{ "id": 521904, "name": "ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, d/b/a Ameritech Illinois, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. PLOTE, INC., Defendant (Piote, Inc., et al., Counterplaintiffs-Appellants)", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Plote, Inc.", "decision_date": "2002-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201400\u20143743", "first_page": "796", "last_page": "806", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 796" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570227 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569023 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45709 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846", "parenthetical": "no private cause of action was available to the plaintiff under section 9 - 113 for injuries sustained in a car accident because the statute was not intended to protect against that type of injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 850", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959133 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857-58", "parenthetical": "no private cause of action was available to the plaintiff under section 9 - 113 for injuries sustained in a car accident because the statute was not intended to protect against that type of injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592608 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 1231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1233" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680681 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 984", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990", "parenthetical": "to establish a common law claim for negligent representation a plaintiff must allege, inter alia, \"a false statement of material fact\" and \"carelessness or negligence in ascertaining the truth of the statement by defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725120 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58", "parenthetical": "to establish a common law claim for negligent representation a plaintiff must allege, inter alia, \"a false statement of material fact\" and \"carelessness or negligence in ascertaining the truth of the statement by defendant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "779 A.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 942824 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/172/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 S.W.3d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 11180205 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "no duty exists for a utility to avoid economic losses by marking the location of its facilities under Texas common law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/29/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5297254 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 C 8319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781332 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 1197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1200" }, { "page": "1201" }, { "page": "1200-01" }, { "page": "1200" }, { "page": "1201" }, { "page": "1201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544916 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "166-68" }, { "page": "167" }, { "page": "168-69" }, { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 N.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261385 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 So. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11613628 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/732/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 N.E.2d 1122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1125" }, { "page": "1125" }, { "page": "1125" }, { "page": "1125" }, { "page": "1125" }, { "page": "1125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 1103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156766 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1107" }, { "page": "1107" }, { "page": "1107" }, { "page": "1107" }, { "page": "1107" }, { "page": "1107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/1103-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 N.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2844622 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443-44" }, { "page": "443-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783186 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240-41" }, { "page": "240-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097419 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 N.E. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092944 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0069-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1031, "char_count": 26033, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5046715916883656e-08, "percentile": 0.2819716516291104 }, "sha256": "9aa5574dbf2aaf6d854f075dbb4126958d46d306e9c5958add23167ae2be92b6", "simhash": "1:ab7dd6fcab346ad4", "word_count": 4274 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.005109+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, d/b/a Ameritech Illinois, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. PLOTE, INC., Defendant (Piote, Inc., et al., Counterplaintiffs-Appellants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCounterplaintiffs, Plote, Inc., Allied Asphalt Paving Company and Milburn Brothers, Inc. (collectively Plote or plaintiff), appeal from the judgement of the circuit court of Cook County granting a motion pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2000)) in favor of counterdefendant Illinois Bell Telephone Company, d/b/a Ameritech Illinois (Bell or defendant), dismissing counts II, III, IV and V of Plote\u2019s lawsuit against Bell. On appeal, Plote contends that its suit is not barred by the Moorman doctrine (Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E. 2d 443 (1982)); that it has a cause of action under both the Illinois Underground Utility Facilities Damage Prevention Act (220 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1996)) and the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)); and that it properly stated a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.\nBACKGROUND\nPlote\u2019s first amended counterclaim makes the following general allegations. Plote entered into a contract with the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) to make improvements to Arlington Heights Road in the City of Arlington Heights, Illinois. Prior to accepting bids for the above-described contract, IDOT submitted the proposed plans for the construction project to Bell so that Bell could locate conflicts between the project and Bell\u2019s underground telephone facilities. Bell, however, did not respond to IDOT\u2019s request that it identify the anticipated conflicts. Alternatively, Plote alleges that Bell did not fully respond to IDOT\u2019s requests to identify anticipated conflicts. On August 8, 1995, a preconstruction conference was held at IDOT\u2019s offices. At this conference a representative of Bell was informed of the date on which the construction project was expected to start.\nBeginning on December 13, 1995, a series of \u201cutility meetings\u201d was held at which various conflicts relating to Bell\u2019s facilities were identified. As a result of Bell\u2019s failure to identify the location of its facilities, or alternatively as a result of Bell\u2019s failure to adequately identify those facilities, the construction project was delayed. Pursuant to the contract, Plote was to complete the project by October 31, 1996; however, due to the delays, it was not completed until May 31, 1997. Plote sustained increased expenses as a result of these delays.\nThe first amended counterclaim alleges three counts pertinent to this appeal. Count II purports to state a claim for a violation by Bell of the Illinois Underground Utility Facilities Damage Prevention Act (Underground Facilities Act) (220 ILCS 50/9 (West 1996)). Count III purports to state a claim for common law negligence. Count IV purports to state a claim for a violation by Bell of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 113(f) (West 1996)). Count V purports to state a claim for tortious interference with contract.\nOn June 16, 1999, Bell filed a motion to dismiss Plote\u2019s first amended counterclaim in its entirety pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2000)). Bell argued that counts II, III and IV were barred under the Moorman doctrine. Bell further argued that count V failed to state a cause of action because it failed to allege that Bell intended to interfere with Plote\u2019s contract with IDOT. The trial court subsequently granted Bell\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 motion and dismissed counts I, II, III, IV and V\nPlote filed its second amended counterclaim on December 1, 1999. This counterclaim made changes to counts I and V and added counts VI and VII. The second amended counterclaim realleged the general allegations made in the first amended counterclaim. It also realleged counts II, III and IV verbatim. Bell subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 619 (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2000)) and 2 \u2014 615. Bell again argued that count V failed to make allegations that its interference with Bell\u2019s contract was intentional. Bell\u2019s motion does not address counts II, III and I\\( except to note in a footnote that \u201calthough not so noted in its counterclaim, the undersigned counsel has confirmed with *** counsel for Plote, that counts II, III and TV were re-pled solely for the purpose of preserving Plote\u2019s appellate rights.\u201d The court granted Bell\u2019s motion and dismissed counts I, V, VI and VII. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nPlote first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing count II of the complaint, which purports to state a claim for a violation by Bell of the Illinois Underground Utility Facilities Damage Prevention Act. 220 ILCS 50/9 (West 1996). Plote contends that it is not barred by the Moorman doctrine from recovering economic losses for Bell\u2019s alleged failure to properly mark the location of its underground facilities, which delayed Plote\u2019s construction project. We agree.\nThe Moorman doctrine, promulgated by our supreme court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982), established the rule known as the economic loss doctrine as the law in Illinois. The Moorman doctrine provides that \u201ca plaintiff cannot recover solely economic losses in tort.