{ "id": 637116, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM E. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson", "decision_date": "2002-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 1124", "first_page": "313", "last_page": "316", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 313" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351147 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 826", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187747 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" }, { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0826-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 F.3d 215", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7634150 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" }, { "page": "219" }, { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/80/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615720 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" }, { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945344 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209968 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544407 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351271 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0425-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 475, "char_count": 8242, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.237821310691602e-08, "percentile": 0.5108664636432472 }, "sha256": "4405a178ffd98daf02349fed879ea672578d17823ae9c00a0042013813ad9f56", "simhash": "1:8d439b2a6b0df2d5", "word_count": 1333 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:10.004592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM E. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GROMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from an order of the circuit court suppressing the evidence and quashing the arrest of defendant, William E. Jackson. The State argues that the circuit court erred by concluding that the police officer lacked a valid basis for the investigatory stop of defendant\u2019s car. We reverse and remand.\nDefendant was indicted by a grand jury for the offense of driving while his driver\u2019s license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303 (West 2000)). He subsequently moved the court to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence obtained from it. At the July 20, 2001, hearing on the motion, the following evidence was introduced by the hearing\u2019s sole witness, police officer Steve Cadle of the Carol Stream police department.\nCadle testified that on May 16, 1999, at approximately 5 p.m., he stopped at an intersection during a routine patrol. He observed defendant drive past him in the opposite direction. As defendant passed him, Cadle \u201csaw what appeared to be a large obstruction in [defendant\u2019s] front windshield\u201d in violation of section 12 \u2014 503(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 503(c) (West 2000)). He then turned his squad car around and initiated an investigatory stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. He testified that the windshield obstruction was the only reason for the stop and that he observed no other violations of the law at that time.\nWhen asked by defense counsel to describe the windshield obstruction, Cadle stated that \u201c[t]wo air fresheners [were] hanging from the rear-view [sic] mirror.\u201d He later added the detail that the air fresheners were \u201ctree or leafy-shaped.\u201d Defense counsel then showed some air fresheners to Cadle and asked him if they were the same air fresheners that he had observed in defendant\u2019s vehicle. Cadle was not able to identify whether they were the same air fresheners, but he stated that \u201cit\u2019s possible\u201d that they were. He also noted that he only observed defendant\u2019s vehicle for approximately two seconds prior to initiating the stop.\nAt the end of the testimony, the court indicated that it found Cadle to be a \u201cvery honest, credible] witness doing his job.\u201d However, it also noted that Cadle did testify that \u201cthe [windshield] obstructions were similar in nature\u201d to the air fresheners presented by the defense. It concluded that Cadle lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal\nactivity to justify the investigatory stop and granted defendant\u2019s motion. On July 31, 2001, the State moved the court to reconsider its decision. The trial court denied the State\u2019s motion and this timely appeal followed.\nAs an initial matter, the parties dispute which standard this court should apply in reviewing the circuit court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion. Their dispute concerns whether we are required to review the circuit court\u2019s factual determinations. Under such circumstances, we accord great deference to the court\u2019s factual findings and credibility assessments and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001). \u201cHowever, suppression motions are best characterized as raising mixed questions of fact and law, and if all factual disputes in the case have been resolved, only a question of law remains.\u201d People v. Bascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d 124, 126 (1997). When a case\u2019s facts and witnesses\u2019 credibility are uncontroverted, we are presented with only a legal question that we review de novo. People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 309 (1998), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000); see also Bascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 127; People v. Frazier, 248 Ill. App. 3d 6, 15 (1993). Those circumstances are present in the instant case. At the motion hearing, the arresting officer was the only testifying witness, and the circuit court explicitly found his testimony credible. We will, therefore, review the court\u2019s legal determination de novo.\nThe only issue on appeal is whether the circuit court correctly found that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify his investigatory stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. An investigatory stop is proper when a police officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is taking place or is about to take place. People v. Repp, 165 Ill. App. 3d 90, 94 (1988). A reasonable suspicion is created when a police officer has knowledge of specific, articulable facts that, when combined with the rational inferences from them, suggest that the person in question has committed or is about to commit a crime. Repp, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 94.\nThe State contends that the court\u2019s determination that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminality contradicts the holding of United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215 (7th Cir. 1996). In Smith, the defendant was stopped for the sole reason of having an air freshener hanging from the car\u2019s rearview mirror. Smith, 80 F.3d at 219. The Smith court held that the officer had probable cause to stop the defendant because objectively the air freshener could be considered a material obstruction between the driver and the windshield in violation of section 12 \u2014 503(c) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 503(c) (West 1994)). Smith, 80 F.3d at 219.\nLikewise, in People v. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d 826 (1992), the court held that an investigatory stop was not pretextual because the officer \u201cwas quite adamant that, in her opinion, the [fuzzy dice hanging from the rearview mirror of defendant\u2019s car] would have materially obstructed the driver\u2019s view in some directions.\u201d Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 838. We find Smith and Mendoza controlling.\nIn the present case, the court found the arresting officer\u2019s testimony credible. The officer testified that, in his opinion, the air fresheners hanging from defendant\u2019s rearview mirror were material windshield obstructions. After finding the officer\u2019s testimony credible, the court, nevertheless, determined that he lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court apparently concluded that the air fresheners in defendant\u2019s vehicle were the same as the ones displayed in court and, in its view, were not material obstructions of the windshield. We cannot agree with this determination.\nThe court\u2019s inquiry during a suppression hearing concerns whether, prior to making the investigatory stop, the arresting officer had knowledge of specific, articulable facts which suggested that the person in question had committed or was about to commit a crime. Smith instructs us that an air freshener hanging from a rearview mirror can create a reasonable suspicion that section 12 \u2014 503(c) of the Code is being violated. Smith, 80 F.3d at 219. Moreover, as Mendoza states, when considering whether the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminality to justify the stop, we look to the officer\u2019s opinions and beliefs at the time he or she made the stop. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 838. The court\u2019s determination should not focus on whether an offense was actually committed but, instead, on whether the arresting officer reasonably suspected at the time of the stop that criminal activity was taking place or about to take place. See People v. Ross, 289 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1016 (1997). We conclude that the uncontroverted evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that, according to Smith and Mendoza, the air fresheners observed by the arresting officer constitute a legal basis for a reasonable suspicion of criminality.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GROMETER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Margaret M. Healy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Charles R. Wolf, of Heller & Richmond, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM E. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 1124\nOpinion filed December 3, 2002.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Margaret M. Healy, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nCharles R. Wolf, of Heller & Richmond, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0313-01", "first_page_order": 331, "last_page_order": 334 }