{ "id": 1599247, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIONNA BEACHEM, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Beachem", "decision_date": "2002-12-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201499\u20140852", "first_page": "688", "last_page": "701", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 688" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1219", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00a7 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 891", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 U.S. 12", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1105068 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript" }, { "parenthetical": "rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/351/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 U.S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167533 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at arraignment" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at arraignment" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at arraignment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/368/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765333 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at trial" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at trial" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 353", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765282 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel on appeal" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel on appeal" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166505 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession" }, { "parenthetical": "rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession" }, { "parenthetical": "rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767501 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty" }, { "parenthetical": "rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty" }, { "parenthetical": "rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 5", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307343 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel" }, { "parenthetical": "rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel" }, { "parenthetical": "rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 2", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307292 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0002-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170963 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States" }, { "parenthetical": "rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States" }, { "parenthetical": "rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531962 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6202354 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "892 F.2d 1541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10532284 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "retroactive application for Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985), and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979), holding burden-shifting jury instructions were unconstitutional" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/892/1541-01" ] }, { "cite": "913 F.2d 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10535444 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "retroactive application for a trial court decision holding unconstitutional the statute under which the defendant was convicted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/913/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6217594 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4898 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "961 F.2d 448", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1863233 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "retroactive application for McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990), and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/961/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 U.S. 656", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9313540 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" }, { "page": "642" }, { "page": "2482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/533/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11319062 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 960", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), holding a criminal defendant may raise a Batson issue even though the defendant and the excused juror do not share the same race" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477007 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), holding a criminal defendant may raise a Batson issue even though the defendant and the excused juror do not share the same race" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11730774 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), holding the defendant can inquire into venirepersons' opinions in support of the death penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801351 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), holding the defendant can inquire into venirepersons' opinions in support of the death penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609695 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for new Illinois Supreme Court rules for capital cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442050 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578278 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002), holding circuit court may not dismiss a postconviction petition for untimeliness at the first stage of the proceedings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6222614 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 407", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5098 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704,108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in a separate investigation" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704,108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in a separate investigation" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704,108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in a separate investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4970 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "905 F.