{ "id": 25347, "name": "In re D.T., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. B.T., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. B.T.", "decision_date": "2003-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-2410", "first_page": "133", "last_page": "155", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 133" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. 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B.T., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE THEIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found respondent mother, B.T., an unfit parent for failing to protect her son, D.T. (born December 18, 1993), from conditions within his environment injurious to his welfare. 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(g) (West 2000). After a best interest hearing, the trial court terminated respondent\u2019s parental rights to D.T. on June 8, 2001. Respondent appeals, arguing that (1) during the unfitness hearing, the trial court misinterpreted section l(D)(g) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(g) (West 2000)) by foreclosing consideration of any evidence that did not directly relate to respondent\u2019s past failing to protect D.T.; (2) the court erred in deciding that termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights was in D.T.\u2019s best interests on the basis of its own discretion, without imposing a burden of proof on the State; (3) the court improperly failed to hold the State to a \u201cclear and convincing\u201d standard of proof or a \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d standard in the best interest hearing; (4) the State failed to meet its burden to prove that terminating respondent\u2019s rights was in D.T.\u2019s best interests; and (5) the trial court\u2019s finding on best interests was incorrect and an abuse of discretion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nI. BACKGROUND\nFollowing a hearing on February 5, 1998, the trial court granted temporary custody of four-year-old D.T. to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). On May 5, 1998, following an adjudicatory hearing, the court found that D.T. had been physically abused by respondent\u2019s boyfriend, Brian Weisenritter, neglected due to respondent\u2019s failure to take D.T. to the hospital after he was injured, and subjected to an injurious environment. On May 27, 1998, the court appointed DCFS as D.T.\u2019s guardian. Following another hearing on August 27, 1998, the court entered an order establishing the permanency goal as substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. On July 19, 1999, the State filed a supplemental petition for appointment of a guardian with right to consent to adoption alleging four separate allegations of unfitness. The State later amended the petition to allege only that respondent was unfit because she failed to protect D.T. from conditions in his environment injurious to his welfare. 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(g) (West 2000).\nAt the unfitness hearing held from September 2000 to April 2001, Dr. Alan Johnson, a physician at Children\u2019s Memorial Hospital, testified that he treated D.T. on February 2, 1998, after he was transferred from Ravenswood Hospital. D.T. had several bruises on his face, multiple cuts and bruises on his arm, various scratches on his back, and several bruises on his buttocks and thighs. Johnson testified that D.T. had a linear bruise on his left cheek that had the characteristic appearance of an opened-handed slap mark. His bruises were inconsistent with those of a normal four-year-old boy.\nJohnson explained that D.T.\u2019s scrotum was swollen to the size of an orange, approximately 5 to 10 times its normal size, and was dark purple. The bruising extended down his leg and up to his abdomen. D.T. was in a significant amount of pain from a puncture wound to the scrotum, which leaked bloody fluid. Johnson opined that D.T.\u2019s scrotum injury had occurred more than 48 hours earlier. D.T. underwent surgery to explore the nature and extent of his injuries, remained in the hospital for two to three days and required narcotic pain medication. Johnson testified that this injury was caused by repetitive blunt blows to the scrotum and that D.T. was a victim of child abuse. He stated that D.T.\u2019s explanation for his injury, that he fell off the couch onto \u201csome junk,\u201d was not consistent with his injury.\nCharles Rocek, a child protective investigator with DCFS, testified that on February 2, 1998, he noticed 11 marks and bruises on D.T.\u2019s face and 8 other circular bruises on his arms and chest. Respondent told Rocek that she had known her boyfriend, Weisenritter, for approximately two months at that time and had met him through a telephone dating service. She stated that she went to Weisenritter\u2019s house on Friday, but later told him that she arrived on Thursday, Wednesday or Tuesday. Respondent also told Rocek that Weisenritter left the apartment Friday night and did not return until Saturday morning. Rocek asked respondent how D.T. sustained the facial injuries, and she responded that he slipped and fell several times in the bathtub. Rocek also asked her how D.T. suffered his groin injury, and she responded that he fell off the couch onto \u201csome junk\u201d at Weisenritter\u2019s apartment. Respondent told Rocek that she did not seek medical care earlier because she did not think D.T. was in pain. On as many as 30 occasions during their two-month relationship, respondent saw Weisenritter wrap D.T. in a towel for several hours and strike him to control his behavior.\nRocek again spoke with respondent on February 4, 1998. During this conversation, respondent stated that she was present with D.T. and Weisenritter the entire weekend except for two instances when she left for several hours to shop for groceries. Respondent told Rocek that after she and D.T. left Weisenritter\u2019s house at approximately 7 p.m. on Sunday, February 1, 1998, she spoke with a friend and, three hours later, brought D.T. to the hospital. Respondent never stated that Weisenritter prevented her from leaving his apartment.\nLisa Froemel, a social worker at Children\u2019s Memorial Hospital, testified that she spoke with respondent on February 2, 1998. Respondent told her that she and D.T. went to Weisenritter\u2019s apartment on January 29. Respondent stated that she did not know how D.T. sustained his injuries, but she noticed some redness to D.T.\u2019s penis on January 30. On January 31, respondent noticed that D.T.\u2019s scrotum was \u201cblack and blue\u201d and he told her that he fell off the couch. The next day, after D.T. complained of pain and she noticed his scrotum was swollen and bleeding, respondent took him to Ravens-wood Hospital. Respondent told Froemel that D.T. sustained several bruises from slipping in the bathtub and running into the kitchen island, but had \u201cno real explanation\u201d for D.T.\u2019s groin injury. Respondent also stated that she gave Weisenritter permission to spank D.T. on his buttocks as a form of discipline and she saw him wrap D.T. in a blanket on a number of occasions. Respondent told Froemel that she left D.T. with Weisenritter for 30 to 40 minutes that weekend, but she never stated that she was not allowed to leave Weisenritter\u2019s apartment. D.T. told Froemel that respondent was not present when he was injured.