{ "id": 521954, "name": "JAMES W. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND-CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Collins v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "2002-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201401\u20142018", "first_page": "909", "last_page": "916", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 909" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642109 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351180 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" }, { "page": "689-90" }, { "page": "689-90" }, { "page": "685-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415345 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096297 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" }, { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 N.E.2d 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544909 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "16-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801355 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "753 N.E.2d 1244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171624 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "741 N.E.2d 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "746 N.E.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132379 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0197-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 737, "char_count": 18608, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.018546641136220683 }, "sha256": "1360a731134aceb4c192877950b982c181a4e0371b36f383f35aa80652221ee9", "simhash": "1:3abcd1823ca38627", "word_count": 3091 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.005109+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JAMES W. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND\u2014CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn June 9, 1998, plaintiff James W Collins filed a complaint for administrative review and other relief with the circuit court of Cook County from a decision by the Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund \u2014 City of Chicago (Board) denying Collins certain benefits under the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000)). On remand, the Board affirmed its decision. The circuit court then heard the matter on appeal from the administrative review. On May 9, 2001, the court affirmed the decision of the Board by written opinion and order. Collins now appeals to this court.\nThe following facts are not in dispute. James W Collins joined the Chicago police department on January 9, 1961. On February 5, 1985, while on duty, Collins was seriously injured when a car crossed the center line and struck the squad car Collins was driving. At the time of the accident, Collins was assigned to Area 2 as a youth officer. Following the accident, Collins attempted to return to active duty but was unable. On August 14,1987, Collins was informed by the Board in writing that he was placed on \u201cduty disability.\u201d In the August 14 letter, the Board informed Collins that he was to be awarded 75% of his salary at the time of his award. Additionally, the Board advised Collins that while he was carried as a disability beneficiary, his \u201cservice and monetary credits for annuity purposes go on just as though [he were] performing active duty.\u201d The status of \u201cduty disability\u201d removed Collins from the City of Chicago payroll and made him subject to the compensation structure of the Illinois Pension Code. Collins remained on \u201cduty disability\u201d until his retirement on November 30, 1998.\nAt the time of his award, Collins was awarded 75% of the salary of an active-duty youth officer. Pursuant to the statute, an active police officer who becomes disabled is entitled to receive \u201cduty disability\u201d benefits \u201cduring any period of such disability for which he does not have a right to receive salary, equal to 75% of his salary, as salary is defined in this Article, at the time the disability is allowed.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 154 (West 2000). Beginning January 1, 1996, the statute was amended to provide that \u201cno duty disability benefit that has been payable under this Section for at least 10 years shall be less than 50% of the current salary attached from time to time to the rank held by the policeman at the time of removal from the police department payroll.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 154 (West 2000). Therefore, starting in January 1998, Collins was awarded an amount equal to 50% of the current salary of an officer of similar rank, that amount being greater than 75% of Collins\u2019 salary at the time of his disability award.\nThe statute also provided Collins with a pension upon retirement based on life annuity credits while on \u201cduty disability.\u201d Section 5 \u2014 172 provides that \u201c[i]n lieu of salary deductions for annuity purposes, the city shall contribute the required amounts for any period during which a policeman receives a duty disability benefit. The city shall also contribute all amounts ordinarily contributed by it for annuity purposes for the policeman as though he were in active discharge of his duties during such disability.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 172 (West 2000).\nAt issue in this dispute is the statutory definition of \u201csalary.\u201d Under the statute, \u201csalary\u201d is the \u201cannual salary of a policeman appropriated for members of his rank or grade in the city\u2019s annual budget or appropriation bill.