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1807255 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/905/1129-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11803 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 383", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 230324 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 115", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1340327 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 U.S. 152", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1730073 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/518/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 1079", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1480933 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/1079-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 518", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652446 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39205 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 U.S. 151", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 915886 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/521/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 L. Ed. 2d 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846, \u00a7 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 461", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11925359 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "addressing \" 'the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination' in [a capital] sentencing proceeding [citation]\"" }, { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "addressing \" 'the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination' in [a capital] sentencing proceeding [citation]\"" }, { "page": "903", "parenthetical": "addressing \" 'the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination' in [a capital] sentencing proceeding [citation]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 F.3d 8", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11243760 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/221/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 F.3d 839", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11233750 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/226/0839-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 F.3d 1281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11239375 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/224/1281-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 F.3d 866", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11233822 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/226/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 F.3d 704", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11188442 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/229/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 F.3d 1262", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11142523 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/241/1262-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 F.3d 489", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9499194 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/259/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2255", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "West 1994 & Supp. 2000" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "773 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477034 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29934 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 1102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"although defendant neglected to raise this issue before the circuit court, the constitutional dimension of the question permits this court to address defendant's argument\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535990 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "\"although defendant neglected to raise this issue before the circuit court, the constitutional dimension of the question permits this court to address defendant's argument\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026052 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767723 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "1451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454543 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550970 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 358", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054393 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361-62" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "1071" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 203", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9137384 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970), holding the reasonable doubt standard governs juvenile delinquency proceedings, applied retroactively" }, { "parenthetical": "In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970), holding the reasonable doubt standard governs juvenile delinquency proceedings, applied retroactively" }, { "parenthetical": "In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970), holding the reasonable doubt standard governs juvenile delinquency proceedings, applied retroactively" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 F.3d 453", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7633230 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "prima facie showing the Supreme Court made Cage retroactive to habeas corpus cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/105/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 F.3d 175", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7407946 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Sullivan applied retroactively" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/41/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 F.3d 963", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7412657 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Sullivan applied retroactively" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/69/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 F.3d 526", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 224533 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Victor/Cage applied retroactively" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/120/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 F.3d 552", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 257065 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/138/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 F.3d 598", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 917809 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Cage applied retroactively" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/202/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 F.3d 1154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10532075 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1157-58", "parenthetical": "Cage applied retroactively" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/39/1154-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6217574 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 275", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12227 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147397 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a72", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169495 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1100, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968) - the holding that a nontestifying codefendant's confession is inadmissible at a joint trial applies retroactively as required by \"fundamental fairness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906071 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "adopting Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1100, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968) - the holding that a nontestifying codefendant's confession is inadmissible at a joint trial applies retroactively as required by \"fundamental fairness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "946 F.2d 982", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10525509 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/946/0982-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 L. Ed. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6212322, 6930932 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0186-01", "/us/340/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 U.S. 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212322 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 1337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), holding a nontestifying codefendant's interlocking confession inadmissible at a joint trial, applied retroactively to a postconviction proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5296623 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657", "parenthetical": "Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), holding a nontestifying codefendant's interlocking confession inadmissible at a joint trial, applied retroactively to a postconviction proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 S. Ct. 2633", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2640" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 L. Ed. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "472 U.S. 320", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6215013 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "2831" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "2827" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "2832" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "212-13" }, { "page": "2832" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 U.S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6140617 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" }, { "page": "292" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/302/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11714690 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "1180" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "1180" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "1180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576736 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "236-37" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12032050 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "1075" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "1076" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "1077" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "1076" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Generally, decisions which announce 'new rules' are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317119 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "\"Generally, decisions which announce 'new rules' are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133049 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252-53" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "1228-29", "parenthetical": "Stevens, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224783 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208048 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 45, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2351" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "446" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "2358" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2363" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" }, { "page": "476-77" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2355-56" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "2359" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "2379", "parenthetical": "Thomas, J., concurring" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "2365" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "447-48" }, { "page": "2356" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "2366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1565, "char_count": 33500, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.080925972642943e-08, "percentile": 0.37542748631290856 }, "sha256": "9dce2d466caf0e5936385feaa23c0e211c081a1e7bb6a26d23e561b33b692838", "simhash": "1:78eb1b0eeb5cb387", "word_count": 5549 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:40.180592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIONNA BEACHEM, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that penetrates the constitutional foundation of this state\u2019s extended-sentencing procedures. In this appeal from a summary dismissal of her postconviction petition, Dionna Beachem (Beachem) challenges the constitutionality of the extended sentence of 90 years she received for first degree murder. The threshold question before us is whether Apprendi reaches beyond a direct appeal to an appeal of the dismissal of a timely filed postconviction petition. We hold that it does. We also hold the defendant was properly sentenced.\nFACTS\nOn December 5, 1994, Annie Jones (Jones), a 77-year-old woman living alone on Chicago\u2019s south side, was fatally beaten in her apartment. That day, Beachem was arrested and subsequently released on bond for attempting to use Jones\u2019s newly issued credit card at a suburban mall jewelry store. Two days later, Jones\u2019s landlord discovered her body.\nBeachem was charged with and convicted of residential burglary, home invasion, robbery, and first degree murder. Though the trial court found her eligible for the death penalty, Beachem was sentenced to an extended term of 90 years\u2019 imprisonment for the murder conviction, 30 years for the home invasion conviction, 15 years for the residential burglary conviction, and 6 years for the robbery conviction, all sentences running concurrently.\nBeachem appealed her convictions and sentences. We affirmed. People v. Beachem, No. 1 \u2014 96\u20143260 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nBeachem then filed a pro se postconviction petition. In a 23-page \u201cMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER,\u201d the trial court dismissed Beachem\u2019s petition. This appeal followed.\nDECISION\nBeachem raises two issues in her initial brief.\nFirst, Beachem contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the allegation in her postconviction petition that her trial attorney failed to advise her of a plea-bargain offer. Beachem\u2019s petition said: \u201cAfter my sentencing, 8-26-96 my attorney told my aunt *** and my mother *** that the [Sjtate offered me 20 years and I turned it down. This offer was never brought to my attention. If the [Sjtate told me that they were offering me 20 years, it was my attorney\u2019s job to discuss that issue with me.\u201d\nThe trial judge found Beachem failed to provide the gist of a constitutional claim, which is all that is required at the first stage of a postconviction proceeding. See People v. Frieberg, 305 Ill. App. 3d 840, 847, 713 N.E.2d 210 (1999). The petition should be dismissed if it is frivolous and patently without merit. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102 (1996).\nHere, Beachem\u2019s petition alleged her attorney should have discussed with her any offer made by the prosecution. Assuming Beachem is contending her attorney failed to advise her, this allegation lacks any record support. Beachem relies on a sworn February 5, 1999, handwritten statement from her mother. But this statement was addressed \u201cTo the Appellate Court\u201d nearly a month after the trial court dismissed Beachem\u2019s petition. The trial judge did not have it.