{ "id": 25450, "name": "BRENDAN O'LOUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF RIVER FOREST, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "O'Loughlin v. Village of River Forest", "decision_date": "2003-03-28", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-0404", "first_page": "189", "last_page": "197", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 189" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3500195 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545386 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395208 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106963 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811545 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990377 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594572 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519654 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599348 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" }, { "page": "666" }, { "page": "666" }, { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453249 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209990 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 1157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570216 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1162" }, { "page": "1162-63" }, { "page": "1163" }, { "page": "1163-64" }, { "page": "1164-65" }, { "page": "1162-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/1157-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 916", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2568525 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0916-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477021 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55982 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55998 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171737 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609696 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472373 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1135" }, { "page": "1136" }, { "page": "1137" }, { "page": "1135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/1133-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351230 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259023 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 857, "char_count": 20406, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4945111256959288e-07, "percentile": 0.6636439035634896 }, "sha256": "7626f80154596114f312c7334523686679733597bd81b3518a6287769917f1f5", "simhash": "1:f1be5de6a6eeb7cf", "word_count": 3312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.941926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRENDAN O\u2019LOUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF RIVER FOREST, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE REID\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Brendan O\u2019Loughlin, appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, the Village of River Forest, Illinois (River Forest), and the denial of his cross-motion for summary judgment. The sole issue raised on appeal is what is meant by the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d under the Illinois Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 1998)) (the Act). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the trial court.\nTHE FACTS\nO\u2019Loughlin was employed as a police officer for River Forest in July 1988. On January 16, 1997, O\u2019Loughlin injured his left shoulder while in the line of duty. The injury occurred when he slipped on ice and fell while approaching a suspected criminal\u2019s car during an investigation. O\u2019Loughlin tore cartilage in his left shoulder joint and was required to undergo surgery and physical therapy. O\u2019Loughlin returned to full duty in November 1997.\nOn January 16, 1998, O\u2019Loughlin injured his left shoulder again while attempting to restrain a subject who whs being placed under arrest. O\u2019Loughlin again underwent surgery and physical therapy. However, as a result of the injury, O\u2019Loughlin was unable to perform the duties of a police officer and consequently was granted a line-of-duty disability pension by the River Forest Police Pension Board on January 11, 1999.\nOn November 23, 1999, O\u2019Loughlin filed a complaint wherein he requested that River Forest pay health insurance premiums for him and his family pursuant to the Act. O\u2019Loughlin argued that he suffered a catastrophic injury, which made him eligible to receive insurance coverage under the Act.\nOn September 28, 2001, River Forest filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion, River Forest argued that O\u2019Loughlin\u2019s shoulder injury was not a catastrophic injury and consequently he was not entitled to receive benefits under the Act. On October 31, 2002, O\u2019Loughlin filed a cross-motion for summary judgment wherein he argued that his shoulder injury was a catastrophic injury and that he was entitled to receive benefits under the Act. On January 10, 2002, the trial court granted River Forest\u2019s motion and denied O\u2019Loughlin\u2019s. This appeal follows.\nANALYSIS\nO\u2019Loughlin argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for summary judgment and instead granted River Forest\u2019s motion for summary judgment. O\u2019Loughlin maintains the trial court erred because the shoulder injury that he suffered qualifies as a \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d for purposes of benefits under the Act.\nAlthough the use of summary judgment aids in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit, it is a drastic measure and should only be granted if the movant\u2019s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted, therefore, only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2000). In considering a summary judgment motion, the court has a duty to construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001). In appeals from orders granting summary judgment, our review is de novo. Travelers, 197 Ill. 2d at 292.