\nSharon Marach testified that she was respondent\u2019s case manager from 1995 to 1997 at Open Door Clinic in Elgin, a service provider for individuals with life-threatening illnesses. She testified that D.T. was always with respondent at her appointments and he appeared well cared for and happy. Respondent never told Marach that Weisenritter abused her or D.T.\nKristen James testified that she was a clinical supervisor and therapist at The Children\u2019s Place Association, which provided services to families with life-threatening illnesses. D.T. entered The Children\u2019s Place Association day care program in the fall of 1997. D.T. was very bright, articulate and advanced for his age. After D.T.\u2019s hospitalization, respondent attended parenting classes, domestic abuse counseling and all of her supervised visits with D.T. D.T. told James through play therapy that Weisenritter kicked him. Respondent never told James that Weisenritter prevented her from leaving the apartment.\nJohanna Sonnenfeld, a therapist at Midwest Family Resource who was qualified as an expert in psychodynamic therapy, had counseled respondent since January 2000. She stated that respondent\u2019s parents physically abused her and she \u201cturned off her awareness\u201d of what was happening to cope. After her father abused respondent, respondent\u2019s mother did not protect her, was not supportive, minimized her injuries and did not seek medical attention. Sonnenfeld testified that respondent similarly disassociated from the situation and minimized D.T.\u2019s injuries. Respondent told Sonnenfeld that Weisenritter kept the keys to respondent\u2019s car during the weekend she stayed with him, although she left the apartment to go grocery shopping. When she left Weisenritter\u2019s apartment, she realized the extent of D.T.\u2019s injuries and brought him to the hospital.\nRespondent testified that her parents physically abused her as a child. After she married D.T., Sr., and became pregnant, D.T., Sr., also became physically abusive. When D.T. was approximately one year old, respondent left D.T., Sr., and returned to her parents\u2019 house. She later learned that she had contracted a life-threatening illness. In August 1997, she and D.T. moved to Chicago House, which provided low-income housing for individuals with her life-threatening illness. Respondent met Weisenritter through a telephone dating service in late December 1997. In January 1998, Weisenritter would wrap D.T. in a towel for 5 to 10 minutes as a form of discipline. At the time, respondent thought that this discipline was \u201cokay,\u201d but now realized that it was abuse. She also allowed Weisenritter to spank D.T.\u2019s buttocks once.\nRespondent testified that she and D.T. went to Weisenritter\u2019s apartment on Thursday, January 29, 1998. That evening, she left the apartment for food. D.T. asked to accompany her, but respondent told him to stay with Weisenritter because the neighborhood was unsafe. Later, respondent learned from D.T. that Weisenritter had threatened to hurt him that night. When she put D.T. to bed that evening, she noticed a red mark on his abdomen and D.T. told her that he fell off the couch. D.T. never told respondent that Weisenritter hurt him, and she did not remember seeing any bruises on D.T. Weisenritter kept her car keys while she was in the apartment, although he did not physically prevent her from leaving. Respondent repeatedly told Weisenrit-ter that she wanted to take D.T. to the doctor, but he told her that was unnecessary. Although she left the apartment three times that weekend, respondent never sought help. When she returned to her apartment on Sunday evening, she noticed D.T.\u2019s groin injury and bruises. She went to her friend\u2019s apartment to return money and then brought D.T. to Ravenswood Hospital. Respondent admitted that it was her responsibility to protect D.T. In a visit with D.T. in April 1998, D.T. told respondent that Weisenritter hit him and kicked him in the stomach and groin with his work boots. Respondent admitted that, at that time, she failed to protect D.T. from an injurious environment.\nIn rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Ann Simonson, D.T.\u2019s foster mother for 21k years at the time of the hearing. In January 1999, D.T. told her that when he was wrapped in the towel, he could not breathe and felt that he could not get away. D.T. also stated that he told respondent not to leave him alone with Weisenritter. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court found that the State had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent was unfit for failing to protect D.T. from an environment injurious to his welfare during the period from January 29 to February 1, 1998.\nAt the best interest hearing in May and June of 2001, the trial court took judicial notice of its previous finding of respondent\u2019s unfitness and the testimony from that hearing. Simonson testified that she had been D.T.\u2019s foster mother since August 1998. D.T. called her \u201cmom\u201d and explained that respondent was the \u201cmother who had me [and Simonson is] the mother who takes care of me.\u201d D.T. was very bright and in a gifted first-grade class, reading at a sixth-grade level. D.T. expressed to Simonson that he worried that respondent would not be able to take care of him if he went home with her. D.T. occasionally stated that he wanted to live with respondent, usually when he was angry with Simonson. D.T. initially had many \u201cmeltdowns\u201d and tantrums, but these had greatly decreased in the previous year. D.T. also frequently discussed the incident when Weisenritter kicked him. During one visit between D.T. and respondent that Simonson supervised, D.T. asked respondent if she would get a job because he was very concerned about working and money. Simonson testified that she did not think D.T. would be at risk with respondent. She also stated that she wanted to adopt D.T.\nJohn Arroyo testified that he had been D.T.\u2019s therapist since September 2000. He stated that while D.T. was adapting well to his foster home, he had difficulty with peer relationships, got into fights and became frustrated at school. Arroyo stated that D.T. needed rules, boundaries and consequences and Simonson helped to set limits and boundaries. Emotionally, D.T. became upset easily because he did not understand what was happening in court. Arroyo believed that the length of the court proceedings was problematic for D.T. and that resolution of this case would help him. D.T. told Arroyo on different occasions that he wanted to live with respondent, Simonson, and respondent\u2019s mother. D.T. also stated that he wanted to live with respondent because she let him eat all the candy he wanted and he did not have to do chores. At Simonson\u2019s house, D.T. explained, he could only have two pieces of candy and he had to do chores and follow rules.