{ "id": 894559, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE C. McCOY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McCoy", "decision_date": "2003-02-25", "docket_number": "No. 2-01-0603", "first_page": "518", "last_page": "525", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 518" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483554 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 1054", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5425082 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1066-67" }, { "page": "1065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/1054-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2474002 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5209366 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520991 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5251673 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156128 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163903 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963678 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317115 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442036 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351226 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0269-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 793, "char_count": 16985, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.834470838160747e-08, "percentile": 0.4582871433817184 }, "sha256": "e41495132056b0f50074cfe56b1aad044fdbee9ace5681a2d94f6c226de28248", "simhash": "1:f930aae66a4677f1", "word_count": 2728 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:38.563173+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE C. McCOY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Willie C. McCoy, was found guilty of three counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)), one count of attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a), 9 \u2014 1(a)(2) (West 2000)), and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.2(a)(1) (West 2000)) based upon accountability. Defendant received a mandatory sentence of natural fife imprisonment under the multiple-murder provision of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2000)). On appeal, defendant argues that his mandatory sentence of natural life based upon accountability offends the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11). We affirm.\nThe evidence at trial established the following. Willie \u201cBay-Bay\u201d Fullilove, a 15-year-old member of the Black Disciples street gang, sold drugs from apartment No. 12, which was located in an Elgin apartment complex known as \u201cthe schoolhouse.\u201d Gangster Disciples\u2019 members, including Quanson \u201cGuda\u201d Carlisle and Anthony Cooper, also sold drugs at the schoolhouse, from apartment No. 23. The Gangster Disciples kept a safe containing drugs and handguns in schoolhouse apartment No. 28. Both gangs are affiliated under the same gang \u201cnation\u201d and coexisted at the schoolhouse without incident. One day, however, Fullilove lent his car to Carlisle and Cooper, and, when the two men were away, Fullilove stole the safe.\nFullilove was subsequently accused of stealing the safe. Fullilove informed a higher-ranking member of the Black Disciples, who, at a meeting to discuss the matter, told defendant and other members of the Black Disciples to \u201chandle the situation.\u201d Allegedly, before resorting to violence, the Black Disciples were to talk to the Gangster Disciples and convince them to leave Fullilove alone. However, handguns were passed out to several of the Black Disciples\u2019 members who were present at the meeting. Defendant did not take a gun.\nAfter the meeting, defendant and the other members of the Black Disciples proceeded to the schoolhouse, where they met Fullilove at his apartment. One of the members stated, \u201cLet\u2019s kill the motherfuckers.\u201d Another said that he was \u201cgonna kill \u2019em if they get out of line.\u201d\nDefendant checked to make sure that apartment No. 23 was occupied and confirmed that people were present there. Defendant agreed when one of his compatriots stated that \u201cwe got these pussy mother-fuckers now.\u201d Those members who were armed inspected their weapons in defendant\u2019s presence. Defendant then called the apartment on his cellular phone and told Carlisle that they needed to talk.\nThe group of Black Disciples, except Fullilove, proceeded to apartment No. 23. Defendant knocked on the door, and, subsequently, Car-lisle and Cooper entered the hallway. Carlisle talked with one Black Disciple who was armed. Their conversation deteriorated and Carlisle went back into apartment No. 23. Cooper was shot in the hallway. Armed Black Disciples then entered the apartment and \u201copened fire.\u201d Other Black Disciples, including defendant, fled the schoolhouse and waited outside in a \u201cget-away van.\u201d Defendant called Fullilove and told him to get out of his apartment. As the group fled the scene in the van, defendant collected the weapons and placed them in a paper bag, which he stowed in a grassy area outside town. The melee left three people dead, all of whom had been shot in the head. Another Gangster Disciple, Corey Boey, was injured by multiple gunshots.\nThe jury found defendant guilty, based on accountability, of one count each of aggravated battery with a firearm and attempted first-degree murder and three counts of first-degree murder. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, because defendant was found guilty of murdering more than one victim, the trial court sentenced defendant to mandatory life imprisonment pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1) (c) (ii) of the Unified Code. The trial court found that great bodily injury had been inflicted on Boey and sentenced defendant to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder. The conviction of aggravated battery with a firearm merged into the attempted first-degree murder conviction. Defendant timely appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the multiple-murder sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to an offender convicted under a theory of accountability. Although defendant did not raise this issue below, a constitutional issue may be raised at any time. People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 279-80 (2001).