{ "id": 1599248, "name": "JOSEPH YATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANCY C. SHACKELFORD et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Yates v. Shackelford", "decision_date": "2002-12-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201400\u20144136", "first_page": "796", "last_page": "806", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 796" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 1041", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5619671 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1047" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496844 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3574740 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" }, { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599663 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592245 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536099 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" }, { "page": "257-58" }, { "page": "259-60" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236685 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" }, { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725365 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567184 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909173 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0525-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 889, "char_count": 22871, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.537536562460142e-08, "percentile": 0.4009575461735414 }, "sha256": "c0a15b40ca144274697a0b5f49b2ae1fce93de356b29a9ac11956538cbdcd23e", "simhash": "1:9f97cb5b1e3990ab", "word_count": 3868 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:40.180592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOSEPH YATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANCY C. SHACKELFORD et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REID\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Joseph Yates, brought suit against the defendants, Nancy Shackelford, Becker Transportation, Inc. (Becker), John Junkins, Green Oak Farms, Inc. (Green Oak), and Brown Transport, Inc. (Brown Transport), seeking damages for injuries he received during an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Yates subsequently moved the court to reconsider and the motion was denied.\nOn appeal, Yates contends the trial court committed error when it denied his motion to reconsider because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether: (1) Shackelford\u2019s act of parking her semi-tractor trailer truck on the left shoulder of the highway, in violation of section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) (West 1996)), proximately caused the accident in which Yates collided into the rear of her trailer as she was attempting to merge back into traffic, and (2) Junkins applied his brakes in a timely fashion and took proper evasive maneuvers to avoid colliding into Yates\u2019 vehicle. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision.\nBACKGROUND\nDuring a discovery deposition, Shackelford testified that on November 20, 1996, she was driving a semi-tractor trailer truck (semi), which was owned by Becker, westbound on Interstate 80 (1-80), when she was informed by radio that the rear taillights of her trailer were not functioning. In response, Shackelford pulled over onto the left shoulder of the highway to check the electrical connection to the trailer. After reconnecting the lights, Shackelford reentered her vehicle and began driving on the shoulder in an attempt to gain speed before merging into the left lane.\nShackelford said that she checked her passenger side mirror for oncoming vehicles in the left lane. After seeing that the lane was clear, she activated her turn signal and began to merge into the left lane from the shoulder. The speed limit on 1-80 is 55 miles per hour. As she was merging from the shoulder to the left lane, Shackelford estimated that she was traveling 50 miles per hour.\nShackelford testified that as she was merging, she saw Yates switch lanes from the center lane to the left lane. Prior to Yates switching lanes, Shackelford\u2019s view of Yates\u2019 car was obstructed because Yates was driving behind a semi in the middle lane. She estimated that Yates was 500 feet behind her but could not approximate how fast he was driving. Shackelford said that Yates never slowed down prior to hitting the back of her trailer. Shackelford said that her trailer was fully in the left lane before the accident occurred. The front end of Yates\u2019 vehicle collided into the middle of the rear of her trailer. At the time of impact, Shackelford estimated that she was traveling 55 miles per hour.\nDuring a deposition, Junkins testified that prior to the accident, he was under dispatch with Brown Transport and was driving a semi owned by Green Oak westbound on 1-80 in the center lane. Earlier, Junkins was informed by radio that a semi was parked ahead on the left shoulder of the highway. Junkins said that he made visual contact with Shackelford\u2019s semi when he was approximately a half mile away. Junkins could clearly see the semi and its lights. Junkins thought that the semi was moving on the shoulder.\nWhen Junkins was approximately a quarter mile from Shackelford\u2019s semi, he could see that it was moving along the shoulder with its right turn signal activated. Junkins looked into his driver\u2019s side mirror and saw that the left lane was clear of traffic.\nWhen Junkins was approximately 500 feet from Shackelford\u2019s semi, he saw Yates\u2019 car pass him in the left lane. Junkins said that he was driving 55 miles per hour and estimated that Yates was traveling 85 miles per hour. Junkins testified that there was a car in front of him in the middle lane as well. He estimated the car to be a truck length ahead.\nJunkins said that he let his foot off the gas pedal when Yates passed him because of the situation developing ahead. Junkins testified that he could see that Yates would not have a lot of room to maneuver in the left lane because Shackelford\u2019s semi was coming off the shoulder, and there was also the car in front of Junkins in the middle lane as well. Junkins wanted to create some space in case Yates needed to switch from the left lane to the middle lane.\nJunkins estimated that he started to apply his brakes when he was approximately 500 to 250 feet from Shackelford\u2019s semi. When Junkins was approximately 250 feet from Shackelford\u2019s semi, he estimated that 50% to 75% of the left lane was occupied by the truck. He estimated that she was traveling between 30 to 40 miles per hour.