{ "id": 894533, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA M. CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Crawford", "decision_date": "2003-03-20", "docket_number": "No. 4-01-0478", "first_page": "624", "last_page": "629", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 624" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "672 P.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10420750 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "action is \"pending\" after it is commenced by either filing a complaint or serving a summons" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/672/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 F. Supp. 1451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3992939 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1452-53", "parenthetical": "grand jury proceeding not \"pending\" until it has actually begun" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/652/1451-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 N.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2624145 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536-37" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462689 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0232-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 570, "char_count": 10255, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.03156400238006154 }, "sha256": "8f59fdc33b194eadf7b1a9cbe19bb28db4fac857fb36aeede0dd9799449c26f7", "simhash": "1:bc3aef3dbbc7dc83", "word_count": 1689 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:38.563173+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA M. CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Linda M. Crawford, was charged with harassment of a witness pursuant to section 32 \u2014 4a(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a)(2) (West 2000)) and convicted after a bench trial. The trial court sentenced her to 24 months\u2019 probation. Defendant appeals, contending the State failed to prove she harassed anyone who was a witness, or who might have been expected to serve as a witness, in a pending legal proceeding. We disagree and affirm.\nThe facts are not in dispute. A 14-year-old girl, Stevie M., awoke on October 14, 2000, believing someone was in her bed. She felt an object enter her vagina. She rolled away and turned and saw David Crawford leaving her bedroom.\nTwo days later she reported the sexual assault to her mother, Sherry. Sometime later during the month of October, Sherry accompanied her daughter, Stevie M., to the police station, where Stevie M. made a complaint about the incident to a City of Decatur police officer, Jeremy Welker. On November 9, 2000, David Crawford learned from the police Stevie M. had made a complaint against him for the sexual assault.\nOn that same date, he told the defendant, who is his sister, and other family members about the complaint. Thereafter, on the same date, defendant and Nicole McKinnon went to Sherry\u2019s residence, where defendant threatened physical harm to Sherry if she did not stop talking about the incident. Defendant later admitted to Officer Welker that she told Sherry to keep her mouth shut about the investigation of David Crawford, stating, \u201cIf it was your brother, you would try to get them to keep their mouth shut too.\u201d\nThere were disputes at trial about what was said and whether Sherry would fit the definition of \u201ca witness,\u201d given that Stevie M. was the complainant. However, the trial court resolved the factual disputes, applied the statute, and concluded (1) the State proved defendant communicated a threat to Sherry, (2) the threat was directly related to the charges pending against defendant\u2019s brother, and (3) as the mother of a 14-year-old who has made a complaint of molestation, Sherry might well be a witness.\nOn appeal, defendant abandons the arguments made to the trial court and essentially acquiesces in the trial court\u2019s assessment of the evidence. The issue now presented \u2014 for the first time \u2014 is whether an essential element of the statute was proved \u2014 that is, was a legal proceeding pending?\nWhen defendant made the threat to Sherry, David Crawford had been interviewed by the police, but he had not been arrested. He was first charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault by indictment on November 21, 2000 \u2014 some 12 days after defendant threatened Sherry.\nSection 32 \u2014 4a(a) of the Code provides as follows:\n\u201cHarassment of representatives for the child, jurors, witnesses [,] and family members of representatives for the child, jurors, and witnesses.\n(a) A person who, with intent to harass or annoy one who has served or is serving or who is a family member of a person who has served or is serving (1) as a juror because of the verdict returned by the jury in a pending legal proceeding or the participation of the juror in the verdict or (2) as a witness, or who may be expected to serve as a witness in a pending legal proceeding, because of the testimony or potential testimony of the witness, communicates directly or indirectly with the juror, witness, or family member of a juror or witness in such manner as to produce mental anguish or emotional distress or who conveys a threat of injury or damage to the property or person of any juror, witness, or family member of the juror or witness commits a Class 2 felony.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a) (West 2000).\nThis case focuses our attention on the phrase \u201cpending legal proceeding\u201d in section 32 \u2014 4a(a)(2) (720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a)(2) (West 2000)). Defendant contends the phrase \u201cpending legal proceeding\u201d must mean an active judicial proceeding, which begins with the filing of formal charges against a criminal defendant. Because no formal charges had been filed against David Crawford, no legal proceeding was pending. The State argues a pending legal proceeding, for the purposes of this statute, began when Stevie M. and her mother reported the sex crime to the police and the police began their investigation, which culminated in the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of David Crawford.