{
  "id": 894463,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST SHIELDS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Shields",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:38.563173+00:00",
  "provenance": {
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST SHIELDS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Ernest Shields was found guilty of two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant only challenges the two convictions for aggravated unlawful use of weapon, arguing that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the reasons set forth below, we reverse the convictions for the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. We will not disturb defendant\u2019s conviction for the unlawful use of weapon by a felon as it is not raised on appeal.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 3, 2001, defendant was pulled over by the police for a traffic violation, ordered out of the car and searched by the police. The officer found a .25-caliber bullet in defendant\u2019s right pants\u2019 pocket. The police then conducted a search of the car and found another .25-caliber bullet in an open compartment on the driver\u2019s door. Defendant was arrested.\nThe police then conducted an inventory search of the car. Under the hood of the car, the police officer found a woman\u2019s glove next to the battery. Inside the glove, the police found a .25-caliber handgun. Defendant was charged with the said crimes.\nANALYSIS\nIn this case, defendant argues that he was not guilty of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon because the weapon was not \u201cimmediately accessible\u201d to him. Defendant was convicted of the following offenses: (1) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, in that defendant, as a convicted felon, knowingly carried a firearm in a vehicle and the firearm was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible at the time of the offense in violation of section 24\u2014 1.6(a)(1) (3)(A) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.6 (a)(1)(3)(A) (West 2000)); (2) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, in that defendant, as a convicted felon, knowingly carried or possessed on or about his person, a firearm, upon a public street in the City of Chicago and the firearm was uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible at the time of the offense in violation of Criminal Code section 24 \u2014 1.6(a)(2)(3)(A) (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.6(a)(2)(3)(A) (West 2000)); (3) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, in that defendant, as a convicted felon, knowingly possessed on or about his person a handgun in violation of Criminal Code section 24 \u2014 1.1(a) (720 ILCS 5/24\u2014 1.1(a) (West 2000)); and (4) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, in that defendant, as a convicted felon, knowingly possessed on or about his person firearm ammunition in violation of Criminal Code section 24 \u2014 1.1(a) (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(a) (West 2000)).\nAccessibility refers to the proximity of the weapon to the defendant and the capability of the defendant to reach the weapon. In other words, a weapon is \u201cimmediately accessible\u201d if it is within \u201ceasy reach\u201d of the defendant. People v. Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d 881, 884 (1996).\nIn this case, defendant was inside the car when he was curbed by the police. In order for defendant to reach for the gun, he would need to stop the car, release the locking mechanism inside the car, open the door, run up to the front of the car, find the latch and release it, then reach inside the engine compartment to take the glove out. With all of these steps involved, it is difficult to conclude that the gun was \u201cimmediately accessible\u201d to defendant. Indeed, in People v. Cook, 46 Ill. App. 3d 511, 513-14 (1977), this court held that a handgun which was placed under a car\u2019s hood, next to the battery, was not \u201cimmediately accessible\u201d to the driver of the car.\nThe State, on appeal, argues that defendant was standing outside the car, so he was \u201cseconds away\u201d from the gun. This is a mischaracterization of the record. The record makes it clear that defendant was ordered to get out of the car by the police. Thus, this argument has no merit.\nOn appeal, the State also relies on People v. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 95 (1978), to support the convictions. This reliance is misplaced. In Smith, the defendant was charged with unlawful use of weapon when a loaded revolver was found inside the locked glove compartment of the defendant\u2019s car. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction. Smith\u2019s fact pattern is distinguishable from the present case. Consequently, we decline to follow Smith\u2019s rationale.\nIn People v. Jastrzemski, 196 Ill. App. 3d 1037 (1990), a case that neither party cited to in their respective briefs, the police found a gun wrapped in a shirt underneath the car\u2019s hood. The defendant was convicted of unlawful use of weapon. The appellate court affirmed the conviction. Fully aware of the Cook decision, the appellate court stated that the statute that Cook was charged with violating required the finding that the weapon was \u201cimmediately accessible\u201d in order to convict the defendant. To the contrary, the criminal statute that Jastrzemski was convicted of violating required no such finding. For this reason, the appellate court declined to follow Cook\u2019s rationale. See Jastrzemski, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 1039.\nIn this case, in order to convict defendant of aggravated unlawful use of weapon, the State was required to prove that the gun was \u201cimmediately accessible\u201d to the defendant. 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.6(a)(l)(3)(A) (West 2000). Thus, even though Jastrzemski is factually similar to this case, we follow the rationale in Cook.\nFor the reasons stated, we conclude that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of aggravated unlawful use of weapon. We reverse the conviction and vacate the sentence for that offense. We affirm the conviction and sentence of count VI, unlawful use of weapon by a felon, and count VII, unlawful possession of firearm ammunition by a felon. Since defendant has already served his sentence, we will not remand this case for resentencing.\nReversed in part; affirmed in part.\nCAMPBELL, PJ., and REID, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE QUINN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James S. Jacobs, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Heather Weiss, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST SHIELDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20144276\nOpinion filed March 21, 2003.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James S. Jacobs, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Heather Weiss, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "1063-01",
  "first_page_order": 1081,
  "last_page_order": 1084
}