\nAt this point, Junkins thought that Yates was attempting to pass in front of the car that was ahead in the middle lane. Although Yates did not have a turn signal on, Junkins was under this belief because of the speed that Yates was traveling. Junkins then saw Yates\u2019 vehicle drift toward the right side of the left lane as it neared Shackelford\u2019s truck. Just as Yates\u2019 car was overcoming the car in front of Junkins, Yates slammed on the brakes and hit Shackelford\u2019s right rear trailer tires. Junkins said that the car in front of him never braked. Junkins thought that the driver of the car never knew of Yates\u2019 presence.\nAt this point, Junkins was braking hard and skidding. After Yates hit the back of Shackelford\u2019s trailer, Yates\u2019 vehicle quarter-turned counterclockwise into the middle lane. Junkins then hit Yates\u2019 car in the driver\u2019s side. At the time of impact, Junkins estimated that he was traveling between 40 to 45 miles per hour.\nJunkins estimated that a small portion of the trailer was still on the shoulder when the accident occurred. Junkins estimated that Yates was traveling \u201cwell above the speed limit\u201d because he did not brake prior to hitting the rear of Shackelford\u2019s trailer. Junkins said that Shackelford\u2019s semi completely entered the left lane just after the accident. Junkins said that Shackelford was traveling \u201cin the neighborhood of 40 miles an hour\u201d when the accident occurred. Junkins testified that the weather was clear and that the pavement was dry.\nYates has no recollection of the accident and consequently was unable to testify about the sequence of events that led up to the accident.\nOn January 22, 1997, Yates filed his initial complaint where he sought damages against Shackelford and her employer, Becker. On January 15, 1998, Yates filed his second amended complaint seeking damages against Shackelford, Becker, Junkins, Green Oak and Brown Transport.\nOn March 13, 2000, Junkins, Brown Transport and Green Oaks filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 20, 2000, Shackelford and Becker filed their motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendants on July 20, 2000. Yates\u2019 motions to reconsider were denied on October 24, 2000, and November 6, 2000. Yates filed his notice of appeal on December 5, 2000, and his amended notice of appeal on December 6, 2000.\nANALYSIS\nI\nThe appellees initially argue that the trial court improperly refused to consider evidence of Yates\u2019 intoxication when it ruled on their motions for summary judgment.\nAs part of their motions for summary judgment, the appellees submitted evidence of Yates\u2019 intoxication. The appellees submitted the affidavit of their expert, Daniel Brown. After examining Yates\u2019 hospital records, Brown opined that Yates was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. However, the trial court struck Brown\u2019s affidavit and refused to consider the intoxication evidence.\nIn response, Yates argues that the appellees have waived this issue because they failed to appeal the trial court\u2019s order which struck Brown\u2019s affidavit. We agree.\n\u201cIt is well settled that issues not raised in the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.\u201d Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). The appellees failed to appeal the order that struck Brown\u2019s affidavit and, as such, have waived review of this issue. However, the disposition of this matter will not be affected by our decision here.\nII\nYates contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to reconsider its orders that granted summary judgment to the appellees. Yates maintains a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Shackelford\u2019s act of parking on the left shoulder of the highway was a proximate cause of the accident. Yates argues that Shackelford violated section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) when she parked on the left shoulder of the highway. Section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) states that, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or to comply with the law or the directions of a police officer or official traffic-control device, no person shall stop, stand or park a vehicle in the area between roadways of a divided highway, including crossovers. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) (West 1996).\nIt is Yates\u2019 assertion that no exceptions to section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) were present when Shackelford pulled over onto the left shoulder. It is Yates\u2019 contention that Shackelford\u2019s malfunctioning taillight did not justify her pulling over onto the left shoulder in violation of section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k). If Shackelford had not violated section 11\u2014 1303(a)(l)(k), Yates claims, she would not have merged into traffic traveling at a rate of speed that was slower than the posted speed limit. Yates argues this subsequently caused him to hit the rear of Shackelford\u2019s trailer. Yates asserts section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) was specifically created to prevent this type of accident from occurring.\n\u201cSummary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, together with any depositions, admissions, or affidavits on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Coughlin v. Gustafson, 332 Ill. App. 3d 406, 411 (2002), citing 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1005(c) (West 1998); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90 (1992). Summary judgment is encouraged in the interest of the prompt disposition of lawsuits, but it is a drastic measure which should be granted only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, when reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party\u2019s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358 (1989). \u201cThe standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment is de novo.\u201d Coughlin, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 411, citing Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 102.\nTo sustain a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty and an injury to plaintiff proximately caused by the breach. Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass\u2019n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (2000).\nWhether a duty exists depends upon whether the parties stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff. Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1991). Generally, \u201c[i]n considering whether a duty exists in a particular case, a court must weigh the foreseeability that defendant\u2019s conduct will result in injury to another and the likelihood of an injury occurring, against the burden to defendant of imposing a duty, and the consequences of imposing this burden.\u201d Ziemba, 142 Ill. 2d at 47.\nTo recover damages based upon a defendant\u2019s alleged statutory violation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he belongs to the class of persons that the statute was designed to protect; (2) his injury is of the type that the statute was designed to prevent; and (3) the violation proximately caused his injury. First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1999), citing Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144 Ill. 2d 425, 434-35 (1991).\nHere, Yates clearly belongs to the class of people that section 11\u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) was designed to protect, and his injury was of the type that the statute was designed to prevent. When a motorist parks on the left shoulder of the highway and attempts to merge back into traffic, a situation can be created that is hazardous to other drivers. One reason this occurs is due to the motorist\u2019s limited view of oncoming traffic.\nWhen a motorist merges into traffic from the right shoulder, he can view oncoming traffic by utilizing his sideview and rearview mirrors. In addition, the motorist also can look over his shoulder to view oncoming traffic. This is impossible when a motorist is attempting to merge from the left shoulder, especially if the motorist is driving a semi, as was Shackelford. It should also be noted that when a motorist merges into traffic from the left shoulder, he or she is attempting to merge into the lane of traffic that is generally regarded as the fastest moving.\nAs such, we must determine if Shackelford\u2019s violation of section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) proximately caused Yates\u2019 injuries.\n\u201cThe term \u2018proximate cause\u2019 describes two distinct requirements: cause in fact and legal cause. Lee [v. Chicago Transit Authority], 152 Ill. 2d [432,] 455 [(1992)]. Cause in fact exists where there is a reasonable certainty that a defendant\u2019s acts caused the injury or damage. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455. A defendant\u2019s conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury only if that conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455. A defendant\u2019s conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about an injury if, absent that conduct, the injury would not have occurred. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455. \u2018Legal cause,\u2019 by contrast, is essentially a question of foreseeability. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456. The relevant inquiry here is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456.\u201d First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 257-58.\nYates relies on Filipetto v. Village of Wilmette, 135 Ill. App. 3d 781 (1985), to support his contention that Shackelford\u2019s actions proximately caused his injuries. In Filipetto the defendant violated a village ordinance by temporarily storing an air compressor on the street. A young boy who was riding his bicycle subsequently hit the compressor and was injured. The Filipetto court found that the village ordinance contemplated possible injury when articles were left on the public way and that the young boy hitting the air compressor was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant violating the ordinance. The court determined that the defendant\u2019s conduct as a matter of law was not too remote to impose liability and reversed the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment. Filipetto, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 786.\nThis case can be distinguished from Filipetto. In Filipetto, the accident was not caused by the unreasonable actions of the boy who was riding his bike. Our set of facts is more similar to the facts in First Springfield.\nIn First Springfield, a tanker truck illegally parked at mid-block. A young girl then illegally crossed the street at mid-block in front of the tanker and was subsequently hit by an oncoming vehicle. The driver of the vehicle said that she could not swerve and avoid the accident by switching to the open lane because of the illegally parked tanker truck. The First Springfield court rejected the plaintiffs assertion that the illegally parked tanker truck was the proximate cause of the accident that led to the girl\u2019s death. The court found that although the tanker was the cause in fact of the accident, it was not the legal cause of the accident. First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 259-60. Instead, the court held that the girl\u2019s actions of ignoring a marked crosswalk, crossing the street at mid-block, and attempting to cross a designated truck route blindly and in violation of the law were the legal cause of the accident. First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 261.\nHere, we must first determine whether Shackelford\u2019s act of pulling over on the left shoulder in violation of section 11\u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) was a cause in fact of Yates\u2019 injuries. In deciding whether a defendant\u2019s conduct was a material and substantial element in bringing about an injury, we ask whether, absent the defendant\u2019s conduct, that injury still would have occurred. First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 260, citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455.\nHad Shackelford not parked on the left shoulder, Yates\u2019 injuries more than likely would not have occurred. It is clear from the record that Yates was speeding. However, it is also apparent that Shackelford was doing just the opposite. When viewed in the light most favorable to Yates, the record shows that Shackelford was traveling below the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. Junkins estimated that Shackelford was traveling at 40 to 45 miles an hour at the time of impact. If Shackelford had not pulled over onto the left shoulder of the highway, she would not have found herself attempting to merge into what is typically considered the fast lane at a rate of speed 10 to 15 miles below the posted speed Emit.