{ "id": 521943, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERICK JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johnson", "decision_date": "2002-10-28", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201401\u20140739", "first_page": "666", "last_page": "680", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 666" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229700 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2921302 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0887-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1241, "char_count": 30620, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3958110104524792e-07, "percentile": 0.6436846318067192 }, "sha256": "ee6e06890751734899581e1d4a7eeed3d3e210f7c518521765d5dd589748f752", "simhash": "1:a3b63064ae481565", "word_count": 4952 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.005109+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERICK JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn February 2001, the State charged defendant, Erick Johnson, with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. In April 2001, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence based upon an alleged illegal strip search, which the trial court denied. In June 2001, a jury found defendant guilty. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney\u2019s alleged conflict with a codefendant; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and the jury\u2019s guilty finding was based on insufficient evidence; and (4) the jury erred in finding defendant guilty based on the lack of expert testimony indicating the chromatography mass spectrometer was working properly. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn February 2001, the State charged defendant by information with one count of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)), alleging he knowingly and unlawfully possessed 5 grams or more but less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine with the intent to deliver. Thereafter, defendant pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial.\nIn April 2001, defendant filed a motion to suppress the State\u2019s intended evidence of (1) 15 bags of crack cocaine and (2) United States currency. Defendant argued law enforcement personnel subjected him to an unreasonable and unlawful strip search that went beyond the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest.\nIn May 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Harvey Welch acted as attorney for defendant and the codefendant, Otto Taylor.\nKary Keleher, an officer with the Urbana police department, testified he and Officer Jay Loschen initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle on February 23, 2001, after the driver disobeyed a traffic sign. After an identification check, the officers learned defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, had a civil warrant for which he was thereafter arrested. Following his arrest, the officers took him to the Champaign County correctional center. Later, Officer Loschen and Officer James Black conducted a strip search of defendant in a shower room. A large bag containing several smaller individual plastic bags containing 15 rocks of crack cocaine was found during the strip search of defendant.\nOfficer Loschen testified he arrested defendant on the civil warrant. Thereafter, he conducted a search of defendant and found nothing. Officer Loschen testified he and Officer Black conducted the strip search of defendant and recovered the suspected cocaine from defendant\u2019s underwear. He stated the search was performed for reasons of evidence and safety.\nFollowing arguments, the trial court found the police arrested defendant on a civil warrant. The court also concluded Officer Loschen had a reasonable belief that defendant was concealing a controlled substance and was entitled to proceed with the strip search. The court then denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nIn June 2001, defendant\u2019s jury trial commenced. Officer Keleher again testified to the traffic stop on February 23, 2001. He stated he was Officer Loschen\u2019s field-training officer at that time. The occupants of the car included the driver Jermaine Wilson, defendant, seated in the front passenger seat, and Otto Taylor, sitting in the backseat on the passenger side. Following an identification check on defendant, the officers were advised of a valid civil warrant. Defendant was subsequently arrested and searched. The search of defendant revealed United States currency in his pockets. The officers then transported defendant to the jail. Officer Keleher testified his search of the vehicle did not reveal any pipes or other devices that would be used in smoking or ingesting crack cocaine. In his experience, Officer Keleher stated, crack cocaine is commonly used in an amount referred to as a \u201c$10 rock.\u201d He stated the \u201crocks\u201d are usually packaged individually using the corners of plastic sandwich bags.\nOfficer Loschen testified he arrested defendant on his civil warrant and conducted a search resulting in the recovery of $291. After transporting defendant to the jail, Officer Loschen informed defendant he was going to conduct a strip search. During the search of defendant, Officer Loschen discovered 15 individual packages of a white, chunky substance in defendant\u2019s underwear, which he suspected to be crack cocaine. Officer Loschen indicated his search of defendant and the other occupants of the vehicle did not reveal any devices that could be used for smoking cocaine. After the search of defendant at the jail, Officer Loschen testified defendant made the spontaneous statement: \u201cYou got me. Call the State\u2019s Attorney and I will plead now.\u201d\nJames Black, a correctional officer at the Champaign County correctional center, testified he participated in the search of defendant in the shower room along with Officer Loschen. He observed the recovery of a \u201clittle bag\u201d from defendant\u2019s underwear area.