{ "id": 25355, "name": "CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Chicago Teachers Union v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees", "decision_date": "2003-03-12", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-4414", "first_page": "90", "last_page": "103", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 90" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "726 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411602 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799402 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 1014", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385572 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451-52", "parenthetical": "\"The court must evaluate the language of the statute as a whole, considering each part or section in connection with every other part or section\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980731 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530-31" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "530-31" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 746", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157998 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/333/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 N.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29956 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 1232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court employed clearly erroneous standard of review where issue before it concerned the interpretation and application of the phrase \"class staffing and assignment\" as used in section 4.5(a)(4) of the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521950 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942-43", "parenthetical": "court employed clearly erroneous standard of review where issue before it concerned the interpretation and application of the phrase \"class staffing and assignment\" as used in section 4.5(a)(4) of the Act" }, { "page": "941" }, { "page": "943" }, { "page": "943" }, { "page": "944" }, { "page": "944-45" }, { "page": "944" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0936-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 920, "char_count": 29677, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.04405216436393e-08, "percentile": 0.37421428816892416 }, "sha256": "5d712fe2cc613dd56cb602740dd3edfad193d87a3e4555c5633b780f4ad170a6", "simhash": "1:38bc884ea7016948", "word_count": 4723 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.941926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue in this case is whether the transfer of a teacher from a permanent position to a reassigned teachers pool is a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d as used in section 4.5(a)(4) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2000)) (the Act).\nThe Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) concluded the decision to transfer a teacher to the reassigned teacher pool is a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment.\u201d According to the IELRB, such a decision is a prohibited subject of collective bargaining under the Act and not subject to arbitration under section 4.5(a)(4). 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(4) (West 2000).\nWe disagree. We reverse the IELRB\u2019s decision and remand for further proceedings.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 1997, Tyrone Greer was employed by the Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, now known as the Chicago Board of Education (Board of Education). He was assigned to teach English at South Shore High School. He was first assigned to South Shore in 1990 and had been employed by the Board of Education for about 10 years. His last day at South Shore was June 25, 1997.\nIn July, he called the teacher personnel office and learned that the principal of South Shore had closed Greer\u2019s position on June 30, 1997. When Greer reported to South Shore on August 26,1997, the principal told Greer he had no \u201cposition number\u201d for Greer and that Greer had to report to the Board of Education. When he did so, Greer learned he had become a \u201creassigned teacher,\u201d that is, a member of the reassigned teachers pool. Greer also received a letter from the director of human resources stating Greer was a reassigned teacher effective August 26, 1997, pursuant to the Board of Education\u2019s reassigned teacher policy.\nSection 5 of the \u201cPolicy Regarding Reassignment and Layoff of Regularly Certified and Appointed Teachers\u201d (the Policy) states that a reassigned teacher is not assigned any additional duties for the first 30 days after reassignment. During this time, the reassigned teacher may interview for positions at other schools. Under section 9, if the reassigned teacher has not found a position within the initial 30-day period, he is assigned to a \u201cRegion\u201d as a day-to-day substitute teacher. One day a week, he is permitted to interview at schools for a permanent position. Under section 10, if after 10 months of reassignment the teacher is unable to secure a permanent position, the teacher will be given an \u201chonorable termination.\u201d\nOn September 9, 1997, the union initiated a grievance on behalf of Greer. The union said Greer contended his displacement violated section 2 of the Policy and articles 3 and 42 of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the union because teachers with less seniority remained employed at South Shore.