\nOur de novo review begins with the presumption that the statute is constitutional. People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 335 (2002). The party challenging the statute bears the burden of showing its invalidity. People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 501 (1997).\nThe multiple-murder sentencing statute provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:\n(1) for first degree murder,\n>:< * \u2756\n(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment when the death penalty is not imposed if the defendant,\n(ii) *** is found guilty of murdering more than one victim[.]\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141 (a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2000).\nDefendant argues that, when a mandatory life sentence is imposed for a conviction based upon accountability, nobody assesses the seriousness of the defendant\u2019s conduct at any stage, at trial or at sentencing, because intent to promote \u201cany offense\u201d is sufficient for accountability. Defendant asserts that \u201c [satisfying the proportionality requirement necessarily requires that some human being, at some stage in the process, judge the seriousness of what the defendant did, and the likelihood of restoring [him] to useful citizenship.\u201d\nUnder section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 2(c) (West 2000)), which incorporated the long-established \u201ccommon-design rule,\u201d a defendant is \u201clegally accountable for the conduct of another when *** [e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d A defendant\u2019s intent may be inferred from the nature of his or her actions and the circumstances accompanying the criminal conduct.\nUnder the common-design rule, if \u201c \u2018two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338-39 (2000). The word \u201cconduct\u201d encompasses any criminal act done in furtherance of the planned and intended act. People v. Terry, 99 Ill. 2d 508, 515 (1984). Because the underlying intent of the accountability statute incorporates the principle of the common-design rule, even if a misdemeanor was originally intended, the defendant is deemed as guilty as the perpetrator of the ultimate felony offense. See Terry, 99 Ill. 2d at 515.\nDefendant was present at the meeting in which handguns were passed out to some of those present and they were told to \u201chandle the situation\u201d between the Black Disciples and the Gangster Disciples. Defendant was aware that some of the gang members were armed and that they exhibited a penchant for violence. Defendant checked to make sure that some Gangster Disciples were present in apartment No. 23, and he called the apartment and lured one of the members out into the hallway. After the shooting began, defendant ran ahead to the \u201cget-away van,\u201d called Fullilove and warned him to leave the schoolhouse, and then subsequently collected and concealed the weapons that had been used in the shooting. Here, the substantive offense that the group conspired to commit was, at the very least, an act of aggravated intimidation (see 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 6.2 (West 2000)) or aggravated assault (see 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 2 (West 2000)). Each person therefore was responsible for the conduct of the other that was done in furtherance of the intended act. The result of their concerted acts was murder and, under the common-design rule, all are legally accountable for those murders. Thus, defendant is deemed as guilty as the perpetrators of the ultimate offenses.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s contention that the constitution was violated because the seriousness of his conduct and his rehabilitative potential were never considered during sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to natural Ufe under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 1 (West 2000)) because he was convicted of a triple homicide. Article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution requires that criminal penalties be determined in accordance with the seriousness of the crime. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11. However, a defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential need not be given more weight than the severity of the offense. People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206 (1984). The legislature\u2019s discretion necessarily includes the power to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if these mandatory sentences restrict the judiciary\u2019s discretion in imposing sentences. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 208. The legislature is assumed to have considered the relevant factors in establishing sentences, and the resultant scheme is presumptively proper. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206.\nThe provisions in section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(c) for a sentence of natural life imprisonment upon conviction of murdering more than one victim have been held not to infringe unduly upon the judicial power or violate the proportionate penalties clause of our constitution. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 209. Moreover, Illinois courts have upheld section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 against similar constitutional challenges where the defendant was an accomplice to the killer (People v. Driskel, 224 Ill. App. 3d 304, 317 (1991)) and where defendants have been found guilty by accountability. The focus is the nature of the homicides, not the defendant\u2019s role in them. See, e.g., People v. Koger, 287 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766 (1997); People v. Perry, 230 Ill. App. 3d 720, 722 (1992); People v. Foster, 198 Ill. App. 3d 986, 998-99 (1990).