{ "id": 637035, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELA M. LITTLE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Little", "decision_date": "2003-01-08", "docket_number": "No. 4 \u2014 01 \u2014 0536", "first_page": "1046", "last_page": "1056", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 1046" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "725 N.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784-85", "parenthetical": "$5-per-day credit against an imposed fine does not establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415371 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970", "parenthetical": "$5-per-day credit against an imposed fine does not establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "in which the supreme court declined to address the merits of the defendant's claim when he first raised it in his appeal from the dismissal of his amended postconviction petition" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224773 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "in which the supreme court declined to address the merits of the defendant's claim when he first raised it in his appeal from the dismissal of his amended postconviction petition" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 N.E.2d 1235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 N.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" }, { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453266 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096315 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486-87", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion to change venue based on the documented \"unprecedented volume of publicity\" combined with the jurors' exposure to polygraph information, which was particularly persuasive and highly prejudicial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3161249 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "noting that when a trial court addresses a motion in limine on the merits, its ruling is always subject to reconsideration during trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 1005", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132510 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1008", "parenthetical": "noting that when a trial court addresses a motion in limine on the merits, its ruling is always subject to reconsideration during trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/1005-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1003", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1011" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588761 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810583 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096300 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2943814 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 1158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1163-64" }, { "page": "1164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243850 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" }, { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442050 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "\"courts will uphold the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant's allegations\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487186 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "\"courts will uphold the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant's allegations\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1106", "parenthetical": "\"A court may also properly dismiss a post[ ]conviction petition if the record of proceedings at trial shows the petition to be nonmeritorious \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464304 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "\"A court may also properly dismiss a post[ ]conviction petition if the record of proceedings at trial shows the petition to be nonmeritorious \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" }, { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259047 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 831", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281450 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0831-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1071" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "445" }, { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259103 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 948, "char_count": 22983, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4207070500049447e-07, "percentile": 0.8009955406666567 }, "sha256": "e92ae45720853cf2c9b5fac641b45e7204a202febb49d68214ece9d8e3b7ef80", "simhash": "1:a3e4d87e17cd97f3", "word_count": 3731 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:10.004592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELA M. LITTLE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn January 2001, defendant, Angela M. Little, pro se filed a petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 through 122 \u2014 8 (West 2000)), alleging, inter alia, that (1) her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to conduct a survey concerning the effect of pretrial publicity to support defendant\u2019s motion to change venue; and (2) her appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the trial court erred by denying her motion to change venue. In April 2001, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s postconviction petition under section 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Act, upon finding that it was untimely filed (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 2000)).\nDefendant appeals, arguing that the trial court (1) erred by dismissing her postconviction petition, and (2) lacked the authority to order that her Department of Corrections (DOC) wages be withheld and remitted to the circuit clerk. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn January 1998, defendant\u2019s estranged husband, Craig Little, was murdered by 15-year-old Anthony Jennings, who was accompanied by Carl Dueringer, defendant\u2019s boyfriend, pursuant to a plan between defendant, Dueringer, and Jennings. In February 1998, the State charged defendant with first degree murder (count I) (720 ILCS 5/9\u2014 1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997)) and solicitation of murder for hire (count II) (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 1.2(a) (West 1998)). Prior to defendant\u2019s trial, the State dismissed count II.\nIn June 1998, defendant filed a motion to change venue due to pretrial publicity in Ford County. In July 1998, the State filed a response to defendant\u2019s motion. In September 1998, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to change venue, stating as follows:\n\u201cI\u2019ve had the opportunity to review the motion for change of venue, which has attached to it numerous news articles from the Bloomington paper, the Paxton paper ***. Gibson City is in here. It looks like Champaign as well. *** And the gist of the motion is that this publicity has made it or will make it impossible to find a jury panel who could fairly try the issues in this case. And the size of Ford County makes jury selection problematic with a high[-]profile case. There is no doubt about that. And it becomes, in my view, more difficult.