{ "id": 521974, "name": "BRENDA DAHMAN, Petitioner, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Dahman v. Department of Human Rights", "decision_date": "2002-10-18", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201401\u20140675", "first_page": "660", "last_page": "666", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 660" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 1022", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" }, { "page": "1028" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229699 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6-7" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599237 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526-27" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 3706", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "1993 Ill. Laws 1", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 1022", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1028" }, { "page": "1025" }, { "page": "1028" }, { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229699 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36" }, { "page": "30-31" }, { "page": "36" }, { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15-16" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 14841, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.018546834197669438 }, "sha256": "d5d3e9aa35bb390db33c8f7528fce5eaf45c3ba5b5bf24e250ece0498ad92b94", "simhash": "1:195281cde94eec80", "word_count": 2498 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.005109+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRENDA DAHMAN, Petitioner, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Brenda Dahman, seeks direct administrative review of the decision of the chief legal counsel of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department) sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of petitioner\u2019s charge of sexual harassment against James McCaslin for lack of substantial evidence. Petitioner seeks review pursuant to section 8 \u2014 111(A)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Human Rights Act) (775 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 111(A)(1) (West 2000)) and Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335). Respondents moved to dismiss the petition for direct review due to petitioner\u2019s failure to name McCaslin, a party of record in the administrative proceedings, as a respondent. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the petition for review.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn May 19, 2000, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Department against her employer, the Illinois Secretary of State, and James McCaslin, a fellow employee, alleging that between April 11 and April 13, 2000, McCaslin sexually harassed her. Oh January 5, 2001, following its investigation, the Department dismissed petitioner\u2019s charge for lack of substantial evidence. Petitioner requested review by the Department\u2019s chief legal counsel. On June 29, 2001, the chief legal counsel issued an order sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of the charge. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn August 3, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for direct review with this court. Pursuant to section 8 \u2014 111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 111(A)(1) (West 2000)) and Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335), we have jurisdiction over this matter. However, petitioner failed to name McCaslin in the petition for review, joining only the Department, chief legal counsel, and the Secretary of State as respondents.\nOn November 20, 2001, respondents moved to dismiss the petition due to petitioner\u2019s failure to name McCaslin, a necessary party, as a respondent. Respondents\u2019 motion alleged that petitioner\u2019s failure to name McCaslin as a respondent in her petition for review was a fatal defect. We agree.\nSection 8 \u2014 111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/8\u2014 111(A)(1) (West 2000)) provides that a complainant may obtain judicial review of any final order entered under the Human Rights Act by filing a petition for review in the appellate court. Both Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335) and section 3 \u2014 113(b) of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 113(b) (West 2000)) govern statutory direct review of administrative orders by the appellate court and each provides that \u201c[t]he agency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents\u201d in the petition for review. It is undisputed that McCaslin was a party of record.\nOur supreme court has held that administrative review actions taken directly to the appellate court involve the exercise of \u201cspecial statutory jurisdiction.\u201d McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7, 649 N.E.2d 404, 407 (1995). When a court is exercising special statutory jurisdiction, the language of the act conferring jurisdiction delimits the court\u2019s power to hear the case. A parly seeking to invoke special statutory jurisdiction thus \u201cmust strictly adhere to the prescribed procedures\u201d in the statute. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 12, 649 N.E.2d at 410. Accordingly, absent strict compliance with the Human Rights Act, the provisions of the Review Law, and the rules adopted pursuant thereto, the appellate court cannot consider the appeal. ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 31, 727 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (2000).