\nArticle 42 describes the policies and procedures applicable to the transfers of teachers. Article 3 of the collective bargaining agreement incorporates violations of the Policy into the agreement by defining a \u201cgrievance\u201d in relevant part as: \u201ca complaint involving a work situation or a complaint that there has been a deviation from, misinterpretation of, or misapplication of a practice or policy.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe pertinent portions of the Policy read:\n\u201cSection 1 \u2014 Scope of Policy\nWhenever an attendance center or a program is closed, there is a drop in enrollment, the educational focus of the attendance center is changed such that available teaching positions cannot accommodate some or all current regularly certified and appointed teaching staff, or when an attendance center is subject to actions taken as a result of remediation, probation, reconstitution or educational crisis, such staff will be reassigned or laid off in accordance with this policy.\nSection 2 \u2014 Selection of Teachers for Removal\nA. In Attendance Centers/Programs That Are Not Subject to Reconstitution\nIf changes in an attendance center or program require removal of some but not all teachers, teachers with appropriate certifications will be selected for retention based on seniority. Provisionals, Day-to-Day substitutes, Cadre substitutes, FTBs and Probationary teachers within the attendance center or program will be removed before any regularly certified and appointed teachers with the appropriate certification is removed, in that order. Within each group, system-wide seniority shall be the determining factor.\u201d\nWhen the union was unable to resolve the grievance directly with the Board of Education, the union demanded arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement.\nThe Arbitration\nAt the arbitration hearing, Greer testified about his reassignment. He also testified that at least one of the teachers that remained at South Shore and taught English had less seniority than Greer.\nIn its posthearing brief, the Board of Education contended Greer\u2019s grievance was \u201csolely a dispute over *** staffing and assignment.\u201d The Board of Education said that under section 4.5(a)(4) of the Act, class staffing and assignment are prohibited subjects of bargaining and arbitration. 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(4) (West 2000). The Board of Education also contended the union had failed to prove any violation of the collective bargaining agreement.\nOn March 9, 1999, the arbitrator issued an opinion and award. In the opinion and award, he deferred the issue of statutory inarbitrability to the IELRB.\nIn addressing the merits, the arbitrator noted the Policy required the removal of certain classifications of teachers, such as FTBs (that is, full-time-basis substitutes), before any certified and appointed teachers with the appropriate certifications are removed. Greer was a certified and appointed teacher teaching English during the 1996-97 school year. Carol Moran, an FTB, taught English at South Shore during the 1996-97 school year and continued teaching English during the 1997-98 school year.\nThe arbitrator concluded Greer\u2019s removal from South Shore while Moran remained constituted a violation of the Policy. The arbitrator ordered Greer restored to the status he enjoyed prior to removal, reinstated to a position as an English teacher at South Shore, and be made whole for all wages and benefits lost until he was restored.\nThe Board of Education refused to comply with the arbitration award.\nAdministrative Proceedings\nOn March 25, 1999, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Board of Education contending violations of section 14(a)(8) and, derivatively, section 14(a)(1) of the Act, for the Board of Education\u2019s refusal to comply with a binding arbitration award. 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(l), (a)(8) (West 2000). The Executive Director of the IELRB issued a complaint. The Board of Education responded by contending the arbitration award was not binding because the grievance was not arbitrable under section 4.5(a)(4) of the Act.\nOn May 15, 2001, the administrative law judge issued her recommended decision and order. In it, she concluded Greer\u2019s reassignment was not a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment.\u201d Rather, Greer\u2019s grievance \u201cinvolves a dispute about retention in a permanent position.\u201d Because section 4.5(a)(4) did not apply to Greer\u2019s grievance, the grievance was arbitrable, the administrative law judge said. After concluding the Board of Education violated sections 14(a)(1) and 14(a)(8) by failing to comply with a binding arbitration award, the administrative law judge ordered the Board of Education to, among other things, comply with the arbitrator\u2019s award.\nThe Board of Education filed exceptions to the administrative law judge\u2019s recommended decision. On November 16, 2001, the IELRB issued an opinion and order. In the opinion, the IELRB reversed the administrative law judge\u2019s recommended decision and order.\nThe IELRB noted section 10(b) of the Act makes null and void any provision in the collective bargaining agreement that is in violation of or conflicts with a statute. Section 4.5 prohibits bargaining of, among other things, determinations of \u201cclass staffing and assignment.\u201d The Act also prohibits arbitration of those subjects.\nThe IELRB said because Greer was receiving full salary and benefits at the time of the arbitration hearing, his grievance was not a matter of job retention. Instead, the subject of Greer\u2019s grievance involved matters of \u201cclass staffing and assignment.