{ "id": 1599259, "name": "STEVEN WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Wilson v. State Employees' Retirement System", "decision_date": "2002-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201402\u20140083", "first_page": "199", "last_page": "206", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 199" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258641 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "Second District" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5297222 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "972", "parenthetical": "First District" }, { "page": "972" }, { "page": "972" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313540 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "615-17" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "615-16" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596991 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483568 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260081 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599237 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229699 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126348 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" }, { "page": "603-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0599-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 589, "char_count": 15904, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.683458684073897e-08, "percentile": 0.4923611376570603 }, "sha256": "67b9008f39d9e12e646013812189d89babf563f99d37c326b8ce766aa01c4a94", "simhash": "1:d964ddbfb99ac43d", "word_count": 2514 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:40.180592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STEVEN WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE EMPLOYEES\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MARA FROSSARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants the State Employees\u2019 Retirement System of Illinois (SEES) and the Executive Committee of SEES appeal from an order of the circuit court on administrative review which reversed a decision by the Board of Trustees of SEES (Board) finding that SEES overpaid plaintiff Steven Wilson occupational disability benefits. Defendants contend on appeal that the Board was the administrative agency which rendered the final decision that SEES overpaid plaintiff and that plaintiffs failure to name the Board as a defendant in his complaint for administrative review required the circuit court to dismiss his complaint. Defendants alternatively contend that the Board\u2019s decision that SEES overpaid occupational disability benefits to plaintiff was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was consistent with sound public policy. We hold that the circuit court was required to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for administrative review based on his failure to name the Board, and accordingly, we vacate the circuit court\u2019s order reversing the Board\u2019s decision, remand the case, and direct the circuit court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.\nPlaintiff, a correctional officer with the Illinois Department of Corrections (Department), claimed that he fell and was injured in February 1997 while working at one of the Department\u2019s correctional facilities. He applied for workers\u2019 compensation benefits from the Department, which denied his claim on the ground that his injury was not work-related. Plaintiff contested the Department\u2019s denial by filing a claim with the Industrial Commission. In January 1998, while his claim with the Industrial Commission was pending, plaintiff applied for temporary disability benefits from SEES. In February 1998, SEES approved his application, and plaintiff received temporary disability benefits for approximately seven months.\nIn March 1999, plaintiff and the Department settled his workers\u2019 compensation claim, which was pending in the Industrial Commission. The settlement awarded plaintiff $26,333.16, representing 70.5 weeks of permanent partial disability. The following year, in March 2000, Eobert Hicks, supervisor of SEES\u2019s disability section, wrote plaintiff a letter informing him that SEES had overpaid him $2,472.84 in benefits. The letter initially noted that SEES had paid plaintiff temporary disability benefits based on the Department\u2019s denial of plaintiff\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The letter then explained that after receiving information regarding plaintiffs settlement with the Department, SEES determined it overpaid plaintiff benefits. In a letter responding to Hicks\u2019 letter, plaintiff asserted he was not liable for any overpayment of benefits by SEES and requested an administrative hearing on the matter.\nThe Executive Committee, which conducted the hearing requested by plaintiff, found that SEES overpaid him benefits in the amount of $2,472.84 and recommended to the Board that plaintiffs appeal be denied. Patrick Cummings, manager of SERS\u2019s claims division, wrote plaintiff a letter dated June 21, 2000, informing him that the Executive Committee reviewed and denied his appeal at its June 8, 2000, meeting based upon a nine-page \u201cRecommendation.\u201d The letter attached the \u201cRecommendation,\u201d which concluded that \u201cthere has been an overpayment of occupational disability benefits to [plaintiff], and, therefore, [plaintiff] is required to repay that overpayment of benefits to the System.\u201d The final sentence of the \u201cRecommendation\u201d stated \u201c[t]he Committee recommends that the appeal of [plaintiff] be denied.\u201d\nOn July 6, 2000, the Board ratified the Executive Committee\u2019s recommendation that plaintiff\u2019s appeal be denied, and on July 10, 2000, Cummings wrote plaintiff a letter notifying him of the Board\u2019s decision. The letter specified \u201c[t]his constitutes a final decision on administrative review of your appeal by the State Employees\u2019 Retirement System (SERS).\u201d\nIn August 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court seeking reversal of SERS\u2019s decision. Plaintiff named SERS and the Executive Committee of SERS as defendants in his complaint, but he did not name the Board as a defendant. Following a hearing at which counsel presented arguments, the circuit court granted the relief requested in plaintiffs complaint for administrative review.