{ "id": 894498, "name": "JANET MULL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE KANE COUNTY FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Mull v. Kane County Forest Preserve District", "decision_date": "2003-03-10", "docket_number": "No. 2-02-0283", "first_page": "589", "last_page": "593", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 589" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381899 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 1098", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260440 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1101" }, { "page": "1101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/1098-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229713 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472428 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-04" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477039 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260391 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0865-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 557, "char_count": 9570, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.95887501656537e-08, "percentile": 0.5016352304709657 }, "sha256": "62771706ceb00a2370ef128feab51a48d5ea066ed9a8853a76ca789c77efd60b", "simhash": "1:97f75b072b4838f6", "word_count": 1583 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:38.563173+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JANET MULL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE KANE COUNTY FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, the Kane County Forest Preserve District (forest preserve), appeals the jury verdict finding the forest preserve liable for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff, Janet Mull, when she fell while riding on the forest preserve\u2019s bike trail. We reverse.\nThe following facts are taken from the record. During the afternoon of September 6, 1999, plaintiff fell from her bicycle after encountering a rut in the Great Western Trail, a path that traverses 17 miles of the forest preserve. The rut was located about 50 yards west of the Hidden Oaks Bridge. Plaintiff sustained injuries due to the fall.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant wantonly and wilfully breached its duty by, inter alia, failing to remedy the dangerous condition on the Great Western Trail. Defendant filed an affirmative defense and motion for summary judgment claiming absolute immunity under section 3 \u2014 107 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (745 ILCS 10/ 3 \u2014 107(a), (b) (West 1998)). The trial court granted plaintiffs motion to strike and dismiss defendant\u2019s affirmative defense and denied defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for a finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308, permitting an interlocutory appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308. However, this court denied defendant\u2019s permissive interlocutory appeal. The matter then proceeded to trial.\nAt trial, plaintiff testified that she was a regular rider on the path, riding once or twice a week, and that she was aware of the ruts in the path. At the time of her fall, she was not distracted and was looking straight ahead, but she forgot that the ruts were present.\nPlaintiff and her husband testified as to the nature and extent of plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiff suffered injuries to her shoulder, collar bone, arm, elbow, and knee. Dr. Jeffrey Grosskopf, plaintiffs physician, testified by deposition that plaintiff was beginning to heal after about six weeks but may continue to experience pain while performing certain activities. Dr. Charles Carroll, an orthopaedic surgeon, testified by deposition that, during plaintiffs last visit, she felt some pain and suffered from delayed healing.\nDr. Richard Olsen, a regular rider on the bike path, testified that three weeks before plaintiffs fall, his wife fell while riding on the path and Olsen called defendant and reported the incident and the condition of the path.\nJohn Duerr, defendant\u2019s director of resources, testified that, before plaintiffs fall, a friend had told him about the ruts in the path.\nDavid Perfect, defendant\u2019s operations supervisor, testified that he knew of no complaints of accidents caused by the condition of the path prior to plaintiffs fall.\nFinally, Eric Siegmeier, defendant\u2019s trail tradesman, testified that he maintained approximately 85 miles of the path and had graded the gravel and limestone path around Labor Day, a few days before plaintiffs fall.\nAfter deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.). This timely appeal followed.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment, striking its affirmative defense, and denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. Defendant claims that it is entitled to immunity under section 3 \u2014 107(a) and section 3 \u2014 107(b) of the Act.\nWe first note the general rule that a denied motion for summary judgment merges into the judgment entered at trial so that the order is not appealable. See Elane v. St. Bernard Hospital, 284 Ill. App. 3d 865, 869 (1996). Therefore, we will review only the trial court\u2019s decision to deny defendant\u2019s motion for judgment n.o.v. We will review this decision de novo. Evans v. Shannon, 201 Ill. 2d 424, 427 (2002).\nDefendant argues that the Act provides immunity for this type of cause of action. We agree.\nWhen interpreting a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language of the statute, which is \u201cthe most reliable indicator of the legislature\u2019s objectives in enacting a particular law.