\nThis case presents a factual scenario similar to that present in Mc-Gaughy in which the supreme court held that dismissal was required for noncompliance with Rule 335. The petitioner, Barbara McGaughy, filed a charge with the Department in which she alleged that her employer had discriminated against her. The Department dismissed the charge for lack of substantial evidence. McGaughy filed a request for review with the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission), which affirmed the dismissal. McGaughy then filed a petition for review in the appellate court. She named as respondents only the Commission and her employer, failing to name the Department. The appellate court held that this failure did not deprive it of jurisdiction and reached the merits of the appeal. The supreme court reversed, vacating the appellate court\u2019s judgment and dismissing the appeal because of McGaughy\u2019s failure to name the Department, a party of record, as a respondent in her petition for review. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 15, 649 N.E.2d at 411.\nSection 3 \u2014 113(b) of the Review Law and Supreme Court Rule 335 explicitly direct that, in a petition for review in the appellate court, \u201c[t]he agency and all other parties of record shall be named respondents.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 113(b) (West 2000); 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a). This language is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, a party seeking administrative review must strictly comply with the statutes conferring jurisdiction and, because the statutes require that all parties of record be named, failure to do so justifies dismissal. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 36, 727 N.E.2d at 1028.\nPetitioner argues that the line of cases that supports dismissal of a petition for review for failing to name all parties of record predates the amendment to section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000)), which precludes dismissal of the petition even if an individual employee or agent acting in his official capacity on behalf of the agency is not named as long as the agency itself is named as a respondent. Petitioner\u2019s argument is without merit. Section 3 \u2014 107(a) applies only to administrative review actions in the circuit court and, thus, is not applicable here. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 8, 649 N.E.2d at 408.\nBecause strict adherence to the procedures of the Review Law and the supreme court rules is required and because petitioner failed to comply with the same, we conclude petitioner\u2019s failure to name Mc-Caslin, a party of record, as a respondent is a fatal defect and justifies dismissal of her petition for review.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we dismiss petitioner\u2019s request for review.\nAppeal dismissed.\nMcCullough, ej, concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent and would address this case on the merits.\nThis Human Rights Act case involves an application for review under section 8 \u2014 111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act. 775 ILCS 5/8\u2014 111(A)(1) (West 2000). Direct review of such administrative orders is controlled by the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 through 3 \u2014 113 (West 2000)). See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 113 (West 2000) (\u201cDirect review of administrative orders by the appellate court\u201d). Section 8 \u2014 111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act formerly provided that judicial review under that section would be \u201cin accordance with Supreme Court Rule 335,\u201d but that language was deleted effective January 1, 1994. Pub. Act 88 \u2014 1, \u00a7 7, eff. January 1, 1994 (1993 Ill. Laws 1, 22).\nUnder the Review Law:\n\u201cNo action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this [s]ection.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000) (language added by Pub. Act 89 \u2014 685, \u00a7 25, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 3706, 3721)).\nThe complaint alleges that James McCaslin, an employee of the Illinois Secretary of State, was acting in his official capacity at the time of the alleged sexual harassment. The Secretary of State was named as a respondent in this direct appeal. By the terms of section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law, it was not necessary to name McCaslin, individually, as a respondent.\nThe Review Law further provides that if a party was not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record, then petitioner shall be granted 21 days to name and serve the unnamed party. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 113 (West 2000) (added by Pub. Act 88 \u2014 1, \u00a7 6, eff. January 1, 1994 (1993 Ill. Laws 1, 20)). The agency final order here referred to the Secretary of State as \u201cRespondent [No.] 1,\u201d and to McCaslin as \u201cRespondent [No.] 2.\u201d The order found that the complainant failed to establish \u201cthat [Respondents sexually harassed [c]omplainant\u201d and that the petition for review need only name \u201cRespondent,\u201d apparently the Secretary of State. Under the terms of section 3 \u2014 113 of the Review Law, I suggest that we cannot dismiss this petition for review, but must grant leave to add McCaslin, if that is necessary at all.\nThe majority says that \u201c[s]ection 3 \u2014 107(a) applies only to administrative review actions in the circuit court and, thus, is not applicable here.\u201d 334 Ill. App. 3d at 663. The majority cites McGaughy for that proposition. Actually, the supreme court in McGaughy noted the addition of section 3 \u2014 113 of the Review Law and changes to section 8 \u2014 111(A)(1) of the Human Rights Act and section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law, but it concluded \u201c[t]hese changes, however, do not pertain to the instant appeals, and we intimate here no view on the application or construction of the new provisions.\u201d McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 15-16, 649 N.E.2d at 411-12. The Review Law clearly applies to this case. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 113 (West 2000).