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 114(d) (West 2000). Effective January 1, 1998, the Illinois legislature expanded the meaning of \u201csalary\u201d: \u201cBeginning January 1, 1998, the salary of a policeman, as calculated under subsection (d), shall include any duty availability allowance received by the policeman.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 114(f) (West 2000). We note the use of the word \u201cshall.\u201d Under rules of statutory construction, we accept this as mandatory. Curtis Investment Firm, Ltd. Partnership v. Schuch, 321 Ill. App. 3d 197, 746 N.E.2d 1233 (2001). Section 5 \u2014 114 also provides an option to officers to apply this provision retroactively:\n\u201cAn active or former policeman who (1) either retired between July 1, 1994 and December 31, 1997, both inclusive, or attained or will attain age 50 and 20 years of service between July 1, 1994 and January 1, 2002, both inclusive, and (2) received a duty availability allowance at any time after June 30, 1994 and before January 1, 1998 may elect to have that duty availability allowance included in the calculation of his or her salary under subsection (d) for all or any portion of that period for which the allowance was received, by applying in writing and paying to the Fund, no earlier than January 1, 1998 and no later than July 1, 1998, the corresponding employee contribution without interest. Thereafter the City shall make its corresponding contribution, without interest.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 114(0 (West 2000).\nCollins does not dispute that the Board correctly calculated and awarded him his \u201cduty disability\u201d benefit prior to the amendment to section 5 \u2014 114.\nOn April 13, 1998, Collins sent a letter to the Board requesting that his award be recalculated to include \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d pursuant to the January 1, 1998, amendment to section 5 \u2014 114. He advised the Board that he wished to exercise his option to have the provision apply retroactively and, as such, enclosed a check for his past contributions. On May 1, 1998, the Board responded to Collins\u2019 request in writing. The Board denied Collins\u2019 request, stating that since he did not receive a \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d from the time he began receiving \u201cduty disability\u201d benefits to the present, he did not now qualify for this additional benefit. The Board returned his check.\nOn June 9, 1998, Collins filed an action for administrative review. After the filing, the Board requested that the matter be remanded to the Board for a de novo review. Collins agreed. After a hearing on September 23, 1999, the Board issued its decision in writing on July 27, 2000. In its decision, the Board affirmed its earlier ruling on the matter. Collins then appealed to the circuit court. On May 9, 2001, in a written opinion and order, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board.\nCollins argues that we must reverse the Board\u2019s decision and define the word \u201csalary\u201d uniformly to both active and disabled police officers. Collins also asks us to reject the Board\u2019s effort to read the word \u201creceived\u201d in isolation and instead give effect to the provisions of the Illinois Pension Code as a whole. Specifically, Collins asks us to determine that the Board failed to correctly calculate his \u201cduty disability\u201d benefits from January 1, 1998, to November 30, 1998, by not considering his \u201csalary\u201d to include the \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d pursuant to the section 5 \u2014 114 amendment.\nUnder the Administrative Review Law, we review the final decision of the administrative agency and not the decision of the circuit court. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000). We will defer to the agency\u2019s findings of fact, yet we conduct an independent review of its conclusions of law. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 318 Ill. App. 3d 205, 209, 741 N.E.2d 998 (2000). When deciding a mixed question of law and fact, we review the agency\u2019s decision under a clearly erroneous standard. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). When the issue on appeal involves no dispute of fact and is one of law only, we review the agency\u2019s decision de novo. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d at 209. Here, the facts were uncontroverted and the Board was charged with interpreting the statute. Because these are issues of statutory interpretation, we will apply a de novo standard of review. White v. City of Aurora, 323 Ill. App. 3d 733, 753 N.E.2d 1244 (2001).\nIt is not in dispute that when Collins was placed on \u201cduty disability\u201d in 1987, he was effectively removed from the City of Chicago payroll. This subjected him to the compensation structure of the Illinois Pension Code. 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2000). It is also undisputed that but for the January 1, 1998, amendment to section 5 \u2014 114, Collins would not be entitled to a \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d as part of his salary calculation for any time after he began receiving \u201cduty disability\u201d benefits. Thus, the controversy here is one of statutory construction and whether or not, under the statute\u2019s amendment, Collins is afforded the benefit of \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d as part of his \u201csalary.