\nD.T. craved structure and rules and tested adults to determine who would provide him with stability and permanency. D.T. told Arroyo that he was tired of telling respondent to get a job. Arroyo never observed a visit between respondent and D.T. Arroyo did not have an opinion as to whether it was in D.T.\u2019s best interests to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nThay Danielson, a social worker at The Children\u2019s Place Association, testified that she had been D.T.\u2019s social worker since November 1999 and saw D.T. and Simonson interact on a monthly basis. She stated that D.T. had a \u201cvery close relationship with [Simonson]\u201d and viewed her as a second mother. Danielson testified that while respondent\u2019s interactions with D.T. were appropriate and she set proper limits and boundaries for him, respondent was not able to parent D.T. However, she also testified that D.T. had a very close relationship and a strong bond with respondent. D.T. needed a structured and controlled environment, which he received from Simonson. D.T. expressed many concerns about respondent\u2019s ability to care for herself and he became very anxious. Danielson stated that D.T. was secure with Simonson and removal from her home would be detrimental and traumatic. D.T. was very affectionate with both respondent and Si-monson. Danielson stated that D.T. needed permanency and removing him from his foster home would cause anxiety and uncertainty. She opined that it was in D.T.\u2019s best interests that respondent\u2019s parental rights be terminated.\nDanielson testified that respondent was receiving in-depth counseling to address her childhood issues and had made \u201csteady progress\u201d in that area. Respondent also successfully completed both individual and group domestic violence treatment and had satisfactorily apprised The Children\u2019s Place Association of her relationships with other men. Danielson was concerned about D.T. in the middle of this situation and stated that D.T. had trouble fully attaching to Simonson because he was also attached to respondent. Initially, D.T. would cry when he ended visits with respondent, but this behavior dramatically decreased. D.T. told Danielson that if he could change anything in his life, he would visit respondent every day. Sonnenfeld told Danielson that respondent had made a breakthrough in the summer of 2000 in terms of understanding how her childhood impacted her behavior with D.T. and that although respondent had progressed in therapy, she needed two more years to fully address these issues before D.T. could return home. One week later, however, Sonnenfeld stated that it would only take nine months to a year.\nKathleen Pesek, called as a witness by the assistant public guardian, testified that she was the coordinator of the parenting assessment team at Threshold Mother\u2019s Project from January 1995 to December 2000. The parties stipulated that Pesek was an expert in child development and in assessing parenting capacity. She and the other members of the team read D.T.\u2019s case records and met with respondent, D.T., and Simonson and observed interactions between them. Pesek testified that, in 1998, D.T. had an insecure attachment to respondent and stated that D.T. often displayed role reversal where he placed respondent\u2019s needs above his own. However, when she observed respondent and D.T. interact in 1999, she saw no evidence of role reversal. Pesek testified that the parenting assessment team did not make recommendations as to whether a child\u2019s goal should be return home or termination. She acknowledged that The Children\u2019s Place Association records noted that respondent was very attentive during visits, did not need coaching and expressed appropriate concern for D.T.\u2019s safety. In December 1999, the team was concerned that respondent would not be able to make the necessary emotional shift to protect D.T. and that there was a substantial risk of maltreatment because of respondent\u2019s tendency to be dependant on others. At her deposition in February 2000, Pesek testified that she believed that while D.T. should remain with Simonson, continued visitation with respondent was in D.T.\u2019s best interests. However, Pesek also stated that it would not be appropriate to return D.T. to respondent without supervision.\nMaria Ferrera testified for respondent that she worked at The Children\u2019s Place Association and supervised D.T.\u2019s case until January 2000, but she had no contact with the case after that date. She stated that she had developed case plans for respondent that included domestic violence counseling, joining a battered women\u2019s group, participating in individual and family counseling and visitation with D.T. Respondent completed domestic violence counseling successfully, and as of January 2000, she was making slow but steady progress in individual counseling. Respondent also displayed a willingness to participate in counseling and even suggested increasing her sessions to twice a week. Ferrera supervised several visits during 1998 and 1999 and observed physical affection between respondent and D.T. When respondent was asked to set limits for D.T. during visitation, she \u201cdid fine\u201d and showed improvement because she was able to put aside her own needs. Respondent received satisfactory ratings on her case plans.\nJames testified that respondent satisfactorily completed parenting classes and group and individual domestic violence counseling sessions and participated in individual and family therapy. She stated that she saw significant growth in respondent over the year she worked with her. Throughout the family sessions with D.T., D.T. expressed his desire to return to respondent. After the court ordered supervised visits in May 1998, D.T. \u201cdrastically deteriorated,\u201d became whiny, clingy and had difficulty at school. After visitation increased in the summer of 1998, D.T.\u2019s behavior improved. James stated that even though D.T. attached to his foster family, his attachment to respondent never faded. She opined that D.T. may have problems with other attachments as an adult as a result of terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. James ended her relationship as D.T.\u2019s case manager in January 1999 and had no contact with D.T. after January 2000.\nSonnenfeld testified that she had been respondent\u2019s therapist since January 2000. While respondent initially minimized what happened to D.T., she eventually became more assertive and less defensive through therapy. Respondent\u2019s nurturing and parenting skills were enhanced through these sessions. She stated that respondent was capable of keeping herself and D.T. safe from abusive relationships, although respondent needed at least one more year of therapy. Son-nenfeld testified that respondent had the capacity and competency to parent D.T. and breaking the attachment between respondent and D.T. would be harmful to him. Sonnenfeld last saw D.T. in December 1999 and she never saw D.T. interact with his foster family. The majority of the basis of Sonnenfeld\u2019s knowledge came from respondent\u2019s self-reports.