{ "id": 637108, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY BOWMAN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bowman", "decision_date": "2002-12-27", "docket_number": "No. 5 \u2014 01 \u2014 0340", "first_page": "1142", "last_page": "1155", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 1142" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5120178 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 F.3d 815", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11143974 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/238/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1595902 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/108/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "900 F.2d 1127", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10537747 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/900/1127-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307255 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 U.S. 315", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8889 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320-21" }, { "page": "1270" }, { "page": "1205-06" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "1268" }, { "page": "1204" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "1269" }, { "page": "1204-05" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "1269" }, { "page": "1205" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "1272" }, { "page": "1207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/360/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864525 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156228 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229707 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" }, { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10205 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "243" }, { "page": "1608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 790", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058675 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058257 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649826 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 759", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058501 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" }, { "page": "775" }, { "page": "1450" }, { "page": "768-71" }, { "page": "771-74" }, { "page": "1447-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" }, { "page": "725" }, { "page": "1629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 1207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished Rule 23 order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045986 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0025-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1234, "char_count": 32255, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.789529050676554e-08, "percentile": 0.45677489305361046 }, "sha256": "2e1ae731ff90cbb861595e62c98e84ca4aa97c4e496f5d1b096839b9e7deb1d2", "simhash": "1:a1e9e56c36e21fe7", "word_count": 5213 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:10.004592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY BOWMAN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nGregory Bowman (defendant) was convicted in 1979 for the murders of two young women. Twenty years later, a newspaper article alleged a previously unknown collaboration between the detective to whom defendant confessed and a cellblock mate of defendant\u2019s during the time of his confession. Defendant filed a postconviction petition asserting that the new information rendered his confession coerced and his constitutional rights violated. After a hearing on defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition, the trial court granted defendant a new trial. During the proceedings, the trial court imposed sanctions against the St. Clair County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, to reimburse defendant for his expenses in responding to motions filed by the State.\nThe State appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant a new trial and the trial court\u2019s order imposing sanctions. The State asserts, inter alia, that the trial court erred in ordering a new trial, because the evidence indicated no police scheme to coerce defendant\u2019s confession, and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions. We affirm.\nFACTS\nBackground\nOn September 7, 1979, defendant was charged by indictment with the murders of Elizabeth West and Ruth Ann Jany. At a hearing on October 24, 1979, defendant waived his right to a trial by a jury, in exchange for the State\u2019s waiving its plea for a death sentence. At the hearing, defendant\u2019s counsel indicated that defendant was entering his plea as provided by North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), and that defendant indicated a willingness to plead guilty but a nonwillingness to concede facts admitting his guilt. Defendant\u2019s counsel stated, \u201c[Defendant], in effect, is pleading guilty[ \u2014 ]desires to plead guilty.\u201d Defendant agreed with his counsel\u2019s statement, and the trial court admonished defendant as required by Supreme Court Rule 402 (58 Ill. 2d R. 402) for a criminal defendant who pleads guilty.\nThereafter, the State presented a factual basis for defendant\u2019s guilty plea, including the testimony of deputy sheriff Robert Miller, who described defendant\u2019s confessions to the abductions and murders of Elizabeth West and Ruth Ann Jany. The State presented evidence corroborating defendant\u2019s confession to the murder of Elizabeth West: Elizabeth disappeared at approximately 11:15 p.m. on April 22, 1978, after walking home from a play at Belleville Township High School West; when Elizabeth\u2019s body was discovered, it was lying facedown in a wooded creek and it was fully clothed, except for a missing bra strap; and Elizabeth had been sexually assaulted, struck twice on the head with a blunt object, and then strangled to death. The State also presented evidence that, on the night of Elizabeth\u2019s disappearance, Judy Barnum had refused defendant\u2019s invitation to attend a play at either Belleville Township High School West or the Muny Opera.