\nNow, we must determine whether Shackelford\u2019s violation of section 11 \u2014 1303(a)(l)(k) was in fact the legal cause of Yates\u2019 injuries. The relevant inquiry here is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct. First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 260, citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456. We find that Shackelford\u2019s actions were not the legal cause of Yates\u2019 injuries.\nNo one in Shackelford\u2019s position could have reasonably anticipated that the act of pulling over on the left shoulder would have resulted in the succeeding accident. Before attempting to merge back into the left lane, Shackelford gained speed while traveling on the shoulder. She checked her passenger side mirror and saw that the left lane was clear of traffic. She activated her turn signal and then began to merge. At that moment, Yates, who was speeding, shifted into the left lane. When Yates switched lanes and passed Junkins, Shackelford\u2019s truck and its lights were plainly visible, as was evidenced by Junkins, who testified that Shackelford\u2019s truck was plainly visible from 500 feet.\nUnexplainably, while the situation with Shackelford was developing in front of him, Yates was still attempting to pass the car ahead in the middle lane. Why did Yates not simply merge into the empty space between Junkins and the car ahead? As Yates neared Shackelford\u2019s trailer, he finally realized that there was not enough space to pass the car in the middle lane and move to his right. However, by this point, Yates could not avoid the impending collision because of his excessive speed. Here, Yates\u2019 unreasonable actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries and not any actions that were taken by Shackelford.\nIll\nLastly, Yates argues that sufficient evidence was presented to the trial court to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact that Junkins breached his duty of care by failing to brake or take proper evasive action.\nIllinois courts have long held that a sudden swerve into a defendant\u2019s right of way by an approaching vehicle does not give rise to negligence by the defendant. Courts will not view a party\u2019s acts with the clarity of hindsight, but by a standard of what a prudent person would have done under the same circumstances. Wilmere v. Stibolt, 152 Ill. App. 3d 642, 647 (1987). The driver of a vehicle who is faced in a sudden emergency with imminent peril is not required to possess the same coolness and judgment as when there is no imminent peril. Turner v. Roesner, 193 Ill. App. 3d 482, 488 (1990), citing McCullough v. McTavish, 62 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1047 (1978).\nTo support his position, Yates relies on Turner, where the decedent\u2019s car crossed the center line and collided with the defendant\u2019s vehicle. Although the defendant was driving 10 to 15 miles below the posted speed limit when the accident occurred, the court held that even this speed may have been excessive considering the weather conditions at the time of the accident. Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 489.\nThere was evidence that on the morning of the accident, there was fog and ice on the road. Also, the defendant stated in his deposition that, prior to the accident, he did not remember braking and that he did not attempt to take evasive maneuvers. The court took this statement to mean that the defendant may have been driving too fast to react to the plaintiffs vehicle and subsequently avoid the accident. Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 489.\nTurner can be distinguished. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence which suggests that weather conditions played a part in the accident. After reviewing the record, we find that Junkins\u2019 conduct played no part in causing Yates\u2019 injuries either. Prior to the accident Junkins was traveling at the posted speed. When Yates passed him, Junkins took his foot off the accelerator because he anticipated that something might happen as a result of Yates\u2019 speeding. In fact, Junkins had already begun braking when Yates slammed on his brakes and hit the back of Shackelford\u2019s truck. When Junkins hit Yates, he did so only because Yates\u2019 car unexpectedly turned into his lane after hitting Shackelford\u2019s truck.\nThis case is more similar to Wilmere. There the decedent\u2019s vehicle crossed the double yellow line and struck the three defendants, who were traveling in the opposite direction. The Wilmere court concluded that the defendants, who were all in their own lanes and traveling at the posted speed limit, were not negligent. Wilmere, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 647.\nThis accident was caused by Yates\u2019 unforeseeably reckless conduct. Junkins acted as a reasonably careful driver under the circumstances and Yates failed to establish a material question of fact as to Junkins\u2019 alleged negligence.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and QUINN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REID" } ], "attorneys": [ "Nagel & Gyarmathy, Ltd., of Homewood (Joseph A. Gyarmathy, Sandra B. Nagel, and Ronald G. Nagel, of counsel), for appellant.", "Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford, David H. Levitt, and Michael J. Cunningham, of counsel), for appellees Nancy C. Shackelford and Becker Transportation, Inc.", "Iwan, Cray, Hyber, Horstman & VanAusdal, L.L.C., of Chicago (James K. Horstman, Stephen W. Heil, and John P. Palumbo, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOSEPH YATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANCY C. SHACKELFORD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201400\u20144136\nOpinion filed December 27, 2002.\nNagel & Gyarmathy, Ltd., of Homewood (Joseph A. Gyarmathy, Sandra B. Nagel, and Ronald G. Nagel, of counsel), for appellant.\nHinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford, David H. Levitt, and Michael J. Cunningham, of counsel), for appellees Nancy C. Shackelford and Becker Transportation, Inc.\nIwan, Cray, Hyber, Horstman & VanAusdal, L.L.C., of Chicago (James K. Horstman, Stephen W. Heil, and John P. Palumbo, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0796-01", "first_page_order": 814, "last_page_order": 824 }