{ "id": 1599232, "name": "RAYMOND PREZE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BORDEN CHEMICAL, INC., f/k/a Acme Resin Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Preze v. Borden Chemical, Inc.", "decision_date": "2002-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201401\u20141381", "first_page": "52", "last_page": "61", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 52" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "6 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2582777 ], "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/365/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5400319 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5788275 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/30/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 2d 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5252318 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/40/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545405 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 993", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281398 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57330 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121957 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "386" }, { "page": "386" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255179 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 N.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58897 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477035 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "339-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" }, { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 914, "char_count": 21197, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.477229684138778e-08, "percentile": 0.5178819305681528 }, "sha256": "1817936c980aee32dd11397c8b60fd14ce13aae80f467246177c8b8a31ba673e", "simhash": "1:23d81ec8376c16bc", "word_count": 3499 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:40.180592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND PREZE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BORDEN CHEMICAL, INC., f/k/a Acme Resin Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs Raymond and Terri Preze appeal a summary judgment for defendants Borden Chemical, Inc., Pinner Electric, Inc., and Lyons Electric Company, Inc., on claims arising out of Raymond\u2019s injuries sustained in a construction accident. Plaintiffs also appeal the trial court\u2019s order striking their safety expert\u2019s affidavit under Supreme Court Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191). We reverse the summary judgment for defendant Borden, affirm summary judgments for defendants Pinner and Lyons, and affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling on the affidavit.\nBorden hired Scheck Mechanical Corporation to perform routine general maintenance in its resin manufacturing plant. Borden also hired Pinner and Lyons to perform electrical work.\nPlaintiff Raymond Preze was employed by Scheck as a pipe fitter. On May 5, 1997, Raymond was repairing a roof in a pump room when he slipped and fell off a ladder coated with resin, sustaining injuries.\nPlaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint against Borden, Pinner and Lyons, alleging defendants were negligent in failing to protect Raymond from the dangerous ladder. Plaintiffs alleged that the ladder Raymond used on May 5 belonged to either Pinner or Lyons. Plaintiffs alleged that Pinner and Lyons knew that Scheck employees routinely used Pinner or Lyons ladders and other tools to complete Scheck jobs. Plaintiffs alleged that this knowledge imposed a duty on Pinner and Lyons to maintain safe equipment. Plaintiffs alleged that Borden was negligent in failing to protect Raymond from a dangerous condition on its property: resin.\nRaymond testified in his deposition that he had over 25 years\u2019 experience as a pipe fitter and that he had worked at the Borden plant for 5 years. Raymond testified that, on May 5, 1997, he was repairing a weakened roof in a pump room. He climbed a 20-foot extension ladder to check work he had just completed when he slipped. Raymond said that the ladder rungs were slippery and coated with resin. He said this was to be expected because \u201cif it was in the building, it had resin on it.\u201d Raymond testified that the ladder belonged to either Pinner or Lyons. Scheck, Raymond\u2019s employer, only had 40-foot ladders, which would not fit in the pump room. Pinner and Lyons both used 20-foot extension ladders. Borden owned no ladders.\nRaymond admitted that he did not complain about the resin-coated ladder on the day he fell. But Raymond said he had complained two days earlier. Raymond asked Ken Biske, a Lyons employee, to clean the ladders. Biske told Raymond to clean the ladders himself. Raymond knocked off the bigger pieces of resin but did not clean the ladder completely because he believed the task was not his responsibility. Raymond said that he complained to Scheck about unsafe working conditions at Borden 25 to 50 times. Raymond said he complained about fumes, resin and acid leaks.\nRaymond testified that he took directions only from Scheck. Borden exercised no control over Raymond\u2019s work. Raymond\u2019s equipment was furnished by Scheck, except for the 20-foot ladders. Raymond did not have to ask Pinner or Lyons to use the ladders. Pinner and Lyons did not exercise control over Raymond\u2019s work or tell him how to use their ladders. Raymond testified that it was Scheck\u2019s policy to tag and remove unsafe equipment from use.\nKen Biske, a Lyons employee, testified in a deposition that he believed that the ladder plaintiff was using on May 5, 1997, belonged to Lyons. Biske admitted that his belief was based on a conversation he had with Raymond five months after the accident. Biske testified that Raymond told him that he slipped off a 20-foot extension ladder while working in the pump room.\nBorden filed a motion for summary judgment. Borden argued that it had no duty to warn Raymond of danger of resin in the plant. Pinner and Lyons filed a joint motion for summary judgment. Pinner and Lyons admitted that ownership of the ladder used by Raymond was disputed. But Pinner and Lyons went on to say that, \u201cassuming!,] arguendo,\u201d the ladder belonged to Pinner or Lyons, neither owed a duty to Raymond as a matter of law.