\nStatutory construction is a matter of law and review is de novo. People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225, 228 (2001); Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1135 (2002), aff\u2019d, 204 Ill. 2d 392 (2003), citing People v. Slover, 323 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623 (2001). The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 228. This inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). The legislative intent is best ascertained by examining the language of the statute itself. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996); Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996).\nThe rules of statutory construction provide that in determining the intent of the legislature, courts must first look to the plain language of the statute and interpret the language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222 (1995); Billman v. Crown-Trygg Corp., 205 Ill. App. 3d 916, 923 (1990), citing County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143 (1985). A term that is undefined in a statute must be given its ordinary and properly understood meaning. Villarreal v. Village of Schaumberg, 325 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 1162 (2001), citing Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 477-78 (1998).\nWhere the words themselves are unambiguous, there is no need to resort to external aids of interpretation. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d at 222; People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). The appellate court cannot restrict or enlarge the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. Stewart v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 135 Ill. App. 3d 661, 666 (1985), citing People v. McCray, 116 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26 (1983). A court may not declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language imports. Stewart, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 666, citing Hetterman v. Weingart, 120 Ill. App. 3d 683, 690 (1983). The court\u2019s only function, where the statutory language is unambiguous, is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. Stewart, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 666, citing Harvey Fireman\u2019s Ass\u2019n v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363 (1979). Rules of construction in interpreting a statute are to be used only where there is doubt as to the meaning of the statute. Stewart, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 667, citing Sickler v. National Dairy Products Corp., 67 Ill. 2d 229, 235 (1977).\nWhen the language used is susceptible to more than one equally reasonable interpretation, the court may look to additional sources to determine the legislature\u2019s intent. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d at 222. Where the language is ambiguous, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history. People v. Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141 (1983), citing People ex rel. Hanrahan v. White, 52 Ill. 2d 70 (1972). \u201cThis court has previously looked to the debates on the floor of the General Assembly to ascertain the legislative intent underlying specific legislation.\u201d Morel v. Coronet Insurance Co., 117 Ill. 2d 18, 24 (1987). Statements of the legislation\u2019s sponsor are particularly helpful in determining the intent of the statute. Spinelli v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, Inc., 144 Ill. App. 3d 325, 330 (1986).\nThe relevant section of the Act provides:\n\u201c\u00a7 10. Required health coverage benefits.\n(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date of this Act suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer\u2019s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee\u2019s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority or until the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age of 25 if the child continues to be dependent for support or the child is a full-time or part-time student and is dependent for support. The term \u2018health insurance plan\u2019 does not include supplemental benefits that are not part of the basic group health insurance plan. If the injured employee subsequently dies, the employer shall continue to pay the entire health insurance premium for the surviving spouse until remarried and for the dependent children under the conditions established in this Section. ***\n* * *\n(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance coverage under this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer\u2019s response to fresh pursuit, the officer or firefighter\u2019s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit health insurance coverage or pension benefits for which the officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children may otherwise be eligible.\u201d 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 1998).\nO\u2019Loughlin contends that the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is an ambiguous term and that this court should look at the legislative history of the Act for guidance in determining its meaning. O\u2019Loughlin asserts that when the legislative history of the Act is reviewed, the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d clearly refers to any injury that causes a police officer to take a line-of-duty disability pension. O\u2019Loughlin relies on Krohe to support his proposition.\nIn Krohe, a firefighter was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension. He then filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment requesting the trial court to enter an order that he was entitled to have his family\u2019s insurance premiums paid by the defendant pursuant to section 10 of the Act. The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to receive benefits under the Act. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in interpreting \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d under section 10 of the Act.