\nDefendants contend that the circuit court was required to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for administrative review because plaintiff failed to name the Board as a defendant in his complaint. Whether plaintiff\u2019s failure to name the Board warranted dismissal of his complaint is a question of law, and accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. Veazey v. Baker, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599, 602 (2001); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (2000).\nThere is no constitutional right to appeal decisions of administrative agencies. ESG Watts, Inc., 191 Ill. 2d at 29. Instead, the appellate and circuit courts have only those powers to review administrative actions \u201cas provided by law.\u201d ESG Watts, Inc., 191 Ill. 2d at 29; Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 6. The Illinois Appellate Court has only such power of direct review as the legislature provides. Central City Education Ass\u2019n, IEA/NEA v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 526-27 (1992).\nSection 14 \u2014 101 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) created SERS, and section 14 \u2014 134 of the Code vests responsibility for the operation of SERS in the Board. 40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 101, 14 \u2014 134 (West 1998). Section 14 \u2014 135.04 of the Code specifically vests the Board with power \u201c[t]o consider and pass on all applications for annuities, allowances, and benefits.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 135.04 (West 1998). Section 14\u2014 150 of the Code provides that \u201cfinal administrative decisions of the retirement board\u201d are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1998)). 40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 150 (West 1998).\nThe Review Law is a departure from the common law and, as such, its provisions must be strictly adhered to by the parties. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 30. Section 3 \u2014 102 of the Review Law expressly makes review of an administrative decision contingent upon compliance with the Review Law\u2019s provisions. It provides:\n\u201cUnless review is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein provided, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 102 (West 1998).\nSection 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law states that \u201cin any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency *** shall be made [a] defendant ].\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 107(a) (West 1998). Section 3 \u2014 101 of the Review Law defines \u201cadministrative agency\u201d as \u201ca person, body of persons, group, officer, board, bureau, commission or department (other than a court or judge) of the State *** having power under law to make administrative decisions.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 1998). The supreme court has stated that compliance with section 3 \u2014 107(a)\u2019s naming requirement \u201cis mandatory and specific, and admits of no modification.\u201d Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 354 (1990). The failure to comply with section 3 \u2014 107(a) requires the circuit court to dismiss a complaint for administrative review. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 603-04, citing McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1995), and Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 354.\nDefendants argue that the Board was the administrative agency which rendered the final administrative decision determining that SERS overpaid plaintiff and that plaintiffs failure to name the Board pursuant to section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law required the circuit court to dismiss his complaint for administrative review. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was required under section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law to name in his complaint the body which made the final administrative decision at issue in the instant case. Rather, he contends that it was the Executive Committee and not the Board which made the final administrative decision and that the circuit court therefore \u201cacted properly when it did not dismiss this administrative review.\u201d\nA review of the record reveals, contrary to plaintiffs contention, that the Executive Committee only recommended to the Board that plaintiffs appeal be denied and that it was the Board which actually made the final administrative decision to deny plaintiffs appeal of SERS\u2019s determination that it overpaid him benefits. The June 21, 2000, letter written to plaintiff by SEES informed him that the Executive Committee reviewed and denied his appeal at its June 8, 2000, meeting based upon a nine-page \u201cRecommendation.\u201d The \u201cRecommendation,\u201d which was enclosed with the letter, concluded by stating the Executive Committee \u201crecommends that the appeal of [plaintiff] be denied.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The letter specified that the Executive Committee\u2019s decision \u201cdoes not become final until it is ratified by the Board of Trustees of [SEES] at its next scheduled meeting in July, 2000.\u201d The July 10, 2000, letter written to plaintiff by SEES advised him that \u201c[a]t the July 6, 2000 meeting of the Board of Trustees of [SEES], the Board ratified the Executive Committee\u2019s decision to deny your request for temporary disability benefits.\u201d The letter specified that \u201c[t]his constitutes a final decision on administrative review of your appeal by [SEES].\u201d These documents thus unambiguously establish that while the Executive Committee recommended the denial of plaintiffs administrative appeal, it was the Board which made the final administrative decision at issue in this case.