{ "id": 637140, "name": "ZOFIA BIEL, Independent Adm'r of the Estate of Jan Biel, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF BRIDGEVIEW et al., Defendants (Lyons Electric Co., Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Biel v. City of Bridgeview", "decision_date": "2002-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 00 \u2014 3689", "first_page": "526", "last_page": "536", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 526" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602939 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 Ill. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2558729 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/381/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 N.E.2d 976", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 Ill. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2552795 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/379/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810152 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 1068", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536099 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "258-59" }, { "page": "258-59" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "261-62" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0252-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 965, "char_count": 26431, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.31734398414733833 }, "sha256": "2b19a21c28fb1518f4a38b67e0617a61bd13ec0688dbe1eedb386360f2c0ec12", "simhash": "1:f0e481fa85e5848c", "word_count": 4304 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:10.004592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ZOFIA BIEL, Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Jan Biel, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF BRIDGEVIEW et al., Defendants (Lyons Electric Co., Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff-appellant, Zofia Biel, independent administrator of the estate of Jan Biel, brought an action to recover against defendants, City of Bridgeview and William Hamman, and defendants-appellees Lyons Electric Co., Inc. (Lyons), and Pinner Electric, Inc. (Pinner), when Jan Biel was struck and killed by a car while crossing the street. Plaintiff claims that defendants\u2019 negligence caused a streetlight to be inoperable which, if operable, would have illuminated the location where Jan Biel was killed. Such negligence, according to plaintiff, was a contributing proximate cause of Jan Biel\u2019s death. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the inoperable streetlight only created a condition and could not have proximately caused the accident as a matter of law. The summary judgment motion was originally denied, but based on a motion to reconsider, the trial court reversed itself and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court\u2019s summary judgment ruling.\nTwo issues are raised on review: whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground that the nonfunctioning streetlight was only a condition and not a proximate cause of the accident; and whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing defendants\u2019 motion to reconsider the denial of summary judgment in their favor. We state the following background facts.\nDefendants are electrical contracting companies. Plaintiffs first amended complaint alleged the City of Bridgeview contracted with defendants to make repairs on particular streetlights within the City. Prior to August 21, 1995, defendants repaired streetlights on 79th Street west of Harlem Avenue, Bridgeview, Illinois.\nOn August 21, 1985, at approximately 11 p.m., Jan Biel was killed when he was struck by a car driven by William Hamman. At the time of the accident, Hamman was traveling westbound on 79th Street just past the intersection of 79th Street and Harlem Avenue, Bridgeview, Illinois. Hamman testified that he knew that one streetlight was out which provided illumination over the median area of 79th Street. He also stated that the marquee signs and parking lot lights of surrounding stores, including a K mart, were turned off. As he was driving approximately 30 miles per hour on 79th Street, just past the intersection of 79th Street and Harlem Avenue, Hamman stated that he moved into the left-hand lane. At that point, something hit the windshield. Hamman pulled to the side of the road, called his wife, told her he may have hit someone, and ran down to where the accident had occurred. Hamman said that he noticed that Biel\u2019s clothing was dark. After the accident, Hamman told police that he never saw Jan Biel prior to the collision.\nPlaintiffs first amended complaint alleged that the City of Bridge-view contracted with defendants to manage, maintain, and control \u201ca certain light post which was intended to provide sufficient lighting to that portion of 79th Street *** near its intersection with Harlem Avenue.\u201d The complaint further alleged that it then became defendants\u2019 duty to manage, maintain, and control \u201cthe aforementioned light pole so as to provide sufficient lighting to that portion of 79th Street *** near its intersection with Harlem Avenue.\u201d Notwithstanding this duty, the complaint stated that defendants were guilty of the following negligent acts or omissions:\n\u201c(a) carelessly and negligently failed to inspect said light pole at all reasonable times;\n(b) carelessly, and negligently failed to maintain said light pole;\n(c) carelessly and negligently failed to create and implement procedures to inspect that aforementioned light pole;\n(d) otherwise carelessly and negligently owned, operated, managed, maintained and controlled said light pole.\u201d\nAt all relevant times, the complaint alleged that the aforementioned light post was not illuminated. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants, \u201cin failing to illuminate the said light post,\u201d the complaint stated the motor vehicle driven by Hamman struck and killed Jan Biel as he crossed 79th Street.\nGlenn Jendrzejewski, an eyewitness to the accident, testified that he was familiar with 79th Street and that he lived in a trailer apartment at 7858 South Harlem Avenue, Bridgeview, Illinois. When he saw the accident, he was sitting on a white chair in front of his apartment. The accident occurred on a clear, dark night at approximately 11 p.m. He indicated that the streetlight in the vicinity of the accident was \u201cout\u201d and that it had been out for approximately a year. In the area where the particular light was not illuminated, the area was dark. The closest crosswalk was at the intersection of 79th Street and Harlem Avenue. According to Jendrzejewski, the accident occurred about a half a block west of this crosswalk on 79th Street.\nJendrzejewski testified that, prior to crossing 79th Street, Jan Biel stumbled and fell over a chain-link fence and then fell several more times on the sidewalk. He stated that Biel appeared to be drunk or on heavy medication. According to Jendrzejewski, Biel was wearing a dark green shirt, green pants, and dark socks. Biel then went over to a light pole that had a 40-mile-per-hour speed limit sign affixed to it. For a short time, Biel leaned against the pole. Jendrzejewski testified that Biel began crossing 79th Street. As Biel crossed, he was wobbling back and forth as he made it halfway across the street. Biel then stood in the middle of the street for about 10 seconds. A car approached, and Jendrzejewski said that he saw Biel get hit by the front end of the vehicle on the driver\u2019s side. Biel flew about five feet into the air. At that time, Jendrzejewski ran inside and dialed 911. Prior to impact, Jendrzejewski said, the car did not slow down.\nHerman Caldwell, also an eyewitness to the accident, testified that he lived in a trailer at 7858 South Harlem Avenue, Bridgeview, Illinois. He lived in the same double trailer as Glenn Jendrzejewski. He stated that he was very familiar with 79th Street west of Harlem Avenue. On the night of the accident, Caldwell stated, he witnessed the accident while sitting in a lawn chair next to Jendrzejewski. He testified that it was a nice summer evening, visibility was clear, and the streets were dry. Caldwell further stated that all of the streetlights on the north side of 79th Street were working on the evening of the accident with the exception of one, the light pole with the 40-mile-per-hour speed limit sign. Caldwell testified that the light had been out for at least a few months.\nAccording to Caldwell, he was sitting in front of Jendrzejewski\u2019s trailer when he first saw Biel. Biel appeared very drunk. He said that Biel kept falling over a chain-link fence and onto the sidewalk. Caldwell said he saw Biel stumble and fall at least four or five times. Biel then leaned on the lamppost with the burned out streetlight and the 40-mile-per-hour speed limit sign. Caldwell said he asked Biel after he fell if he would like to sit down for a few minutes and if Biel would like a ride home. Biel, who was slurring his words, responded no thank you. Biel waited at the lamppost for about 20 seconds.\nCaldwell testified that Biel began crossing 79th Street at the light pole with the 40-mile-per-hour speed limit sign on it. Prior to crossing, Caldwell said, Biel looked east toward Harlem Avenue for oncoming traffic. He then began staggering into the street. When Biel had moved about four feet into the street, he was hit by a fast-moving, oncoming vehicle. Biel\u2019s body flew high into the air and landed near the double yellow line next to the left-hand lane. After the accident, Caldwell said, he ran out into the street to block traffic. According to Caldwell, the left front headlight on the vehicle was out prior to the accident.\nCaldwell also said that there were no crosswalks at the place where Biel was crossing. However, he did testify that he had noticed other people crossing 79th Street where the accident occurred. He also stated that he had crossed the street there and that he observed others crossing at that location daily.\nJames O\u2019Donnell, a doctor of pharmacy and expert in alcohol effects, testified that he examined documents related to the alcohol levels in the decedent, Jan Biel, at the time of the accident. O\u2019Donnell opined that Biel was severely intoxicated on August 21, 1995, with a blood-alcohol level of .258. O\u2019Donnell based his opinion on the \u201calcohol test\u201d taken from Biel at Christ Hospital and the testimony of the eyewitnesses who saw him stumbling prior to the accident. He further stated that a person with a blood-alcohol level of .258 would be severely impaired and would have difficulty walking.\nIn her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent because they carelessly and negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and illuminate the streetlight, and these negligent acts were a proximate cause of Jan Biel\u2019s death. As noted by plaintiff, defendants initially filed motions in the trial court for summary judgment on the ground that failure to repair the streetlight at issue was only a condition and not a proximate cause of Jan Biel\u2019s death. The motions were stricken by Judge Philip Bronstein in an order entered June 4, 1999, because counsel for defendants failed to appear. Defendants then filed a second motion for summary judgment on the \u201ccause vs. condition analysis.\u201d The second summary judgment motion was denied by Judge Sophia Hall on December 6, 1999.