\nPlaintiffs submitted an affidavit of a safety expert, Dennis Puchalski, opposing the summary judgment motions. Puchalski testified that he was experienced in construction management, worksite safety and investigating worksite accidents. Puchalski said the presence of resin, inadequate lighting and loud noise in the pump room in Borden\u2019s plant were hazardous and dangerous. Puchalski also averred that Borden was responsible for project supervision and should have cleaned up the resin but failed to do so. Puchalski concluded that Borden knew or should have known that the dangerous conditions in the pump room could cause an accident. Puchalski also testified that the ladder belonged to Pinner and that Pinner had a duty to maintain the ladder in a safe condition. Puchalski\u2019s affidavit was based on a review of Borden\u2019s, Pinner\u2019s and Scheck\u2019s company policies and rules relating to employee safety, photographs of the pump room, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards. The documents referenced by Puchalski were not attached to the affidavit.\nPinner and Lyons filed a motion to strike the Puchalski affidavit under Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191). Borden joined the motion. Defendants argued that the affidavit offered opinion, not facts, and failed to include documents as required by Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191). The motion also alleged Puchalski\u2019s statement that Pinner owned the ladder was not based in fact.\nThe trial court granted the motion to strike. The trial court then granted the motions for summary judgment on all claims.\nWe first address the ruling on plaintiffs\u2019 affidavit.\nWe agree that the Puchalski affidavit was properly stricken under Rule 191. 145 Ill. 2d R. 191. Plaintiffs contend that the failure to attach papers upon which the affiant relied and the offer of conclusions instead of facts supported by evidence were improper grounds for striking the affidavit. Plaintiffs argue the affidavit \u201cfirmly supported\u201d their claim that defendants were liable for Raymond\u2019s injuries.\nThe trial court granted the motion to strike \u201cin part as explained on the record.\u201d Plaintiffs did not include a transcript of the hearing in the record on appeal. We cannot tell from the briefs what parts of the affidavit were stricken or the trial court\u2019s reasons for striking them. Plaintiffs also failed to cite case law to support their argument. Plaintiffs, as appellants, bear the burden of providing a complete record to facilitate a meaningful review. Foutch v. O\u2019Byrant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984). We must assume that the trial court\u2019s order was correct and had sufficient factual basis absent a complete record on appeal. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. The trial court\u2019s reasoning aside, it is clear that the ruling on the Puchalski affidavit was correct.\nAffidavits submitted under Rule 191 in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are substitutes for testimony at trial. Strict compliance with Rule 191 insures that a trial court is presented with all valid evidentiary facts upon which to base a decision. The plain language of Rule 191(a) requires that documents supporting an affidavit must be attached. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 339, 775 N.E.2d 987 (2002). The failure to attach the documents is fatal. Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d at 339-40.\nWe next address the grant of summary judgments for all defendants. We review these rulings de novo. General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284, 769 N.E.2d 18 (2002).\nPlaintiffs first argue that Borden, as owner, owed Raymond a duty to protect him from the dangerous conditions on its property.\nWhether a duty exists is a question of law. Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140, 554 N.E.2d 223 (1990). We consider four issues to determine whether a duty exists: (1) foreseeability; (2) likelihood of injury; (3) magnitude of the burden on the defendant to guard against the injury; and (4) consequences of placing a burden on the defendant. LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 389, 706 N.E.2d 441 (1998). Where, as here, an injury is allegedly caused by a condition on a defendant\u2019s property, we first consider foreseeability and are guided in the analysis by section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and on supreme court interpretation of it. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 389. Section 343 subjects a landowner to liability if he: knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition; should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm; should expect that the danger will not be discovered by invitees; and fails to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against the danger. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 343 (1965). This duty does not extend to risks created by \u201copen and obvious\u201d conditions. Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 447-48, 665 N.E.2d 826 (1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 343A (1965).\nPlaintiffs concede that the presence of resin in Borden\u2019s plant created an open and obvious condition of which Raymond was aware. Plaintiffs contend that Borden is nevertheless liable under what has come to be known as the \u201cdeliberate encounter exception,\u201d contained in the comments to section 343A of the Restatement.\nThe deliberate encounter exception imposes a duty when a possessor of land \u201chas reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 343A, Comment f, at 220 (1965).\nBorden counters that the exception does not apply because it was not foreseeable that Raymond would use a resin-coated ladder given earlier testimony that he cleaned ladders before using them. Borden also questions Raymond\u2019s actions in light of Scheck\u2019s policy of removing unsafe equipment from use. Raymond had testified that he followed this policy before his accident. Borden next argues that there was no evidence that Raymond was required or forced to use a resin-coated ladder to complete a \u201clow priority\u201d job.