\nLikewise, the State presented evidence corroborating defendant\u2019s confession to the murder of Ruth Ann Jany: Ruth Ann was abducted on July 7, 1978, at approximately 11:30 p.m. from a First National Bank automated teller machine located in downtown Belleville; at the time of her disappearance Ruth Ann did not have her purse in her possession; after Ruth Ann disappeared, a number of successful and unsuccessful attempts were made to withdraw money from her checking account via her automated teller machine card and a total of $330 was successfully withdrawn; and when Ruth Ann\u2019s body was discovered in a rural area south of Belleville, approximately 20 feet from a farmer\u2019s road and 400 feet from the county line, it was not buried, was fully dressed, and had around the neck a halter top with a knot. The State further produced evidence that both defendant and Ruth Ann had accounts with, and automated teller machine cards for, the First National Bank of Belleville and that, at the time of Ruth Ann\u2019s disappearance, defendant was spending an unusual abundance of cash. Defendant\u2019s corroborated admissions regarding the murder of Ruth Ann and the location of her body were made prior to the discovery of her body.\nThe trial court concluded that defendant was entering his plea voluntarily, after having knowingly and understanding^ waived his rights, and that a factual basis existed for the plea. Defendant was sentenced on November 30, 1979, to two concurrent terms of natural-life imprisonment.\nOn January 7, 1980, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant appealed his sentence only, and in an order entered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (73 Ill. 2d R. 23), on February 25, 1982, this court affirmed defendant\u2019s sentences. People v. Bowman, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1207 (1982) (unpublished Rule 23 order).\nOn June 3, 1999, almost 20 years later, defendant filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1998)). Defendant alleged that his statements to deputy sheriff Robert Miller were involuntary because defendant had recently learned from an article published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that Deputy Miller and Danny Stark had contrived a scheme to acquire defendant\u2019s confession, thereby creating circumstances bespeaking fraud, trickery, deceit, and coercion and that, thus, they had violated defendant\u2019s constitutional rights.\nOn November 28, 2000, at the postconviction hearing held before the Honorable Richard Aguirre, the following evidence was adduced.\nDefendant testified that while he was incarcerated in the county jail, after his sentencing in an unrelated case and while awaiting his return to Menard Correctional Center (Menard), in which he had previously spent four years, defendant met Danny Stark, a cellblock mate. Defendant stated that he revealed to Stark that defendant was terrified of returning to Menard and that Stark thereafter orchestrated a plan to bond out of jail, return to jail, and help defendant escape. Defendant testified that in order to circumvent the weekly transfers to Menard until Stark returned to free defendant, he threw himself from the top bunk of the cell and was taken to the hospital. Defendant testified that he thereafter accepted Stark\u2019s suggestion that defendant make a statement regarding the Elizabeth West and Ruth Ann Jany murders, about which defendant previously had been questioned after his arrest in the unrelated case. According to the escape scheme, defendant could remain in the county jail while the police investigated his statements, avoiding a transfer to Menard, until Stark was released and could return to free defendant. Defendant explained that his attorney had provided him with newspaper articles and police reports and that police officers had, while questioning defendant previously concerning the murders, also revealed police reports to defendant. Defendant testified that from this information, he and Stark created \u201ca believable story.\u201d Defendant testified that he never believed that his statements would be used against him because he had an alibi during the murders and he understood that the investigators had corroborated the alibi.\nDefendant testified that after he requested to speak with an investigator, deputy sheriff Robert Miller arrived to interview him. Defendant stated that during the interrogations, Deputy Miller suggested the answers to the questions he had asked defendant. Defendant told Deputy Miller that he would provide a written statement on the following Sunday, the day after the day defendant expected to escape with Stark. Stark was released, but on Sunday, after Stark failed to appear at the jail on Saturday, defendant recanted his confession. Defendant stated that he had been unaware of the collusion between Deputy Miller and Stark until the St. Louis Post-Dispatch published an article stating that Deputy Miller had admitted tricking defendant into confessing by recruiting Stark to convince defendant that Stark would assist in defendant\u2019s escape and keep defendant from returning to Menard.\nCarolyn Tuft, a St. Louis Post-Dispatch investigative reporter, testified that she had interviewed Deputy Miller in February 1999. Tuft stated that during the interview, Deputy Miller indicated that he had placed Stark, a \u201ccon artist,\u201d in a cell with defendant and had told Stark to convince defendant that if defendant discussed the murders, defendant would avoid a transfer to Menard and stay in the county jail long enough for Stark to be released from jail, to return, and to assist in defendant\u2019s escape.