\nOn August 3, 2000, defendants sought leave to file a motion to reconsider Judge Hall\u2019s ruling entered on December 6, 1999. On the same day, leave was granted to file the motion, but Judge Donald O\u2019Brien limited the motion to the issue of \u201c \u2018cause vs. condition\u2019 and the applicability of [First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 720 N.E.2d 1068 (1999),] and other cases on the issue subsequent to 12/6/99.\u201d Also on August 3, 2000, defendants filed their motion to reconsider the December 6, 1999, order on two grounds: that the trial court ruled on summary judgment without the benefit of the supreme court\u2019s decision in Galman, cited above; and that Caldwell\u2019s and O\u2019Donnell\u2019s depositions were not available for the court\u2019s consideration in defendants\u2019 prior motion for summary judgment. On September 20, 2000, Judge Sophia Hall granted defendants\u2019 motion to reconsider on the ground that she had misapplied the law and entered summary judgment in defendants\u2019 favor. Plaintiff appeals the entry of the motion to reconsider and the summary judgment order in favor of defendants. We first address whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment on the basis that the inoperable streetlight was only a condition and not a proximate cause of Biel\u2019s death. The supreme court has stated:\n\u201cSummary judgment is *** proper only when the resolution of a case hinges on a question of law and the moving party\u2019s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. [Citation.] In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the affidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and pleadings on file and has a duty to construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. [Citation.] If the court finds that the record contains any material issues of genuine fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. A triable issue of fact exists where there is a dispute as to material facts or where the material facts are undisputed but reasonable persons might draw different inferences from those facts. [Citation.] As in all cases involving summary judgment, we review the evidence in the record de novo.\u201d In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 410-11, 615 N.E.2d 736 (1993).\nThe supreme court has also held: \u201cTo recover damages based upon a defendant\u2019s alleged negligence, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. [Citation.]\u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 256. In the instant case, plaintiffs first amended complaint alleges the elements set forth above. In granting summary judgment, however, the trial court found that defendants\u2019 failure to replace the inoperable streetlight was, as a matter of law, a condition as opposed to a proximate cause of Biel\u2019s injury.\nIn Galman, the supreme court held: \u201cIllinois courts draw a distinction between a condition and a cause.\u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 257. The court further stated:\n\u201cIndeed, if the negligence charged does nothing more than furnish a condition by which the injury is made possible, and that condition causes an injury by the subsequent, independent act of a third person, the creation of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury. Briske v. Village of Burnham, 379 Ill. 193, 199[, 39 N.E.2d 976] (1942); Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, 316[, 45 N.E.2d 665] (1942); see also Thompson [v. County of Cook,] 154 Ill. 2d [374,] 383[, 609 N.E.2d 290 (1993)]. The test that should be applied in all proximate cause cases is whether the first wrongdoer reasonably might have anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural and probable result of the first party\u2019s own negligence. [Citation.]\u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 257.\nThe Galman court also identified a second test for determining proximate cause which was established in Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455, 605 N.E.2d 493 (1992). Specifically, it stated:\n\u201cIn Lee the court held that the term \u2018proximate cause\u2019 describes two distinct requirements: cause in fact and legal cause. [Citation.] Cause in fact exists where there is a reasonable certainty that a defendant\u2019s acts caused the injury or damage. [Citation.] A defendant\u2019s conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury only if that conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. [Citation.] A defendant\u2019s conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about an injury if, absent that conduct, the injury would not have occurred. [Citation.] \u2018Legal cause,\u2019 by contrast, is essentially a question of foreseeability. [Citation.] The relevant inquiry here is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct. [Citation.]\u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 257-58.\nThe court noted that the parties in that case were under the mistaken impression that the two tests were incompatible. Instead, the supreme court held that although Briske, Merlo, and Thompson employed a different vocabulary than Lee, all of the cases asked the same question: \u201cWas defendant\u2019s negligence a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury, and, if so, was the injury of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct?\u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258-59. It went on to conclude that, \u201c[fiar from conflicting, Briske, Merlo, Thompson, and Lee uniformly embrace the traditional proximate cause test that has governed Illinois for the better part of this century. [Citation.]\u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258-59.\nWith the above standard in place, we must determine whether the requirements of proximate cause, specifically cause in fact and legal cause, have been satisfied in the instant case.