gladrey provided greater compensation to similarly situated male employees. The report then listed several defenses for McGIadrey, including the differences in experience, duties, responsibilities, and compensation among Anderson, Fishel, and several other senior managers.\nAccording to the report, Anderson spoke with Jeff Johnson, a managing director at McGIadrey, about her level of compensation. Anderson alleged that Johnson told her that she was \u201ctoo sensitive to women\u2019s issues.\u201d Johnson stated that he mentioned Anderson\u2019s sensitivity to \u201cwomen\u2019s issues.\u201d However, Johnson contended that his remark was not related to Anderson\u2019s compensation.\nThe report concluded that Anderson lacked substantial evidence that McGladrey\u2019s defenses were a pretext for discrimination. It stated that neither information supplied by Anderson nor the Department\u2019s investigation had revealed a similarly situated male employee at Mc-GIadrey who was treated differently from Anderson.\nOn July 10, 2000, Anderson requested that the dismissal of her charge be reviewed by the Department\u2019s chief legal counsel. The chief legal counsel vacated the dismissal and reinstated Anderson\u2019s charge \u201cfor further work\u201d and \u201cother proceedings by the Department\u201d on February 26, 2001.\nThe Department issued a second notice of dismissal on July 5, 2001. The second dismissal was accompanied by an addendum to the original investigation report. The addendum stated that McGIadrey billed its clients for Fishel\u2019s services at a higher rate than for Anderson\u2019s services. The difference between the two billing rates was greater than the difference between the compensation McGIadrey paid Fishel and Anderson. Fishel had three consulting specialties (operations, information technology, and finance) and Anderson had one specialty (human resources).\nThe addendum again concluded that Anderson lacked substantial evidence that McGladrey\u2019s reasons for the pay differential between Anderson and Fishel were a pretext for discrimination. According to the addendum, this conclusion was supported by (1) McGladrey\u2019s documentation showing that billing rates compared to salaries did not indicate sex discrimination, and (2) the absence of a pattern showing that female employees were paid less than their male counterparts.\nOn July 5, 2001, Anderson requested review by the chief legal counsel of the second dismissal of her charge. The chief legal counsel issued her order on November 30, 2001, sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of Anderson\u2019s charge. In the order, the chief legal counsel stated that she had reviewed the Department\u2019s investigation file. The order said that because Fishel\u2019s functional area was operations and Anderson\u2019s area was human resources, Fishel was not similarly situated to Anderson. The order also listed the annual salaries of 10 senior managers at McGladrey which indicated no pattern that males were paid more than females. The order concluded that Anderson failed to establish, and the Department\u2019s investigation failed to show, that Mc-Gladrey subjected Anderson to unequal pay because of her sex. Anderson appealed.\nANALYSIS\nAnderson argues that the chief legal counsel abused her discretion by sustaining the dismissal of Anderson\u2019s discrimination charge.\nUnder the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1998)), an employee may file a discrimination charge against the employer with the Department. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(A)(1) (West 1998). If the charge is dismissed by the Department, the dismissal is reviewable by the Department\u2019s chief legal counsel. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(D)(2)(a) (West 1998).\nThe chief legal counsel\u2019s order reviewing the dismissal is a final and appealable order. 775 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101.1(A) (West 1998). The plaintiff then may seek review of the chief legal counsel\u2019s order in the appellate court. 775 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 111(A)(1) (West 1998). The standard of review is whether the Department\u2019s chief legal counsel abused her discretion. Kalush v. Department of Human Rights, 298 Ill. App. 3d 980, 700 N.E.2d 132 (1998).\nIn Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 545 N.E.2d 684 (1989), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a three-part analysis for employment discrimination charges under the Act. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption arises that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff. Second, in order to rebut the presumption of discrimination, the employer only need articulate, but not prove, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Third, if the employer articulates such a reason, the plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer\u2019s reason was untrue and was a pretext for discrimination.\nTo establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she performed her job satisfactorily; (3) the employer took adverse action against her despite the adequacy of her work; and (4) a similarly situated employee, who is not a member of the protected group, was not subjected to the same adverse action. Kalush, 298 Ill. App. 3d 980, 700 N.E.2d 132.\nIn the present case, the chief legal counsel agreed with the Department\u2019s determination that Anderson established a prima facie case in her charge of discrimination. As a woman, she is a member of a protected group. She performed her job satisfactorily. Anderson alleged that McGladrey subjected her to disparate pay despite the adequacy of her work. She contended that Fishel was a similarly situated employee, was not a member of the protected group, but was compensated at a much higher rate.\nHaving established her prima facie case, the burden shifted to Mc-Gladrey to articulate, but not prove, a reason for the disparate pay. McGladrey carried its burden by stating that Anderson and Fishel had substantially dissimilar experience, duties, and responsibilities. The burden then shifted back to Anderson to prove that McGladrey\u2019s reasons were a pretext for discrimination.\nAnderson contended that Johnson\u2019s remark about her sensitivity to \u201cwomen\u2019s issues\u201d showed that she was paid less than Fishel because she is a woman. Anderson, however, failed to prove that Johnson\u2019s comment about her sensitivity to \u201cwomen\u2019s issues\u201d was connected to her level of compensation. She did not otherwise prove that McGlad-rey\u2019s reasons for the disparity in pay were pretexts for discrimination.\nUnder the three-part test in Zaderaka, Anderson did not prove that McGladrey discriminated against her. Therefore, the Department\u2019s chief legal counsel did not abuse her discretion by sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of Anderson\u2019s charge of sex discrimination based on disparate pay.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the chief legal counsel of the Illinois Department of Human Rights dismissing Anderson\u2019s discrimination charge.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE and McDADE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SLATER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. Kevin Wolfe (argued), of Harvey & Stuckel, Chtrd., of Peoria, for petitioner.",
      "James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), and Jacqueline S. Lustig, General Counsel, both of Chicago, for respondent Department of Human Rights.",
      "Roy G. Davis (argued), of Davis & Campbell, of Peoria, for respondent RSM McGladrey, Inc."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "RAYLANA S. ANDERSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHIEF LEGAL COUNSEL, The Department of Human Rights, et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 02\u20140007\nOpinion filed October 2, 2002.\nJ. Kevin Wolfe (argued), of Harvey & Stuckel, Chtrd., of Peoria, for petitioner.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General (Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), and Jacqueline S. Lustig, General Counsel, both of Chicago, for respondent Department of Human Rights.\nRoy G. Davis (argued), of Davis & Campbell, of Peoria, for respondent RSM McGladrey, Inc."
  },
  "file_name": "0630-01",
  "first_page_order": 648,
  "last_page_order": 653
}