\nThe Krohe court initially looked to the Act and determined that it did not define the term \u201ccatastrophic injury.\u201d The court then found that the intent of the language of the Act was uncertain and ambiguous and turned to its legislative history for guidance. Krohe, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1136. In finding that the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d was ambiguous, the Krohe court only stated that \u201cthe term\u2019s uncertain definition renders the Act ambiguous.\u201d Krohe, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1137.\nWhen it reviewed the legislative history of the Act, the Krohe court relied on the following statement from Senator Donahue as being representative of the legislature\u2019s intended definition for the term \u201ccatastrophically injured\u201d: \u201c \u2018I\u2019d like to say for the sake of the record what we mean by catastrophically injured. What it means is that it is our intention to define \u201ccatastrophically injured\u201d as a police officer or firefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line-of-duty disability.\u2019 \u201d Krohe, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1135, quoting 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue).\nIn response, River Forest contends that O\u2019Loughlin\u2019s shoulder injury is not a catastrophic injury under the Act. Specifically, River Forest asserts that when one considers the usual, common and customary meaning of the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d without resorting to outside aids or sources, then O\u2019Loughlin\u2019s shoulder injury cannot be considered catastrophic in nature. River Forest argues that the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is not ambiguous and that there is no need to resort to outside aids such as legislative history to interpret its meaning. River Forest relies on Villarreal to support its argument.\nIn Villarreal, an on-duty police officer suffered a knee injury that caused him to receive a duty-related disability pension of 65% of his salary. The police officer then sought to receive benefits under the Act from the defendant and was denied. Subsequently, the police officer then brought an action seeking an order of mandamus requiring the defendant to provide him with health insurance coverage pursuant to the Act. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the police officer argued that he suffered a catastrophic injury and that he was eligible for benefits under the Act.\nThe Villarreal court first noted that \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d was not defined in the Act and sought to determine its ordinary meaning. After looking at several definitions of the word \u201ccatastrophe,\u201d the Villarreal court determined that the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d meant \u201cfinancially ruinous\u201d and as such that it was not an ambiguous term. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1162-63.\nThe plaintiff in Villarreal was found to still be capable of engaging in a wide variety of occupations after his employment as a police officer. The court found that, \u201c[i]n the context of the Act, the mere fact that plaintiff currently cannot perform the duties of a police officer does not qualify his injury as \u2018catastrophic.\u2019 \u201d Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1163.\nThe Villarreal court then addressed the plaintiffs contention that the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d was intended to cover a range of injuries. In rejecting this argument, the court turned to the doctrine of noseitur a sociis. The court reviewed the Act and found that because the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d was followed by \u201cor killed in the line of duty,\u201d \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d meant an injury of such serious consequences to make it just short of getting killed. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1163-64.\nThe Villarreal court then reviewed the definition of \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d in other jurisdictions and found that those definitions were in accord with its decision. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1164-65.\nHere, the essential question to be answered is whether the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is ambiguous. The Act does not define the term. As such, the rules of statutory construction require us to first look to the plain language of the statute and interpret the language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d at 222.\nFollowing are several definitions of the word \u201ccatastrophe\u201d:\n\u201cA notable disaster; a more serious calamity than might ordinarily be understood from the term \u2018casualty.\u2019 Utter or complete failure.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 219 (6th ed. 1990).\n\u201cA disastrous end, bringing overthrow or ruin. Any great and sudden calamity, disaster, or misfortune. A total or ignominious failure.\u201d Webster\u2019s New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 1999).\n\u201cA sudden and widespread disaster. Any misfortune, mishap, or failure; fiasco. A final event or conclusion, usually an unfortunate one; a disastrous end.\u201d Random House Webster\u2019s Unabridged Dictionary 326 (2d ed. 2000).\nIn our view, these definitions of the word \u201ccatastrophe\u201d do not leave a clear impression of what the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d means. The word that reoccurs throughout these different definitions is \u201cdisaster.\u201d That leaves us to ask, is it not a disaster for one to lose his ability to follow his chosen profession? Or is it only a disaster for one to never be able to work again? It is arguable that both are disasters.\nThe last definition of \u201ccatastrophe\u201d stated that it is \u201c[a] final event or conclusion, usually an unfortunate one; a disastrous end.