\nJohn Martin, a forensic scientist employed by the Illinois State Police Bureau of Forensic Science, testified as an expert in forensic chemistry for controlled substances and cannabis. He indicated he tested two larger bags and a smaller bag containing a white, chunky substance weighing 8.8 grams. He also weighed the remaining 12 bags, which totaled 2 grams. Martin performed \u201ccolor tests\u201d on a portion of the 8.8 grams and found an indication of cocaine present in the powder. Then he performed a confirmatory analysis using an infrared spectrophotometer and a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer. Those tests revealed the presence of a cocaine base. Martin opined, based upon a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that the 8.8 grams contained cocaine as its base. He did not perform tests on the other 2 grams found in the 12 bags.\nFollowing the conclusion of the State\u2019s case and at the close of all the evidence, defendant moved for a directed finding, which the trial court denied. Defendant rested without presenting any evidence. Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. In July 2001, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. State\u2019s Motions\nInitially, we consider the State\u2019s motion to supplement the record on appeal and its motion to correct the motion to supplement the record on appeal. These motions are allowed, and our review of the record indicates a body attachment in Champaign County case No. 00 \u2014 F\u2014434 was issued against defendant on February 8, 2001.\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Denial of Defendant\u2019s Motion To Suppress\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) the police had no authority to ask for his identification and perform a computer search; and (2) the officer\u2019s strip search violated his constitutional rights and Illinois law. We disagree.\nFirst, we find defendant\u2019s argument concerning the officer\u2019s request for his identification to be forfeited. Failure to raise a contention in a motion to suppress results in forfeiture of the issue. People v. Johnson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892, 620 N.E.2d 506, 511 (1993). Defendant failed to argue the propriety of the identification check in his motion to suppress or at the hearing; instead, he structured his focus on the constitutionality of his strip search. To preserve an argument for appeal from a jury trial, the defendant\u2019s \u201cchallenge must be presented to the trial court not only at the motion to suppress stage, but it must also be included in the defendant\u2019s post[ jtrial motion.\u201d Johnson, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 893, 620 N.E.2d at 511. Such a requirement allows the court of review the benefit of the trial court\u2019s judgment on the issue under contention. Johnson, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 893, 620 N.E.2d at 511. Here, defendant failed to include his argument on this issue in his motion to suppress and his posttrial motion. Thus, defendant has failed to properly preserve this issue for review.\nSecond, we find the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Defendant argues the strip search violated section 103 \u2014 1(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 1(c) (West 2000)). We disagree.\nStatutory construction is a matter of law and our review is de novo. People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623, 753 N.E.2d 554, 557 (2001). Section 103 \u2014 1(c) of the Code states:\n\u201cNo person arrested for a traffic, regulatory[,] or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip[-]searched unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 1(c) (West 2000).\nIn this case, defendant was arrested on a civil warrant for failure to appear in Champaign County case No. 00 \u2014 F\u2014434. Thereafter, defendant was to be placed in the general population of the county jail. Although defendant claims the strip search violated section 103 \u2014 1(c), we find another provision of the Code forecloses his argument. Section 103 \u2014 l(j) of the Code states \u201c[t]he provisions of subsections (c) through (h) of this [sjection shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by or remanded to the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to a court order.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 l(j) (West 2000). Thus, the provisions of section 103 \u2014 1(c) do not apply to sheriff and jail officials when a person is taken into custody by or remanded to them pursuant to court order. As defendant was lawfully taken into custody pursuant to court order, his claim that the strip search violated section 103 \u2014 1(c) of the Code fails.\nDefendant also argues the strip search violated his federal and state constitutional rights. We disagree, finding the search reasonable in this case. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 6. \u201cStrip searches are not per se illegal or unconstitutional.\u201d People v. Orsby, 286 Ill. App. 3d 142, 151, 675 N.E.2d 237, 243 (1996). Notwithstanding, strip searches amount to a \u201csevere intrusion into one\u2019s privacy.\u201d People v. Seymour, 84 Ill. 2d 24, 39, 416 N.E.2d 1070, 1077 (1981). However, courts have approved strip searches as incident to a lawful arrest without a showing of probable cause and as a search prior to incarceration. Seymour, 84 Ill. 2d at 39-40, 416 N.E.2d at 1077. Further, \u201c[although one confined to a jail does not lose his constitutional rights, they are, nonetheless, diminished by the needs of the institutional environment.\u201d Seymour, 84 Ill. 2d at 39, 416 N.E.2d at 1076.\nIn Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 483, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1886 (1979), the United States Supreme Court found the strip searches and visual body cavity inspections of inmates who had contact with visitors were \u201creasonable responses *** to legitimate security concerns.\u201d The Supreme Court stated in part, as follows:\n\u201cThe test of reasonableness under the [flourth [a]mendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case[,] it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider [(1)] the scope of the particular intrusion, [(2)] the manner in which it is conducted, [(3)] the justification for initiating it[,] and [(4)] the place in which it is conducted. [Citations.] A detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence.\u201d Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 481, 99 S. Ct. at 1884.