{ "id": 894537, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUDI L. MARCOTTE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Marcotte", "decision_date": "2003-04-22", "docket_number": "No. 3-02-0238", "first_page": "798", "last_page": "805", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 798" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249207 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 1032", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5246026 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725091 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "self-serving hearsay statement rejected as proof that transaction was loan" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2744544 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "self-serving hearsay statement rejected as proof that transaction was loan" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "cause of death established by hearsay testimony of coroner's physician" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "404 Ill. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5308647 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "cause of death established by hearsay testimony of coroner's physician" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/404/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573752 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "765 N.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183369 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576671 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544445 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 1175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29942 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0209-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 599, "char_count": 13449, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.253930028742345e-08, "percentile": 0.43248660443137804 }, "sha256": "5456ac9719212807f61c44c18cbccc1b48771c42e0cff7f8f1a74a67a3ec1cb5", "simhash": "1:ab22390d72618293", "word_count": 2242 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:38.563173+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUDI L. MARCOTTE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the defendant, Judi L. Marcotte, was found guilty of disorderly conduct by knowingly transmitting a false report of the sexual abuse of a child to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) (720 ILCS 5/26 \u2014 1(a)(7) (West 1998)). On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe record of the trial in this case consists of a certified bystander\u2019s report.\nAt trial, Detective Gregory Kunce of the Bourbonnais police department testified for the State. He stated that he investigated an anonymous telephone call placed to the DCFS \u201chotline\u201d on September 3, 1999, alleging that a five-year-old child had been sexually abused at the Fortin Villa Daycare Center (Fortin Villa) in Bourbonnais. Kunce said that he assisted in interviewing the child and determined that the child had not been abused.\nThe officer testified that the child\u2019s mother, Rachel Gagnon, told him about a conversation that Gagnon had with Gina Blanchette in August 1999. In that conversation, Blanchette said that the defendant had told her during a phone conversation that DCFS was investigating Fortin Villa. At trial, the defendant objected that the officer\u2019s testimony was hearsay. The court overruled the defendant\u2019s objection and admitted the testimony for the purpose of establishing Kunce\u2019s investigation.\nKunce said that he went to the defendant\u2019s home to interview the defendant concerning Gagnon\u2019s statement. During this interview, the defendant denied contacting DCFS. Kunce stated that during the interview, the defendant\u2019s answers were short and vague. While at her home, Kunce noted that the defendant provided daycare. He observed other parents coming and going from the residence.\nKunce testified that the defendant phoned him at the police station \u201ca day or so after\u201d he interviewed her at her home. In response to one of Kunce\u2019s questions, the defendant said that if a telephone call was made to DCFS from her home, it was not made by her. She suggested that such a call may have been made by Blanchette because Blanchette had access to the defendant\u2019s home and telephone. Blanchette testified that at one time the defendant provided childcare for Blanchette\u2019s child.\nKunce initiated a second telephone conversation with the defendant during her daycare business hours. He told the defendant that he had a copy of her telephone records which showed that the call to DCFS originated from her telephone number. On cross-examination, Kunce said that, contrary to what he told the defendant, her phone records did not show a call from her home to DCFS. He submitted that \u201c1-800\u201d numbers could not be traced. Kunce stated that he did not obtain a copy of the DCFS \u201chotline\u201d tape of the phone call \u201cor any other verbal evidence or telephone documentation pertaining to the alleged complaint to DCFS.\u201d\nKunce submitted that this second phone conversation with the defendant lasted approximately 45 minutes. He said that in response to his last question to her she said, \u201cyes[,] I did it.