\u201d Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 176, 441 N.E.2d 324, 326 (1982); Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 86, 435 N.E.2d at 451. Our supreme court, however, has defined several exceptions to the Moorman doctrine. These exceptions include the \u201cinformation provider\u201d exception, which allows recovery in tort for economic losses \u201cwhere the plaintiff\u2019s damages are a proximate result of a negligent misrepresentation by a defendant in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions.\u201d In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 240-41, 641 N.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1994). See Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 89, 435 N.E.2d at 452 (allowing recovery for economic losses against those who are \u201cin the business of supplying information for the guidance of others,\u201d thereby upholding the right of recovery under Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969), which allowed recovery of economic damages against a surveyor).\nPlote urges that the information provider exception applies to Bell in this case because all Bell was required to do in this situation was provide information about the location of its facilities. Plote contends that the determination of whether Bell is an information provider is made by looking to the context of the specific transaction involved and not on the basis of Bell\u2019s general business. Bell contends that it does not fall within the information provider exception because its primary business is to supply telephone service and not information, even though its function under the circumstances contemplated by the Underground Facilities Act is solely to provide information. We agree with Plote.\nSection 10 of the Underground Facilities Act provides in relevant part as follows:\n\u201cUpon notice by the person engaged in excavation or demolition, the person owning or operating underground utility facilities *** shall mark, within 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) of receipt of notice, the approximate locations of such facilities so as to enable the person excavating or demolishing to establish the location of the underground utility facilities or CATS facilities.\u201d 220 ILCS 50/10 (West 1996).\nThis statute provides that the limit of Bell\u2019s obligations in the case at bar was to provide information to Plote regarding the location of its underground facilities. Thus, in the context of the Underground Facilities Act, Bell is imposed with the duty of being nothing but an information provider.\nAlthough cited only by defendant in a footnote, the decision of the Fifth District of this court in Followell v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 278 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 663 N.E.2d 1122 (1996), is squarely on point. The facts in that case are virtually identical to the facts in the case at bar. In Followell, the plaintiff contractor was hired by the City of West Frankfort, Illinois, to replace several water mains. The plaintiff contacted the defendant natural gas utility company and asked that the defendant mark the locations of its lines which conflicted with excavations which the plaintiff would need to undertake in the course of its water main work. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently marked the location of its lines, and the plaintiff allegedly broke one of the defendant\u2019s gas Unes as a result. The plaintiff had to stop work until the defendant repaired the gas line, thus incurring economic losses, for which it sued the defendant.\nThe court reasoned that section 9 of the Act created a private cause of action for a violation of section 10. Followell, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, 663 N.E.2d at 1125; 220 ILCS 50/9 (West 1994). The court finally noted that \u201cthe plain language of the Act does not restrict the damages a plaintiff may recover under the Act to \u2018actual\u2019 or \u2018physical\u2019 damages.\u201d Followell, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, 663 N.E.2d at 1125. The court then held \u201cthat in this instance, where a person suffers purely economic damages as a result of an owner\u2019s breach of its duty under section 10 of the Act, that person may bring an action under section 9 for purely economic damages.\u201d Followell, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, 663 N.E.2d at 1125. The court thus held that the plaintiff could recover for its economic losses. Followell, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, 663 N.E.2d at 1125; accord A&L Underground, Inc. v. City of Port Richey, 732 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. App. 1999).\nThe Followell court held that the defendant had an independent duty to supply information to the plaintiff regarding the location of its underground facilities. The court reasoned:\n\u201cThis statute imposes a duty on the defendant as the owner or operator of underground facilities to supply information about the location of the underground facilities to the plaintiff or any other person properly giving notice of an intention to excavate or demolish. The defendant is clearly engaged in the business of supplying information concerning the location of its underground facilities to persons like the plaintiff who must rely on the information in order to engage in excavations.\u201d Followell, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, 663 N.E.2d at 1125.\nThus, the court held that the statute created an independent duty upon the defendant to provide information, and thus, in the context of that statute defendant was deemed to be in the business of supplying information. Followell, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, 663 N.E.2d at 1125.