{ "id": 1599301, "name": "In re ESTATE OF MARLIN L. SNODGRASS, Deceased (Christopher Parr, a/k/a Christopher Snodgrass, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. Larry Snodgrass, Ex'r, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Snodgrass v. Snodgrass", "decision_date": "2003-02-07", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201402\u20140513", "first_page": "619", "last_page": "624", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 619" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278067 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.E.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "390 Ill. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2508284 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/390/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 N.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4971112 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/323/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 Ill. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2469610 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/395/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243860 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.E.2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "399 Ill. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460735 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/399/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 1147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1152" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477662 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801347 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 12011, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.468800018618317e-08, "percentile": 0.48538215934596957 }, "sha256": "c08225fda63c258b7dcd3e63722f302f945d6364946ce8d249f99c2b7bd316bf", "simhash": "1:0d439cb0d7f0ad50", "word_count": 1960 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:40.180592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF MARLIN L. SNODGRASS, Deceased (Christopher Parr, a/k/a Christopher Snodgrass, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. Larry Snodgrass, Ex\u2019r, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioners, Christopher and Craig Parr, a/k/a Snodgrass, allege they are the natural children of decedent, Marlin L. Snodgrass. Their mother, Kaye Parr, was never married to decedent. Carl E. Parr (not a party to this lawsuit) is petitioners\u2019 adoptive father. Respondent, Larry Snodgrass, is decedent\u2019s brother and the executor of his estate.\nPetitioners filed an amended complaint contesting decedent\u2019s will. As executor, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Carl Parr had adopted petitioners, they were not decedent\u2019s children within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(d)(1) (West 2000)) and they therefore lacked standing to contest decedent\u2019s will. After denying the motion for summary judgment, the trial court granted respondent\u2019s motion to certify the following question for interlocutory review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)):\n\u201cWhen the mother of an illegitimate child marries someone other than the father of the child, and the spouse of the mother then adopts the illegitimate child, is the child still the child of his or her natural father for purposes of inheritance under [section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1)]?\u201d\nWe answer yes to the question and remand this case for further proceedings.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDecedent executed his will on January 23, 1990, and died on October 8, 2000. The will named neither of the petitioners as a beneficiary. On April 4, 2001, petitioners filed an amended complaint contesting the will, alleging they were decedent\u2019s natural children, he had lacked testamentary capacity, and the beneficiaries of the will had unduly influenced him.\nOn December 14, 2001, respondent filed his motion for summary judgment. In addition to affidavits averring that decedent had a sound mind and free will, respondent presented certified copies of petitioners\u2019 birth certificates as well as records of a paternity case and an adoption case from the De Witt County circuit court. According to the birth certificates, Christopher Parr was born on September 25, 1967, and Craig Parr was born on March 15, 1969, and Carl Parr was their father. In the paternity case, petitioners\u2019 mother, Kaye Pitchford (now Parr), had sought to establish that decedent was petitioners\u2019 father. The De Witt County circuit court had dismissed the case for lack of prosecution. In the adoption case, Carl Parr adopted petitioners on September 21, 1972, with decedent\u2019s consent.\nOn January 7, 2002, petitioners filed a response to the motion for summary judgment. As part of their response, they submitted Kaye Parr\u2019s affidavit that she was petitioners\u2019 natural mother, her grandparents were petitioners\u2019 great-grandparents, and she was married to Carl Parr when he adopted petitioners.\nOn April 10, 2002, the trial court denied respondent\u2019s motion for summary judgment, because if petitioners proved the averments in their mother\u2019s affidavit, they would have standing under section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1) of the Probate Act. We granted respondent\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThis appeal requires us to interpret section 2 \u2014 4(d) of the Probate Act. We interpret statutes de novo \u2014 that is to say, without any deference to the trial court\u2019s interpretation. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). When interpreting a statute, we strive to ascertain the legislature\u2019s intent. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177, 688 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1997). The best evidence of that intent is the language the legislature used in the statute, and we should give the language its plain and ordinary meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177, 688 N.E.2d at 139. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we should discern the legislative intent from that language alone, without resorting to other tools of statutory construction, such as legislative history. People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 261, 644 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (1994).\nSection 2 \u2014 4(d)(1) of the Probate Act provides as follows:\n\u201c(d) For purposes of inheritance from or through a natural parent and for determining the property rights of any person under any instrument, an adopted child is not a child of a natural parent, nor is the child a descendant of a natural parent or of any lineal or collateral kindred of a natural parent, unless one or more of the following conditions apply:\n(1) The child is adopted by a descendant or a spouse of a descendant of a great-grandparent of the child, in which case the adopted child is a child of both natural parents.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 4(d)(1) (West 2000).\nThe parties agree that unless petitioners are children of decedent within the meaning of the statute quoted above, petitioners lack standing to contest decedent\u2019s will. Only an \u201cinterested person\u201d has the right to contest the admission of a will to probate. 755 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 1 (West 2000). An \u201cinterested person\u201d includes \u201cone who has *** a financial interest[ ] [or] property right *** which may be affected by the action ***, including[,] without limitation[,] an heir.