\nI would acknowledge today that it would be more difficult in Ford County to pick a jury than it would up in Morris in Grundy County. Now, that\u2019s not a reason to change venue. The only reason that we change venue is because a [c]ourt finds, based upon pretrial publicity, that the population in Ford County is so prejudiced against the defendant that we will not be able to pick a fair and impartial jury. I believe it is a difficult standard to meet and one which without some sophisticated surveys *** is very difficult to meet. And the information provided in the motion does not establish in my view that the community is prejudiced. It simply establishes that there is quite a bit of publicity; and to those who have read every single article, they may have formed some opinions. Jurors may be selected and sworn to hear a case that they are familiar with from the newspapers if they can set it aside. It\u2019s a standard question. That\u2019s the way we pick juries all the time.\nAnd in the final analysis, the test for whether or not venue ought to remain here or be moved occurs at jury selection, and change of venue motions are never over until the jury is selected. And so if it turns out to be a difficult proposition or an impossible one in selecting [a] jury, I believe that that can always be revisited, at least until jurors are sworn it can be. But to make a finding that I must change venue [because] the population is prejudiced against the defendant, I can[ ]not based upon the evidence that the parties have submitted thfujs far. So the motion for change is denied.\u201d (Emphases added.)\nDuring voir dire, the trial court questioned 69 venire members. Of those, 36 had been exposed to pretrial publicity, and the court excused three venire members for cause because they had already formed opinions based on that publicity. Defendant did not renew her motion to change venue following jury selection.\nFollowing her November 1998 trial, the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997)). The trial court later sentenced her to 56 years in prison. The court also ordered that (1) defendant pay $315 in court costs; and (2) the DOC withhold 50% of defendant\u2019s DOC wages and remit those funds to the Ford County circuit clerk to be applied toward the amounts due in costs.\nOn direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence (People v. Little, No. 4 \u2014 99 \u2014 0145 (March 31, 2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)). In July 2000, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal (People v. Little, 189 Ill. 2d 695, 734 N.E.2d 896 (2000)).\nAs earlier stated, in January 2001, defendant pro se filed a post-conviction petition. In support of her petition, she attached several documents, including the following: (1) an affidavit, in which defendant averred that her family members overheard jurors complaining because they were not allowed to sentence defendant; (2) the affidavit of Randy Berger, in which he averred that Darrell Rickey had told him that (a) juror 218 had made some \u201cprejudice [sic] remarks\u201d about defendant before trial, and (b) Rickey and juror 218 had discussed defendant\u2019s poor work attendance record; and (3) 15 newspaper articles regarding the incident and the trial proceedings. In April 2001, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s postconviction petition as untimely under section 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1 (West 2000)).\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Proceedings Under the Act\nA defendant may proceed under the Act by alleging \u201cthat in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 (West 2000). A petition filed under the Act must \u201cclearly set forth the respects in which petitioner\u2019s constitutional rights were violated.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2000). The petition shall have attached \u201caffidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2 (West 2000).\nThe Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a post-conviction petition (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 through 122 \u2014 8 (West 2000); People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244, 757 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2001)), and this case involves the trial court\u2019s dismissal of defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition at the first stage. At this stage, the Act does not permit any further pleadings from the defendant or any motions or responsive pleadings from the State. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996). Instead, the court determines whether the petition alleges a constitutional infirmity that would necessitate relief under the Act. Unless positively rebutted by the record, all well-pled allegations are taken as true at this stage. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-81, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (1998).\nDismissal at the first stage of postconviction proceedings is warranted when the trial court independently reviews the postconviction petition and determines that \u201cthe petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2000); Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, 757 N.E.2d at 445. A postconviction petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit only if the allegations in the petition fail to present the \u201c \u2018gist of a constitutional claim.\u2019 \u201d Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, 757 N.E.2d at 445, quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418, 675 N.E.2d at 106. The \u201cgist\u201d standard is \u201c \u2018a low threshold.\u2019 \u201d Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, 757 N.E.2d at 445, quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418, 675 N.E.2d at 106. To set forth the \u201cgist\u201d of a constitutional claim, the postconviction petition \u201c \u2018need only present a limited amount of detail\u2019 \u201d and hence need not set forth the claim in its entirety. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, 757 N.E.2d at 445, quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418, 675 N.E.2d at 106.\n\u201cIn considering a petition pursuant to [section 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Act], the [trial] court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding!,] and any transcripts of such proceeding.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(c) (West 2000). The court should examine those records to determine whether the allegations are positively rebutted by the record. That determination will assist the court in resolving the issue as to whether the petition is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Smith, 326 Ill. App. 3d 831, 840, 761 N.E.2d 306, 315 (2001). On appeal from a first-stage dismissal, this court reviews de novo the trial court\u2019s decision. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 247, 757 N.E.2d at 447.\nOur supreme court has consistently upheld the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant\u2019s allegations. People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 222, 756 N.E.2d 831, 834 (2001); see People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 157, 361 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (1977) (\u201cA court may also properly dismiss a post[ ]conviction petition if the record of proceedings at trial shows the petition to be nonmeritorious \u201d); see also People v. De Avila, 333 Ill. App. 3d 321, 329, 775 N.E.2d 79, 85 (2002) (\u201ccourts will uphold the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant\u2019s allegations\u201d).\nB. Dismissal of Defendant\u2019s Postconviction Petition\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her postconviction petition. We disagree.\nInitially, we note that in People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 97 (2002), the supreme court held that during the first-stage review of a postconviction petition, a trial court may not dismiss the petition as untimely filed. Thus, the trial court erred by dismissing defendant\u2019s postconviction petition as untimely during these first-stage proceedings. However, because this court may affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment on any basis supported by the record, we determine whether defendant\u2019s postconviction petition presents the gist of a constitutional claim.\n1. Defendant\u2019s Claim That She Received Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her postconviction petition because it stated the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to conduct a survey concerning the effect of pretrial publicity to support defendant\u2019s motion for a change of venue, as the trial court had suggested. Defendant bases this claim on the court\u2019s remarks that (1) a motion to change venue is best supported by \u201csophisticated surveys\u201d; and (2) it could not grant defendant\u2019s motion based on the evidence then before it, but the motion was subject to reconsideration following jury selection. We conclude that defendant\u2019s petition failed to state the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim.\nTo establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). First, the defendant must prove that counsel made errors so serious, and counsel\u2019s performance was so deficient, that counsel was not functioning as the \u201ccounsel\u201d guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI).\nSecond, the defendant must establish prejudice \u2014 that is, she must prove that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Further, this prejudice prong of the Strickland test entails more than an \u201coutcome-determinative\u201d test; the defendant must also show that counsel\u2019s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708 N.E.2d 1158, 1163-64 (1999). Because a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, a reviewing court can dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel solely on the ground that the defendant did not suffer prejudice without deciding whether counsel\u2019s performance was constitutionally deficient. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 94, 708 N.E.2d at 1164.\nIn this case, the record positively rebuts defendant\u2019s claim that her trial counsel\u2019s failure to conduct a survey to support her motion for change of venue prejudiced her. See Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d at 222, 756 N.E.2d at 834. A defendant is entitled to a change of venue as a result of pretrial publicity if a reasonable apprehension exists that she cannot receive a fair and impartial trial. People v. Fort, 248 Ill. App. 3d 301, 309, 618 N.E.2d 445, 452 (1993). \u201cExposure to publicity about a case is not enough to demonstrate prejudice because jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case.\u201d People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 529, 743 N.E.2d 94, 108 (2000). Instead, what is essential is that the jurors ultimately chosen must be able to lay aside impressions or opinions and render a verdict based upon the evidence at trial. People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 16, 610 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1992). Thus, the relevant inquiry on appeal is not how much pretrial publicity occurred, but whether the defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 422, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1011 (1989).\nThe record shows that the jury that heard defendant\u2019s case was fair and impartial. Of the 12 jurors selected, only 8 had even read or heard about the case. Five of those eight jurors had read or heard initial news accounts of the case but had read or heard nothing nearer the time of defendant\u2019s trial; one juror had only \u201cvaguely\u201d heard about the case; one juror had heard coworkers talking about a single newspaper article; and the remaining juror had heard others talking about the case months before voir dire. Each of those eight jurors expressed a willingness to put aside what he or she knew about the case and decide it based only on the evidence presented at trial. Each also stated that he or she could set aside any bias or prejudice and be open-minded and fair to both sides.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s contention, the newspaper articles and affidavits attached to her postconviction petition do not support her claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Whether jurors had heard about the case prior to voir dire is not the issue. Instead, as earlier stated, the relevant inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant actually received a fair and impartial trial. The newspaper articles about defendant\u2019s case generally described the circumstances of the murder and defendant\u2019s arrest, the charges against defendant and her codefendants, the police investigation, and the impact of the victim\u2019s death on his surviving family members. The content of those articles was not so prejudicial to defendant that the jurors\u2019 assertions of impartiality and fairness should be disregarded. In addition, even accepting that postconviction allegations can properly be supported by affidavits containing inadmissible hearsay, the affidavits attached to defendant\u2019s petition do not suggest that the jurors who ultimately heard defendant\u2019s case were biased and unfair despite their assertions otherwise.\nBecause neither the record nor defendant\u2019s postconviction filings support defendant\u2019s claim that the jury that ultimately decided her case was not fair and impartial, defendant fails to state the gist of a meritorious claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a survey concerning the effect of pretrial publicity to support her motion to change venue. Simply put, because the record establishes that defendant received a fair and impartial trial, the fact that her trial counsel failed to conduct a survey is of no moment. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing defendant\u2019s postconviction petition.\nIn so concluding, we commend the trial court for its handling of defendant\u2019s motion for change of venue. As the court recognized, a pretrial ruling denying a defendant\u2019s motion to change venue is subject to reconsideration following jury selection. In this regard, such a ruling is akin to a denial of a motion in limine. See People v. Drum, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1008, 748 N.E.2d 344, 347 (2001) (noting that when a trial court addresses a motion in limine on the merits, its ruling is always subject to reconsideration during trial). After all, because the best evidence of whether a fair and impartial jury can be selected will be the responses of the prospective jurors during the jury selection process, the wisest course for a court to take often will be to initially deny the motion for change of venue because it is based upon speculation and revisit the matter \u2014 either on defendant\u2019s motion or sua sponte \u2014 once the jury selection process has occurred.\nWe are not suggesting that a trial court should never grant a motion to change venue prior to jury selection. In some cases, the extent or effect of the pretrial publicity may warrant a change of venue. See, for example, People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377, 395, 462 N.E.2d 478, 486-87 (1984) (holding that the trial court should have granted the defendant\u2019s motion to change venue based on the documented \u201cunprecedented volume of publicity\u201d combined with the jurors\u2019 exposure to polygraph information, which was particularly persuasive and highly prejudicial). In other cases, the State may decide not to oppose the defendant\u2019s motion to change venue. We simply note that a trial court\u2019s denial of a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to change venue is always subject to reconsideration following jury selection.\n2. Defendant\u2019s Claim That She Received Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her postconviction petition because it stated the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim that her appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to raise the issue of trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness \u201cfor failing to follow the trial court\u2019s directive\u201d to conduct a survey concerning the effect of pretrial publicity. We disagree.\nA defendant who claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance must show that (1) the failure to raise the issue on appeal was objectively unreasonable; and (2) this decision prejudiced the defendant. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 377, 743 N.E.2d 1, 11 (2000). Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues that, in counsel\u2019s judgment, are without merit, unless counsel\u2019s appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. Accordingly, unless the underlying issues are meritorious, the defendant suffers no prejudice from counsel\u2019s failure to raise them on appeal. People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 476, 737 N.E.2d 169, 190 (2000).\nGiven our conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to conduct a survey, defendant cannot state the gist of a meritorious claim that her appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the issue of trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness.\nC. Wage Withholding Order\nLast, defendant argues that the trial court lacked the authority to order that her DOC wages be withheld and remitted to the circuit clerk.\nDefendant raises this issue for the first time in her appeal from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of her postconviction petition. In People v. Griffin, 321 Ill. App. 3d 425, 428, 748 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (2001), this court declined to construe the Act as permitting a defendant to raise on appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition an issue she never raised in that petition. We adhere to Griffin and thus deem this issue forfeited. See also People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521, 544, 727 N.E.2d 348, 360 (2000) (in which the supreme court declined to address the merits of the defendant\u2019s claim when he first raised it in his appeal from the dismissal of his amended postconviction petition).\nEven assuming that defendant had not forfeited this issue, we conclude that her claim is not cognizable under the Act. In Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d at 464, 737 N.E.2d at 184, the supreme court discussed proceedings under the Act as follows:\n\u201cThe [Act] provides a mechanism by which criminal defendants can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. [Citation.] An action for post[ ]conviction relief is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the underlying conviction and sentence. [Citations.] In order to be entitled to post[ ]conviction relief, a defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe issue raised by defendant involves a matter created by statute involving the payment of costs and fees. This court has held that such statutorily created matters do not constitute a \u201cdeprivation of federal or state constitutional rights\u201d and, thus, are not cognizable under the Act. See Griffin, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 748 N.E.2d at 1238 (a trial court\u2019s failure to hold a hearing regarding a defendant\u2019s financial ability to reimburse the State for appointed counsel\u2019s fees violates statutory law but \u201cdoes not constitute any \u2018deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights,\u2019 much less a \u2018substantial\u2019 one\u201d (emphasis in original)); People v. Guerrero, 311 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970, 725 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (2000) ($5-per-day credit against an imposed fine does not establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. Affirmed.\nTURNER and APPLETON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Paige Clark Strawn (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Tony Lee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Paxton (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Kathy Shepard (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELA M. LITTLE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 01 \u2014 0536\nArgued December 18, 2002.\nOpinion filed January 8, 2003.\nRehearing denied February 4, 2003.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Paige Clark Strawn (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nTony Lee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Paxton (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Kathy Shepard (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1046-01", "first_page_order": 1064, "last_page_order": 1074 }