\u201d Thus, the arbitration award was not binding, and the Board of Education did not violate sections 14(a)(1) and 14(a)(8) by refusing to comply with the award, according to the IELRB.\nOne member dissented, concluding that transfer to the reassigned teachers pool was the \u201cfirst step in a process used to discharge teachers from permanent employment.\u201d Thus, Greer\u2019s grievance was not a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment,\u201d but of job retention, according to the dissenter.\nThe union then filed this appeal against the IELRB and the Board of Education. The issue on appeal is whether the IELRB correctly concluded Greer\u2019s grievance was not arbitrable.\nDECISION\nStandard of Review\nWe are asked to interpret the phrase \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d as used in section 4.5(a)(4) and determine whether the subject of Greer\u2019s grievance involved a determination of \u201cclass staffing and assignment.\u201d Because the issue before us is a mixed question of law and fact, we will apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 334 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942-43, 778 N.E.2d 1232 (2002) (court employed clearly erroneous standard of review where issue before it concerned the interpretation and application of the phrase \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d as used in section 4.5(a)(4) of the Act).\nUnder the clearly erroneous standard of review, the reviewing court will reverse the agency\u2019s decision \u201conly where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is \u2018left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019 \u201d AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395, 763 N.E.2d 272 (2001), quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948). This standard is largely deferential to the agency\u2019s decision, but does not require blind deference. AFM Messenger Service, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 395.\nThe Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act\nThe Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act regulates labor relations between educational employers and educational employees. 115 ILCS 5/1 (West 2000). The Act also requires employers to \u201cbargain collectively with regard to policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/4 (West 2000). The collective bargaining agreement must contain a grievance resolution procedure and must \u201cprovide for binding arbitration of disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the agreement.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/10(c) (West 2000).\nThe union and the Board of Education entered into a collective bargaining agreement for the period September 1, 1995, to August 31, 1999. Article 3 of the collective bargaining agreement describes the grievance procedure. Article 3 \u2014 5 provides for the arbitration of grievances and states the decision of the arbitrator \u201cshall be final and binding on the parties.\u201d\nUnder section 14 of the Act, which describes unfair labor practices, employers are prohibited from \u201c[Refusing to comply with the provisions of a binding arbitration award\u201d (115 ILCS 5/14(a)(8) (West 2000)) and \u201c[i]nterfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under this Act\u201d (115 ILCS 5/14(a)(l) (West 2000)).\nSection 4.5 of the Act describes prohibited subjects of collective bargaining. Among those prohibited subjects are:\n\u201c(4) Decisions to determine class size, class staffing and assignment, class schedules, academic calendar, hours and places of instruction, or pupil assessment policies, and the impact of these decisions on individual employees or the bargaining unit.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(4) (West 2000).\nA prohibited subject of bargaining cannot be arbitrated. Chicago Teachers Union, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 941.\nSection 10(b) of the Act prohibits implementation of any provision in a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation \u201cwould be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any [Illinois] statute or statutes.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/10(b) (West 2000). As applied here, should the arbitration award conflict with the provisions of section 4.5(a)(4) (that is, should Greer\u2019s grievance involve a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d), under section 10(b) the award is not binding, and no violation of section 14(a)(8) occurred. Thus, the sole question before us is whether Greer\u2019s grievance involved a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment.\u201d\nInterpretation of \u201cClass Staffing and Assignment\u201d\nThe union contends \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d as used in section 4.5(a)(4) means class staffing and class assignment. The IELRB agrees with the union that \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d is unambiguous and should be interpreted to mean class staffing and class assignment. Although the Board of Education concedes \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d refers to which class a teacher is assigned to teach, the Board of Education nonetheless contends the phrase \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d is not clear and unambiguous and urges us to consider the Act\u2019s legislative history.\nThe word \u201cclass\u201d in \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d as used in section 4.5(a)(4) modifies both \u201cstaffing\u201d and \u201cassignment.