\nDefendant relies on the definition of \u201cprosecution\u201d to bolster her position. Section 2 \u2014 16 of the Code provides: \u201c \u2018Prosecution\u2019 means all legal proceedings by which a person\u2019s liability for an offense is determined, commencing with the return of the indictment or the issuance of the information, and including the final disposition of the case upon appeal.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 16 (West 2000).\nThe defendant\u2019s reliance on this definition is misplaced. The word \u201cprosecution\u201d does not appear in section 32 \u2014 4a(a) of the Code, nor does the statute contain the phrase \u201cany matter pending in any court\u201d \u2014 the phrase found in the statute that prohibits communicating with jurors or witnesses. 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4 (West 2000). This suggests \u201cpending legal proceeding\u201d is not limited to a prosecution, and it need not be a matter already pending in court.\nThe purpose of the statute is to prevent a witness \u2014 or someone who may be expected to be a witness \u2014 from being harassed or threatened. Defendant\u2019s reading of the statute would permit someone to threaten a witness to a crime to discourage them from testifying as long as the threat is conveyed before a criminal charge is filed. We do not believe the legislature intended to provide a window of opportunity for miscreants to threaten or harass a witness after the witness has lodged a complaint with the police but before the criminal prosecution begins.\nA criminal investigation is a pending legal proceeding within the context of section 32 \u2014 4a(a)(2) of the Code. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute and lead to an absurd result.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s decision, to wit, that the term \u201cpending legal proceeding\u201d in section 32 \u2014 4a(a) includes a police report or even a police contact. Defendant threatened Sherry after Sherry complained to the police and the police interrogated David Crawford but before the filing of a formal charge or even an arrest.\nUnless the statute says otherwise, we must give words and phrases in the statute their common, ordinary meaning. People v. Laws, 200 Ill. App. 3d 232, 236, 558 N.E.2d 638, 640 (1990). Section 32 \u2014 4a(a) does not specifically define \u201cpending legal proceeding\u201d; therefore, we must give the phrase its common, ordinary meaning. \u201cLegal proceedings\u201d are \u201cproceeding^] *** instituted in a court or tribunal.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 906 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, a police investigation is not a \u201clegal proceeding.\u201d \u201cPending\u201d means \u201cRemaining undecided; awaiting decision.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1154 (7th ed. 1999). When defendant threatened her, Sherry was not \u201cexpected to serve as a witness in a pending legal proceeding\u201d (see 720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 4a(a) (West 2000)), because there was no \u201cpending legal proceeding\u201d at the time.\nWhile arising in a different context, the term \u201cpending court proceedings\u201d was defined in People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger, 30 Ill. App. 3d 525, 332 N.E.2d 649 (1975). There, the defendants were charged with a violation of \u201cAn Act in relation to Meetings\u201d (the Open Meetings Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 102, par. 42) for their participation in a closed meeting to discuss with the city council committee, its attorney, and others, the subject of contemplated litigation, to wit, annexation of land. The court there said:\n\u201cWe must agree with defendants\u2019 contention that \u2018pending\u2019 cannot be reasonably interpreted to include preliminary discussion with an attorney to secure advice on either the bringing of suit or the defense of a suit which is either threatened or likely to be brought against the city. *** The traditional concept of litigation begins in terms of \u2018notice, pleading, trial[,] and appeal\u2019 [citation], and presumably it is at that point that the litigation is \u2018pending.\u2019 \u201d Barger, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 536-37, 332 N.E.2d at 659.\nCf. United States v. Ellis, 652 F. Supp. 1451, 1452-53 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (grand jury proceeding not \u201cpending\u201d until it has actually begun); Johnson v. McCaughan, Carter & Scharrer, 672 P.2d 221, 222 (Colo. App. 1983) (action is \u201cpending\u201d after it is commenced by either filing a complaint or serving a summons).\nThese facts disclose a pending citizen complaint to the police, not a pending legal proceeding. The majority reads into the definition of the statutory term at issue the possibility of a legal proceeding. What if the police were investigating a complaint and, during the investigation, someone threatened a potential witness, but the State nevertheless determined, after the threat, that it would not prosecute because the complaint was ill-founded? The majority\u2019s unwarranted expansion of the statute\u2019s plain and ordinary meaning would make it applicable to such conduct.\nI agree with the majority that miscreants should not be allowed to threaten or harass a witness \u2014 either prior to or after such a witness lodges a complaint with the police. Such conduct is properly prosecuted as the offense of intimidation. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 6 (West 2000). That is what this defendant did, on these facts, and she should have been charged with and prosecuted for that offense, not for harassing a witness. I would reverse her conviction for harassment of a witness, an offense that is patently inapplicable to her case.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Susan M. Wilham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Scott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA M. CRAWFORD, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201401\u20140478\nOpinion filed March 20, 2003.\nAPPLETON, J., dissenting.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Susan M. Wilham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nScott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0624-01", "first_page_order": 642, "last_page_order": 647 }