\nIn exercising our de novo review (People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 322, 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000)), we agree with the trial court: Beachem\u2019s plea-bargain offer allegation was \u201cfrivolous or *** patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 1996). It was pure unsupported conclusion.\nSecond, Beachem contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Because Beachem\u2019s petition contained no such allegations, this claim is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 3 (West 1996).\nIn a supplemental brief, Beachem raises another, more substantial issue never addressed in the trial court. Beachem contends her extended-term sentence was unconstitutional.\nIn Beachem\u2019s first appeal, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 90-year extended-term sentence. The court found two statutory aggravating factors, \u201cthat the crime was exceptionally brutal and heinous, indicative of wanton cruelty, and based on the fact that the victim was over 60 years of age.\u201d These findings triggered the extended-term sentence provision of the Unified Code of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(1) (West 1996).\nAfter Beachem\u2019s direct appeal, and after the denial of her postconviction petition, the United States Supreme Court decided Apprendi.\nJustice Stevens\u2019 opinion for a 5-4 majority of the Court framed the issue:\n\u201cThe question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense *** be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351.\nThe Court then said:\n\u201cOur answer to that question was foreshadowed by our opinion in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227[, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215] (1999), construing a federal statute. We there noted that \u2018under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 [Citation.] The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a state statute.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 446, 120 S. Ct. at 2355.\nNoting the constitutional founders would have recognized no distinction between an element of a felony offense and a so-called \u201csentencing factor,\u201d the Court offered an historical overview of the principle that a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of the charged offense. The Court assured, however, \u201cnothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion \u2014 taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender \u2014 in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 449, 120 S. Ct. at 2358.\nThe Court did not provide legislatures any leeway. The fact that the New Jersey legislature intended racial hatred to be an enhanced sentencing provision, not part of the crime of possessing weapons, was of no significance:\n\u201c \u2018[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363, quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 332, 119 S. Ct. at 1228-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).\nThe Court said it again: \u201cOther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.\nBefore proceeding to the merits of Beachem\u2019s Apprendi claim, we must answer a threshold question: does Apprendi apply to cases on collateral review? We limit our consideration of this question to timely, first postconviction petitions. We make no comment on untimely or successive postconviction petitions.\nTo determine whether Apprendi reaches back to a timely postconviction petition, we have to weigh the public\u2019s interest in the finality of criminal judgments against its interest in the fairness and integrity of criminal trials. This balance usually tips toward nonretroactivity. See People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 430, 686 N.E.2d 587 (1997) (\u201cGenerally, decisions which announce \u2018new rules\u2019 are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review\u201d).\nBut a plurality decision by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 237, 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990), established two exceptions to this general principle.\nFirst, \u201ca new rule should be applied retroactively if it places \u2018certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.\u2019 \u201d Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 109 S. Ct. at 1075, quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404, 420, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 1180 (1971). Because Apprendi did not address primary, private behavior, this first exception does not apply.\nSecond, \u201ca new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of \u2018those procedures that... are \u201cimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 109 S. Ct. at 1076, quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 421, 91 S. Ct. at 1180, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 82 L. Ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937).\nHow broad would this second exception be? The Court:\n\u201c[W]e believe *** concerns about the difficulty in identifying both the existence and the value of accuracy-enhancing procedural rules can be addressed by limiting the scope of the second exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.\nBecause we operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.\u201d Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1077.\nIn a subsequent case the Court explained:\n\u201cIt is *** not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this [second] exception must not only improve accuracy, but also \u2018 \u201calter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements\u201d \u2019 essential to the fairness of a proceeding.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 211, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990), quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311,103 L. Ed. 2d at 357,109 S. Ct. at 1076, quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 421, 91 S. Ct. at 1180.\nMuch depends on how we describe the holding in Apprendi. If we were to say Apprendi reaches only a portion of a noncapital sentence, not its underlying conviction, it would be difficult, but not impossible, to make a case for the existence of procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, per Teague and Flowers. But analysis by label or category \u2014 sentence or conviction \u2014 is not a principled methodology. The question is how far a certain procedure reaches into the constitutional fabric of a fundamentally fair trial and conviction. Does it reach \u201cbedrock\u201d?\nThe rights affirmed in Apprendi are at the core of our criminal justice system. Justice Stevens\u2019 majority opinion:\n\u201cAt stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without \u2018due process of law,\u2019 Arndt. 14, and the guarantee that \u2018[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,\u2019 Arndt. 6. Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to \u2018a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355-56.