\nDr. Frank Lani testified that he was a child psychologist on the parenting assessment team at Threshold Mother\u2019s Project. The court accepted Dr. Lani as an expert in the area of child psychology and evaluations of parenting custody issues. After interviewing and testing D.T. and respondent in November 1998, he found that there seemed to be an attachment between respondent and D.T. In 1998, he thought it was possible for D.T. to return home in a supervised living situation. Lani performed a follow-up evaluation in November 1999, without observing D.T. or respondent, which showed that respondent had made some improvement. At that time, respondent had been engaged in treatment and showed signs of growth. He admitted that he had no contact with respondent or D.T. since November 1998 and he never observed D.T. with his foster family.\nDanielson testified that she observed a visit between respondent and D.T. on May 21, 2001, where D.T. stated that he wanted the judge to \u201cmake up his mind\u201d and he wanted to return home to respondent. Danielson continued to believe that respondent\u2019s parental rights should be terminated. D.T. had also told Danielson that he wanted to remain with Simonson.\nRespondent testified that after the incident, she participated in parenting classes, group and individual therapy, and domestic violence counseling and obtained an order of protection against Weisenritter. Respondent explained what she learned in these sessions and the emotional progress she made in dealing with her abusive childhood. D.T. repeatedly told her that he wanted to return home to her. Ideally, she wanted D.T. to live with her, but she was willing to give guardianship to Simonson. Respondent also stated that she would be willing to name Simonson in a standby adoption plan. She stated that she loved D.T. and could keep him safe.\nThe trial court found, within its sound discretion, that it was in D.T.\u2019s best interests to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. The court credited Simonson, finding that D.T.\u2019s physical and emotional health had greatly improved since his placement with her, and Arroyo, who testified that D.T. needed resolution to this case. Additionally, the court relied on Danielson\u2019s recommendation that termination was in D.T.\u2019s best interests. The court gave little weight to the testimonies of Ferrera, James, Sonnenfeld and Lani because they had no contact with the case in over a year and a half and, therefore, their testimonies provided little insight as to the best interests of D.T. in June 2001. The court noted the severity of D.T.\u2019s injuries and respondent\u2019s inability to protect her child or seek immediate medical attention and considered all of the best interest factors enumerated in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 before terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2000). Respondent then filed this timely appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nUnder the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2000)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494, 777 N.E.2d 930, 940 (2002). First, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is \u201cunfit,\u201d as that term is defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/KD) (West 2000)). D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 494-95, 777 N.E.2d at 940. Although section 1(D) sets forth several grounds under which a parent may be found \u201cunfit,\u201d any one ground, properly proven, is sufficient for a finding of unfitness. 750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (West 2000); In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210, 766 N.E.2d 1105, 1113 (2002). At this stage, the court focuses on the parent\u2019s conduct and cannot consider the child\u2019s best interests. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183 (1990); In re Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d 165, 169, 775 N.E.2d 304, 307 (2002). We will reverse a trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness only where it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 211, 766 N.E.2d at 1113. If the court makes a finding that the parent is unfit, the court next considers whether it is in the child\u2019s best interests to terminate parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2000); D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 495, 777 N.E.2d at 940.\nA. Unfitness\nRespondent first challenges the trial court\u2019s finding that she was unfit under section l(D)(g) of the Adoption Act, which provides that unfitness may be based on the \u201c[flailure to protect the child from conditions within his environment injurious to the child\u2019s welfare.\u201d 750 ILCS 50/l(D)(g) (West 2000). She argues that the court erred in adopting a \u201cpast-only focus\u201d and restricting the scope of the unfitness hearing to the four-day period from January 29 to February 1, 1998, when D.T. was injured and before respondent sought medical attention. Respondent contends that the court misinterpreted the statute and unconstitutionally applied it to her by excluding evidence concerning her efforts to protect and care for D.T. before and after that time period. The State and assistant public guardian on behalf of D.T. respond that the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed section 1(D) (g) and rejected these arguments in In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 766 N.E.2d 1105 (2002). Respondent seems to concede in her reply brief and at oral argument that C.W. resolved this argument.\nWe agree that C.W. settled this issue. In C.W., our supreme court held that under the plain language of section l(D)(g), evidence in support of this unfitness ground must focus on the child\u2019s environment and the parent\u2019s failure to protect before removal of the child from the injurious home environment. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 214-15, 766 N.E.2d at 1115. Further, the court found that an unfitness finding under section l(D)(g) can be based on evidence of the parent\u2019s conduct that gave rise to the removal of the child. Thus, evidence of the parent\u2019s conduct after the removal of the child is irrelevant to a section 1(D) (g) unfitness finding. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 218, 766 N.E.2d at 1117. The court reasoned that \u201cevidence that a parent substantially completed offered services, or otherwise refrained from prior objectionable conduct following removal of the child, does not somehow absolve or erase the parent\u2019s initial failing that triggered State intervention and removal of the child.\u201d C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 217, 766 N.E.2d at 1116. Such evidence is appropriately considered at the best interest stage of the termination of parental rights hearing. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 217, 766 N.E.2d at 1116.\nTherefore, in the present case, the trial court properly based its unfitness finding only on respondent\u2019s conduct before D.T.