\nBill Smith, also a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter, accompanied Tuft during her interview with Deputy Miller. He testified that during the interview Deputy Miller had referred to his knowledge of defendant\u2019s fear of returning to Menard. Smith testified that during the interview with Deputy Miller, Deputy Miller had conveyed the idea that it was his plan to obtain information from defendant through the escape scheme.\nDanny Stark testified that prior to the underlying incident, he had worked as an informant for Deputy Miller. Stark testified that Deputy Miller did not place him in defendant\u2019s cellblock with the intent of promoting the escape scheme to obtain defendant\u2019s confession. Stark stated that while he was in the cellblock with defendant, defendant indicated his involvement with the disappearances of Ruth Ann Jany and Elizabeth West. Stark stated that because it was the right thing to do, he notified Deputy Miller that defendant was implicating himself in the murders. He testified that Deputy Miller told Stark to keep his ears open.\nStark explained that he and defendant, not Deputy Miller, concocted the escape plan and that it was common for inmates to discuss escaping. Stark testified that he had not reviewed information from the newspapers and had not discussed with defendant how to obtain additional information about the murders. Stark admitted, however, that he utilized defendant\u2019s intense fear of returning to Men-ard to promote the escape plan and that he might have relayed defendant\u2019s fear to Deputy Miller.\nOn March 21, 1979, the same day that defendant gave his first taped statement to Deputy Miller, the State\u2019s Attorney agreed to a bond reduction for Stark, and he was released. Stark asserted that although his charge at the time of defendant\u2019s confession was ultimately reduced to misdemeanor theft, that was based on a theory of Stark\u2019s accountability for the theft and was not based on the assistance Stark gave Deputy Miller in defendant\u2019s case.\nDeputy Miller testified that he did not place Stark in the cellblock with defendant and that he did not propose the escape plan. Deputy Miller also denied that he conveyed the idea to Tuft and Smith that he had contrived the escape scheme between Stark and defendant to obtain defendant\u2019s confession.\nDeputy Miller testified that he had utilized Stark as an informant approximately four to six times prior to defendant\u2019s case. Deputy Miller testified that in return for Stark\u2019s previous assistance, Deputy Miller would thereafter \u201c[c]atch him speeding, let him go, give him a warning ticket.\u201d Deputy Miller stated that on March 10, 1979, Stark approached him with defendant\u2019s admissions and that he encouraged Stark to continue talking with defendant. Deputy Miller admitted that he may have told Stark to convince defendant that if defendant discussed the murders, defendant could stay in the county jail.\nDeputy Miller testified that before speaking with defendant, he reviewed the July 28, 1978, report or spoke with Investigator David Gravot regarding Investigator Gravot\u2019s interrogation of defendant concerning the abduction and murder of Elizabeth West, in which defendant invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel and referred all questions to his attorney. Deputy Miller thereafter reread defendant his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)) before speaking with him. Deputy Miller explained that he had given details to defendant during bis interview, i.e., that Elizabeth West\u2019s bra strap was missing, to persuade defendant to continue his statements.\nDeputy Miller testified that he was unaware of defendant\u2019s intense fear of returning to Menard but was aware that as a means of acquiring information from defendant, Stark was telling defendant that he would assist in defendant\u2019s escape. Deputy Miller explained that he did not note the escape plan in his police reports because he did not believe that an escape would occur. Deputy Miller stated that during his and defendant\u2019s fourth and last conversation, on Sunday, March 25, 1979, after defendant was to escape on Saturday with the assistance of Stark, who had been released from jail on Wednesday, March 21, 1979, defendant recanted his confession.\nDeputy Miller testified that in exchange for Stark\u2019s assistance in defendant\u2019s case, Deputy Miller probably attempted to obtain leniency through the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office regarding Stark\u2019s pending theft charges.\nOn April 12, 2001, the trial court found that defendant had pleaded guilty in 1979 in accordance with Alford. In its order, the trial court also made the following pertinent factual findings:\n(1) On March 10, 1979, while defendant remained in the county jail awaiting transport to Menard for his conviction concerning an unrelated abduction, Stark approached Deputy Miller to inform him that defendant had made statements implicating himself in the abduction and murder of Elizabeth West.\n(2) On March 20, 1979, defendant told jailers he wanted to talk to a detective. Miller appeared, obtained a waiver of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, and conducted an oral interview during which defendant admitted the abduction, assault, and murder of Elizabeth West. He promised a future written statement and to take Deputy Miller to Ruth Ann Jany\u2019s body, yet unfound.