\nAccordingly, as in Followell, the factual situation in the case at bar falls within the information-provider exception to the Moorman doctrine. In this particular case, Bell has the same duty that the utility company had in Followell to provide information to Plote, which originates in a statute, section 10 of the Underground Facilities Act. As in Followell, the transaction between Bell and Plote created by the provisions of the Underground Facilities Act does not extend beyond the provision of information. While Bell\u2019s general business may be providing telephone service, as in Followell, it is the nature of the transaction at issue in the specific case on an ad hoc basis that is determinative. Cf. Tolan & Son, Inc. v. KLLM Architects, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 18, 719 N.E.2d 288 (1999). We thus find that the trial court erred in dismissing count II of Plote\u2019s complaint.\nBell argues the applicability of Fireman\u2019s Fund Insurance Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 160, 679 N.E.2d 1197 (1997), to the instant case. However, we find several significant distinctions between the facts presented there and those presented to us here. In Fireman\u2019s Fund, our supreme court addressed the question:\n\u201c \u2018Is a professional engineer who prepares plans and specifications for a construction project in the business of supplying information to others for the guidance of the recipient in its business dealings and liable in tort for negligent misrepresentation under Moorman ***[?]\u2019 \u201d Fireman\u2019s Fund, 176 Ill. 2d at 166, 679 N.E.2d at 1200.\nThe court answered the question in the negative, holding that the economic loss doctrine barred a contractor\u2019s tort suit against the project engineer whose drawings allegedly miscalculated the site for a water supply system. Fireman\u2019s Fund, 176 Ill. 2d at 169, 679 N.E.2d at 1201. The court reached this answer through the application of a two-pronged analysis, and both prongs reveal the distinctions between the facts presented in Fireman\u2019s Fund and those presented in this case.\nThe first prong of the court\u2019s analysis centered on the applicability of the economic loss doctrine to service, providers who distribute information as part of their services. The court noted that sound policy dictates that a service provider, such as an engineer, generally should be protected by the doctrine because the duties of a service provider may well be defined by its contract with a client as may the duties of any other seller. The economic loss doctrine seeks to protect the integrity of contract law and to force plaintiffs whose damages, in essence, equal their commercial expectations to sue on their bargained-for agreement. Thus, the court concluded, the doctrine should be applied to contractual relationships between service providers and clients. Fireman\u2019s Fund, 176 Ill. 2d at 166-68, 679 N.E.2d at 1200-01.\nIn the instant case, however, Bell\u2019s duties and obligations to Plote are not defined by a contract because there is no contract between the parties. The nature of the duty is wholly created and defined by statute under the provisions of the Underground Facilities Act. As the Fireman\u2019s Fund court noted:\n\u201c \u2018The evolution of the economic loss doctrine shows that the doctrine is applicable to the service industry only where the duty of the party performing the service is defined by the contract that he executes with his client. Where a duty arises outside the contract, the economic loss doctrine does not prohibit recovery in tort for the negligent breach of that duty.\u2019 \u201d Fireman\u2019s Fund, 176 Ill. 2d at 167, 679 N.E.2d at 1200, quoting Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 159 Ill. 2d 137, 161-62, 636 N.E.2d 503 (1994).\nBecause Bell\u2019s duty to Plote is not the result of any contract, but only defined by statute, the policy concerns underlying the application of the economic loss rule are not triggered in this case. Plote is not seeking the benefit of its bargain via a tort suit rather than through more appropriate contract remedies.\nThe second prong of the Fireman\u2019s Fund court\u2019s analysis was premised upon its conclusion that the applicability of the economic loss doctrine depends upon whether the information provider is supplying information that is incidental to a tangible product. The court reasoned that if the \u201cultimate result\u201d of the information is a tangible product, then the doctrine should apply. Fireman\u2019s Fund, 176 Ill. 2d at 168-69, 679 N.E.2d at 1201. As this court has recently reiterated, \u201c \u2018[i]n short, if the intended end result of the plaintiff-defendant relationship is for the defendant to create a product, a tangible thing, then the defendant will not fit into the \u201cbusiness of supplying information\u201d negligent misrepresentation exception.\u2019 \u201d Tolan, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 28, 719 N.E.2d at 296, quoting MW Manufacturers, Inc. v. Friedman Corp., No. 97 C 8319, slip op. at_(N.D. Ill. July 21, 1998). Because the defendant engineering firm in Fireman\u2019s Fund provided plans for building a water supply system, the court concluded that it was hired to create a tangible thing and did not fit into the information provider exception. Fireman\u2019s Fund, 176 Ill. 2d at 169, 679 N.E.2d at 1201.