{ "id": 894518, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY R. JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "2003-03-13", "docket_number": "No. 2-01-0777", "first_page": "546", "last_page": "556", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 546" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958193 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "\"The circumstances under which the trier of fact may disregard uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony are severely limited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224780 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5799076 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "merger results in vacation of merged convictions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801356 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314", "parenthetical": "\"Evidentiary errors are harmless if properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant's guilt\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171733 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259041 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "22" }, { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2865248 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 F.3d 1164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10531488 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/33/1164-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 F.3d 502", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1733533 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/189/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 F.3d 78", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1567035 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/156/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "954 F.2d 199", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10517433 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/954/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2656849 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3158554 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864525 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351271 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 951, "char_count": 20792, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.096437504537744e-08, "percentile": 0.4674602650579242 }, "sha256": "2ff5f80d4b4033e3077d5c27bc4c33c77fd144ae7e116e9d9b8c546b9e405397", "simhash": "1:bfbef3f937591564", "word_count": 3427 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:38.563173+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY R. JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Anthony R Jones, was convicted of, inter alia, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24\u2014 1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (West 2000)). He was sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress a statement; (2) the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument improperly highlighted defendant\u2019s failure to testify; (3) the court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence and evidence of unrelated criminal activity; and (4) defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.\nI. FACTS\nDefendant was charged with driving while his license was suspended (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a) (West 2000)), two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(a) (West 2000)), and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.\nIn his motion to suppress, defendant alleged as follows. On August 28, 2000, he was arrested for driving while his license was suspended. He was handcuffed and placed in a police car as the police searched the vehicle that he was driving. The police found a loaded handgun in the glove box. An officer told defendant that he had found a handgun in the vehicle, and defendant replied, \u201cWhy did you go into the locked glove box?\u201d Defendant\u2019s statement was the product of a custodial interrogation. Because defendant had not received Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)), his statement required suppression.\nAt a hearing on the motion, the only witness was William Greenaberg, a Darien police officer. He testified that on August 28, 2000, about 2:42 a.m., he saw a white Ford Probe lacking a rear registration. He effected a traffic stop, and defendant, the driver, was alone in the Probe. Greenaberg asked defendant to produce his driver\u2019s license and insurance card. Defendant \u201cshuffled some papers that were on the passenger\u2019s seat\u201d and said that he could not find them. Defendant gave his name, and Greenaberg found that his license was suspended. Greenaberg arrested defendant and told him that his car would be towed. Defendant \u201casked numerous times to keep the keys to the car\u201d and said that he could have someone pick it up. Greenaberg rejected that option, handcuffed defendant, and placed him in the back of his squad car.\nGreenaberg testified that he and an Officer Foster inventoried the Probe. Foster used the ignition key to unlock the glove box and found a loaded handgun therein. Under the gun was a receipt dated August 19, 2000, with defendant\u2019s name. Greenaberg told defendant that he had \u201clocated a handgun in the car.\u201d Greenaberg\u2019s purpose in so stating was simply to advise defendant of what he had found. In response, defendant asked why Greenaberg \u201cwent into a locked glove box without a search warrant.\u201d At no point was defendant advised of his Miranda rights.\nThe court ruled that, although defendant was in custody, Greenaberg\u2019s statement that he had found a gun was not interrogative. Thus, despite the absence of Miranda warnings, the court determined that defendant\u2019s response was admissible.