\n(3) On March 21, 22, and 25, 1979, defendant implicated himself in both murders, promising to lead Deputy Miller to Ruth Ann Ja-ny\u2019s body on Sunday, all for the purpose of delaying his departure for Menard so that Stark could make bail and return to help defendant escape, and Deputy Miller, feigning ignorance of the escape plan, pressured defendant to lead Deputy Miller to Ruth Ann Jany\u2019s body to justify delaying defendant\u2019s transfer to Men-ard.\n(4) Stark\u2019s bond was reduced, at the request of an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, to $500 cash, and on March 21, 1979, Stark posted bail and was released at 6:40 p.m., soon after the first recorded interview with defendant.\n(5) When the escape did not materialize, defendant recanted his prior statements, without revealing the escape plan to Deputy Miller.\nThe trial court held that the unusual facts of this case, including the escape scheme orchestrated through Stark\u2019s agency relationship with Deputy Miller, amounted to a type of police overreaching that could result in a false confession, that defendant\u2019s incriminating statements to Deputy Miller were involuntary, and that defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nSanctions\nPrior to the postconviction hearing, in an order filed September 28, 1999, the trial court, over the State\u2019s objection, granted defendant\u2019s motion for discovery. On October 12, 1999, the State filed a motion to vacate the order granting defendant\u2019s motion for discovery, and the State also filed a petition to transfer the postconviction proceedings to the trial judge who had presided over defendant\u2019s plea proceedings in 1979.\nOn November 3, 1999, the State filed a motion for substitution of judge for cause, explaining why Judge Roger Scrivner was under a conflict of interest, was biased in favor of defendant, and was prejudiced against the State. On November 15, 1999, Judge Scrivner denied the State\u2019s motion to substitute judge, ordered that all evidence and police reports be produced to defendant, and ordered a deposition of Deputy Miller. The State filed a motion in the supreme court for a supervisory order directing Judge Scrivner to vacate his order of November 15 and to transfer the cause to another judge for a hearing on the motion to substitute. On December 21, 1999, the supreme court entered an order denying the motion for a supervisory order.\nOn February 23, 2000, defendant filed a motion seeking attorney fees for responding to the motions by the State. On June 15, 2000, Judge Scrivner entered an order wherein he found that the State\u2019s conduct in filing the motion to transfer to the original trial judge and the motion to vacate the order for discovery, while never requesting a hearing, thereby abandoned said issues and caused defendant\u2019s attorney a great waste of time and effort. Judge Scrivner also imposed sanctions in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), because the motion for substitution of judge for cause was not well founded in fact or warranted by existing law and because the motions were filed to unnecessarily delay the proceedings and increase the cost of litigation for defendant. Judge Scrivner ordered the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office to pay attorney fees to defendant\u2019s attorneys in the total amount of $1,950.\nOn July 7, 2000, the State filed a motion to vacate the order granting sanctions, and on August 25, 2000, Judge Scrivner denied the State\u2019s motion. The State filed its timely appeal.\nANALYSIS\nNew Trial\nInitially, defendant contends that he did not enter an Alford plea, i.e., that the trial court had rejected his Alford plea, and that therefore he was subjected to a trial. We disagree.\nAt the guilty plea proceeding, defendant\u2019s counsel stated that although defendant was unwilling to concede facts admitting his guilt, defendant was in effect entering a guilty plea. The court admonished defendant in accordance with a guilty plea proceeding, i.e., explained to defendant that he was waiving his right to a trial by jury and his right to cross-examine. The State presented evidence to establish the factual basis for the guilty plea, in compliance with Alford. See Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160 (although Alford stated that he had not committed the crime, the guilty plea was deemed valid where Alford entered his plea of guilty and the State presented a sufficient factual basis for the plea). The trial court, after recognizing that defendant had waived his right to a trial by jury in exchange for the State\u2019s waiver of its right to seek a death sentence, stated that it would proceed in the fashion of a bench trial, without evidence being presented by defendant or cross-examination by defendant. The trial court stated, \u201c[I]n effect *** the [defendant *** would be pleading to the case.\u201d The court asked defendant if he, in effect, desired to plead guilty, and defendant answered in the affirmative. The State then presented lengthy evidence, by way of witnesses and stipulations, designed to satisfy the requirement in Alford that a strong factual basis be presented when a defendant wishes to plead guilty while maintaining his innocence. Defendant entered an Alford plea and was not subjected to a trial.\nAlthough neither the State nor defendant addresses how the ramifications of defendant\u2019s Alford plea relate to defendant\u2019s contentions concerning his coerced confession, we refuse to proceed with our analysis as if defendant\u2019s confession had been offered into evidence at a trial. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 775, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1450 (1970).\nIn Illinois, a voluntary plea of guilty waives all errors or irregularities that are not jurisdictional. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 490 (1993). \u201cIssues waived by a defendant\u2019s plea of guilty include the admissibility of his or her confession.