\u201d Random House Webster\u2019s Unabridged Dictionary 326 (2d ed. 2000). Does an injury that causes one to be unable to follow a chosen profession qualify as a final event? Does the finality contemplated under the Act mean the complete inability for one to work as a police officer, or the complete inability for one to work? These questions in themselves suggest that the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d is ambiguous.\nIn Villarreal the court determined that \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d meant financially ruinous and as such was not an ambiguous term. Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1162-63. However, in coming to this conclusion, the Villarreal court took note of six different definitions of \u201ccatastrophe\u201d and \u201ccatastrophic injury,\u201d four of which were from jurisdictions outside Illinois. In our view, this tends to show that there is no clear-cut definition for the term. We also note that the Villarreal court did not look to the legislative history of this state for guidance. This may be because it determined that the term was not ambiguous and consequently that there was no need to resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. Yet, that leaves us to ask, why did it consider the definition of the term from no less than four other jurisdictions if the term was not ambiguous?\nWe find \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d to be an ambiguous term, and as such, we will look to the legislative history for guidance.\nRepresentative Tenhouse was the sponsor of House Bill 1347 (the Bill), which eventually became the Act. On April 14, 1997, Representative Tenhouse stated:\n\u201c1347 is a simple Bill. It simply provides that fall-time law enforcement officers and firefighters that are tilled or disabled in the line of duty, we\u2019re going to continue the health benefits for the officer\u2019s children and spouse.\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 14, 1997, at 180 (statements of Representative Tenhouse).\nSpeaker Hannig then responded: \u201cIs there any discussion?\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 14, 1997, at 180 (statement of Representative Hannig). No Representatives responded. A vote was taken, and the Bill passed with a constitutional majority of 113 to 4.\nIn the Senate, on May 16, 1997, Senator Donahue, who was the sponsor of the Bill in the Senate, when speaking about the Bill stated:\n\u201cAnd what this does is that it provides that for full-time law enforcement officers and firefighters that are tilled or disabled in the line of duty shall continue the health benefits for the officer or the firefighter, their spouses and their children.\u201d 90th 111. Gen. As-sem., Senate Proceedings, May 16, 1997, at 192 (statements of Senator Donahue).\nAfter Senator Donahue finished speaking, Presiding Officer, Senator Dudycz, asked, \u201cIs there any discussion?\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 16, 1997, at 192 (statements of Senator Dudycz). There were no questions and the Bill passed with a 53 to 1 vote, with 1 voting present.\nOn August 1, 1997, House Bill 1347 was vetoed by the Governor. In response, on October 28, 1997, Representative Tenhouse stated:\n\u201cHouse Bill 1347 was a Bill that passed out of here with overwhelming support. Creates the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act. Provides that employers of full-time law enforcement and firefighters v/ho are tilled or disabled in the line of duty, shall continue health benefits for the officer o[r] firefighter and the spouse and children, thereof. *** I\u2019m seeking total override of the Governor\u2019s Veto, and I stand ready to answer any questions.\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, October 28, 1997, at 16 (statements of Representative Tenhouse).\nSpeaker Hannig responded, \u201cOn House Bill 1347, is there any discussion?\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, October 28, 1997, at 16 (statements of Representative Hannig). There were no questions posed, and the Bill passed with 115 voting yes and 1 voting no.\nOn November 14, 1997, before voting to override the Governor\u2019s veto in the Senate, Senator Donahue stated:\n\u201cI\u2019d like to say for the sake of the record what we mean by catastrophically injured. What it means is that it is our intent to define \u2018catastrophically injured\u2019 as a police officer or firefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line-of-duty disability.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue).\nIn response, Presiding Officer, Senator Dudycz, stated, \u201cSenator Donahue has moved that House Bill 1347 do pass, the veto of the Governor to the contrary notwithstanding. Any discussion?\u201d 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Dudycz). No questions or arguments were had and the Bill passed with a 58 to 1 vote.\nHere, it is clear that the legislature of Illinois intended for the Act to cover police officers and firefighters who were forced to take a line-of-duty disability. Consequently, the trial court\u2019s decision is reversed.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is reversed.\nReversed.\nCAMPBELL, EJ., and QUINN, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE REID" } ], "attorneys": [ "John R. Roche, Jr., of Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, of Western Springs, for appellant.", "Jay S. Judge and Michael E. Kujawa, both of Judge, James & Kujawa, L.L.C., of Park Ridge, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRENDAN O\u2019LOUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF RIVER FOREST, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201402\u20140404\nOpinion filed March 28, 2003.\nJohn R. Roche, Jr., of Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, of Western Springs, for appellant.\nJay S. Judge and Michael E. Kujawa, both of Judge, James & Kujawa, L.L.C., of Park Ridge, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0189-01", "first_page_order": 207, "last_page_order": 215 }