{ "id": 637054, "name": "JILL REPEDE, a Minor, by Her Mother and Next Friend, Lois Repede, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 300 et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Repede v. Community Unit School District No. 300", "decision_date": "2002-10-31", "docket_number": "No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0940", "first_page": "140", "last_page": "144", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 140" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578808 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 783", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381846 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490683 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3354082 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524115 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 252057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" }, { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" }, { "page": "422-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5595999 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183313 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" }, { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0717-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 451, "char_count": 7356, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.191221743643092e-08, "percentile": 0.32567053137074786 }, "sha256": "22ba08bec6fd4649a5e8f3f7b8b3aa629f2829aa012c28662cecca093d77fc0c", "simhash": "1:8f392d1351c85f7c", "word_count": 1156 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:10.004592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JILL REPEDE, a Minor, by Her Mother and Next Friend, Lois Repede, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 300 et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Jill Repede and Lois Repede, appeal the circuit court\u2019s order that dismissed their complaint alleging negligence against defendants, Community Unit School District No. 300, Dundee-Grown High School, and Jacqueline Gilly. The trial court ruled that defendants were immune from suit. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that defendants are not immune because (1) they voluntarily assumed a duty; (2) Gilly was not acting in a discretionary capacity when the accident occurred; and (3) defendants were not acting in a governmental capacity when the injury occurred.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that in September 1997, plaintiff Jill Repede (hereafter plaintiff) was a member of the freshman cheerlead-ing squad at Dundee-Grown High School. Gilly was the cheerleading coach. While practicing a pyramid routine, plaintiff fell, breaking her arm.\nThe complaint further alleges that the freshmen cheerleaders were inexperienced in performing such routines. Although defendants knew this, they provided no coaching supervision and no \u201cspotters\u201d for the routine. A spotter is someone who observes a routine and is available to assist anyone who falls.\nPursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2000)), defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Defendants argued that they were immune from suit for failing to supervise an activity on public property. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiff timely appeals.\nWhere a cause of action has been dismissed pursuant to a section 2 \u2014 619 motion, the questions on appeal are whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Brown v. King, 328 Ill. App. 3d 717, 721 (2001). We review de novo the dismissal of an action pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619. Brown, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 721.\nWhen plaintiffs accident occurred, section 3 \u2014 108(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) provided that \u201cneither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996). Defendants contend, as they did in the trial court, that plaintiffs complaint alleges a failure to supervise an activity \u2014 cheer-leading practice \u2014 on public property. Plaintiff does not dispute this, but nonetheless argues that immunity does not apply for several reasons.\nPlaintiff first contends that defendants voluntarily assumed a duty. She argues that by joining the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) and adopting its \u201cspirit rules\u201d governing cheerleading, defendants assumed a duty to supervise the cheerleaders\u2019 activities.\nOne who voluntarily undertakes to provide services to another is liable for an injury caused by the failure to exercise due care in doing so. Vesey v. Chicago Housing Authority, 145 Ill. 2d 404, 415 (1991). However, the existence of a duty and the existence of immunity are separate issues. Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. App. 3d 416, 421 (1994). Morever, failing to comply with self-imposed regulations does not generally impose a legal duty on a governmental defendant. Geimer v. Chicago Park District, 272 Ill. App. 3d 629, 636 (1995); Blankenship, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 422-23.\nIn Geimer, the court held that defendant had no duty to enforce its own officiating rules during a touch football game. Geimer, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 637. Here, the defendants did not undertake an additional duty to protect plaintiff merely by joining the IHSA and adopting its rules. Thus, the trial court correctly held that defendants here were not liable for failing to enforce the spirit rules they voluntarily adopted.\nPlaintiff next contends that immunity does not apply because in conducting cheerleading practice, Gilly was performing a ministerial, rather than discretionary, duty. Plaintiff appears to confuse the \u201cdiscretionary\u201d immunity embodied in sections 2 \u2014 109 and 2 \u2014 201 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 109, 2 \u2014 201 (West 2000)) with supervisory immunity under section 3 \u2014 108. These immunities are separate and, while the Act expressly adopts the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties in sections 2 \u2014 109 and 2 \u2014 201, the distinction is simply irrelevant to the existence of supervisory immunity under section 3 \u2014 108. Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 381 (1997). Thus, it does not matter whether Gilly was performing a discretionary or ministerial function when plaintiff was injured and plaintiff may not avoid defendants\u2019 immunity on this basis.\nPlaintiff finally contends that defendants are not immune because they were not engaged in a governmental function when plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff cites cases holding that a governmental unit is not necessarily immune from liability when engaging in a \u201cproprietary\u201d rather than a \u201cgovernmental\u201d function. See Comastro v. Village of Rosemont, 122 Ill. App. 3d 405 (1984). Plaintiff argues that the School Code (105 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)) expressly requires or authorizes school districts to provide certain programs, but nowhere mentions varsity athletics or cheerleading teams. Plaintiff posits that because the School Code does not expressly authorize a district to sponsor athletic teams, such activities are ultra vires and not a \u201cgovernmental\u201d function.\nThe supreme court has rejected the distinction between governmental and proprietary activities in deciding whether a governmental body is immune under the Act. See Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 379; Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388 (1996). Even if the governmental/proprietary distinction applied here, we would find that defendants\u2019 cheerleading squad was a governmental activity. Plaintiff cites no authority for her contention that an activity must be specifically authorized by a statute to be considered a governmental function.\nIn a slightly different context, a court observed that \u201c[vjarsity athletics are an integral part of virtually all school programs at every level.\u201d Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education, 60 Ill. App. 3d 729, 736 (1978), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 77 Ill. 2d 165 (1979). In Payne v. Lake Forest Community High School District 115, 268 Ill. App. 3d 783 (1994), this court held that defendant was not liable for injuries plaintiffs suffered while working on the set and lighting for a school talent show. In Koh v. Village Greens of Woodridge, 158 Ill. App. 3d 226, 228-29 (1987), we held that a municipal golf course was a governmental, rather than a proprietary, function. Defendants\u2019 cheer-leading squad is not analytically different from a school talent show or a municipal golf course. Plaintiff cannot avoid defendants\u2019 immunity on this basis.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEOMETER and CALLUM, J!, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel E. Compton, of Brittain & Ketcham, P.C., of Elgin, for appellants.", "John G. Foreman, of Spesia, Ayers & Ardaugh, of Joliet, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JILL REPEDE, a Minor, by Her Mother and Next Friend, Lois Repede, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 300 et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 0940\nOpinion filed October 31, 2002.\nDaniel E. Compton, of Brittain & Ketcham, P.C., of Elgin, for appellants.\nJohn G. Foreman, of Spesia, Ayers & Ardaugh, of Joliet, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0140-01", "first_page_order": 158, "last_page_order": 162 }