\nIn the case sub judice, Bell was not hired to \u201ccreate a product, a tangible thing,\u201d but was instead statutorily obligated simply to provide information to Plote about the location of its facilities so as to avoid damage to those facilities during Plote\u2019s road construction project. Bell\u2019s information was not to be incorporated into a product or structure but was merely to be used to avoid causing the public any harm from utility disruption. The only \u201cproduct\u201d that Bell had a duty to contribute was information and the \u201cultimate result\u201d was avoidance of damage to Bell\u2019s facilities, not the creation of a structure or tangible object itself.\nFinally we note that Bell\u2019s reliance on Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Vincent DiVito Construction, 214 Ill. App. 3d 203, 573 N.E.2d 243 (1991), is misplaced. Northern Illinois Gas does not address the information provider exception, which we have found applicable herein, nor does it address a situation to which that exception is applicable. In Northern Illinois Gas, the plaintiff contractor sued the defendant gas company for economic losses it suffered when it damaged one of the defendant\u2019s gas lines thereby delaying plaintiffs construction project. Plaintiff contended that defendant was negligent because the gas line was not buried sufficiently far beneath the surface. There is nothing in Northern Illinois Gas that would pertain to any breach of duty involving the supply of information.\nPlote next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing count III, which purported to state a claim against Bell based on common law negligence. Plote contends that this count is not barred by the Moorman doctrine. We disagree.\nThe same reasons that compel us to reverse the dismissal of count II compel us also to affirm the dismissal of count III. Unlike count II, where a statute is pled so as to provide Bell with an obligation to provide information to Plote, count III is pled as a common law cause of action and is not based on the Underground Facilities Act or any other statute. Count III thus contends that Bell owed Plote a duty at common law to mark the location of its underground facilities.\nPlote, however, has not argued or cited any authority for the proposition that Bell has a common law duty to mark the location of its facilities in order to avoid causing Plote economic losses. Furthermore, our research has indicated that no such common law duty exists. Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tx. Ct. App. 2000) (no duty exists for a utility to avoid economic losses by marking the location of its facilities under Texas common law); cf. W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 92, at 657 (5th ed. 1984) (\u201cthere is no general duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid intangible economic loss or losses to others that do not arise from tangible physical harm to persons and tangible things\u201d); accord Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 779 A.2d 67, 70 (Vt. 2001); Weisblatt v. Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n, 292 Ill. App. 3d 48, 58, 684 N.E.2d 984, 990 (1997) (to establish a common law claim for negligent representation a plaintiff must allege, inter alia, \u201ca false statement of material fact\u201d and \u201ccarelessness or negligence in ascertaining the truth of the statement by defendant\u201d). The Illinois case of Diaz v. Krob, 264 Ill. App. 3d 97, 100, 636 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (1994), is also helpful. There the court held that where the plaintiff was hit by a car while crossing the street after being waved across the street by a school bus driver, the bus driver had no duty to provide accurate information. We note that in this case, unlike Diaz, plaintiff has not alleged that Bell made any false statements or, for that matter, any affirmative statements at all. Thus, without even reaching a Moorman analysis the complaint fails to establish any duty on the part of Bell at common law to supply the information required under the statute.\nPlote next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing count IV of its complaint because it has adequately stated a cause of action under the Illinois Highway Code. We disagree.\n\u201cIn order to recover for a defendant\u2019s violation of a statute or rule designed to protect human life or property, a plaintiff must show[, inter alia, that his injury is] *** the kind of injury which the rule sought to prevent.\u201d Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 144 Ill. 2d 535, 543, 582 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1991). Section 9 \u2014 113(f) of the Illinois Highway Code (605 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 113(f) (West 2000)) states in relevant part as follows:\n\u201cAny ditches, drains, track, rails, poles, wires, pipe line or other equipment located, placed or constructed upon, under or along a State highway with the consent of the State highway authority under this Section shall, upon written notice by the State[ ] highway authority be subject to removal, relocation or modification at no expense to the State highway authority when and as deemed necessary by the State highway authority for highway or highway safety purposes.