{ "id": 521968, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. KEEGAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Keegan", "decision_date": "2002-10-25", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201402\u20140233", "first_page": "1061", "last_page": "1065", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 1061" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543239 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 976", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that untimeliness of petition for contributory attorney fees under divorce statute was waivable issue pursuant to Belleville Toyota" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209217 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that untimeliness of petition for contributory attorney fees under divorce statute was waivable issue pursuant to Belleville Toyota" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "770 N.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383649 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283190 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 1050", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5239688 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/1050-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224794 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127069 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0202-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 471, "char_count": 8334, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33185351732861645 }, "sha256": "cc48c541e46f16857c6d07565683a2b39c5b33fc019405f80c7f5006cf4b48c3", "simhash": "1:b2a4e7abf7c1fe66", "word_count": 1316 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:41.005109+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. KEEGAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Michael L. Keegan was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). One hundred and three days later, he filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driving privileges. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition on its merits. The State then moved to reconsider on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petition was untimely. The court granted the State\u2019s motion and vacated the rescission order. Defendant appeals, arguing that the 90-day period for filing a petition to rescind under section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1 (West 2000)) is not jurisdictional and was waived by the State\u2019s failure to raise the issue prior to the hearing on defendant\u2019s petition. We reverse.\nBACKGROUND\nThe record shows that defendant was arrested and charged with DUI on August 17, 2001. His petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges was filed in the circuit court on November 28. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that the evidence did not show that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol.\nThe State moved to reconsider based on defendant\u2019s failure to file his petition to rescind within 90 days of receiving notice of the summary suspension (625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1 (West 2000)). The circuit court, reasoning that section 2 \u2014 118.1 was \u201canalogous\u201d to an administrative review proceeding, ruled that the lack of a timely petition deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985). Accordingly, the court granted the State\u2019s motion and vacated its order rescinding the summary suspension of defendant\u2019s driving privileges.\nISSUE AND ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s analogy to administrative review proceedings was in error. He contends that the filing period in section 2 \u2014 118.1 is an ordinary statute of limitations that should be considered as an affirmative defense, which the State waived by failing to assert it prior to the hearing on the merits of his petition.\nOrdinary statutes of limitation present procedural bars that may be asserted as an affirmative defense or waived. See People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 723 N.E.2d 230 (1999). Fairness dictates that affirmative defenses that are neither pled nor argued at a hearing on the merits may not be raised later in a motion to reconsider. Harmon Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Thorson, 226 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 590 N.E.2d 920 (1992).\nBy contrast, time limitations contained in statutes that confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court based on the timely filing of a pleading pose jurisdictional bars that cannot be waived. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 592 N.E.2d 977 (1992). If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because a cause is not filed within a jurisdictional time limitation, the court\u2019s judgment may be attacked at any time as a void judgment. Eckel v. MacNeal, 256 Ill. App. 3d 292, 628 N.E.2d 741 (1993).\nThe question before us is whether failure to comply with the 90-day period for filing a request for a hearing under section 2 \u2014 118.1 is a jurisdictional bar or a procedural defect that may be waived. This is apparently a question of first impression; however, our supreme court, considering a four-year limitations period under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/14 (West 2000)), recently provided guidance to resolve the issue.\nIn Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334-35, 770 N.E.2d 177, 184 (2002), the court stated:\n\u201c \u2018[Sjubject matter jurisdiction\u2019 refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs. [Citations.] With the exception of the circuit court\u2019s power to review administrative action, which is conferred by statute, a circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution. [Citations.] Under section 9 of article VI, that jurisdiction extends to all \u2018justiciable matters.\u2019 Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 9. ***\n*** GeneraUy, a \u2018justiciable matter\u2019 is a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. [Citations.] The legislature may create new justiciable matters by enacting legislation that creates rights and duties that have no counterpart at common law or in equity. [Citation.] *** The legislature\u2019s creation of a new justiciable matter, however, does not mean that the legislature thereby confers jurisdiction on the circuit court. Article VI is clear that, except in the area of administrative review, the jurisdiction of the circuit court flows from the constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 9.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nOur supreme court thus made it clear that, unless the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction derives from administrative review law, the circuit court has original subject matter jurisdiction over justiciable matters, whether the rights asserted by the petitioner were known to common law or are purely creations of statute. See In re Marriage of Lindsey-Robinson, 331 Ill. App. 3d 261, 771 N.E.2d 976 (2002) (holding that untimeliness of petition for contributory attorney fees under divorce statute was waivable issue pursuant to Belleville Toyota).\nTurning to section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Code, we note that the statute sets forth a comprehensive procedure for the conduct of a prompt judicial hearing when a person seeks to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges. The scope of the hearing is limited to four specific issues relating to the circumstances surrounding the defendant\u2019s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Unlike related statutes, section 2 \u2014 118.1 does not merely provide for judicial review of an underlying administrative hearing previously held before the Secretary of State. Cf. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.8(h) (West 2000) (providing for judicial review of suspension following administrative proceeding under \u201czero tolerance\u201d statute); 625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118(e) (West 2000) (providing for judicial review of suspension, revocation or denial of license following hearing before Secretary of State). Although statutory summary suspensions are considered administrative, rather than criminal in nature (Koss v. Slater, 116 Ill. 2d 389, 507 N.E.2d 826 (1987)), the rescission statute contains no basis, express or implied, for applying administrative review law.\nConsidered in light of Belleville Toyota, we hold that a defendant\u2019s right to a hearing under section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Code is a justiciable matter over which the circuit court has original subject matter jurisdiction under this state\u2019s constitution. Therefore, the 90-day period for filing a petition to rescind is an ordinary statute of limitations \u2014 not a jurisdictional prerequisite that could not be waived by the State. See Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 770 N.E.2d 177.\nIn this case, the 90-day time limitation could have been asserted by the State in a motion to dismiss prior to a hearing on the merits of defendant\u2019s petition to rescind. By failing to do so, the State forfeited its \u201caffirmative defense.\u201d Justice is not served by allowing the State to raise the procedural bar for the first time on a motion to reconsider. See Harmon Insurance, 226 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 590 N.E.2d 920.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, the order granting the State\u2019s motion for reconsideration is reversed, and the order granting rescission of defendant\u2019s summary suspension is reinstated.\nReversed; rescission order reinstated.\nLYTTON, EJ., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SLATER" } ], "attorneys": [ "John P. Ridge, of Kankakee, for appellant.", "Edward D. Smith, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Feople." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. KEEGAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 02\u20140233\nOpinion filed October 25, 2002.\nJohn P. Ridge, of Kankakee, for appellant.\nEdward D. Smith, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Feople." }, "file_name": "1061-01", "first_page_order": 1079, "last_page_order": 1083 }