\nBorden\u2019s arguments stress the obviousness of the danger to a reasonable plaintiff. But the language of section 343A frames the duty analysis with an eye to the foresight of the landowner. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 343A (1965) (possessor of land not liable \u201cunless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite\u201d knowledge or obviousness of the condition). (Emphasis added.) Liability stems from the landowner\u2019s knowledge of the premises and what the landowner had reason to expect the invitee would do in the face of the dangerous condition. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 392. Although an analysis under the deliberate encounter exception involves some consideration of the actions of a plaintiff (Hastings v. Exline, 326 Ill. App. 3d 172, 176, 760 N.E.2d 993 (2001)), those actions do not determine a landowner\u2019s duty or answer the question whether he acted reasonably under the circumstances. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 150. In short, the scope of a defendant\u2019s duty is not defined by plaintiffs negligence. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 148.\nBorden\u2019s reference to a lack of economic compulsion is unpersuasive. Borden contends that it was not necessary for Raymond to risk using a slippery ladder to complete a \u201clow priority\u201d job. The consequences faced by Raymond had he refused to work are relevant only to determine whether Raymond unnecessarily assumed the risk. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 394. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that our supreme court\u2019s reading of the Restatement imposes a duty on Borden as a matter of law.\nOur supreme court\u2019s reasoning in LaFever guides our analysis. The defendant in LaFever operated a manufacturing plant that produced a waste product called edge trim. Edge trim is slippery and difficult to grasp by hand. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 384. Defendant hired a contractor to haul away the edge trim collected in a compactor on the defendant\u2019s property. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 384. The evidence revealed that edge trim would spill out of the compactor onto the ground around the compactor. The defendant\u2019s employees cleared the edge trim from the area when they were aware of it. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 386. The plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell on edge trim that had spilled onto the ground near the compactor he was trying to empty. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 386. The court found that the defendant \u201ccould have reasonably foreseen that [the] plaintiff would risk walking through the edge trim, because it was necessary for [the] plaintiff to fulfill his employment obligations.\u201d LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 392. This conclusion was based on the court\u2019s findings that emptying the compactor was the plaintiffs job, the plaintiff had to walk through spilled edge trim to reach the compactor, and the defendant knew that the edge trim posed a hazard. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 392.\nHere, it is undisputed that Borden owned and operated a resin manufacturing plant. Raymond testified that resin was everywhere and coated everything \u2014 \u201cif it was in the building, it had resin on it.\u201d Raymond was charged with completing a specific task on Borden\u2019s property \u2014 performing routine maintenance. This job had to be undertaken despite the presence of resin throughout the plant, just as the compactor in LaFever had to be emptied even though surrounded by edge trim. We must conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable to Borden that Raymond would risk an encounter with the resin to fulfill his employment obligations. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 392.\nBorden insists, however, that LaFever is distinguishable because that case addressed a condition on the defendant\u2019s property, while this case involves the condition of a piece of equipment not owned by Borden, but present on Borden\u2019s property. But Borden overlooks that it is the resin in its plant that created the dangerous condition, not the structurally sound ladder. We do not believe the result in LaFever would have been different if the hazardous edge trim had been on a piece of equipment rather than on the ground. The point made in LaFever is that the plaintiff had no choice but to encounter the edge trim to fulfill his employment obligations. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 392. Where the edge trim was located within the plant was not determinative. So, too, Raymond had no choice but to encounter resin in Borden\u2019s plant because \u201cif it was in the building, it had resin on it.\u201d\nWe note that while our analysis does render property owners insurers of invitees\u2019 welfare, the analysis is only partially conclusive of a possessor\u2019s duty. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 156; LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 396. The open or obvious nature of the hazard created by the resin will affect Raymond\u2019s ultimate recovery. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 143. The reasonableness of Raymond\u2019s conduct is relevant to a comparative negligence analysis, but not to whether Borden owes a duty. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 143.\nWe briefly review the remaining factors of the duty test. We believe they are also satisfied.\nWe concede that the likelihood of injury factor weighs against Raymond. He was aware of the slipperiness of the resin. But the factor is offset by the pervasiveness of the resin. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 397.\nThe remaining factors, the magnitude of the burden on Borden to guard against injury and the consequences of placing that burden on Borden, require us to consider whether Borden and Raymond stand in such a relationship to one another that the law imposes an obligation of reasonable conduct on Borden for Raymond\u2019s benefit. LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 388-89; Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 140-41. The existence of a duty is also shaped by public policy. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987).\nBorden hired Raymond\u2019s employer to perform routine maintenance in its resin plant. As a consequence, Borden owed Raymond and all other subcontractors a nondelegable duty of providing a safe place to work. Leatherman v. Schueler Bros., Inc., 40 Ill. App. 2d 56, 61, 189 N.E.2d 10 (1963). See also American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Leveque, 30 Ill. App. 2d 120, 173 N.E.2d 737 (1961); Weber v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 625, 295 N.E.2d 41 (1973); Pempek v. Silliker Laboratories, Inc., 309 Ill. App. 3d 972, 982, 723 N.E.2d 803 (1999). Imposing a burden on Borden here is consistent with public policy of ensuring safe workplaces. The consequences of placing this burden on Borden are not unreasonable when compared to the likelihood of serious injury.\nPlaintiffs next argue that, because codefendants Pinner and Lyons knew that Scheck employees regularly used their ladders, Pinner and Lyons had a duty to warn Raymond of the dangers of using a resin-coated ladder. Plaintiffs\u2019 argument is based on our analysis in Melchers v. Total Electric Construction, 311 Ill. App. 3d 224, 723 N.E.2d 815 (1999). In Melchers, we held that a subcontractor who knew that its tools and equipment were used by other subcontractors had a duty to protect the other subcontractors against injury. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 230. We reversed summary judgment for the defendant subcontractor and remanded the case for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant breached a duty and proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 230-31. Melchers is distinguishable.\nThe plaintiff in Melchers was an employee of an electrical subcontractor responsible for installing conduit and wire. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 226. The plaintiffs employer entered into an oral subcontract with an excavation company to dig the necessary trenches. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 226. The plaintiff then worked in the trenches to dig around piping material in the ground while installing conduit. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 227. The plaintiff was injured when an unevenly loaded wheelbarrow fell on him. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 227. In finding that the excavation subcontractor had a duty to protect the plaintiff, we noted that a person \u201c \u2018engaged in the construction of a building owes to another not in his employ, engaged in the same work and exercising due care for his own safety, the duty of using reasonable care to avoid injuring him.\u2019 \u201d Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 229, quoting Ziraldo v. W.J. Lynch Co., 365 Ill. 197, 201, 6 N.E.2d 125 (1936). We then noted that the evidence showed that the excavation subcontractor furnished all the tools used to dig the trenches, including the wheelbarrow that injured the plaintiff, and allowed the plaintiff to use the same tools when further digging became necessary. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 230. This evidence led us to conclude that the excavating subcontractor had a duty to protect the plaintiff against injury from its equipment. Melchers, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 230-31.\nThe extensive interaction that gave rise to a duty in Melchers is not present here. Pinner and Lyons were not involved in the same work as Raymond. Pinner and Lyons were hired separately by Borden to perform electrical work, while Scheck was hired to perform routine maintenance. The record shows that the subcontractors did not work in conjunction with each other or that they were even in the same area like the subcontractors in Melchers. Raymond\u2019s isolated use of a ladder belonging to either Pinner or Lyons is insufficient to give rise to a duty under a Melchers analysis.\nWere we to agree with Raymond that Melchers imposed a duty on Pinner and Lyons to protect Raymond against unsafe equipment, Raymond\u2019s claim would still fail. It is undisputed that the ladder itself was not unsafe. The ladder became unsafe when coated by resin in Borden\u2019s plant. Raymond introduced no evidence that either Pinner or Lyons furnished a resin-coated ladder for Raymond\u2019s use. The evidence instead suggests that the ladder became coated with resin after Scheck secured it in place in the pump room for several weeks before the accident. Summary judgment for Pinner and Lyons was proper.\nWe affirm summary judgment for Pinner and Lyons. The grant of summary judgment for Borden is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. The order striking the Puchalski affidavit is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nMcBRIDE, EJ., and BURKE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark R. McKenna, of Christopher T. Hurley & Associates, and David A. Novoselsky and Leslie J. Rosen, both of Novoselsky Law Offices, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Michael W. Davis, Rick L. Jett, and Vandhana Balasubramanian, all of Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, of Chicago, for appellee Borden Chemical, Inc.", "Maureen A. Coleman and John M. O\u2019Driscoll, both of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Press, of Chicago, for appellees Pinner Electric, Inc., and Lyons Electric Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND PREZE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BORDEN CHEMICAL, INC., f/k/a Acme Resin Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20141381\nOpinion filed November 26, 2002.\nRehearing denied January 27, 2003.\nMark R. McKenna, of Christopher T. Hurley & Associates, and David A. Novoselsky and Leslie J. Rosen, both of Novoselsky Law Offices, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nMichael W. Davis, Rick L. Jett, and Vandhana Balasubramanian, all of Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, of Chicago, for appellee Borden Chemical, Inc.\nMaureen A. Coleman and John M. O\u2019Driscoll, both of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Press, of Chicago, for appellees Pinner Electric, Inc., and Lyons Electric Company." }, "file_name": "0052-01", "first_page_order": 70, "last_page_order": 79 }