\nMcGaughy in fact rejected the proposition that there should be \u201ctwo divergent procedural standards for the review of administrative matters, and we do not believe that the meanings of these similar requirements should vary, depending on whether the destination of the case is the circuit court or the appellate court.\u201d McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 13, 649 N.E.2d at 410.\nThe majority tells us that a party seeking to invoke special statutory jurisdiction must strictly adhere to the prescribed procedures in the statute. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 662. It is clear that the legislature disagrees with the hypertechnical arguments that have been advanced to defeat jurisdiction in these cases. If we strictly adhere to the statutes in this case, we should not dismiss this appeal. Nor should we establish two divergent procedures, one for circuit court review and another for direct review in the appellate court.\nThis case is not controlled by ESG Watts. ESG Watts arose under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1994)); this case arises under the Human Rights Act. As discussed above, Supreme Court Rule 335, which was applied in ESG Watts, has not applied in Human Rights Act cases since January 1, 1994. ESG Watts involved the complete failure to name a party, the State, as a respondent; this case involves the naming of a government entity, the Illinois Secretary of State, which naming includes an employee (Mc-Caslin) who acted in his official capacity. ESG Watts noted the changes to section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law and noted further that (1) the changes to section 3 \u2014 107(a) did not apply to Watts and (2) the changes would not help Watts if they did apply. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 35-36, 727 N.E.2d at 1028.\nAddressing the first point, the suggestion that section 3 \u2014 107(a) did not apply to Watts, why should the section not apply? The section is one of \u201cthe provisions of the Review Law\u201d that must be strictly complied with before an appellate court may consider the appeal. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 30-31, 727 N.E.2d at 1025. Perhaps the reasoning is that of the majority, that section 3 \u2014 107(a) applies only to administrative review actions in the circuit court, and only section 3 \u2014 113 applies to direct review of administrative review actions in the appellate court. Section 3 \u2014 107, however, states that it applies \u201cin any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency.\u201d (Emphases added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). When section 3 \u2014 107 was originally enacted, the only review available was in the circuit court; appellate review was not possible until section 3 \u2014 113 of the Review Law was enacted. Nevertheless, nothing in the language of section 3 \u2014 107 suggests that it applies only, to actions in the circuit court, and there is no apparent reason why that should be the case. Even if only section 3 \u2014 113 applies to the present case, section 3 \u2014 113 itself provides that if the appellate court determines that a party of record was not made a defendant in the review proceedings, and the party was not named by the administrative agency in its final order, \u201cthe court shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamed party as a defendant.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 113(b) (West 2000).\nThe second point, that none of the exceptions carved out by the legislature would help Watts, is not the fact in the present case. Section 3 \u2014 107 prohibits dismissal for lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an employee who acted in his official capacity where the administrative agency has been named as a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2000). That was not the situation in ESG Watts, where there was a complete failure to name the State as a defendant. It is, however, exactly the situation in the present case, where the employee was not named but the governmental entity was. ESG Watts recognizes that the legislature has \u201ccarved out\u201d exceptions. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 36, 727 N.E.2d at 1028. ESG Watts does not hold that those exceptions are ineffective, only that they did not apply there. ESG Watts recognizes that the matter is one for the legislature, that \u201c \u2018the Illinois appellate court has only such power of direct review as the legislature may provide.\u2019 \u201d ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 29, 727 N.E.2d at 1024, quoting Central City Education Ass\u2019n v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 526-27, 599 N.E.2d 892, 906 (1992). The legislature has spoken in the present case. There is no justification for not accepting the naming of the Illinois Secretary of State as sufficient to include the employee, McCaslin, or in the alternative, for not allowing petitioner 21 days to name McCaslin.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard G. Leiser and Warren E. Danz, both of Warren E. Danz, P.C., and Andrew J. Kleczek, of Law Offices of Andrew J. Kleczek, both of Feoria, for petitioner.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Catherine Basque Weiler, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRENDA DAHMAN, Petitioner, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01\u20140675\nOpinion filed October 18, 2002.\nCOOK, J., dissenting.\nRichard G. Leiser and Warren E. Danz, both of Warren E. Danz, P.C., and Andrew J. Kleczek, of Law Offices of Andrew J. Kleczek, both of Feoria, for petitioner.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Catherine Basque Weiler, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondents." }, "file_name": "0660-01", "first_page_order": 678, "last_page_order": 684 }