\u201d Chicago Teachers Union, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 943; Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 315 Ill. App. 3d 522, 530-31, 734 N.E.2d 69 (2000). \u201cClass staffing and assignment\u201d refers to \u201chow a class is staffed (i.e., one teacher, two teachers working as a team, etc.) or what class is assigned to a particular teacher.\u201d Chicago Teachers Union, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 943. Issues of job retention do not fall within the scope of the phrase. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 531.\nWe reject the Board of Education\u2019s contention that we should consider the legislative history of the Act in interpreting section 4.5(a)(4). \u201cThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.\u201d Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 451, 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997). The language of the statute is the best evidence of the legislature\u2019s intent. Bruso, 178 Ill. 2d at 451. If the plain language of the statute reveals the legislature\u2019s intent, we need not consider other aids for construction. In re Marriage of Murphy, 203 Ill. 2d 212, 219 (2003).\nHere, the legislature\u2019s intent in employing the phrase \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d is clear and unambiguous. The parties agree the phrase refers to how a class is staffed and what teacher is assigned to teach which class.\nThis construction is further supported by viewing, section 4.5(a)(4) as a whole. Bruso, 178 Ill. 2d at 451-52 (\u201cThe court must evaluate the language of the statute as a whole, considering each part or section in connection with every other part or section\u201d). Besides decisions on \u201cclass staffing and assignment,\u201d section 4.5(a)(4) also excludes the following subjects from bargaining: decisions to determinate class size, class schedules, academic calendar, hours and places of instruction, or pupil assessment policies. 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(4) (West 2000). The section also excludes \u201cthe impact of these decisions on individual employees or the bargaining unit.\u201d 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(4) (West 2000).\nThese exclusions all pertain to the logistics of organizing and operating classes. These exclusions do not pertain to decisions about job retention. To read \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d to include more than just decisions on how to staff a class or which teacher is assigned to which classroom is to interpret the phrase in a manner inconsistent with not only the plain language of the statute, but also the remainder of section 4.5(a)(4). Because the language of section 4.5(a)(4) is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to the legislative history to ascertain the legislators\u2019 intent.\nApplication of \u201cClass Staffing and Assignment\u201d\nThe remaining issue is whether assigning Greer to the reassigned teachers pool constitutes a decision about \u201cclass staffing or assignment.\u201d Our analysis in two recent cases where we interpreted and applied section 4.5(a)(4) provides guidance.\nIn Chicago Teachers Union, the union filed grievances on behalf of four teachers contending violations of the collective bargaining agreement where the Board of Education failed to select these teachers to teach summer school classes. The arbitrators ruled in favor of the union in each case, but the Board of Education failed to comply with the arbitration awards. The union filed unfair labor practice charges against the Board of Education alleging violations of section 14(a)(8) and, derivatively, section 14(a)(1).\nThe IELRB concluded \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d referred to which class a teacher is assigned to, not whether a teacher is assigned to a permanent position. Because the teachers already were employed by the Board of Education, and because a summer school assignment is not a permanent position, the IELRB said assignment to summer school was a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment\u201d and a prohibited subject of bargaining and arbitration. The IELRB concluded the arbitration awards were not binding. We reversed.\nWe noted that the \u201cissue of whether one has a job is different from the issue of which class one is assigned to teach.\u201d Chicago Teachers Union, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 944. We concluded that whether a teacher is given summer employment is not a matter of \u201cclass staffing and assignment,\u201d because summer employment is an opportunity to earn an additional salary. Chicago Teachers Union, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 944-45. The grievances were about \u201cthe general issue of employment in summer school rather than the more specific topic of assignment to a particular class.\u201d Chicago Teachers Union, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 944.\nIn Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, the Board of Education reconstituted seven schools. Teachers displaced due to the reconstitutions were required to interview for their previous positions. During this reconstitution, a number of teachers were not rehired to their previous positions. In accord with the Policy, they remained employees for 10 months during which time they were required to search for employment. If the teachers failed to find another position within 10 months, they would be laid off and given an honorable termination. At the time of the arbitration hearing, not a single teacher had been laid off.