\nDefendant claims that Foster, Perry, and Roger were wrongly decided because of their reliance on Taylor. Defendant notes that the constitutional challenge rejected in Taylor had nothing to do with accountability and that the conviction of Dorothy Taylor, one of the defendants, established personal culpability. It is apparent from the facts of the case that Dorothy Taylor did not personally kill the victims, and thus, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, she was found guilty of first-degree murder based upon accountability. However, it makes no difference that the court in Taylor did not address the issue of accountability because it is the nature of the act and not the identity of the actor that permits the sentence. Thus, for sentencing purposes, a defendant found guilty under the common-design rule is deemed as culpable as the principal unless a statutory exception exists or in certain situations where the death penalty is sought. We see no reason to depart from the reasoning of the courts and find that section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 is not unconstitutional under article I, section 11, as applied to those found guilty by accountability.\nDefendant next suggests that People v. Ratzke, 253 Ill. App. 3d 1054 (1993), supports the conclusion that the constitution is violated unless a trial court, after considering a defendant\u2019s relative culpability, has the discretion to impose a natural life sentence under section 5 \u2014 8\u2014l(a)(l)(c)(ii). We agree with the State that defendant\u2019s reliance on Ratzke is misplaced. First, the defendant\u2019s natural life sentence in Ratzke, which arose from a conviction based on the common-design rule, resulted from the trial court\u2019s discretionary finding that the murder committed by the principal was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b) (West 1996)).\nSecond, we never held that the constitution requires the trial court to exercise discretion to consider a defendant\u2019s relative culpability. In fact, we specifically rejected the defendant\u2019s assertion that being convicted under an accountability theory precluded the imposition of a natural life term because the defendant did not possess the requisite mental state for an enhanced penalty. We held that the enhanced penalty of an extended-term sentence may be imposed upon a defendant found guilty based upon an accountability theory because the statutory accountability provisions make a defendant criminally responsible for a wide range of criminal acts and there is no sound reason to differentiate exceptionally brutal or heinous conduct from other conduct for which a participant in a criminal endeavor may be held criminally responsible. Ratzke, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 1066-67.\nRelying on People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194 (1995), and People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281 (1991), defendant last contends that section 5 \u2014 8\u2014l(a)(l)(c)(ii) should be construed as mandatory only \u201cwhen a mental state with respect to the murder[er]s themselves is determined by the trier of fact.\u201d We fail to see the relevance of defendant\u2019s argument. Farmer and Gean involved instances in which the applicable felony statutes appeared to impose absolute liability because they did not require a mental state. The supreme court found that the legislature did not intend to impose absolute liability under the statutes, and the term \u201cknowingly\u201d was read into the text of the statutory offenses. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d at 206-07; Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 288. Here, because an accomplice is legally accountable for the conduct of the person he aids, the mental state of the person he aids may, in essence, be imputed to a defendant convicted under an accountability theory. See Ratzke, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 1065.\nWe note that defendant filed a motion to cite as additional authority People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002), which was published during the pendency of the present appeal. We granted the motion and now address the applicability of Miller to the present case. In Miller, the defendant, a 15-year-old juvenile, was charged with two counts of first-degree murder based upon accountability and was transferred to be prosecuted as an adult. Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of both counts. However, the trial court concluded that the statutorily mandated sentence as applied to the defendant would offend the proportionate penalties clause. The supreme court agreed with the trial court\u2019s judgment. The court found that the convergence of the accountability statute, the transfer statute, and the multiple-murder sentencing statute eliminated the trial court\u2019s ability to consider any mitigating factors, such as the defendant\u2019s age at the time of the crime or his or her individual level of culpability. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. The court concluded that this was particularly harsh and unconstitutional when applied to the 15-year-old juvenile defendant, who had but one minute to contemplate his decision to participate in the incident and stood as a lookout. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. In so holding, the court recognized that its decision was \u201cconsistent with the long-standing distinction made in this state between adult and juvenile offenders.\u201d Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341.\nThe present case does not involve the juvenile transfer rules characterized in Miller. Unlike in Miller, defendant was 19 years of age at the time of the offense, and he was initially prosecuted and convicted as an adult under a theory of accountability. Moreover, in Miller, the defendant had little time to consider his actions and minimally participated in the crime, whereas, in the present case, defendant had time to ponder the consequences of his involvement and intimately participated in the offense. Accordingly, we find Miller inapposite.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEOMETER and KAPALA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Mark G. Levine, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Meg Gorecki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Stephen E. Norris and Trent M. Marshall, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIE C. McCOY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201401\u20140603\nOpinion filed February 25, 2003.\nG. Joseph Weller and Mark G. Levine, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMeg Gorecki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Stephen E. Norris and Trent M. Marshall, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0518-01", "first_page_order": 536, "last_page_order": 543 }