\nThe right to a jury trial, and particularly its companion right to a jury verdict proved beyond a reasonable doubt, stand, inviolable, for what the Apprendi Court termed \u201ccogent reasons\u201d related to accuracy:\n\u201cProsecution subjects the criminal defendant both to \u2018the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and ... the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.\u2019 [Citation.] We thus require this [reasonable doubt standard], among other, procedural protections in order to \u2018provid[e] concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,\u2019 and to reduce the risk of imposing such deprivations erroneously. [Citation.] If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not \u2014 at the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances \u2014 be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 451, 120 S. Ct. at 2359.\nThe argument for extending Apprendi to collateral proceedings relies on the conclusion that the operative fact \u2014 the fact that leads to an enhanced sentence \u2014 becomes an element of the offense. The Supreme Court warned against a restrictive use of labels when analyzing the two factors at issue in Apprendi\u2019s sentencing \u2014 unlawful possession of a weapon and selection of victims to intimidate them because of their race: \u201cMerely using the label \u2018sentence enhancement\u2019 to describe the latter [selecting victims according to race as a factor to exceed the maximum sentence] surely does not provide a principled basis for treating them differently.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355.\nIn a footnote, the Court observed an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence \u201cis the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury\u2019s guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of an \u2018element\u2019 of the offense.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457 n.19, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 n.19; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 521, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 473, 120 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., concurring) (\u201cIf a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment \u2014 for establishing or increasing the prosecution\u2019s entitlement \u2014 it is an element [of the crime]\u201d). But the Court again cautioned against placing form over substance: \u201cDespite what appears to us the clear \u2018elemental\u2019 nature of the factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect\u2014 does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury\u2019s guilty verdict?\u201d (Emphasis added.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457, 120 S. Ct. at 2365.\nWe take Apprendi to mean that once the defendant serves the prescribed maximum sentence, he or she remains in prison on a charge never made and never proved. And if we acknowledge the defendant remains in prison on a charge never made or proved, we have impugned the integrity of our criminal justice system. It is as if the sentencing judge actually said to the defendant: \u201cI have convicted you of a charge never made against you and never heard by the jury, and I have done it based on the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d Such a conviction, and its concomitant sentence, are repugnant to our notions of fundamental fairness.\nSince Teague, no United States Supreme Court or Illinois Supreme Court case has found a new rule qualifies for retroactivity under the second Teague exception. But these decisions either do not involve fundamental rights or do not directly implicate accuracy. They are not \u201cbedrock\u201d pronouncements.\nFor example, in Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990), the Court held Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), which prohibited a capital sentence if the prosecution misled the jury to believe the ultimate sentencing decision rested elsewhere, did not apply retroactively. The Court recognized the false information outlawed in Caldwell \u201cmight produce \u2018substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences\u2019 \u201d (Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 205, 110 S. Ct. at 2827, quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 240, 105 S. Ct. at 2640), but the Court felt Caldwell provided merely \u201can additional measure of protection against error\u201d beyond that afforded by another case (Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 244, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 212, 110 S. Ct. at 2832). That is:\n\u201cThe Caldwell rule was designed as an enhancement of the accuracy of capital sentencing, a protection of systemic value for state and federal courts charged with reviewing capital proceedings. But given that it was added to an existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental unfairness, we cannot say this systemic rule enhancing reliability is an \u2018absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness\u2019 [citation], of the type that may come within Teague\u2019s second exception.\u201d Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 244, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 212-13, 110 S. Ct. at 2832, quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 314, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1077.\nApprendi not only safeguards fundamental fairness; its reasonable doubt standard provides the only measure of accuracy in extended sentencing. Where a new rule secures both \u201cthe accuracy of the truth-finding function\u201d and \u201cthe fairness and the constitutional integrity of a criminal proceeding,\u201d courts have held it applies retroactively. People v. Kubik, 214 Ill. App. 3d 649, 657, 573 N.E.2d 1337 (1991) (Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), holding a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s interlocking confession inadmissible at a joint trial, applied retroactively to a postconviction proceeding); accord Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 994 (2d Cir. 1991); see also People v. Ikerd, 47 Ill. 2d 211, 213, 265 N.E.2d 120 (1970) (adopting Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1100, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968) \u2014 the holding that a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s confession is inadmissible at a joint trial applies retroactively as required by \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d).\nPrior to the applicability of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 18 U.S.C. \u00a72 et seq. (2000), several federal circuit court cases considered the retroactivity of Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994), Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 112 L. Ed. 2d 339, 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990), which held jury instructions diluting the reasonable doubt standard were unconstitutional. These cases held Cage and its progeny fall within Teague\u2019s second exception because \u201c[t]he reasonable doubt standard guards against conviction of the innocent by ensuring the systemic accuracy of the criminal system\u201d and \u201cuse of a lower standard of proof frustrates the jury-trial guarantee.