\u2019s removal and correctly limited the scope of respondent\u2019s unfitness hearing to respondent\u2019s failure to protect D.T. from January 29 through February 1, 1998. Further, after reviewing the evidence admitted at the unfitness hearing, including respondent\u2019s admission that she failed to protect D.T. during that four-day period, we hold that the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent was unfit under section 1(D) (g) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence,\nB. Best Interests\nAfter a parent has been found unfit, the court conducts a separate hearing that focuses on whether termination of the parent\u2019s rights is in the child\u2019s best interests. Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 775 N.E.2d at 307. Even after a parent has been found unfit, it does not automatically follow that the parent cannot remain the child\u2019s legal parent with the attendant rights and privileges. In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1003, 706 N.E.2d 524, 528 (1999). The question of what is in the best interests of the child should not be treated lightly. In re G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d 18, 25, 768 N.E.2d 367, 372 (2002). When determining whether termination of parental rights is in a child\u2019s best interests, the court must consider the following factors in the context of the child\u2019s age and developmental needs: (1) the child\u2019s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child\u2019s identity; (3) his background and ties, including familial, cultural and religious; (4) his sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) his wishes; (6) his community ties; (7) his need for permanence, including his need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2000). A trial court\u2019s finding that termination of a parent\u2019s rights is in the child\u2019s best interests will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766 (2002); In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1115-16, 762 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2002).\nRespondent argues that the trial court incorrectly found that the best interest determination rested within its sound discretion and improperly failed to hold the State to any burden of proof during the best interest hearing. Further, respondent argues that due process concerns require the court to impose upon the State a \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d standard of proof, citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). Alternatively, respondent asserts that the State should bear the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of a parent\u2019s rights is in the child\u2019s best interests.\nThe State concedes that it has the burden to show that termination is in the child\u2019s best interests. However, the State contends that \u201csound discretion\u201d is a sufficient burden of proof at the best interest hearing, explaining that this standard is well established in case law. If this court were to reject sound discretion as a burden of proof, the State asserts that a preponderance of the evidence standard is the proper burden. While respondent urges this court to adopt a clear and convincing evidence standard, the State rejects that standard, contending that Santosky does not mandate such a burden at the best interest stage and instead suggests that a lower burden is appropriate. The assistant public guardian on behalf of D.T. asserts that there is no burden of proof at the best interest hearing, but if a burden exists, it is a preponderance of the evidence.\nFirst, we agree with respondent that \u201csound discretion\u201d is not a burden of proof. \u201cBurden of proof\u2019 is defined as \u201c[a] party\u2019s duty to prove a disputed assertion or charge\u201d and includes both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 190 (7th ed. 1999). The burden of production is \u201c[a] party\u2019s duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling,\u201d while the burden of persuasion includes \u201c[a] party\u2019s duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors that party.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 190 (7th ed. 1999). An issue is \u201cproved\u201d when the court is convinced by the data submitted that the alleged fact is true. 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 336, at 409 (5th ed. 1999).\nIllinois courts recognize only three burdens of proof in civil cases: (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard; (2) the clear and convincing evidence standard; and (3) the proof beyond a reasonable do\u00fcbt standard. 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 339, 341, at 421, 432 (5th ed. 1999). See also In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 343, 730 N.E.2d 1086, 1088 (2000) (State bears the burden of proving abuse, neglect or dependence by a preponderance of the evidence); Schrager v. North Community Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3d 696, 703, 767 N.E.2d 376, 381 (2002) (a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation requires clear and convincing evidence); People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 324-28, 752 N.E.2d 1055, 1059-61 (2001) (while the proceeding is civil, the burden of proof required to commit a defendant to confinement as a sexually dangerous person is proof beyond a reasonable doubt). In support of its contention that sound discretion is a sufficient burden of proof in a best interest hearing, the State cites In re G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d 18, 768 N.E.2d 367 (2002), In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 760 N.E.2d 542 (2001), In re C.M., 319 Ill. App. 3d 344, 744 N.E.2d 916 (2001), In re Sheltanya S., 309 Ill. App. 3d 941, 723 N.E.2d 744 (1999), In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d 291, 719 N.E.2d 1168 (1999), In re J.J., 307 Ill. App. 3d 71, 716 N.E.2d 846 (1999), and In re G.V., 292 Ill. App. 3d 301, 685 N.E.2d 406 (1997). In these cases, the courts merely repeat that the best interest decision is within the sound discretion of the trial court, citing \u201cwell-established case law,\u201d and summarily dismiss the parents\u2019 claims that the clear and convincing standard applies. These cases do not contain any analysis of the appropriate burden of proof or consider the application of a preponderance of the evidence standard. In this case, we are asked to consider both issues.\nWe first determine that the State, as the petitioner, bears the burden of proof in both the unfitness and best interest stages of a termination of parental rights hearing. M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1116, 762 N.E.2d at 706-07. See also In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 322, 763 N.E.2d 251, 258 (2001), quoting People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453, 455, 114 N.E. 145 (1916) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that, upon the filing of a petition under the Juvenile Court Act, the \u2018people become the real party complainant and must prosecute the proceeding\u2019 \u201d). Although M.F. clarifies this issue, it does not specify which burden of proof applies, a preponderance, clear and convincing, or beyond a reasonable doubt. We first look to the language of the statutes.\nAlthough the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2000)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2000)) repeatedly explain that the State carries the burden at the unfitness stage by clear and convincing evidence, neither act specifies the proper burden of proof at the best interest hearing. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2000) (\u201c[w]henever a \u2018best interest\u2019 determination is required, the following factors shall be considered\u201d); 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 29(2) (West 2000) (\u201c[i]f *** the court finds that it is in the best interest of the minor that parental rights be terminated *** the court, *** after finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of the Adoption Act, may terminate parental rights\u201d); 750 ILCS 50/8(a)(l) (West 2000) (consent for adoption is required unless the person is found by the court \u201cto be an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of this Act, by clear and convincing evidence\u201d).\nRespondent cites Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), and argues that Santosky mandates the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard in a best interest hearing. In Santosky, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a New York statute that allowed the State to terminate the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding at the fact-finding hearing, the first stage in the bifurcated permanent neglect proceeding, by a \u201cfair preponderance of the evidence\u201d that the child was \u201cpermanently neglected.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 603, 102 S. Ct. at 1391. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court recognized the fundamental liberty interest natural parents have in the care, custody, and management of their children and rejected respondent\u2019s claim that a parental rights termination proceeding does not interfere with this fundamental interest. The Court analyzed the statute\u2019s due process implications under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), factors and held that \u201c[bjefore a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 603, 102 S. Ct. at 1391-92. Our supreme court adopted this analysis in In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d 124, 133-34, 520 N.E.2d 362, 367 (1988).\nRespondent contends that New York\u2019s fact-finding hearing is equivalent to both our unfitness and best interest hearings and, thus, Santosky requires a clear and convincing standard at both stages. Because the language of Santosky makes clear that the fact-finding stage is comparable only to Illinois\u2019s unfitness determination, we reject her argument.\nSantosky explains that the New York statute bifurcated its permanent neglect proceeding into fact-finding and dispositional hearings. After the State establishes parental unfitness and proves that the child has been permanently neglected at the initial fact-finding stage, the court then \u201cdetermines at a subsequent dispositional hearing what placement would serve the child\u2019s best interests.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 603, 102 S. Ct. at 1392. The Court noted that the fact-finding hearing \u201cpits the State directly against the parents\u201d and is not intended to balance the child\u2019s interest in a normal family home against the parents\u2019 interest in raising the child, and \u201cthe focus emphatically is not on\u201d the child or his foster parents. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610, 102 S. Ct. at 1398. Victory by the State at the fact-finding hearing \u201centails a judicial determination that the parents are unfit to raise their own children.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 611, 102 S. Ct. at 1398. Further, the Court found that \u201c[a]ny parens patriae interest in terminating the natural parents\u2019 rights arises only at the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unfit.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 n.17, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 615 n.17, 102 S. Ct. at 1402 n.17. Thus, New York\u2019s fact-finding hearing corresponds only to Illinois\u2019s unfitness hearing while the dispositional stage in New York is equivalent to our best interest hearing. See also In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 271, 760 N.E.2d 542, 549 (2001) (\u201cSantosky did not hold, as respondents argue, that the State prove that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child by clear and convincing evidence\u201d); M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1116, 762 N.E.2d at 707 (\u201cboth Santosky and Enis were dealing with the applicable standard of proof necessary in the context of an unfitness finding\u201d); In re M.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 205, 213, 729 N.E.2d 86, 93 (2000), aff\u2019d, 196 Ill. 2d 356, 751 N.E.2d 1134 (2001) (Santosky \u201celevated the burden of proof necessary to support a finding of unfitness to clear and convincing evidence\u201d).\nFurther, Santosky implies that a lesser burden of proof is permitted at the best interest hearing. In holding that use of the preponderance of the evidence standard at the fact-finding hearing did not comport with due process, the Court noted that until the State proved parental unfitness at that hearing, \u201cthe child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 611, 102 S. Ct. at 1398. Thus, at the fact-finding stage, because the interests of the child and his parents coincide to favor the use of error-reducing procedures, the State bears the risk of an erroneous result by proving that the parent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence. At the dispositional hearing, however, the child\u2019s and parents\u2019 interests diverge, and therefore, due process does not demand the same heightened standard of proof. D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 271, 760 N.E.2d at 549.\nRespondent cites authority from other jurisdictions that impose a clear and convincing evidence standard in the equivalent of Illinois\u2019s best interest stage of a termination proceeding. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9 \u2014 27\u2014341(b)(3)(A) (Michie 2000); Conn. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 45a\u2014 717(g) (West 2000); In re J.W., 779 N.E.2d 954, 959 (Ind. App. 2002); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 625.090(1) (Michie 2000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12A, \u00a7 4055(1)(B)(2) (West 2000); In re Paternal Rights as to K.D.L., 58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 2151.414(B)(1) (West 2000); S.D. Codified Laws \u00a7 26 \u2014 8A\u201427 (Michie 2000); Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 78 \u2014 3a\u2014406(3) (2000); Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 16.1 \u2014 283(B) (Michie 2000). While respondent is correct that many states employ a clear and convincing standard, several other states use the preponderance of the evidence standard. See, e.g., Alaska Child in Need of Aid R. 18(c)(2)(C) (West 2000) (preponderance); In re Guardianship of Jolie S., 298 A.D.2d 194, 195, 748 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (2002) (preponderance); In re Dependency of A.S., 101 Wash. App. 60, 74, 6 P.3d 11, 18 (2000) (preponderance). The fact that these states utilize two different and distinct standards suggests that Santosky does not mandate the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard at the best interest hearing.