\u201d\nCollins correctly points out in his brief that the primary purpose of statutory construction is to give effect to the language and intent of the legislature. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 149, 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997). Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996). People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425, 656 N.E.2d 118 (1995). The statute must be read and considered as a whole such that each section of the statute is examined in relation to other sections and all words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Advincula, 176 Ill. 2d at 16-17. We must presume that the legislature did not intend for any absurd or unjust meaning. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 426. Additionally, the \u201cresponsibility for the wisdom or justice of legislation rests with the legislature, and courts may not rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the court\u2019s idea of orderliness and public policy.\u201d People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 29, 740 N.E.2d 755 (2000). Also, where a statute defines its own terms, we consider those terms in accordance with the statutory definition provided. A.R. v. Chicago Board of Education, 311 Ill. App. 3d 29, 33, 724 N.E.2d 6 (1999). Holland v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686, 682 N.E.2d 323 (1997).\nWe also note the well-settled principle that the purpose of laws regarding pension is beneficial, and statutes of this nature should be liberally construed in favor of those to be benefitted. The Holland court specifically noted that Article 5 of the Illinois Pension Code should be interpreted in favor of police officers. Holland, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 689-90. Board of Trustees of the Policemen\u2019s Pension Fund v. Department of Insurance, 42 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159, 356 N.E.2d 171 (1976).\nSection 5 \u2014 154 of the Illinois Pension Code allows for a \u201cduty disability\u201d benefit to an active police officer who becomes disabled in the performance of an act of duty. The section states that this benefit is available during any period of such disability for which the officer does not have a right to draw a salary \u201cas salary is defined in [the] Article.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 154(a) (West 2000). Section 5 \u2014 114(f) states that the \u201csalary\u201d of a police officer shall include any \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d received by the police officer. 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 114(f) (West 2000). Also relevant is section 5 \u2014 172, which requires the city to contribute toward an officer\u2019s annuity while the officer is on \u201cduty disability\u201d: \u201c[t]he city shall also contribute all amounts ordinarily contributed by it for annuity purposes for the policeman as though he were in active discharge of his duties during such disability.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 172 (West 2000).\nWe interpret the \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d to mean that the officer is entitled to an allowance in the event he is available for duty. The parties draw our attention to an agreement between the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7, and the City of Chicago (FOP agreement). Section 20.13 of this agreement addresses \u201cduty availability.\u201d Specifically, the agreement allows for Chicago police officers to receive a certain sum of money per quarter. Section 20.13(B) states: \u201cIn accordance with the Letter of Understanding, the Employer shall treat duty availability allowance payments as pensionable retroactive to July, 1994.\u201d Section 20.13(C) states: \u201cEntitlement to duty availability pay is not dependent on an officer being present for duty for an entire pay period.\u201d\nIn its brief, the Board argues, in examining the language of amended section 5 \u2014 114(f), that the \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d benefit is only available to a police officer who has actually received the benefit and not an officer who could have received the benefit. It goes on to note that the language of section 5 \u2014 114(f) is clear and unambiguous in this respect. Therefore, because Collins was on \u201cduty disability\u201d when the amended section was enacted, he never actually received the \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d and, thus, is not now entitled to it.\nCollins argues that this logic is flawed. First, Collins points out that section 5 \u2014 172 of the Code prevents disparate treatment between active and disabled officers. As noted above, section 5 \u2014 172 states that a disabled officer should be treated under the Code for purposes of benefits \u201cas though he were in active discharge of his duties.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 172 (West 2000). Collins further argues that under the Board\u2019s reasoning, there would be disparate treatment among disabled officers. Collins presents this court with the following example. If an active police officer were to become disabled today, he would already have \u201creceived\u201d the \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d as part of his \u201csalary.