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 1994) (Cage applied retroactively); accord Gaines v. Kelley, 202 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cage applied retroactively); Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc), aff\u2019d, 120 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1997) (Victor/Cage applied retroactively); Harmon v. Marshall, 69 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1995) (Sullivan applied retroactively); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994) (Sullivan applied retroactively); see also Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 1996) (prima facie showing the Supreme Court made Cage retroactive to habeas corpus cases); cf. Ivan V. v. New York, 407 U.S. 203, 32 L. Ed. 2d 659, 92 S. Ct. 1951 (1972) (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970), holding the reasonable doubt standard governs juvenile delinquency proceedings, applied retroactively).\nFlowers can be distinguished. In Flowers, the Illinois Supreme Court held People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184, 526 N.E.2d 141 (1988), did not apply to cases on collateral review. The Reddick court had found unconstitutional jury instructions that erroneously stated the burden of proof for voluntary manslaughter mitigating mental states. The Flowers court recognized Reddick involved a \u201cgrave\u201d jury instruction error \u201cof constitutional dimension\u201d (Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 236-37), but declined to place a Reddick error within Teague\u2019s second exception: \u201cThis exception must be narrowly construed and we do not believe that the Reddick rule established such a component of basic due process so as to fall within it.\u201d Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 242.\nReddick discussed the constitutional obligation of the jury to follow the trial judge\u2019s instructions (see People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 66-67, 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977)), but, unlike Victor, Cage, Sullivan, or now Apprendi, it did not implicate the right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt and, consequently, the fundamental fairness and accuracy concerns inherent in the second Teague exception.\nApprendi tells us we deal with \u201cconstitutional protections of surpassing importance.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355. The reasonable doubt standard \u201c \u2018 \u201creflects] a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447-48, 120 S. Ct. at 2356, quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-62, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 374, 90 S. Ct. at 1071, quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 499, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1451 (1968). Our jury tradition is \u201can indispensable part of our criminal justice system.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 459, 120 S. Ct. at 2366. How, then, could we say we do not deal with procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty? Have we not reached \u201cbedrock\u201d?\nWe view the gravity of an Apprendi violation within the narrow window of retroactivity established by the courts. Finding retroactivity never should be lightly done. Can we say the likelihood of an accurate conviction in this case is seriously diminished? If we conclude there is a certainty of inaccurate conviction since Beachem was convicted of a crime never charged or proved, it follows that Beachem\u2019s imprisonment beyond the maximum sentence violates established principles of fundamental fairness.\nWe understand the implications of extending Apprendi to collateral review. But we do what we believe the law requires. Our constitutional history teaches us we best survive when we hew to the line drawn by the rule of law. Because, under Teague, we conclude Apprendi implicates procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, we find Apprendi applies to a timely filed postconviction petition.\nBecause Apprendi applies, we turn to the merits of Beachem\u2019s claim that her sentence is unconstitutional.\nThe State initially contends Beachem waived this issue when she failed to include it in her postconviction petition. But Apprendi was decided nearly 18 months after the trial court denied her petition. Beachem instead raised Apprendi in a supplemental brief before this court shortly after it was decided. Beachem did not forfeit her right to review of her extended sentence in light of Apprendi. People v. Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d 573, 740 N.E.2d 377 (2000); see People v. Woofers, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 510, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (1999) (\u201calthough defendant neglected to raise this issue before the circuit court, the constitutional dimension of the question permits this court to address defendant\u2019s argument\u201d).\nPost-Apprendi decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court support the State\u2019s claim that Beachem was properly sentenced.\nHere, as in People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 761 N.E.2d 735 (2001), the trial court, before sentence was imposed, found, beyond a reasonable doubt, Beachem was eligible for the death penalty. That means her sentence of 90 years is not beyond the maximum prescribed by law.\nIn addition, Beachem was charged with committing a robbery on a victim over 60 years of age. The issues instructions for the robbery charge required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the victim was over 60 before it could convict. Thus, the jury\u2019s guilty verdict was a finding that the murdered victim of the robbery was over 60. That is sufficient to permit the trial judge to sentence defendant to an extended term under the statutory scheme established in section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 (West 1994)). People v. Hopkins, 201 Ill. 2d 26, 773 N.E.2d 633 (2002). Apprendi was not violated in this case.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal of the defendant\u2019s postconviction petition.\nAffirmed.\nBURKE and HALL, JJ., concur.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court denied the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal in this case, but directed us to vacate and reconsider the judgment we entered on December 6, 2000. We have done so.\nSeveral federal circuit courts have addressed the related question whether Apprendi applies to a second collateral review petition under 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). These courts have replied with a uniform no. See, e.g., In re Clemmons, 259 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2001); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001); Rodgers v. United States, 229 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000); Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Joshua, 224 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. United States, 226 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2000); Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000).