\nAside from her reliance on Santosky, respondent also urges us to consider whether due process considerations require the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall \u201cdeprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. Xiy \u00a7 1. The due process clause guarantees \u201c \u2018heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.\u2019 \u201d In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362, 751 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (2001), quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 787, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997). Both the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have recognized the fundamental liberty interest natural parents have in the care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 56, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 606, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95; Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 649-50, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2159-60 (1981); M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 362, 751 N.E.2d at 1139; Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 128-29, 520 N.E.2d at 365. Further, Santosky established that parental rights termination proceedings interfere with this fundamental liberty interest and, therefore, must meet the requirements of the due process clause. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 606-07, 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95; M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363, 751 N.E.2d at 1140. As the Santosky Court noted, \u201c[w]hen the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610, 102 S. Ct. at 1397.\nIn Santosky, the Court reiterated that the nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings involves balancing the three factors first delineated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 607, 102 S. Ct. at 1395, citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 649, 101 S. Ct. at 2159. The Mathews factors are: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute safeguards would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33, 96 S. Ct. at 903.\nApplying the first factor to the clear and convincing standard of proof, we recognize two competing private interests at stake in the best interest stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding. The first is the interest of a parent in the custody, care and control of her child and in maintaining a parental relationship with that child. In re Vanessa C., 316 Ill. App. 3d 475, 481, 736 N.E.2d 593, 598 (2000). This interest is fundamental and will not be extinguished lightly. M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 365, 751 N.E.2d at 1141. \u201cEven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 606, 102 S. Ct. at 1395. Additionally, the child has an important interest in a loving, stable and safe home environment, which may not involve any relationship with her natural parent. While she has a stake in preserving some kind of relationship with her natural parent, she may also have an interest in maintaining a relationship with her foster parents. At this hearing, the interests of the parents and child diverge and they may become adversaries. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 611, 102 S. Ct. at 1398.\nUnder the second Mathews factor, we next consider the risk of erroneous deprivation of the child\u2019s and parent\u2019s interests resulting from the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. \u201cThe function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to \u2018instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.\u2019 \u201d Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 329, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808 (1979), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 379, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1076 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process clause \u201creflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.\u201d Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 607, 102 S. Ct. at 1395.\nThus, under this factor, we must balance the rights of the child versus the rights of the parent to determine who should shoulder the risk of error at the best interest hearing. By this stage, the parent has been found unfit by clear and convincing evidence. While the parent retains a fundamental interest, the proper focus of this hearing is on the child. See Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 775 N.E.2d at 307. Once a finding of unfitness has been made, all considerations, including the parent\u2019s rights, must yield to the best interest of the child. G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 24, 768 N.E.2d at 372; Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 170, 775 N.E.2d at 307. Further, \u201ca parent\u2019s right or interest in his child does not amount to an absolute vested right.\u201d In re S.W., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 1156, 735 N.E.2d 706, 709 (2000). In proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, the primary concern is the best interests of the child and the \u201cparents\u2019 right to the custody of their child shall not prevail when the court determines that it is contrary to the health, safety, and best interests of the child.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2(3)(c) (West 2000). See also In re Andrea F., 327 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1079, 764 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (2002). After balancing these interests, we find that the child\u2019s interest is of paramount concern at the best interest hearing and determine that the child should not bear the risk of error at this proceeding. The use of the clear and convincing evidence standard would unfairly place a significant burden of proof on the State to the detriment of the child. Additionally, the application of the clear and convincing standard would provide an unfit parent with greater protection at the child\u2019s expense. Because the child\u2019s interest trumps that of the parent during the best interest hearing, we find that a heightened burden of proof is not required.\nLastly, we must consider the governmental interests involved in the best interest stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding and any burdens that a higher standard of proof would place on those interests. The State has two interests at stake in termination proceedings: a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 615, 102 S. Ct. at 1401. The State also has a parens patriae interest in terminating the natural parent\u2019s rights after he or she has been found unfit. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 n.17, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 615 n.17, 102 S. Ct. at 1402 n.17. Once a parent has been found unfit by clear and convincing evidence at the first stage, the State\u2019s interest in protecting the child is sufficiently compelling to allow the termination of parental rights. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 308, 745 N.E.2d 1233, 1244 (2001). Thus, the use of the higher clear and convincing evidence standard is unnecessary.\nAfter balancing the Mathews factors, we conclude that due process concerns do not require the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard at a best interest hearing. Rather, we will apply the usual standard of proof in civil cases, the preponderance of the evidence standard. 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 339, at 421 (5th ed. 1999). This standard fairly allocates the risk of error by imposing upon the State the burden to prove that it is more likely than not that termination of the parent\u2019s rights is in the child\u2019s best interests. Additionally, the preponderance standard adequately protects the parent\u2019s fundamental right to the care and custody of her child, the child\u2019s right to a safe, loving and secure environment and the State\u2019s parens patriae interests.\nAccordingly, we hold that, at the best interest stage in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the State bears the burden to prove that termination is in the child\u2019s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. In meeting its burden, the State must present evidence supporting the best interest factors delineated in the Juvenile Court Act. See 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2000). In determining whether the State met this burden of proof, the trial court must make credibility determinations and factual findings supporting its final decision to terminate the parent\u2019s rights. Next, the Juvenile Court Act dictates that the best interests factors \u201cshall be considered in the context of the child\u2019s age and developmental needs.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2000). By using the phrase \u201cshall be considered,\u201d the legislature implied that when considering and weighing these factors and arriving at the ultimate decision whether termination of the parent\u2019s rights are in the child\u2019s best interests, the trial court should exercise its discretion. On appeal, we review the trial court\u2019s factual findings under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 773; M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1115-16, 762 N.E.2d at 706. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite conclusion. D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 773.\nApplying this burden of proof and appellate review to this case, we find that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights was in D.T.\u2019s best interests. Thus, the trial court\u2019s decision to terminate respondent\u2019s rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. While there was some evidence to support the trial court\u2019s decision, the bulk of the evidence weighed against termination. Specifically, the evidence from the State\u2019s witnesses did not show a benefit to D.T. from terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights nor did it reveal that continued contact with respondent would harm him. Only one witness, Danielson, testified that termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights would be in D.T.\u2019s best interests. While D.T. was close to Simon-son, Danielson stated that he had a strong bond and very close relationship with respondent and was very affectionate with her. While Arroyo testified that D.T. needed rules, boundaries and limits and stated that Simonson provided this structure, he had never observed a visit between respondent and D.T. Additionally, Danielson testified that respondent acted appropriately with D.T. and set proper limits and boundaries during visits. Simonson testified that although she wanted to adopt D.T., she did not believe that he would be at risk with respondent. D.T. told Danielson that he wanted to visit respondent every day and also told her in May 2001 that he wanted to return home to respondent. The Children\u2019s Place Association records noted that respondent was very attentive during visits, did not need coaching, and expressed appropriate concern for D.T.\u2019s safety. Further, in February 2000, Pesek believed that continued visitation with respondent was in D.T.\u2019s best interests. Respondent\u2019s therapist, Sonnenfeld, testified that breaking the attachment between respondent and D.T. would be harmful to him. There was also substantial evidence that respondent completed many domestic violence and parenting classes, participated in individual and family counseling sessions, made steady progress in therapy and attended all of her visits with D.T. Therefore, the evidence did not establish that it would be in D.T.\u2019s best interests to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nTherefore, we hold that the trial court\u2019s decision to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights to D.T. was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We reverse this case and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nGREIMAN and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.\nThe court also terminated the parental rights of D.T.\u2019s father, D.T., Sr., but he is not a party to this appeal.\nRespondent appealed from the August 27, 1998, permanency order and this court remanded the case with directions to reassign it to another judge. In re D.T., No. 1 \u2014 98\u20144175 (March 31, 2000) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23).\nRespondent does not argue that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies at this hearing. Even if we were to consider the application of this standard, we would reject it. First, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is rarely used in civil cases. 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 341, at 432 (5th ed. 1999). Additionally, because Santosky implies that a lesser burden than clear and convincing evidence is permissible at the best interest stage, the higher standard, beyond a reasonable doubt, is not applicable.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE THEIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard Cozzolla, Diana White, Kimberly Jordan, Colleen Connolly, Sheri Diaz, and Ruth Giles Ott, all of Legal Assistance Foundation, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Nancy Kisicki and Carrie E. Strobel, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles P. Golbert and Rhonda S. Love, of counsel), guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re D.T., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. B.T., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20142410\nOpinion filed March 27, 2003.\nRichard Cozzolla, Diana White, Kimberly Jordan, Colleen Connolly, Sheri Diaz, and Ruth Giles Ott, all of Legal Assistance Foundation, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Nancy Kisicki and Carrie E. Strobel, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Charles P. Golbert and Rhonda S. Love, of counsel), guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0133-01", "first_page_order": 151, "last_page_order": 173 }