\u201d Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d at 491.\nThe Supreme Court has expressly held that a defendant\u2019s relinquishment of his right to challenge a confession is a valid bargaining point in plea negotiations. McMann, 397 U.S. at 768-71, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 771-74, 90 S. Ct. at 1447-49; People v. Stice, 160 Ill. App. 3d 132, 139 (1987). In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970), McMann, 397 U.S. 759, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441, and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785, 90 S. Ct. 1458 (1970), the Court dealt at length with the effect of a plea of guilty on the later assertion of constitutional right violations.\nAlthough in each case the Supreme Court refused to subject the defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to collateral attack on the ground that it was motivated by a constitutional violation prior to the guilty plea, i.e., a coerced confession, we find the Supreme Court\u2019s analyses to be instructive. In Brady, the Court explained, \u201cCentral to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant\u2019s admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment.\u201d Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 756, 90 S. Ct. at 1468. The Court in Tollett explained that even if the circumstances relating to the constitutional violation were unknown at the time of the guilty plea, \u201c[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.\u201d Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973).\nIn the present case, unlike Brady, McMann, Parker, and Tollett, defendant did not solemnly admit in open court that he was in fact guilty of the offense with which he was charged. We therefore hold that if a defendant enters a guilty plea but maintains his innocence of the crime, as permitted by Alford, and the State\u2019s factual basis for the defendant\u2019s plea primarily concerns a confession, of which facts unknown at the time of the defendant\u2019s plea suggest coercion, the defendant may collaterally attack his guilty plea.\nAccordingly, we now review defendant\u2019s claim that the St. Louis Post-Dispatch article in February 1999 alerted him to a previously unknown scheme between Deputy Miller and Stark to obtain defendant\u2019s confession and that the scheme rendered his confession involuntary.\nIn reviewing whether defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary, we must accord great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). We review de novo the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50. In determining whether a statement has been voluntarily given, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 426-27 (1984).\nCertain interrogation tactics, in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned. People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 208 (1998). To determine if defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary, we must focus on the crucial element of police overreaching. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d at 208.\n\u201cThe abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.\u201d Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1265, 1270, 79 S. Ct. 1202, 1205-06 (1959).\nA defendant\u2019s confession will be considered involuntary when the defendant\u2019s will was overborne at the time of his confession so that the confession cannot be deemed the product of a rational intellect and a free will. People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1995). \u201c[Pjolice are allowed to play on a suspect\u2019s ignorance, fearst,] and anxieties so long as they do not magnify these emotionally charged matters to the point where a rational decision becomes impossible.\u201d United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1130 (7th Cir. 1990).\nThe State may not extort confessions by deliberate fraud or trickery. People v. Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d 172, 180 (1969). Evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into the waiver of his rights will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d at 179; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629 (1966). \u201c \u2018Trickery\u2019 involves affirmative acts of fraud or deceit.\u201d Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d at 179. The confession must not result from deceptive interrogation tactics calculated to overcome the defendant\u2019s free will. United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2001).\nIn Spano, the defendant had contacted a close childhood friend who was a recruit at the police academy, and the defendant implicated himself in the murder for which he was indicted. Spano, 360 U.S. at 317, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1268, 79 S. Ct. at 1204. Bruno, the childhood friend, contacted his superiors with the information, and officials requested that Bruno falsely convey to the defendant that the defendant\u2019s contact had placed Bruno\u2019s job in jeopardy and that the loss of his job would be disastrous to his wife, his children, and his unborn child. Spano, 360 U.S. at 319, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1269, 79 S. Ct. at 1204-05. After four sessions playing on the defendant\u2019s sympathies, the defendant succumbed to his friend\u2019s prevarications and agreed to make a statement to officials. Spano, 360 U.S. at 319, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1269, 79 S. Ct. at 1205. The Court, considering the totality of the circumstances, held that the defendant\u2019s will was overborne by \u201cofficial pressure, fatigue[,] and sympathy falsely aroused.\u201d Spano, 360 U.S. at 323, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1272, 79 S. Ct. at 1207.