\nAt trial, the State first called Greenaberg, who testified as he did at the motion hearing but added the following details. He took five seconds to stop his vehicle and walk to the side of the Probe. As he approached, he did not lose sight of defendant\u2019s head and did not detect any movement. He could not see the glove box. When he got to the side of the Probe, defendant\u2019s belt was unfastened and his pants were unbuttoned and unzipped. The key was in the ignition, but the vehicle\u2019s engine was off. When Greenaberg asked for defendant\u2019s license and insurance card, defendant said that the insurance card would be with Vince Williams, the owner of the car. Williams\u2019s name was on a valid temporary registration on the windshield. In looking for his license, defendant did not open the glove box. When Foster first saw the gun, nothing was on top of it. The barrel of the gun was pointing at the passenger side of the car, and the grip was pointing at the passenger seat. No fingerprints were found on the gun. The glove box was not checked for prints.\nThe State next called Mark Reid, who testified that he was in the narcotics unit of the Joliet police department. At a sidebar, defendant objected, asserting that Reid\u2019s testimony was irrelevant and would \u201craise a suspicion of additional crimes.\u201d The court overruled the objection. Reid testified as follows. On November 8, 2000, he and other officers were at a Joliet residence. Defendant was one of two adults in the house. Outside the house were a Cadillac and a white Ford Probe. In a bedroom, Reid found defendant\u2019s Illinois identification card and a set of keys.\nPatrick Cardwell, a Joliet police officer, testified that he was at the residence with Reid and 5 to 10 other officers. Defendant moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Cardwell testified that Reid gave him the keys from the bedroom and that Cardwell used one to access the Probe, which was going to be towed. None of the keys accessed the Cadillac. Cardwell had gotten permission to search both vehicles, but it was not defendant who consented to a search of the Probe. Defendant said that Williams owned the Cadillac but did not say who owned the Probe.\nThe parties stipulated that defendant had been convicted of a felony and had never been issued a firearm owner\u2019s identification card. The State rested, and the court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. Defendant presented no evidence.\nThe court instructed the jury. During his closing argument, the prosecutor made six references to the evidence as \u201cuncontradicted\u201d or \u201cuncontroverted.\u201d The prosecutor then argued:\n\u201c[T]he important thing that was found in the glove box which shows that the defendant had access to it, and control over it, *** is the personal papers inside the glove box for the defendant ***. It is uncontradicted.\u201d\nDefendant objected, asserting that the State was trying to shift the burden of proof \u201cby constantly referring to that.\u201d The court overruled the objection, noting that the jury had been instructed on the burden of proof.\nThe jury found defendant guilty as charged. The court assessed costs for the traffic offense and merged the remaining offenses into one count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, imposing a four-year prison term for that offense. The court denied defendant\u2019s motions for a new trial and for reconsideration of his sentence, and he appealed.\nII. MIRANDA\nFirst, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He asserts that his question to Greenaberg as to why he \u201cwent into a locked glove box\u201d was obtained in violation of Miranda. We disagree.\nOur review of a ruling on a motion to suppress consists of two steps. First, we reverse the trial court\u2019s factual findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Here, the evidence is undisputed, so we may simply proceed to the second step, in which we review de novo the ultimate question of the defendant\u2019s legal challenge to the denial of his motion. See People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001).\nIt is well established that, if a suspect does not receive Miranda warnings, any statements that he makes during a custodial interrogation may not be admitted. People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 206 (1998). Here, it is undisputed that defendant made his statement in custody and without Miranda warnings. Thus, the issue is whether Greenaberg interrogated defendant by advising him that he had \u201clocated a handgun in the car.\u201d\nUnder Miranda, an \u201cinterrogation\u201d refers both to express questioning and to any words or actions, other than those normally accompanying arrest and custody, that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 391-92 (1995). Although Greenaberg testified that he had no intent to elicit such a response, our primary focus is on defendant\u2019s perceptions, not Greenaberg\u2019s intent. See Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d at 392.\nEach party relies on an Illinois case that is clearly distinguishable. Defendant cites People v. Burson, 90 Ill. App. 3d 206 (1980), in which an officer saw the defendant driving when the officer knew that the defendant\u2019s license was revoked. After the defendant parked, the officer told him to enter his squad car. The defendant complied, and the officer said, \u201c \u2018Now, Jerry, you know better than to drive that car.\u2019 \u201d Burson, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 208. The defendant replied, \u201c \u2018Yes, I know but can\u2019t you give me a break?\u2019 \u201d Burson, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 208. The officer arrested the defendant for driving while his license was revoked. The appellate court determined that the officer\u2019s question was interrogative, as it \u201cposited the guilt of the defendant as fact while attempting to elicit comments directed toward why the defendant committed the act.\u201d Burson, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 210.\nThe State relies on People v. Clark, 186 Ill. App. 3d 109 (1989), in which two officers arrested the defendant for disorderly conduct. One of the officers conducted a protective search and found a handgun in the defendant\u2019s pocket. The officer showed the gun to his partner and said, \u201c \u2018Look at this.