\nSeveral teachers who contended the interview process was discriminatory requested the union file grievances on their behalf. To investigate the charges, the union requested information from the Board of Education in accord with the collective bargaining agreement. When the Board of Education failed to respond, the union filed grievances on behalf of several teachers. The Board of Education then denied the request for information.\nThe union initiated an unfair labor practices charge against the Board of Education for failure to provide the requested information. The Board of Education responded by contending, among other things, that the information requested pertained to a prohibited subject of bargaining under section 4.5(a)(4) of the Act.\nThe administrative law judge issued a recommended decision and order finding that because of the displacement and potential termination of the teachers as a result of the reconstitutions, the information requested concerned the terms and conditions of employment. The administrative law judge concluded the Board of Education violated the Act by fading to supply the requested information.\nOn appeal, the Board of Education contended the underlying grievances for which the Union sought the information were about decisions on \u201cclass staffing and assignment,\u201d a prohibited subject of bargaining. We rejected this contention.\nWe concluded:\n\u201c[T]he [underlying] grievances relate to the decision whether to retain the grievants as employees, not to how a class is staffed (one or two teachers) or what class a particular teacher is assigned to teach. The grievances at issue involve questions of retention and discrimination, not prohibited subjects of bargaining.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 531.\nHere, Greer was removed from his permanent position as an English teacher at South Shore and designated a \u201creassigned teacher.\u201d Although his displacement is referred to as a reassignment,, he was not reassigned to teach another class or even reassigned to another permanent position.\nAs a \u201creassigned teacher,\u201d Greer was not given any class to teach initially. His employment no longer was permanent. On the contrary, if he was unable to find a permanent position within the Board of Education during the 10 months following reassignment, he would be \u201chonorably terminated.\u201d Thus, the decision to displace Greer removed Greer from a permanent teaching position and placed him in teaching limbo \u2014 hardly a decision about class assignment.\nAs we noted in Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, the decision to place a teacher in the reassigned teachers pool is a matter of retention, which is not a prohibited subject of bargaining under section 4.5(a)(4). Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 531. That the teachers had not been terminated and remained employees of the Board of Education did not affect our analysis. Similarly, here, that Greer remained employed after becoming a \u201creassigned teacher\u201d does not affect our conclusion.\nThe IELRB attempts to distinguish Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees by categorizing it as a case involving grievances alleging only that the Board of Education had violated the nondiscrimination provisions of the collective bargaining agreement by removing certain teachers from reconstituted schools based on discriminatory reasons. The IELRB is only partially correct.\nIn Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, in determining whether the Board of Education\u2019s failure to provide the requested information was a violation of the Act, we looked at the underlying grievances for which the Union had requested information. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 530-31. The basis for the underlying grievances was the decision to remove the teachers from their positions and place them in the reassigned teachers pool. That the reason may have been discriminatory was only part of the analysis. This is evidenced by our statement that \u201c[t]he [underlying] grievances at issue involve questions of retention and discrimination, not prohibited subjects of bargaining.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 531.\nThe IELRB relies on its decision in Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 15 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.), par. 1037, No. 98 \u2014 CA\u2014 0021 \u2014 C (IELRB April 23, 1999) (hereinafter Reassigned Teachers). In that case, the union filed a grievance concerning teachers in the reassigned teachers pool, contending the Board of Education violated the collective bargaining agreement by appointing temporary teachers, instead of teachers from the reassigned teachers pool, to vacant positions. The IELRB concluded the Policy \u201cconcerns the method by which teachers are assigned to classes, and, accordingly, involves decisions concerning \u2018class staffing and assignment.\u2019 \u201d\nReassigned Teachers did not involve the placing of a permanently positioned teacher into the reassigned teachers pool. It involved the class assignments not given to teachers already in the pool. Arguably, the IELRB was dealing with a method for assigning teachers to classes, an issue not subject to arbitration. Whether the IELRB correctly decided the matter is something we need not determine. This is a different case.\nThe Board of Education contends section 4.5(a)(4) is nonetheless controlling because the true decision grieved is the Board of Education\u2019s decision to assign another teacher to teach the remaining English classes at South Shore. That Greer was designated a \u201creassigned teacher\u201d was merely the \u201cimpact of [this] decision[ ] on [Greer],\u201d which is a prohibited subject of bargaining under section 4.5(a)(4). 