\nBased upon the pleadings and depositions in this record, we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendants\u2019 conduct in failing to replace the streetlight was a material element and a substantial factor in Jan Biel\u2019s death. We note that, \u201c[w]here reasonable minds could differ, whether the defendant\u2019s conduct was of such a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs injury is for the jury to decide.\u201d Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455. At the very least, from the testimony presented, it can be inferred that Biel\u2019s death would not have occurred but for an inoperable streetlight above the accident location, and that Biel may have avoided the accident in the event the streetlight was illuminated. Further, Jendrzejewski and Caldwell both testified that the streetlight was inoperable where Biel elected to cross. They also said that the lights of the K mart and other surrounding businesses were turned off and that the area where Biel crossed 79th Street was dark. Based upon these facts, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendants\u2019 conduct was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about Biel\u2019s death.\nWe also find that a material question of fact exists as to whether defendants\u2019 failure to repair, maintain, and illuminate the streetlight in question was the legal cause of Jan Biel\u2019s death. As we noted above, legal cause is essentially a question of foreseeability. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258. \u201cThe relevant inquiry here is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.\u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258.\nHere, defendants suggest that they could not have reasonably foreseen that \u201callowing an inoperative streetlight to exist on 79th Street mid block would likely result in plaintiffs decedent Jan Biel: (1) failing to utilize nearby crosswalks; (2) deciding to cross the street mid block; (3) at a location where the streetlight was out; (4) wearing dark clothing; (5) being extremely intoxicated; (6) staggering and not able to control his own movement; and (7) standing in the middle of 79th Street in such a condition for at least 10 seconds.\u201d According to defendants, as a matter of law, the independent acts of Jan Biel were not reasonably foreseeable. We disagree.\nWhile Jan Biel\u2019s conduct may have been contributorily negligent, we cannot say as a matter of law that Biel\u2019s death was not foreseeable to defendants, which failed to maintain, repair, and illuminate the streetlight at the location where Biel crossed 79th Street. As we noted above, Jendrzejewski and Caldwell both testified that the streetlight was \u201cout\u201d where Biel elected to cross. There seems to be no dispute that defendants had contracted with the City of Bridgeview to maintain the streetlight at issue. Additionally, Jendrzejewski said that the light had been out for approximately one year. Caldwell testified that the light had been out for at least a few months. Both Jendrze-jewski and Caldwell said that the lights of surrounding businesses had been turned off, making the area very dark. Further, Caldwell testified that he crossed 79th Street where Biel crossed and that he had seen other pedestrians using the exact same location to cross almost daily. Based upon the testimony presented, we conclude that a question of fact exists as to whether Biel\u2019s injury was foreseeable to defendants.\nFurther, we are not persuaded by the city ordinances and state laws relied upon by defendants in this case. The statutes relied upon by defendants concern a pedestrian\u2019s duties to yield to drivers under certain conditions and to remain alcohol and drug free upon a street, highway, or public place. These statutory violations relate to the issue of Jan Biel\u2019s contributory negligence and not to whether it was foreseeable to defendants that the inoperable streetlight could have resulted in an injury to Biel.\nIn Lee, cited above, an intoxicated pedestrian entered a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) right-of-way at the intersection of Kedzie Avenue and the Ravenswood railway line in Chicago. The right-of-way was posted with signs warning of danger and electric current. Also, the CTA had laid uneven-edged boards, approximately six inches apart, called \u201cjaws,\u201d in order to inform pedestrians that the area was restricted. Despite these warnings, the pedestrian, who had a blood-alcohol level of 0.341, urinated on the third rail of the CTA railway and sustained fatal injuries. On review, the supreme court held that, despite the fact the pedestrian was intoxicated, the \u201cdecedent\u2019s intoxication was properly a consideration only with respect to his contributory negligence.\u201d Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 454. In this case, Biel\u2019s conduct in violating local ordinances is a consideration in regard to his contributory negligence, not to whether it was foreseeable to defendants that the inoperable streetlight could have caused Biel\u2019s injury.\nDefendants claim that the facts in this case are analogous to those in Galman and that, therefore, the disposition in both cases should be the same. In Galman, Howard Dobson drove a tanker truck for ADM Trucking, Inc. (ADM). At about 3 p.m. on Tuesday, November 21, 1989, Dobson parked his truck mid-block on the north side of Lawrence Avenue, 41 feet from the intersection of English Street in Springfield, Illinois. Parking was prohibited on the north side of Lawrence Avenue between the hours of 7 a.m. and 6 p.m., Monday through Saturday. After Dobson parked his truck, May Phillippart, an 18-year-old French foreign exchange student, began walking south on English Street. At the intersection of English Street and Lawrence Avenue, Phillippart did not use the marked crosswalk. Instead, she walked 41 feet from the intersection plus the full length of Dobson\u2019s truck before deciding to cross Lawrence Avenue. At the front of Dobson\u2019s truck, Phillippart entered Lawrence Avenue and waited for traffic to clear. After taking IV2 slow steps into the center of the westbound lane of Lawrence Avenue, she began running across the street. At about the center line of Lawrence Avenue, Phillippart' was struck by the front passenger\u2019s side of a car driven by Amanda Galman. She died from her injuries. Section 80.04 of the City of Springfield Code provided: \u201c \u2018Pedestrian crossings between intersections shall be prohibited in the interest of public safety, except where there may be a marked crosswalk.