\nBecause \u201ca criminal judgment necessarily includes the sentence imposed upon the defendant\u201d (Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358 n.2, 109 S. Ct. at 1077 n.2), Teague\u2019s accuracy concerns may be implicated by sentencing procedures, as well as by trial procedures. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260, 277, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (addressing \u201c \u2018the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination\u2019 in [a capital] sentencing proceeding [citation]\u201d); see generally, G. Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court\u2019s views as to retroactive effect of its own decisions announcing new rules as to sentencing in criminal cases, 122 L. Ed. 2d 837, 846, \u00a7 7 (1997).\nThe Seventh Circuit has observed:\n\u201cPrisoners seem to think that Apprendi reopens every sentencing issue decided by a federal court in the last generation. It does not. All Ap prend\u00ed holds is that most circumstances increasing a statutory maximum sentence must be treated as elements of the offense \u2014 and, if the defendant has demanded a jury trial, this means that they must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury\u2019s satisfaction.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Talbott, 226 F.3d at 869.\nSee O\u2019Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 138 L. Ed. 2d 351, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997) (no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 137 L. Ed. 2d 771, 117 S. Ct. 1517 (1997) (no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 135 L. Ed. 2d 457, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996) (no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 131 L. Ed. 2d 152, 115 S. Ct. 1275 (1995) (per curiam) (no retroactive application for a federal circuit court rule regarding the dismissal of recaptured fugitive appeals); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 127 L. Ed. 2d 236, 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994) (no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 124 L. Ed. 2d 306, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993) (no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states); (Graham, 506 U.S. 461, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260, 113 S. Ct. 892 (no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,108 L. Ed. 2d 347, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990) (no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704,108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect\u2019s request for counsel in a separate investigation); Teague, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (no retroactive application for Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), holding the State may not exercise race-based peremptory challenges); People v. Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d 331 (2002) (no retroactive application for People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (2002), holding circuit court may not dismiss a postconviction petition for untimeliness at the first stage of the proceedings); People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585 (2001) (no retroactive application for new Illinois Supreme Court rules for capital cases); People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 688 N.E.2d 658 (1997) (no retroactive application for Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), holding the defendant can inquire into venirepersons\u2019 opinions in support of the death penalty); People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d 356, 647 N.E.2d 960 (1995) (no retroactive application for Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), holding a criminal defendant may raise a Batson issue even though the defendant and the excused juror do not share the same race).\nFor a new rule of constitutional law to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review under the AEDPA, the United States Supreme Court must hold that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 150 L. Ed. 2d 632, 642, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482 (2001).\nOther post-Teague federal circuit court cases have held new rules apply retroactively under the second exception. See, e.g., Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992) (retroactive application for McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990), and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988), holding a jury instruction requiring unanimity in finding mitigating evidence was unconstitutional); Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1990) (retroactive application for a trial court decision holding unconstitutional the statute under which the defendant was convicted); Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (retroactive application for Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985), and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979), holding burden-shifting jury instructions were unconstitutional).\nAdditionally, several pre-Teague, United States Supreme Court cases held new rules were retroactively applicable. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300, 90 S. Ct. 1757 (1970) (rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 21 L. Ed. 2d 2, 89 S. Ct. 32 (1968) (rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 5, 89 S. Ct. 35 (1968) (rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel); Wither-spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968) (rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964) (rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963) (rule requiring counsel on appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963) (rule requiring counsel at trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961) (rule requiring counsel at arraignment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 100 L. Ed. 891, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956) (rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript). See generally G. Chamberlin, Annotation, United States Supreme Court\u2019s Views as to Retroactive Effect of Its Own Decisions Announcing New Rules, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1219 \u00a7 5[d] (1980).\nBeachem attempts to shortcut this question, contending a sentence that does not conform to a statutory requirement is void. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107,113, 658 N.E.2d 445 (1995). We find Ama does not apply. Beachem\u2019s sentence conformed to all statutory requirements. We must decide whether her sentence conformed to Apprendi\u2019s constitutional requirements.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Michael H. Orenstein, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine Cook, Alan J. Spellberg, William D. Carroll, and Michele Grimaldi Stein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIONNA BEACHEM, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201499\u20140852\nOpinion filed December 24, 2002.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Michael H. Orenstein, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine Cook, Alan J. Spellberg, William D. Carroll, and Michele Grimaldi Stein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0688-01", "first_page_order": 706, "last_page_order": 719 }