\u201d According to Kunce, he then told the defendant that he was going to arrest her. On cross-examination, Kunce stated that he did not remember the exact words that the defendant used in her \u201cclaimed \u2018admission,\u2019 \u201d but she used words similar to those he used in his previous testimony.\nBlanchette testified for the State. She said that during a phone conversation she initiated with the defendant in August 1999, the defendant told Blanchette that the defendant heard a rumor that DCFS was investigating Fortin Villa. Blanchette said that she later called Gagnon and Diana Parker, the director of Fortin Villa, and told them of the rumor. During cross-examination, Blanchette stated that she did not know who called DCFS. She submitted that she did not call DCFS.\nParker testified that Kunce investigated the child abuse claim. She, however, did not recall a phone call regarding the rumor that DCFS was investigating Fortin Villa.\nThe defendant took the witness stand in her own defense. She testified that she was a licensed daycare provider since 1998. The defendant contended that she never made any contact with DCFS regarding an alleged sexual abuse incident at Fortin Villa. She submitted that she did not admit to Kunce that she made such a phone call to DCFS.\nThe defendant stated that the second phone conversation with Kunce took place while she was providing childcare, when she was tired, and when a speech therapist was at her home working with her child. When she told Kunce that her phone conversation with him was going on too long, Kunce told her that it would be against the law for her to hang up on him. The defendant testified that out of her exasperation over the length of the call and because of Kunce\u2019s persistence, she sarcastically told Kunce, \u201cYes[,] I made a phone call, yeah whatever\u201d in order to end the call. She submitted that the phone conversation with Kunce lasted approximately IV2 hours.\nThe defendant testified that her August 1999 phone conversation with Blanchette involved \u201cvague gossip\u201d the defendant had heard concerning Fortin Villa. She stated that she later called Parker at For-tin Villa and told Parker that she did not make the alleged call to DCFS.\nAt the conclusion of the trial, the court found the defendant guilty. The bystander\u2019s report states, \u201cThe Court believed that [the defendant] was not credible.\u201d\nThe court sentenced the defendant to 12 months of conditional discharge, a $300 fine, and 60 hours of public service. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the court\u2019s finding and sentence. In her motion, the defendant argued that the State failed to prove the elements of the offense. Her motion was denied and she appealed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nReasonable Doubt\nThe defendant argues that the State did not prove the elements of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.\nA person commits disorderly conduct when she knowingly transmits a false report of child abuse to DCFS. 720 ILCS 5/26\u2014 1(a)(7) (West 1998).\nWhen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will reverse a defendant\u2019s conviction only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational finder of fact could have found the crime to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 761 N.E.2d 1175 (2001).\n1. Admission\nThe defendant submits that the State\u2019s only evidence of her guilt was her statement that she made the call to DCFS, which she claims was not an admission, but instead was a sarcastic remark.\nWhen presented with conflicting versions of events, the trier of fact is entitled to choose between those versions. The fact finder need not accept the defendant\u2019s version of events. It is not the role of an appellate court to second-guess the verdict or to retry the defendant. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 761 N.E.2d 1175.\nIn this case, the judge, as trier of fact in a bench trial, was not required to accept the defendant\u2019s version of events. The bystander\u2019s report specifically stated that the judge did not find the defendant\u2019s testimony to be credible. The judge was entitled to choose Kunce\u2019s version of events over the defendant\u2019s version. A rational trier of fact could have inferred that the defendant admitted to Kunce that she made the call to DCFS.\n2. Corpus Delicti\nThe defendant submits that assuming, arguendo, she admitted to Kunce that she made the phone call, the corpus delicti of the crime cannot be proved on the basis of her admission alone. The defendant contends that the State failed to produce independent evidence of the phone call.\nThe corpus delicti of a crime has two components: (1) proof of the occurrence of the harm, and (2) that the harm was caused by criminal conduct. Proof of the corpus delicti may not depend exclusively on a defendant\u2019s extrajudicial confession, admission, or other statement. The defendant\u2019s statement must be corroborated with independent evidence which tends to show that the offense occurred. People v. Wright, 286 Ill. App. 3d 456, 677 N.E.2d 494 (1997). To establish the corpus delicti, the independent evidence need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed. People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 563 N.E.2d 421 (1990).\nHearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Doyle, 328 Ill. App. 3d 1, 765 N.E.2d 85 (2002). Failure to object to hearsay during the trial allows such evidence to be considered by the trier of fact and to be given its natural probative effect. People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 563 N.E.2d 431 (1990). The probative effect of such hearsay may range from being given full weight (see Town of Cicero v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 404 Ill. 487, 89 N.E.2d 354 (1949) (cause of death established by hearsay testimony of coroner\u2019s physician)), to no weight (see First National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford v. Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford, 19 Ill. 2d 385, 167 N.E.2d 223 (1960) (self-serving hearsay statement rejected as proof that transaction was loan)).\nHere, Kunce testified that he was investigating a phone call to DCFS that a child had been sexually abused at Fortin Villa. According to the bystander\u2019s report, the defendant did not object to the admission of Kunce\u2019s statement in evidence.\nKunce\u2019s statement consisted of two assertions: (1) that DCFS received the phone call, and (2) that he was investigating that phone call. Kunce\u2019s assertion that DCFS received the phone call was a statement by DCFS, made out of court, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the statement was hearsay.\nThe defendant, however, did not object to Kunce\u2019s statement as hearsay, or on any other grounds, either in court or in her posttrial motion. Because the defendant did not object to its admission, Kunce\u2019s assertion that DCFS received the call could be considered by the judge and given its natural probative effect. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the statement of a police officer that he was investigating a phone call received by a state agency should be given less than its full probative weight.\nThe defendant is incorrect that the State failed to produce evidence independent of her admission that she made the phone call. A trier of fact reasonably could have concluded that the defendant\u2019s admission was corroborated by Kunce\u2019s assertion that DCFS had received such a call.\n3. Knowledge\nOn rehearing, the defendant argues that the State did not prove she knew the report was false at the time of its transmission. She contends that the evidence only showed she admitted making a report that was found to be unsubstantiated following Kunce\u2019s investigation.\nThe knowledge element of a crime rarely can be proved by direct evidence. People v. Sanchez, 292 Ill. App. 3d 763, 686 N.E.2d 367 (1997). The knowledge element ordinarily is inferred from circumstantial evidence. People v. Price, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 589 N.E.2d 192 (1992); People v. Holt, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 649 N.E.2d 571 (1995). Determining whether a defendant acted with the requisite state of mind is for the trier of fact. When facts in a case give rise to more than one inference, a reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the trier of fact, unless that judgment was inherently implausible or unreasonable. Price, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 589 N.E.2d 192.\nIn the present case, the defendant initially denied to Kunce that she called DCFS. Later, she admitted to Kunce that she made the call, but she did not protest that the call was made in good faith, i.e., that she believed the statement to be true. On the witness stand, when given an opportunity to assert a claim that she believed the statement to be true, the defendant instead claimed that her statement to Kunce was not an admission, but was a sarcastic remark. From this circumstantial evidence, a rational trier of fact could have inferred that the defendant knew the report was false at the time of its transmission. Since the judge found the defendant had in fact made the call, it was not unreasonable for the judge to infer from the defendant\u2019s failure to claim that the call was made in good faith that the defendant knew the report was false at the time of the transgression. We will not substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trier of fact because it is not inherently implausible or unreasonable to infer that the defendant knew that her report was false.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nTaking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the elements of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Kankakee County circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nSLATER and LYTTON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dan J. Hofmeister, Jr., David M. Lavin, and Kevin D. Tessier, all of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, and Kurt T. Temple, of Quarles & Brady, L.L.C., both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward D. Smith, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUDI L. MARCOTTE, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201402\u20140238\nOpinion filed April 22, 2003.\nDan J. Hofmeister, Jr., David M. Lavin, and Kevin D. Tessier, all of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg, and Kurt T. Temple, of Quarles & Brady, L.L.C., both of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward D. Smith, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0798-01", "first_page_order": 816, "last_page_order": 823 }