\nWe note that the procedure followed by SEES in the instant case was consistent with the provisions of the Code which authorize the Board, not the Executive Committee, to make final administrative decisions regarding disability benefits. As noted earlier, the Code (1) places responsibility for the operation of SEES with the Board (40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 134 (West 1998)), (2) vests the Board with the power and duty \u201c[t]o consider and pass on all applications for annuities, allowances and benefits\u201d (40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 135.04 (West 1998)), and (3) provides for judicial review of \u201cfinal administrative decisions of the retirement board\u201d (40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 150 (West 1998)). To facilitate the Board\u2019s ability to comply with its duties and responsibilities, section 14 \u2014 135.03 of the Code delegated authority to the Board to prescribe rules to administer SEES. 40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 135.03 (West 1998). Pursuant to that authority, the Board promulgated rules governing claims for benefits payable by SEES. Those rules provide, among other things, that following a hearing, the Executive Committee\u2019s \u201crecommendation\u201d shall be communicated to the party claiming benefits and that the Executive Committee shall implement the appropriate action \u201csubject to the approval of the Board of Trustees\u201d (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1540.270(d)(8) (1996)), that a rehearing may be conducted within 90 days following the notification of the \u201cfinal decision of the [Board] with respect to the recommendation of the Executive Committee\u201d (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1540.270(e)(2) (1996)), and that \u201c[decisions of the [Board] shall be final administrative decisions subject to the provisions of the [Review Law].\u201d 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1540.270(f)(1) (1996).\nIn the instant case, as previously noted, the Executive Committee made the recommendation to the Board to deny plaintiffs appeal, and the Board rendered the final administrative decision by ratifying that recommendation. This procedure thus complied with the administrative rules promulgated by the Board and provisions under the Code giving the Board the authority to make final administrative decisions regarding disability payments.\nPlaintiff next contends that defendants waived the issue of whether he was required to name the Board by not raising it in the circuit court. In support of this contention plaintiff cites DeCastris v. State Employees Retirement System, 288 Ill. App. 3d 136 (1997), a Fourth District case. We recognize that the reviewing court in DeCastris held that a defendant\u2019s failure to move to dismiss a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court based on the complainant\u2019s failure to name the Board as defendant pursuant to section 3 \u2014 107 of the Review Law waives that party\u2019s right to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. DeCastris, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 143. We decline, however, to follow DeCastris as it conflicts with the supreme court\u2019s decision in Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613 (1952), and subsequent cases decided by the Appellate Court in the First and Second Districts. See Zientara v. Lottery Control Board, 214 Ill. App. 3d 961, 972 (1991) (First District); Orlowski v. Village of Villa Park Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 273 Ill. App. 3d 42, 47 (1995) (Second District).\nIn Cuny, an employer sought review of an administrative decision of the Board of Review of the Illinois Department of Labor. Cuny, 411 Ill. at 614. The employer named the Director of the Department of Labor as the sole defendant. Cuny, 411 Ill. at 615. The Director did not raise the employer\u2019s failure to name the Board of Review as a defendant at the trial court level, and the trial court affirmed the Board of Review\u2019s decision. Cuny, 411 Ill. at 615-17.\nOn direct appeal to the supreme court, the Director moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the employer failed to name the Board of Review as a defendant. Cuny, 411 Ill. at 615. The employer countered by arguing, among other things, that the Director waived the issue of the failure to name the Board of Review by not raising it in the circuit court. Cuny, 411 Ill. at 615-16.\nThe supreme court held that the Director did not waive the issue. Cuny, 411 Ill. at 617. The court found that the statute requiring all adverse parties to the administrative proceeding to be named as defendants was mandatory and concluded that \u201c[t]he failure of the [Director] to object that the Board of Review was not made a party defendant *** could not operate as a waiver of the express requirement of the statute.\u201d Cuny, 411 Ill. at 617.\nFollowing the supreme court\u2019s decision in Cuny, the First and Second District Appellate Courts addressed the failure to name a necessary defendant in a complaint for administrative review. See Zientara, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 972; Orlowski, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 47. Both courts found, based upon Cuny, that a defendant\u2019s failure to object in the trial court that the plaintiff did not name all necessary parties does not waive section 3 \u2014 107(a)\u2019s naming requirement. See Zientara, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 972; Orlowski, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 47. Accordingly, pursuant to Cuny, Zientara, and Orlowski, we find that defendants\u2019 failure to object in the circuit court to plaintiffs failure to name the Board as a defendant did not waive their right to raise that issue before this court.\nBased on the foregoing reasons, we vacate the circuit court\u2019s decision reversing the Board\u2019s decision, remand plaintiffs appeal to the circuit court, and direct the circuit court to dismiss it.\nVacated and remanded with directions.\nO\u2019BRIEN, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MARA FROSSARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Erik G. Light, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.", "Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago (David M. Goldberg, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEVEN WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE EMPLOYEES\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201402\u20140083\nOpinion filed December 20, 2002.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Erik G. Light, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.\nCornfield & Feldman, of Chicago (David M. Goldberg, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0199-01", "first_page_order": 217, "last_page_order": 224 }