\u201d Thus, this officer would be entitled to receive a percentage of this allowance as part of his \u201cduty disability\u201d benefit but Collins cannot. Collins argues that the Code was not drafted to draw these distinctions. Collins contends that the \u201cduty disability\u201d benefits he is entitled to are based on the current salary of an officer of similar rank and not what he (Collins) has personally received.\nIn examining the FOP agreement, the Board argues that not every officer is going to receive the \u201cduty availability allowance\u201d and, therefore, Collins cannot argue that he is entitled to it under his \u201csalary.\u201d The Board draws our attention to subsection C of section 20.13 of the agreement, which states that \u201centitlement to duty availability pay is not dependent on an officer being present for duty for any entire pay period.\u201d The Board reasons that subsection C means that in order to receive the \u201cduty availability allowance,\u201d an officer need not be available for an \u201centire\u201d pay period, but must be available for duty for at least a portion of the pay period. Because not all officers will qualify for this benefit, the Board reasons, Collins cannot qualify for this benefit.\nIn his reply brief, Collins responds to this argument by suggesting that subsection C was created to alleviate the problem of active police officers who were suspended for a few days within the quarter and being denied the \u201cduty availability allowance.\u201d Collins states that instead of treating him as an officer injured in the line of duty and subject to the rights of active officers while on disability, as required by the statute, the Board is attempting to treat him as though he were suspended for disciplinary reasons.\nStudying the legislative history of the section 5 \u2014 114(f) amendment does not shed additional light on this matter. On April 8, 1997, the bill that became the amendment was introduced in its third reading by the sponsor of the bill, Representative Capparelli, who stated: \u201cThis allowance, which currently totals about $400 per quarter does not count as part of their retirement. House Bill 345 would change the definition, from duty availability to salary so it would count towards their retirement.\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 8, 1997, at 112 (statements of Representative Capparelli). The legislature made no distinction between active and disabled officers in consideration of this legislation.\nWe consider that pension benefits should be viewed in favor of the beneficiaries \u2014 in this case, the police officers. Holland, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 689-90. Moreover, we recognize that when interpreting a statute, we are to view it as a whole. Particular provisions of the statute must not be read in isolation, but must be read in conjunction with all other relevant provisions of the statute. Holland, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 685-87.\nTaking into account all the relevant sections of the Illinois Pension Code, we find no evidence that the legislature intended to exclude those officers under \u201cduty disability\u201d benefits from the amended definition of \u201csalary\u201d and, thus, from the benefit of \u201cduty availability\u201d for purposes of calculating pension benefits. As noted above, section 5 \u2014 114 provides for the meaning of \u201csalary\u201d under the Pension Code: \u201cBeginning January 1, 1998, the salary of a policeman, as calculated under subsection (d), shall include any duty availability allowance received by the policeman.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 114(f) (West 2000). We note the use of the word \u201cshall.\u201d Under rules of statutory construction, we accept this as mandatory. Curtis Investment Firm, Ltd. Partnership v. Schuch, 321 Ill. App. 3d 197, 199, 746 N.E.2d 1233 (2001).\nAdditionally, we are not persuaded by the Board\u2019s argument that an officer must have \u201creceived\u201d the benefit prior to \u201cduty disability\u201d in order to qualify. We believe the legislature intended that those officers, disabled in the fine of duty, be afforded the same benefits as those officers who continue to actively serve. We find this has been made clear by the language found in sections 5 \u2014 154, 5 \u2014 114 and 5 \u2014 172 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 154, 5 \u2014 114, 5 \u2014 172 (West 2000).\nAccordingly, we reverse the decision of the Board and remand the matter for a recalculation of Collins\u2019 monthly duty disability allowance \u201csalary\u201d to include the duty availability allowance currently paid to youth officers; for a recalculation of Collins\u2019 life annuity account credits to include the recalculation of his \u201csalary\u201d; and for the acceptance of a voluntary pension contribution from Collins in accordance with the retroactivity provision in section 5 \u2014 114(f).\nReversed and remanded.\nBURKE, PJ., and GORDON, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel J. Collins, of Williams, Collins & Bax, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.", "David R. Kugler, of Retirement Board of Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES W. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND\u2014CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 01\u20142018\nOpinion filed June 18, 2002.\nRehearing denied November 25, 2002.\nDaniel J. Collins, of Williams, Collins & Bax, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.\nDavid R. Kugler, of Retirement Board of Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0909-01", "first_page_order": 927, "last_page_order": 934 }