\u2019 \u201d Clark, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 111. The defendant responded, \u201c T need that for the gangbangers.\u2019 \u201d Clark, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 111. The defendant was arrested for unlawful use of a weapon. The appellate court held that \u201cthe officer\u2019s spontaneous response to the discovery of a weapon\u201d did not constitute an interrogation. Clark, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 113.\nThis case falls squarely between the extremes of Burson and Clark. Here, Greenaberg merely informed defendant of what he had found in the vehicle. He did not posit defendant\u2019s guilt and invite an explanation, as in Burson. However, because Greenaberg had to travel from the Probe to his squad car to convey the information, his statement to defendant was not a spontaneous response to his discovery, as in Clark.\nIn the absence of applicable Illinois authority, we have looked to other jurisdictions and discovered a case that is substantially identical. In United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1992), the defendant was arrested for selling cocaine. He was advised of his Miranda rights, which he invoked. Three agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including Martin, accompanied the defendant as he was driven to the point where he would be turned over to the United States Marshals Service. En route, Martin received a call from an agent who had executed a warrant to search the defendant\u2019s residence. Martin told the defendant, \u201c \u2018They found a gun at your house.\u2019 \u201d Payne, 954 F.2d at 201. The defendant responded, \u201c T just had it for my protection.\u2019 \u201d Payne, 954 F.2d at 201. The defendant was charged with a weapons offense.\nThe defendant argued that Martin\u2019s statement was interrogative. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, disagreed:\n\u201cAs the district court found, Agent Martin\u2019s statement \u2018was not one that sought or required a response.\u2019 Officers \u2018surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions,\u2019 [citation] and we cannot conclude that Agent Martin \u2018should have known\u2019 that her statement, which was the only discussion of the charges or evidence against [the defendant], was \u2018reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.\u2019 [Citation.] Moreover, [the defendant] \u2018was not subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.\u2019 [Citation.] Thus, *** the rather innocuous statement at issue here did not constitute interrogation ***.\u201d Payne, 954 F.2d at 203.\nOther circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, have indicated their agreement with Payne. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 156 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 502, 510 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Moreno-Flores, 33 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1994). None has disagreed.\nIn accordance with this weight of authority, we too follow Payne. Greenaberg\u2019s statement was purely informational. We cannot determine that Greenaberg should have known that the statement was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, as the statement did not seek or require a response at all. Thus, the statement was not interrogative, and the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nIII. THE PROSECUTOR\u2019S CLOSING ARGUMENT\nDefendant argues that, in repeatedly referring to the evidence as \u201cuncontradicted\u201d or \u201cuncontroverted,\u201d the prosecutor impermissibly drew attention to defendant\u2019s failure to testify. We disagree.\nA criminal defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. Thus, the prosecutor may not comment directly or indirectly on the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 156 (1998). That said, the supreme court has determined:\n\u201c[T]he State may comment that evidence is uncontradicted and may do so even if the defendant was the only person who could have provided contrary proof. [Citation.] To put it differently, the State is free to point out what evidence was uncontradicted so long as it expresses no thought about who specifically \u2014 meaning the defendant \u2014 could have done the contradicting. See, e.g., People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 480, 487-88 (involving the comment, \u2018[n]o one else testified\u2019).\u201d People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1995).\nThe trial court has discretion to determine the character, scope, and prejudicial effect of closing arguments, and improper remarks warrant reversal only if they cause the defendant substantial prejudice. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 151-52.\nHere, as in Keene, the State \u201ckept its remarks to the \u2018what\u2019 of the evidence uncontradicted.\u201d Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 22. The prosecutor\u2019s final reference, which elicited defendant\u2019s cumulative objection, was typical. The prosecutor simply stated that it was uncontradicted that the glove box contained defendant\u2019s \u201cpersonal papers.\u201d He \u201cdid not stray into the \u2018who\u2019 of the issue.\u201d Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 23. Thus, defendant\u2019s argument fails.\nIV IMPROPER EVIDENCE\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Reid\u2019s and Cardwell\u2019s testimony. Specifically, he asserts that (1) the testimony connecting defendant to the Probe in November was irrelevant; and (2) the testimony about the circumstances of the officers\u2019 presence at the residence injected evidence of another crime.\nA. Relevance\nEvidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make more or less probable the existence of any material fact. We may reverse a trial court\u2019s determination of relevance only if the court abused its discretion. People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455 (2001).