{ "id": 637059, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERIN N. GOEKING, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Goeking", "decision_date": "2002-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 1358", "first_page": "321", "last_page": "325", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 321" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251541 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926980 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256260 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243856 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506-07" }, { "page": "519-20" }, { "page": "520" }, { "page": "520" }, { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0501-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 456, "char_count": 8493, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.426140871105827e-08, "percentile": 0.5165689196551614 }, "sha256": "0055ec51dbede17236348c2ce0f63938bc898d647bccea84be4b27eb3ed22a21", "simhash": "1:07ab0c6e76b26853", "word_count": 1420 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:10.004592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERIN N. GOEKING, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Erin Goeking, was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5 (West 2000)) following a search of her car. The State appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash her arrest and suppress the evidence, contending that defendant validly consented to the search.\nTroy Kindle, a Polo police officer, was on patrol when he saw defendant\u2019s car parked on the wrong side of the street and then saw it pull away from the curb without a turn signal. Kindle made a traffic stop and ascertained the identities of defendant, who was driving, and her three passengers. Defendant seemed fidgety and nervous and seemed \u201cadamant about leaving.\u201d\nKindle ran checks on all four of the car\u2019s occupants and discovered nothing suspicious. Defendant\u2019s eyes looked \u201cglossy\u201d and were red and bloodshot. In response to his question, defendant said that there was nothing in the car that \u201cshouldn\u2019t be in the vehicle.\u201d Kindle had her step out of the car to see whether she was intoxicated. He did not smell any alcohol on her breath. Kindle then explained why he had her get out of the car, issued a verbal warning for the traffic violations, and told her that she was free to go.\nDefendant began walking back toward her car. Kindle then asked her if she had any \u201cknives, guns, drugs, dead bodies, grenades, rocket launchers, anything that shouldn\u2019t be in the vehicle.\u201d She said she did not. Kindle then asked if she had any objection to his searching the vehicle. She said she did not.\nDefendant testified that she did not feel free to continue walking toward the car or to drive away after the officer asked her if she had anything illegal. She did not feel she had any choice in permitting the search because the officer would become \u201csuspicious\u201d if she refused consent.\nKindle then searched the car and found a pen and a socket wrench containing THC residue. At about that time, defendant\u2019s mother arrived at the scene. Kindle told her that he was going to take defendant to the police station.\nDefendant moved to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence. She argued that the purpose of the traffic stop was complete after Kindle issued the verbal warning and told her she was free to leave. Therefore, under People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999), her consent was invalid because Kindle prolonged the stop merely to try to get consent to search and she did not feel that she could refuse. The trial court granted the motion. The State filed a certificate of impairment and a timely appeal.\nThe State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence. It argues that this case is distinguishable from Brownlee because the officer expressly told defendant that she could leave.\nIn reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we must accept the trial court\u2019s factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Gonzalez, 324 Ill. App. 3d 15, 19 (2001). If we accept the trial court\u2019s findings, we review de novo whether suppression is warranted under these facts. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12 (1998).\nIn Brownlee, defendant was a passenger in a car that police stopped for a minor traffic violation. After one of the officers returned the driver\u2019s license and insurance card, he paused for about two minutes, then asked for permission to search the car. The driver agreed and the subsequent search revealed marijuana. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 506-07.\nThe supreme court held that the purpose of the traffic stop was complete when the officer returned defendant\u2019s license. However, the officers improperly prolonged the stop by waiting two minutes, then requesting consent to search the car. Because the driver would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances, his consent was invalid. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 519-20.\nThis case is similar to Brownlee. The purpose of the stop was complete when Kindle issued a verbal warning about the traffic violations, but he prolonged the stop by asking defendant whether she had anything illegal in the car and requesting permission to search it.\nThe State argues that this case is distinguishable from Brownlee because the officer expressly told defendant that she was free to leave. Thus, the subsequent conversation, including the consent to search, was consensual. The State fears that if the officer\u2019s express statement that the driver may go does not end the seizure and render a subsequent conversation consensual, then we will be creating a per se rule that a consensual encounter may never follow a traffic stop.\nBrownlee held that the test was whether under all the circumstances a reasonable person in the driver\u2019s position would feel free to leave. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520. While telling the driver that she is free to go is certainly a relevant consideration, it is not dispositive. Here, the officer told defendant that she could leave, but then almost immediately questioned her about illegal items in the car and asked for permission to search. Thus, the officer at best sent defendant mixed signals.\nBrownlee recognizes the inherently coercive nature of a traffic stop. While the court stopped short of saying that a voluntary encounter could never follow a traffic stop, we would think that such cases would be rare. It is difficult to imagine many cases in which a motorist would voluntarily remain at the scene of a traffic stop to engage the officer in casual conversation.\nIn any event, we need not speculate whether under other circumstances an encounter following a traffic stop is voluntary. The trial court here found that defendant in fact did not feel free to leave and the State does not challenge this finding.\nIt is certainly reasonable to conclude that defendant did not feel free to simply drive away from Officer Kindle. The 17-year-old defendant, with no previous experience with law enforcement, was stopped by the officer and questioned about illegal items in her car. The officer suspected that she was under the influence of alcohol and had her step out of the car to evaluate her condition. Then, immediately after telling her that she could go, the officer again asked her whether she had any contraband in the car and asked for permission to search. The court could reasonably find that a person in defendant\u2019s position would not have felt free to leave.\nThe evidence shows that in fact defendant did not think that she could leave the scene. She testified that she felt she had no choice when asked for her consent to search. Kindle never said that she had the right to refuse to consent. Moreover, Kindle had testified that defendant initially was \u201cadamant\u201d about leaving. When he told her she was free to leave, she began walking toward her car. However, when he again began questioning her, she immediately stopped. The record supports the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant did not feel she had a choice in the matter. Although the Brownlee court noted that the test of whether a reasonable person in the driver\u2019s position would feel free to leave is an objective one, a driver\u2019s subjective belief is nevertheless relevant. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520.\nCiting People v. Gherna, 325 Ill. App. 3d 157 (2001), the State argues that the officer\u2019s conversation with defendant after the traffic stop ended was justified by the community caretaking doctrine. However, community caretaking does not involve a seizure. People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1990). In Gherna, the court held that defendant was never seized. Gherna, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 162. Here, it is undisputed that a seizure occurred when Kindle effected the traffic stop. Thus, Gherna is inapplicable.\nIn light of its finding, the trial court could properly conclude that defendant\u2019s consent to the search was involuntary. Accordingly, the court properly suppressed the evidence found in the search. See Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 521.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEOMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Douglas P. Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Martin P. Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert T. Hanson, of Moehle, Smith, Nieman, Hanson & Hahn, P.C., of Mt. Morris, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERIN N. GOEKING, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 01 \u2014 1358\nOpinion filed December 6, 2002.\nDouglas P. Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Martin P. Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert T. Hanson, of Moehle, Smith, Nieman, Hanson & Hahn, P.C., of Mt. Morris, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0321-01", "first_page_order": 339, "last_page_order": 343 }