\nIn the present case, the trial court found that with the knowledge of defendant\u2019s previous assertion of his right to remain silent, Deputy Miller collaborated with Stark to obtain defendant\u2019s confession to the underlying murders. Stark and defendant contrived the escape scheme, and in reliance on the escape scheme, defendant and Deputy Miller each \u201cessayed strategic deception on the other\u201d: defendant making admissions, promising to lead Deputy Miller to the location of Ruth Ann Jany\u2019s body on Sunday, and delaying his departure for Menard so that Stark could make bail and return to help defendant escape on Saturday; and Miller feigning ignorance of the escape plan and asking to be led to Ruth Ann Jany\u2019s body to justify delaying defendant\u2019s transfer to Menard, of which defendant was intensely fearful. Stark was rewarded for his persuasive tactics when his bond was reduced, and Stark posted bail and was released soon after Deputy Miller\u2019s first recorded interview with defendant. When defendant realized that he had been tricked by Stark, yet still unaware of the relationship between Deputy Miller and Stark, defendant recanted his prior statements to Deputy Miller. Deputy Miller\u2019s knowledge of the escape plan and his involvement in the deception were never recorded and never disclosed to the defense.\nWe find that the trial court\u2019s factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Deputy Miller admitted that he and Stark had a history of Stark providing Deputy Miller with information in exchange for lenient consequences for Stark\u2019s illegal behavior. Deputy Miller admitted knowledge of the previous interrogation of defendant in which defendant asserted his right to remain silent. Even though Stark and Deputy Miller testified that Stark\u2019s placement in jail near defendant, and the coincidence of such placement, was the result of mere happenstance, Deputy Miller soon learned of Stark\u2019s deception of defendant concerning the escape scheme. Deputy Miller encouraged Stark to continue the interplay with defendant. Stark was ultimately rewarded when his charge was later reduced to misdemeanor theft. Defendant had an intense fear of returning to Menard. Stark was aware of that fear and utilized it to promote the escape scheme to persuade defendant to confess. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that defendant\u2019s confession was the result of deceptive interrogation tactics calculated to overcome defendant\u2019s free will at the time of his confession and that defendant\u2019s confession cannot be deemed to be the product of a rational intellect. The trial court correctly granted defendant a new trial, an authorized disposition under section 122 \u2014 6 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 6 (West 2000)).\nSanctions\nThe State further argues that the circuit court was without authority to order sanctions against the office of the State\u2019s Attorney of St. Clair County because Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) is inapplicable to proceedings initiated under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)).\nIllinois Supreme Court Rule 137 provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cThe signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion!,] or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law!;] and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nSection 122 \u2014 4 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, regarding pauper petitions, provides, \u201cA petitioner who is a prisoner *** who files a pleading *** that purports to be a legal document seeking post! ] conviction relief *** against the State *** in which the court makes a specific finding that the pleading *** is frivolous shall not proceed as a poor person and shall be liable for the full payment of filing fees and actual court costs ***.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 4 (West 2000). Contrary to the State\u2019s assertion, section 122 \u2014 4 does not prohibit the application of Rule 137 in postconviction proceedings. See also 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 2000) (regarding proceedings on a postconviction petition, this section provides, \u201cThe court may in its discretion make such order as to *** filing further pleadings *** as shall be appropriate, just!,] and reasonable and as is generally provided in civil cases\u201d).\nImposing sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed by a court of review absent an abuse of discretion. Wagener v. Papie, 242 Ill. App. 3d 354, 363 (1993).\nIn imposing sanctions, Judge Scrivner held that the State\u2019s conduct in fifing the motion to transfer to the original trial judge and the motion to vacate the order for discovery, while never requesting a hearing, thereby abandoned said issues and caused defendant\u2019s attorney a great waste of time and effort. Judge Scrivner also held that the motion for substitution of judge for cause was not well founded in fact or warranted by existing law and that the motions were filed to unnecessarily delay the proceedings and increase the cost of litigation for defendant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against the State.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCHAPMAN and MAAG, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Al W Johnson, of Johnson, Fellows, Blake & Terry, and Stephen B. Evans and Deeba Sauter Herd, all of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY BOWMAN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 01 \u2014 0340\nOpinion filed December 27, 2002.\nRehearing denied February 13, 2003.\nRobert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nAl W Johnson, of Johnson, Fellows, Blake & Terry, and Stephen B. Evans and Deeba Sauter Herd, all of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1142-01", "first_page_order": 1160, "last_page_order": 1173 }