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court found \u201cofficials in charge of the jail have a strong interest in preventing contraband drugs and especially weapons from entering the lockup.\u201d Seymour, 84 Ill. 2d at 39, 416 N.E.2d at 1076. In that regard, the court, quoting United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 300-01 (1st Cir. 1975), stated \u201c \u2018the modesty of one lawfully arrested must give way to reasonable precautionary procedures designed to detect hidden evidence, drugs, or objects which might be used against others or to cause self-inflicted harm.\u2019 \u201d Seymour, 84 Ill. 2d at 40, 416 N.E.2d at 1077.\nIn this case, the officers made a lawful arrest of defendant based on his civil warrant and transported him to the county jail, where Officer Keleher stated defendant would be placed with other arrestees in a common holding area. Officer Loschen stated that regardless of the result of the strip search, defendant was going to be booked and placed in holding cells with other arrestees. Thus, defendant\u2019s placement in the general jail population was imminent. He also testified the strip search was conducted to search for evidence and for safety reasons. Officer Loschen stated he received authority from command personnel to conduct the search, which took place in a shower room with Officer Black present.\nIn People v. Calvert, 326 Ill. App. 3d 414, 424, 760 N.E.2d 1024, 1032 (2001), this court held that based on \u201cthe substantial need to ensure institutional security, good penal practices not only permit, they require strip searches before placing detainees into the general jail population.\u201d Jails and correctional officials have a legitimate and substantial need, along with a corresponding duty, to prevent arrestees from smuggling weapons or contraband into a detention facility. The practice of strip searching detainees before their intermingling with the general jail population is a necessity for the health and safety of the arrestee, other inmates, and the correctional officers. See Calvert, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 424, 760 N.E.2d at 1032 (other inmates and officers could be at serious risk if detainees are not searched before placement in general jail population). Based on the security and safety concerns involved with placing a detainee into the general population, we conclude the strip search here was reasonable. Courts must not deprive jail and prison officials of the power to conduct a full search because doing so \u201cwould seriously impede such administrators as they attempted to protect their inmate populations.\u201d Calvert, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 424, 760 N.E.2d at 1032. As we find the strip search of defendant reasonable incident to his placement among the general jail population, we need not address whether the search was also lawful incident to defendant\u2019s arrest. See Calvert, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 424-25, 760 N.E.2d at 1032.\nC. Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his attorney\u2019s alleged conflict with a codefendant. We disagree.\nA criminal defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental right. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1715 (1980). \u201cThe assistance of counsel means assistance which entitles an accused to the undivided loyalty of his counsel and which prohibits the attorney from representing conflicting interests or undertaking the discharge of inconsistent obligations.\u201d People v. Washington, 101 Ill. 2d 104, 110, 461 N.E.2d 393, 396 (1984). An attorney\u2019s relationships with certain clients can create a conflict that adversely affects the outcome of the trial. People v. Coleman, 301 Ill. App. 3d 290, 299, 703 N.E.2d 137, 143 (1998). Our supreme court has found two classes of conflicts of interests that may encroach on a defendant\u2019s sixth amendment rights. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 14-19, 525 N.E.2d 30, 34-37 (1988).\nThe first class involves a per se conflict, which \u201cexists where certain facts about a defense counsel\u2019s status, by themselves, are held to engender a disabling conflict.\u201d People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521, 538, 727 N.E.2d 348, 357 (2000). Per se conflicts are created when defense counsel has a \u201cprior or contemporaneous association with either the prosecution or the victim.\u201d Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 14, 525 N.E.2d at 34.\n\u201cTo obtain relief based on an alleged per se conflict, a defendant must show only that counsel had a contemporaneous conflicting professional commitment to another; however, a defendant need not show prejudice. [Citations.] For example, this court has held that a per se conflict of interest exists where defense counsel engages in a contemporaneous representation of the defendant and the State\u2019s witness.\u201d Moore, 189 Ill. 2d at 538, 727 N.E.2d at 357.\nIn this case, we find no per se conflict existed. Here, defendant\u2019s attorney also represented codefendant, Otto Taylor, at the motion to suppress hearing. Illinois courts have found that an attorney\u2019s simultaneous representation of two or more codefendants does not create a per se violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. People v. Lee, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1096, 649 N.E.2d 457, 459 (1995); People v. Sanchez, 161 Ill. App. 3d 586, 594, 515 N.E.2d 213, 218 (1987); see also People v. Becerril, 307 Ill. App. 3d 518, 524, 718 N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (1999) (discussing waiver of such a conflict). In that regard, \u201cQ]oint representation is permitted because \u2018[a] common defense often gives strength against a common attack.\u2019 \u201d Sanchez, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 594, 515 N.E.2d at 218, quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92, 86 L. Ed. 680, 710-11, 62 S. Ct. 457, 475 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Based on this analysis, we proceed to the second class of conflicts.\nThe second class of conflicts of interest involves joint or multiple representation of codefendants. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 17, 525 N.E.2d at 36. In this class, defense counsel brings the potential conflict to the trial court\u2019s attention at an early stage of the proceeding, whereupon the court has a duty to appoint separate counsel or determine whether the risk of conflict is too remote to require the appointment of counsel. People v. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d 204, 219, 565 N.E.2d 950, 956 (1990). A conviction may be reversed in that case without \u201ca showing of \u2018specific prejudice.\u2019 \u201d Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d at 219, 565 N.E.2d at 956, quoting Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 17-18, 525 N.E.2d at 36, citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978). \u201cHowever, if the trial court is not apprised of the potential conflict, then reversal of the conviction will only be had upon a showing that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected\u2019 counsel\u2019s performance.\u201d People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 29, 636 N.E.2d 433, 446 (1994), quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 348, 100 S. Ct. at 1719.\nIn this case, defendant cannot establish an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel\u2019s performance. Codefendant Taylor did not testify for the State or for the defense at defendant\u2019s jury trial. Further, the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion in limine as to Taylor\u2019s possible testimony regarding his activities involving the possession of cannabis found at the vehicle stop. Defendant contends his counsel\u2019s representation of Taylor would hinder his willingness to call Taylor as a witness. However, defendant\u2019s speculation does not establish his counsel\u2019s performance was adversely affected. Defendant\u2019s defense consisted of conceding possession while denying any intent to deliver. Calling Taylor as a witness could possibly have opened the door for the State to elicit testimony regarding the fruits of the illegal drug trade, including possession of marijuana. Such testimony would have only added to the evidence establishing an intent to deliver a controlled substance. Therefore, defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.\nD. The Trial Court\u2019s Denial of Defendant\u2019s Motion for Directed Verdict and the Jury\u2019s Guilty Finding\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for directed verdict and the evidence was insufficient to support the jury\u2019s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.\nThe making of a motion for directed verdict \u201crequires the trial court to consider only whether a reasonable mind could fairly conclude the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, considering the evidence most strongly in the People\u2019s favor.\u201d People v. Withers, 87 Ill. 2d 224, 230, 429 N.E.2d 853, 856 (1981); People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 914, 751 N.E.2d 1219, 1226 (2001). A motion for a directed verdict presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 917-18, 751 N.E.2d at 1229.\nTo support a conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance, possession of the controlled substance, and the intent to deliver the controlled substance. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 407, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1026 (1995).\nIn closing argument, defense counsel conceded defendant was guilty of possession. On appeal, defendant contends the State\u2019s circumstantial evidence failed to prove defendant\u2019s intent to deliver. In a case involving unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, \u201cintent is a mental state seldom susceptible of direct proof but which must be inferred from circumstantial evidence.\u201d People v. Neylon, 327 Ill. App. 3d 300, 310, 762 N.E.2d 1127, 1136 (2002).\n\u201c \u2018This issue involves the examination of the nature and quantity of circumstantial evidence necessary to support an inference of intent to deliver. In controlled substances prosecutions, many different factors are probative of intent to deliver. Such factors include whether the quantity of controlled substance in defendant\u2019s possession is too large to be viewed as being for personal consumption, the high purity of the drag confiscated, the possession of weapons, the possession of large amounts of cash, the possession of police scanners, beepers or cellular telephones, the possession of drug paraphernalia, and the manner in which the substance is packaged. [Citation.] The quantity of controlled substance alone can be sufficient to prove an intent to deliver. This is the case only where the amount of controlled substance could not reasonably be viewed as designed for personal consumption.\u2019 \u201d Neylon, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 762 N.E.2d at 1136, quoting People v. Beverly, 278 Ill. App. 3d 794, 799, 663 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (1996), citing Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408, 657. N.E.2d at 1026-27.\nIn the case sub judice, Officer Loschen\u2019s search of defendant revealed 15 individual packages of a white, chunky substance in his underwear, a portion of which was later determined to be crack cocaine. He noted the rocks were individually wrapped in small plastic bags such as the corners of sandwich bags. John Martin testified the substance totaled 10.8 grams. Defendant had $291 on him at the time of the vehicle stop. The evidence indicates defendant had a large amount of individually packaged rocks of crack cocaine stuffed in his underpants along with a substantial amount of cash. These factors, including the quantity of drugs found, the packaging, and the large amount of cash, lead to the inference that defendant did not possess the cocaine for personal consumption but instead was intent on delivering it.