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 2.11 (West 2000). \u201cHeirs\u201d are those whom the law designates to receive an intestate estate. Gridley v. Gridley, 399 Ill. 215, 222, 77 N.E.2d 146, 150 (1948). Natural children of a decedent are descendants of the decedent and are, therefore, the decedent\u2019s heirs. 755 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1(a), (b) (West 2000). Only by virtue of their alleged status as children of decedent would petitioners have any interest in the estate.\nPetitioners reason as follows. They are the natural children of Kaye Parr and decedent. When Carl Parr adopted petitioners, he was the spouse of Kaye Parr. As their natural mother, Kaye Parr was, of course, a descendant of a great-grandparent of petitioners (on their mother\u2019s side): her paternal and maternal grandparents were petitioners\u2019 great-grandparents. Petitioners conclude they are decedent\u2019s children under the exception in section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1). Respondent considers petitioners\u2019 interpretation and application of section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1) to be \u201cstrained\u201d and \u201cconvoluted.\u201d We disagree. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and if petitioners prove the facts in their rationale, they will fit neatly within the terms of the statute.\nRespondent interprets the statute to mean that the adopted child remains a child of both natural parents only if the adopting parent is a descendant, or spouse of a descendant, of a grandparent of the parent who no longer is a legal parent. Thus, under respondent\u2019s interpretation, if Carl Parr were decedent\u2019s brother or brother-in-law, petitioners would remain children of both natural parents \u2014 but not if Carl Parr were merely the spouse of petitioners\u2019 mother. Respondent interprets the statute as follows:\n\u201cThe child is adopted by a descendant or a spouse of a descendant of a paternal great-grandparent of the child, in which case the adopted child is a child of both natural parents.\u201d\nIf the legislature intended the statute to mean what respondent argues it means, the legislature could have easily said so by inserting a single but highly significant qualifying word: \u201cpaternal.\u201d The statute does not so read, however, and we will not insert conditions or limitations into a statute that are absent from the text (Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85, 710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1999)).\nWhile denouncing petitioners\u2019 interpretation as a \u201cclever sleight of hand,\u201d respondent concedes their interpretation \u201cfalls within the letter of the statute.\u201d Quoting In re Estate of Abell, 395 Ill. 337, 346, 70 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1946), he urges us, however, to accept his own interpretation as being \u201c \u2018within the object, spirit[,] and meaning of [the] statute[,] *** although not within the letter.\u2019 \u201d He argues: \u201cGiven the number of children who are adopted by the spouse of a natural parent, [petitioners\u2019] interpretation would have the absurd result of preserving the inheritance rights of adopted children from their natural parents in a staggering number of cases.\u201d\nThe supreme court said, in Abell, 395 Ill. at 347, 70 N.E.2d at 257: \u201cIf the language of a statute employed admits of two constructions, one of which makes the enactment mischievous, if not absurd, and the other renders it reasonable and wholesome, the construction leading to an absurd result should be avoided.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As we explained, respondent\u2019s interpretation has no basis in the plain and unambiguous language of section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1), and therefore the statute does not \u201cadmit of\u2019 his interpretation.\nMoreover, unlike respondent, we perceive no \u201cabsurdity\u201d in an adopted child\u2019s inheriting from both of the parents who brought him or her into the world. Traditionally, courts regarded \u201cthe adoption statute [as leaving] the rights of inheritance between the adopted child and his natural parent the same as though no adoption had taken place.\u201d In re Estate of Tilliski, 323 Ill. App. 490, 499, 56 N.E.2d 481, 485 (1944), aff\u2019d, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1945). As the supreme court said, in a passage that petitioners quote:\n\u201cThe statute authorizing adoption of children is remedial. It was unknown to the common law. Primarily, it is beneficial to the adopted child. It gives to it rights it did not have before. It does not purport to lessen any of its natural rights, but gives additional rights. The same right of heirship from blood parents enjoyed by a natural child should not be taken from an adopted child unless clearly required by statute.\u201d In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 Ill. at 285, 61 N.E.2d at 29.\nOn its face, section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1) does not \u201cclearly require\u201d us to hold that petitioners have no right of heirship from decedent. Rather, it \u201cclearly requires\u201d us to hold they are his heirs, if indeed they are his natural children and the averments in Kaye Parr\u2019s affidavit are true.\nEven if we agreed with respondent that section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1), as petitioners literally interpret it, is inconsistent with sound public policy, we would not interpret it as saying something other than what it plainly says. We will not effectively amend the clear and unambiguous language of statutes to eliminate what we consider bad public policy (conveniently labeled as \u201cabsurdities the legislature could not have intended\u201d). If the statute, as written, seems a bad idea, the appeal is to the legislature, not to us. People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 476, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992).\nJust as we should not allow considerations of public policy to lure us away from the clear language of the statute, we should not allow legislative history to do so, either. Therefore we decline the parties\u2019 invitation to consider the legislative history of section 2 \u2014 4(d)(1). As the supreme court recently said:\n\u201cOnly if the statutory language is ambiguous may we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent. In the absence of ambiguity, we must rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words chosen by the legislature.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 426 (2002).\nBecause the statutory language is clear, we will rely on its plain and ordinary meaning, without an unnecessary foray into legislative history.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and remand this case for further proceedings.\nQuestion answered; cause remanded.\nKNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Steven Beckett, Chad S. Beckett, and Andrew W.B. Bequette, all of Beckett & Webber, P.C., of Urbana, for appellant.", "William A. Allison, of Allison & Mosby-Scott, and George R. Flynn, both of Bloomington, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF MARLIN L. SNODGRASS, Deceased (Christopher Parr, a/k/a Christopher Snodgrass, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. Larry Snodgrass, Ex\u2019r, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20140513\nOpinion filed February 7, 2003.\nJ. Steven Beckett, Chad S. Beckett, and Andrew W.B. Bequette, all of Beckett & Webber, P.C., of Urbana, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Allison, of Allison & Mosby-Scott, and George R. Flynn, both of Bloomington, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0619-01", "first_page_order": 637, "last_page_order": 642 }