\nDefendant contends that the testimony suggesting that he possessed a key to the Probe in November was irrelevant to the fact in dispute: \u201cdefendant\u2019s alleged knowledge of the presence of a weapon in the locked glove box at the time of the arrest.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) However, the trial court did not err in deeming the testimony relevant to that issue.\nDefendant\u2019s theory was that he did not know what was in the glove box because he did not own the car. That theory could succeed, however, only if defendant also was not a regular driver of the car. When Reid and Cardwell raised the inference that defendant retained a key to the car in November, they made it much more probable that defendant was a regular driver of the car and thus was aware of what it contained in August. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.\nB. Other Crimes\nEvidence of other crimes is admissible for any purpose other than to show a defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime, and only if its probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. Again, we may reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on the admissibility of such evidence only if the court abused its discretion. People v. Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d 793, 796-97 (2001).\nDefendant contends that, when Reid testified that he was a narcotics officer who searched a bedroom and when Cardwell testified that 5 to 10 officers were at the residence, the State \u201cstrongly suggested that [defendant] was involved in criminal drug activity.\u201d We agree.\nThe State does not submit a legitimate purpose for this evidence, but it asserts that the evidence did not show a propensity to commit a crime. It first claims that \u201c[t]he simple fact that one of the officers was in the narcotics unit is insufficient for the jury to conclude that the officers were there to investigate drug activity.\u201d We deem that claim disingenuous. When a narcotics officer conducts a search of a residence, the clear inference is that he is searching for evidence of a narcotics offense.\nThe State further asserts that, because the officers did not testify that they actually found such evidence or that defendant was arrested, \u201cthe jury could have reasonably been left with the impression that the officers found nothing relating to criminal activity at the house or even that the officers searched the wrong house.\u201d We deem that unlikely, but the State misses the point. No matter what the officers found, the evidence strongly implied that defendant had at least a propensity to commit a crime. Thus, as the evidence had no legitimate purpose, the trial court erred in admitting it. Nevertheless, we determine that the error is not reversible because, as we will explain, the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt is overwhelming. See People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 314 (1997) (\u201cEvidentiary errors are harmless if properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant\u2019s guilt\u201d).\nV SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE\nDefendant challenges the evidence of his four original weapons convictions. However, because those convictions merged into one conviction of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, we need address only the evidence of that offense. See People v. Kargol, 219 Ill. App. 3d 66, 75 (1991) (merger results in vacation of merged convictions).\nIn evaluating an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not retry the case. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Instead, we defer to the jury\u2019s determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1991). We must deem the evidence sufficient if, viewing it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 265-66 (2000).\nAs we noted, defendant was ultimately convicted of only one count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. As that crime was charged, the element in dispute was that defendant \u201cknowingly\u201d carried a firearm in a vehicle. 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.6(a)(1) (West 2000). Defendant\u2019s specific contention is that the evidence did not establish that he knew of the handgun in the glove box. However, as we indicated above, we find that evidence overwhelming.\nThe evidence was undisputed, and the jury had no basis to disregard it. See People v. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723 (1993) (\u201cThe circumstances under which the trier of fact may disregard uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony are severely limited\u201d). In looking for his driver\u2019s license and insurance card, defendant did not open the glove box. The vehicle\u2019s engine was off, and defendant repeatedly resisted giving Greenaberg the key. That key was used to open the glove box, and therein the handgun was resting uncovered atop a receipt bearing defendant\u2019s name. Greenaberg told defendant that he had found a gun, and defendant replied by asking why the officer had opened the glove box.\nDefendant\u2019s knowledge of the gun was strongly suggested by his avoidance of the glove box, his withholding of the key, and the presence of the gun atop defendant\u2019s receipt. Most damagingly, however, defendant admitted to Greenaberg that he knew the location of the gun. In sum, this evidence was not only sufficient to establish defendant\u2019s guilt; by any definition, it was overwhelming.\nVI. CONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHUTCHINSON, EJ., and McLAEEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Timothy P. King, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Daniel N. Malato, of Cary, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY R. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201401\u20140777\nOpinion filed March 13, 2003.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Timothy P. King, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Daniel N. Malato, of Cary, for the People." }, "file_name": "0546-01", "first_page_order": 564, "last_page_order": 574 }