\u2019 \u201d Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 255.\nFollowing Phillippart\u2019s death, the National Health Service of France (NHSF) paid her estate $452,794.82 as compensation for medical expenses. First Springfield Bank & Trust, acting on behalf of her estate, sued Galman, Dobson, and ADM for negligence. It also sued ADM for violating section 5 of the Public Nuisance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. IOOV2, par. 26.(5) (now 720 ILCS 5/47 \u2014 5(5) (West 1998))), which made it a nuisance to obstruct or encroach upon public highways. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 255. The jury entered a verdict, finding that Phillippart\u2019s damages totaled $1 million and that Phillippart was 45% at fault. Thus, the jury awarded First Springfield $550,000. Dobson and ADM moved to reduce the jury award by the amount paid to Phillippart\u2019s estate by the NHSF. Dobson and ADM moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on both counts and the motions were denied by the trial court.\nThe appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment. In a dissent, Justice Steigmann concluded that Dobson and ADM were entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the illegally parked tanker truck was not the proximate cause of Phillippart\u2019s injuries. Instead, the truck was merely a condition that allowed Phillippart\u2019s injuries to occur. Dobson and ADM appealed the appellate court\u2019s judgment on several bases including the ground that the illegally parked truck was not the proximate cause of Phillippart\u2019s injuries.\nThe supreme court concluded that the ADM\u2019s tanker truck was a cause in fact of Phillippart\u2019s injury because, had Dobson not parked the truck illegally on Lawrence Avenue, Phillippart\u2019s injuries almost certainly would not have occurred. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 260. However, the court found that the tanker truck was not the legal cause of Phillippart\u2019s injuries because it was not reasonably foreseeable that violating a no-parking sign and parking mid-block would result in the death of a young woman. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 261-62. Therefore, the court held that the illegally parked tanker truck was not the proximate cause of Phillippart\u2019s injuries. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 262.\nIn our view, Galman is distinguishable from the instant case. As we noted above, we find that factual questions remain as to whether the inoperable streetlight was a cause in fact of Biel\u2019s injuries. As we noted above, one could reasonably infer that defendants\u2019 failure to maintain the streetlight at issue was a material and substantial element in Biel\u2019s death and that absent defendants\u2019 conduct the injury would not have occurred. Further, unlike Galman, we conclude that it was foreseeable that defendants\u2019 failure to repair, maintain, and replace an inoperable streetlight might result in injury to a pedestrian crossing 79th Street at the relevant location. The foreseeability of an injury or death was supported by Caldwell\u2019s testimony that he noticed other people crossing 79th Street where the accident occurred, that he had crossed the street there, and that he observed others crossing 79th Street at that location daily. Further, Hamman testified that he never saw Biel before he struck him. Finally, there was testimony that the area where Biel was hit was dark. As a result, the facts in Galman are inapposite.\nWe conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding at the summary judgment stage that the inoperable streetlight was merely a condition and not a proximate cause of Biel\u2019s injuries was incorrect. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. As a result, we reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling in regard to the summary judgment in favor of the defendants.\nBecause of our finding with regard to the first issue, the question of whether the motion to reconsider was properly granted is effectively moot. The decision of the trial court is reversed.\nReversed.\nCERDA and BURKE, JJ., concur.\nHereinafter \u201cdefendants\u201d means only defendants-appellees, Lyons and Pinner.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marvin A. Brustin and Milo W. Lundblad, both of Marvin A. Brustin, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Howard K. Preiss II and Basileios Katris, both of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ZOFIA BIEL, Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Jan Biel, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF BRIDGEVIEW et al., Defendants (Lyons Electric Co., Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 00 \u2014 3689\nOpinion filed November 26, 2002.\nMarvin A. Brustin and Milo W. Lundblad, both of Marvin A. Brustin, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nHoward K. Preiss II and Basileios Katris, both of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0526-01", "first_page_order": 544, "last_page_order": 554 }