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a)(4) (West 2000). Similarly, the IELRB contends the decision to reassign Greer implicated the Board of Education\u2019s decisions about which remaining teachers would be assigned to which remaining classes.\nWe read the language of section 4.5(a)(4) more narrowly. This was a particular decision to place Greer in the reassigned teachers pool. Of course, that decision had grave impact on him. But that would matter only in the event that he was the subject of a class staffing or class assignment decision. He was not. When the grievance at issue involves a question of job retention, it is not a prohibited subject of bargaining and, thus, arbitration. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 531.\nThe IELRB contends the Policy on reassignment is a vehicle by which teachers receive new teaching assignments; thus, a decision to designate a teacher a \u201creassigned teacher\u201d is a matter of \u201cclass assignment.\u201d In so contending, the IELRB completely ignores the fact that \u201creassigned teachers\u201d are not guaranteed new teaching assignments. On the contrary, they are required to search for new teaching positions. And, if they are unable to find a new position, they are terminated.\nIt would be little solace to a teacher that his termination is \u201chonorable.\u201d Either way, he is out of a job. The Board of Education would have ended his employment without incurring the inconvenience of complying with the collective bargaining agreement.\nBecause Greer\u2019s grievance did not fall within the prohibited subjects of section 4.5(a)(4), the arbitrator\u2019s award did not conflict with the Act and is binding on the parties. By failing to abide by the award, the Board of Education violated section 14(a)(8) and, derivatively, section 14(a)(1) of the Act.\nThe Policy\nThe union contends, aside from whether the grievance was about \u201cclass staffing and assignment,\u201d the IELRB\u2019s decision should be reversed because the Board of Education must follow its own policies. According to the Union, section 4.5(a)(4) is specifically directed at substantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and does not bar enforcement of the Policy.\nOur conclusion in favor of the union based on the interpretation and application of section 4.5(a)(4) would dispose of this case. There is no need to address this issue.\nSection 34 \u2014 18(31) of the Illinois School Code\nThe Board of Education contends the arbitration award is not binding because it also conflicts with section 34 \u2014 18(31) of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/34 \u2014 18(31) (West 2000)). For purposes of administrative review, a party waives review of arguments not raised before the administrative agency. North Avenue Properties, L.L.C. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 312 Ill. App. 3d 182, 185, 726 N.E.2d 65 (2000). Because the Board of Education never raised this argument before the IELRB, the Board has forfeited our review of this contention.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated we reverse the IELRB\u2019s decision and remand this cause to the IELRB for further proceedings. We decide only the issue of arbitrability. On remand, the IELRB will review the arbitrator\u2019s award. Because Greer did not grieve his termination, that issue is not before the IELRB or this court. We make no comment on the question of whether Greer suffered any compensable loss.\nReversed and remanded.\nSOUTH, PJ., and HOFFMAN, J., concur.\nThe union appears to have abandoned its reliance on article 42 by failing to raise the issue before the arbitrator during the hearing and failing to argue it in the Board of Education\u2019s post-arbitration-hearing brief. Both the arbitrator and the administrative law judge noted this in their respective decisions. For this reason, we do not discuss Article 42 in any detail.\nThe Board of Education initially raised the issue of arbitrability in a motion to bifurcate the arbitration, which the arbitrator denied.\nGreer was unable to find a permanent position within the 10-month period. The Board honorably terminated Greer in January 1999. Greer later found a permanent position and was reinstated in August 1999. Greer did not challenge his termination, but instead pursues the appeal to recover under the arbitration award his lost wages for the period January 1999 to August 1999.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "John K. Hughes, Jonathan A. Rothstein, Jose J. Behar, and Allison G. Margolies, all of Gressler, Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Marilyn F. Johnson, General Counsel, and Lee Ann Lowder and Rochelle L. Gordon, all of Chicago Board of Education, of Chicago, for appellee Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for ap-pellee Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20144414\nOpinion filed March 12, 2003.\nJohn K. Hughes, Jonathan A. Rothstein, Jose J. Behar, and Allison G. Margolies, all of Gressler, Hughes, Socol, Piers, Resnick & Dym, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nMarilyn F. Johnson, General Counsel, and Lee Ann Lowder and Rochelle L. Gordon, all of Chicago Board of Education, of Chicago, for appellee Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for ap-pellee Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board." }, "file_name": "0090-01", "first_page_order": 108, "last_page_order": 121 }