{ "id": 1599242, "name": "In re ANDREA D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andre D., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Andre D.", "decision_date": "2003-01-22", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201402\u20140763", "first_page": "335", "last_page": "339", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 335" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58911 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" }, { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547227 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891", "parenthetical": "plain error rule invoked where issue involved fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980628 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623", "parenthetical": "plain error rule invoked where issue involved fundamental right to a jury trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477054 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 1104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12146638 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/1104-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 1085", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533379 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091-92" }, { "page": "1093" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/1085-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571076 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 987", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472374 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0987-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 490, "char_count": 9587, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.922219451084389e-07, "percentile": 0.8467051553970907 }, "sha256": "2255cf0761b7b7e83558a22fe631b48a592536cec5e7db79301147a6fd44f9ea", "simhash": "1:9b5b6c6a8ac7f750", "word_count": 1583 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:40.180592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ANDREA D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andre D., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Andre D., appeals the trial court\u2019s orders finding him unfit and terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Andrea D. Respondent raises two arguments in this appeal. First, he argues that the court\u2019s findings of unfitness were erroneous as a matter of law because the State\u2019s amended motion for termination of parental rights was not sufficiently specific, where it (1) did not state a cause of action; (2) did not comply with a statutory notice requirement to apprise respondent that he could \u201cpermanently\u201d lose his parental rights (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000)); and (3) was not verified. Respondent next asserts that the trial court\u2019s determination that he was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We reverse.\nI. Motion Taken With the Case\nIn a motion that we ordered taken with this case, the State requests that we strike a paragraph of respondent\u2019s brief as improper due to its argumentative nature. We note that, following the State\u2019s motion, respondent filed a motion to, inter alia, amend his brief to delete the argumentative portion of the aforementioned paragraph. We allowed respondent\u2019s motion. Therefore, given our disposition of respondent\u2019s motion, the State\u2019s request is denied as moot.\nII. Failure to State a Cause of Action\nRespondent argues first that the State\u2019s pleadings were insufficiently specific in that they failed to state a cause of action.\nThe sufficiency of pleadings is an issue of law, which we review de novo. U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Zurich Insurance Co., 329 Ill. App. 3d 987, 1002 (2002). The essential test of the sufficiency of a petition is whether it reasonably informs the respondent of a valid claim against him. In re Harpman, 146 Ill. App. 3d 504, 512 (1986). The requirement of pleading with specificity does not require more than a setting forth of the specific statutory grounds of unfitness. In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1091-92 (1991).\nIn its amended petition, the State alleged that respondent was an unfit parent under subsections (b), (i), (r), and (s) of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(b), (i), (r), (s) (West 2000)). The State recited the statutory language, without more.\nIn M.S., this court held that a petition that merely tracked the statutory language \u201cwas sufficient to apprise the respondent of the claim against her.\u201d M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d at 1093. Given this precedent, we conclude that the pleadings here were sufficiently specific.\nIII. Pleading Defect Relating to Permanent Termination of Parental Rights\nRespondent next contends that the trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness was erroneous because the State\u2019s petition was defective on its face in that it failed to apprise respondent that his parental rights could be \u201cpermanently\u201d terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000).\nWe note first that respondent did not raise this issue at trial. Generally, pleading defects must be raised at trial so that they may be remedied; otherwise, the defects are waived. In re Dragoo, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1107 (1981). However, under the plain error doctrine, we may address a waived issue if the evidence is closely balanced or the error affects substantial rights. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). The termination of parental rights affects a fundamental liberty interest. In re J.J., 201 Ill. 2d 236, 243 (2002). Here, we are not amenable to invoking waiver where the question is whether respondent was provided with a statutorily mandated notice. Thus, we choose to review this question. In re R.A.B., 315 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623 (2000) (plain error rule invoked where issue involved fundamental right to a jury trial); In re J.C., 163 Ill. App. 3d 877, 891 (1987) (plain error rule invoked where issue involved fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel).\nSection 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) provides:\n\u201c(4) If termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoption of the minor under Section 2 \u2014 29 is sought, the petition shall so state. If the petition includes this request, the prayer for relief shall clearly and obviously state that the parents could permanently lose their rights as a parent at this hearing.\nIn addition to the foregoing, the petitioner, by motion, may request the termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent to adoption of the minor under Section 2 \u2014 29 at any time after the entry of a dispositional order under Section 2 \u2014 22.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000).\nThe State\u2019s petition, in its prayer for relief, requests that the parental rights of Andrea\u2019s parents \u201cbe terminated with respect to said minor[ ]\u201d; that the Guardianship Administrator be continued as legal guardian of Andrea and that she \u201cbe given the power to consent to [Andrea\u2019s] adoption should anyone desire to legally adopt [Andrea]\u201d; and that the consent of the \u201cGuardian\u201d to adoption \u201cshall be binding upon\u201d the parents \u201cwithout any further notice to them, or consent by them.\u201d Nowhere in th\u00e9 State\u2019s petition is there an explicit request for \u201cpermanent\u201d termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nRespondent argues that the State\u2019s failure to comply with the Act\u2019s explicit requirement that its petition \u201cclearly and obviously\u201d state that respondent could \u201cpermanently\u201d lose his rights as a parent renders the pleadings defective.\nThe State responds that its petition properly indicated to respondent that the State sought to terminate his parental rights. It points to the language in the prayer for relief that requests that the parental rights of the parents \u201cbe terminated\u201d; that the Guardianship Administrator be given the power to consent to Andrea\u2019s adoption; and that the consent \u201cshall be binding\u201d on the parents \u201cwithout any further notice to them, or consent by them.\u201d\nIn interpreting a statute, our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 480 (1997). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 480. The Act contains strict procedural requirements that embody a policy favoring the superior right of parents to the custody of their own children. In re Y.B., 285 Ill. App. 3d 385, 390 (1996). Where the language of a statute applicable to juvenile or adoption proceedings is clear and unambiguous, \u201cit is the duty of the court to apply it literally.\u201d Y.B., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 390.\nThe State\u2019s contention that its petition adequately complies with the language in the second sentence of section 2 \u2014 13(4) of the Act is unpersuasive. The aforementioned language in the State\u2019s petition conforms to the requirements in the first sentence in section 2 \u2014 13(4). However, the second sentence of that section assumes compliance with the first because it begins, \u201c[i]f the petition includes this request.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000). Section 2 \u2014 13(4) then sets forth an additional requirement for a valid petition in cases where the petition includes a request for termination and a request for the aforementioned adoption powers: the petition must \u201cclearly and obviously\u201d state that the parents could \u201cpermanently\u201d lose their parental rights at the hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(4) (West 2000). We are required to give full effect to each provision in a statute and construe the language so that it is not rendered meaningless. See In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 218 (2002). Thus, we conclude that the preceding requirement was not satisfied in this case. The notice that the legislature required was directed to laypersons/parents. It was not directed to persons trained in the law. In this context, the State\u2019s argument fails. The requirement that the notice be clear and obvious necessarily requires the use of the word \u201cpermanently\u201d in the petition. The State\u2019s petition was therefore defective on its face and this defect warrants reversal.\nIV Verification of Pleadings\nRespondent next argues that the State\u2019s pleadings were insufficient in that they were not verified. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(2) (West 2000).\nUpon filing its brief in this case, the State also moved for leave to supplement the record with a copy of its amended pleadings. We allowed the motion. Upon review, the pleadings contain a verification page. However, it is not clear from the record whether the State attempted to admit the verification page in the trial court. Should the State choose to file another petition in this matter, it should note that the Act requires verification of a petition for termination of parental rights filed thereunder. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 13(2) (West 2000).\nV Conclusion\nBecause we hold that the State\u2019s petition was defective, the orders of the trial court finding respondent unfit and terminating his parental rights must be reversed. As such, we deem it unnecessary to rule upon the remaining issues presented in this appeal.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.\nReversed.\nMcLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Anna M. Wilhelmi, of Anna M. Wilhelmi Law Offices, P.C., of Aurora, for appellant.", "Meg Gorecki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin P. Moltz and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ANDREA D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andre D., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201402\u20140763\nOpinion filed January 22, 2003.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied February 19, 2003.\nAnna M. Wilhelmi, of Anna M. Wilhelmi Law Offices, P.C., of Aurora, for appellant.\nMeg Gorecki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin P. Moltz and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0335-01", "first_page_order": 353, "last_page_order": 357 }