\u201d 605 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 113(f) (West 2000).\nThis statute establishes that the highway authority may move facilities that infringe on its easement. This statute does not purport to impose any duty upon a utility to provide information to anyone, and in no event does it impose a duty to supply information to private contractors. Nothing in this statute indicates that its purpose is to protect Plote or other contractors from economic losses. Rather, this statute gives the state highway authority the power to subject objects on its highways to removal upon its written notice. We thus find that Plote has no private cause of action based on section 9 \u2014 113 of the Highway Code. Cf Swope v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 850, 857-58, 623 N.E.2d 841, 846 (1993) (no private cause of action was available to the plaintiff under section 9 \u2014 113 for injuries sustained in a car accident because the statute was not intended to protect against that type of injury). As is the case with respect to count III, since Plote has no cause of action based on this statute, we do not reach any Moorman issues with respect to that count.\nFinally, Plote argues that the trial court erred in dismissing count V of its complaint. Plote contends that count V properly states a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract. Bell contends that Plote has failed to plead such a cause of action because Plote had not alleged that Bell acted intentionally or that Bell\u2019s actions were unjustified. We agree with Bell.\nHere, too, as is the case with respect to counts III and IV Plote has not shown that Bell owed it any duty not to interfere with Plot\u00e9\u2019s contract with IDOT by providing information concerning the location of its underground facilities. However, even if we were to graft the duty imposed by the Underground Facilities Act onto this cause of action, Plote would not prevail because Plote has failed to plead intentionality.\n\u201cIn order to establish an action for intentional interference with contract, a plaintiff must plead and prove[, inter alia,] *** defendant\u2019s intentional and unjustified inducement of [a] third party to breach [a] contract.\u201d Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Services, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17, 32, 691 N.E.2d 834, 845 (1998). \u201cA necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of an action for tortious interference with contract is a defendant\u2019s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of contract.\u201d Strosberg, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 33, 691 N.E.2d at 845; Futurevision, Inc. v. Dahl, 139 Ill. App. 3d 61, 66, 487 N.E.2d 127, 131 (1985).\nIn the case at bar, Plote has not pled that Bell intentionally caused Plote to breach its contract with IDOT or that Bell intended to cause Plote harm. The trial court\u2019s dismissal of count V was thus correct.\nPlote\u2019s reliance on HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 545 N.E.2d 672 (1989), is misplaced. HPI stands for the proposition that a plaintiff in an interference-with-contract action does not need to prove that the defendant\u2019s conduct was malicious or unjustified unless that defendant\u2019s conduct was privileged. HPI, 131 Ill. 2d at 157, 545 N.E.2d at 677. Plote thus argues that since Bell\u2019s conduct was not privileged, it need not plead that Bell\u2019s conduct was unjustified or malicious. Nothing in HPI, however, limits the element of intentionality to cases where the defendant\u2019s conduct was privileged. Plote was thus required to plead that Bell acted intentionally, which Plote did not do.\nFor the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed in part and reversed in part and this cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nMcBRIDE and CAHILL, JJ., concur.\nCount I purported to state a claim under the Illinois Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 201 (West 1992)) and is not at issue in this appeal.\nCount VI purported to state a claim for breach of contract, and count VII purported to state a claim for breach by Bell of a highway permit issued by the State of Illinois, of which Plote contended it was a third-party beneficiary. Neither count is relevant to the instant appeal.\nThe other exceptions mentioned include \u201cwhere the plaintiff has sustained damage resulting from a sudden or dangerous occurrence\u201d and \u201cwhere the plaintiff\u2019s damages are the proximate result of a defendant\u2019s intentional, false representation (fraud).\u201d In re Illinois Bell, 161 Ill. 2d at 240-41, 641 N.E.2d at 443-44.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Warren R. Fuller and Karen A. Berres, both of Fuller & Berres, of South Barrington, for appellants.", "Jennifer S. Holloway and Donald C. Clark, Jr., both of Clark & DeGrand, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, d/b/a Ameritech Illinois, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. PLOTE, INC., Defendant (Piote, Inc., et al., Counterplaintiffs-Appellants).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00\u20143743\nOpinion filed October 21, 2002.\nWarren R. Fuller and Karen A. Berres, both of Fuller & Berres, of South Barrington, for appellants.\nJennifer S. Holloway and Donald C. Clark, Jr., both of Clark & DeGrand, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0796-01", "first_page_order": 814, "last_page_order": 824 }