\nDefendant contends the absence of drug paraphernalia on defendant or in the car shows he lacked the intent to deliver. However, paraphernalia, such as scales, cutting instruments, or packaging materials, would not be expected to be found in a moving vehicle in broad daylight. Further, no drug paraphernalia used in personal consumption, such as pipes or other smoking devices, was found. The lack of drug paraphernalia for personal consumption leads to the inference that defendant was intent on delivering the cocaine. See Beverly, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 802, 663 N.E.2d at 1067 (appellate court found intent to deliver based on weight of substance, packaging, cash found, and lack of drug paraphernalia associated with personal use). Thus, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable mind could fairly conclude defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession with intent to deliver. The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nDefendant also argues the jury had insufficient evidence to support a guilty finding of unlawful possession with intent to deliver. We disagree. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 752 N.E.2d 410, 425 (2001). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the relevant inquiry is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 152, 661 N.E.2d 287, 296 (1996).\nOur analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury\u2019s guilty finding is identical to the analysis applied to the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. Since defendant offered no evidence, our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient for the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains the same.\nE. Expert\u2019s Testimony Based on Electronic or Mechanical Device\nDefendant argues no foundation was laid regarding whether the infrared spectrophotometer and gas chromatography mass spectrometer (GCMS) machines were functioning properly. We find defendant has forfeited this issue.\nDefendant relies on People v. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703, 710-11, 756 N.E.2d 338, 344-45 (2001), in which the First District reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver because the State failed to establish a proper foundation regarding the GCMS machine. In that case, defense counsel contested the forensic scientist\u2019s expertise and moved for a directed finding based upon chain of custody and lack of proper foundation. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 705, 756 N.E.2d at 340. The defendant reiterated his foundation objection during closing argument. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 705, 756 N.E.2d at 340.\nThe First District stated \u201c \u2018when expert testimony is based upon an electronic or mechanical device such as that used here [GCMS machine], the expert must offer some foundation proof as to the method of recording the information and proof that the device was functioning properly at the time it was used.\u2019 \u201d Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 707, 756 N.E.2d at 341, quoting People v. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d 502, 514, 629 N.E.2d 724, 732 (1994). The Raney court found the expert failed to offer any evidence the GCMS machine was functioning properly at the time the controlled substance was tested. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 707, 756 N.E.2d at 342. The appellate court found the State failed to establish the necessary foundation, which required reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction for unlawful possession with intent to deliver. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710-11, 756 N.E.2d at 344.\nIn Bynum, the expert witness failed to testify to the general acceptance of the GCMS machine by experts in her particular field, how the machine was calibrated, or how she knew the results were accurate. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 514, 629 N.E.2d at 732. The appellate court found the State\u2019s failure to establish a necessary foundation would have been sufficient to preclude the expert\u2019s testimony, \u201chad defendant objected on these grounds.\u201d Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 514, 629 N.E.2d at 732. The court concluded that since defense counsel failed to object that the expert\u2019s testimony lacked sufficient foundation, the argument was forfeited on appeal. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 515, 629 N.E.2d at 732-33.\nIn this case, defendant failed to object that Martin\u2019s testimony lacked sufficient foundation on whether the GCMS machine was working properly. In closing argument, defense counsel indicated the evidence offered by the State was an illegal substance. No argument on the issue of the GCMS machine appeared in defendant\u2019s posttrial motion. \u201cTo preserve an issue for review, a defendant must both object at trial and specifically include the objection in a post[ ]trial motion.\u201d People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 524, 739 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (2000). Raising the foundation issue at trial with \u201ca timely and specific objection allows the State the reasonable opportunity to correct any deficiency in the foundation proof.\u201d Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 514-15, 629 N.E.2d at 732. Defendant failed to object at trial and has now forfeited his argument on appeal.\nWe also note that defendant did not contest the identity of the substance recovered as evidence in this case. In closing argument, defense counsel conceded the issue of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. \u201cA party forfeits [his] right to complain of an error where to do so is inconsistent with the position taken by the party in an earlier court proceeding.\u201d In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 670, 756 N.E.2d 422, 430 (2001), citing McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255, 730 N.E.2d 1, 3 (2000). Defendant is thus estopped from raising the foundation argument on appeal because is it inconsistent with the strategy pursued at trial.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, EJ, and STEIGMANN, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Scott A. Lerner (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERICK JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01\u20140739\nArgued July 17, 2002.\nOpinion filed October 28, 2002.\nRehearing denied November 20, 2002.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Scott A. Lerner (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0666-01", "first_page_order": 684, "last_page_order": 698 }