\u201d Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. Statutory language is to be given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. Thompson v. Village of Newark, 329 Ill. App. 3d 536, 540 (2002). We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).\nSection 3 \u2014 107 of the Act relieves a public entity from liability for injuries caused by the condition of access roads and trails. This section provides:\n\u201cNeither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a condition of: (a) Any road which provides access to fishing, hunting, or primitive camping, recreational, or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city, town or village street, (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) a township or other road district highway, (b) Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 107 (West 1998).\nIn our view, section 3 \u2014 107(b) applies here and provides immunity to defendant. The plain and ordinary meaning of a trail is a \u201cmarked path through a forest or mountainous region.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2423 (1993). In Brown v. Cook County Forest Preserve, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1098 (1996), the Appellate Court, First District, applied this definition in a situation similar to the case at bar. In Brown, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Cook County Forest Preserve where the plaintiff fell while riding her bike on a bicycle path. The bicycle path was paved, the land surrounding the path was wooded and undeveloped, and the path provided access to the wooded areas around a lake. However, a highway and a guardrail ran alongside the path. Brown, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 1099. The court held that, because the path was commonly used by bicyclists and was designed to provide access to natural areas around the lake, the path was a \u201criding trail\u201d within the meaning of section 3 \u2014 107(b) of the Act. Brown, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. According to the court, the fact that the path was paved was irrelevant. Brown, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 1101.\nThe case at bar is materially similar to Brown. It is undisputed that the trail at issue here is used as a riding path. It traverses Kane County Forest Preserve for approximately 17 miles and provides access to forests. We recognize that the trail runs through some developed areas, but it is surrounded by wild grasses and shrubs. Further, the nature of the land next to the trail should not determine immunity. If it did, immunity and nonimmunity could vary depending on an adjacent landowner\u2019s decision to develop or not develop his land. We do not believe immunity should be based on decisions made solely by private landowners.\nAlso, contrary to plaintiffs contention, the fact that the trail in this case was adjacent to a road is not dispositive. Plaintiff ignores that the trail in Brown was adjacent to a highway and, unlike the trail at bar here, the Brown trail was paved. The trail here is even less developed than the Brown trail because it is not paved but covered with gravel and asphalt. Therefore, we determine that the trail at issue here, like the trail in Brown, is a \u201ctrail\u201d within the meaning of section 3 \u2014 107(b) of the Act.\nThe plaintiff cites Goodwin v. Carbondale Park District, 268 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1994), to support her position that the trail at issue is not a \u201ctrail.\u201d However, Goodwin is distinguishable from this case because the trail in Goodwin was located in a developed city park (Goodwin, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 490), whereas the trail in this case is surrounded by wooded or undeveloped land and runs through a forest preserve. Thus, Goodwin is not controlling here.\nIn addition, we reject plaintiffs contention that the trail at issue cannot be considered a \u201ctrail\u201d because the entrance to a subdivision is located near the path. If we accepted plaintiffs interpretation, immunity could be lost if a neighboring landowner decided to develop his property. We do not believe the legislature intended immunity to be based on the actions of a property owner different from the public entity in question.\nAccordingly, the record establishes that the trail at issue is a trail within the meaning of the Act and, thus, defendant is immune from this cause of action. Thus, the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion for judgment n.o.v.\nBecause we have determined that defendant is immune under section 3 \u2014 107(b) of the Act, we need not address defendant\u2019s other arguments regarding immunity under section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Act, the \u201copen and obvious danger\u201d doctrine, and certain alleged trial errors.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.\nReversed.\nGEOMETER and KAPALA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patrick M. Kinnally and Matthew J. Herman, both of Kinnally, Krentz, Loran, Hodge & Herman, P.C., of Aurora, for appellant.", "Lawrence D. Wechter, of Law Office of Larry Wechter, of Geneva, and Stephen M. Jacobs, of Shaw, Jacobs & Associates, P.C., of St. Charles, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JANET MULL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE KANE COUNTY FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201402\u20140283\nOpinion filed March 10, 2003.\nPatrick M. Kinnally and Matthew J. Herman, both of Kinnally, Krentz, Loran, Hodge & Herman, P.C., of Aurora, for appellant.\nLawrence D. Wechter, of Law Office of Larry Wechter, of Geneva, and Stephen M. Jacobs, of Shaw, Jacobs & Associates, P.C., of St. Charles, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0589-01", "first_page_order": 607, "last_page_order": 611 }