{ "id": 25406, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD W. STIVERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Stivers", "decision_date": "2003-04-15", "docket_number": "No. 2-01-0991", "first_page": "262", "last_page": "265", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 262" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2990741 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631", "parenthetical": "if charging instrument shows on its face that statute of limitations has run, it must allege facts invoking an extended limitations period or tolling the statute of limitations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442050 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-01" }, { "page": "100-01" }, { "page": "100-01" }, { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259103 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131034 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132451 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483555 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0472-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 436, "char_count": 7584, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2192578832330147e-07, "percentile": 0.5978066674929696 }, "sha256": "e93afd132ef77ca658f114f7b98e29e41f19323d1e3ab307946da0c1c430afca", "simhash": "1:baf0d68f9338e879", "word_count": 1235 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.941926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD W. STIVERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn separate cases, defendant, Ronald Stivers, pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(1) (West 1998)) and criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(1) (West 1998)) and was sentenced to prison terms of 13 years and 9 years, respectively. Defendant filed a postconviction petition. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the issues were waived because defendant did not file a direct appeal. Defendant appeals the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the trial court erred by holding that the failure to directly appeal waives all issues on collateral review. He also contends that his petition states the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim. We reverse and remand.\nOn April 16, 1998, in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u201461, defendant was charged by indictment with criminal sexual assault. On August 6, 1998, in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u2014119, defendant was charged by information with aggravated criminal sexual assault. Both charging instruments alleged that defendant committed the offenses in 1994.\nIn case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u201461, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sexual assault in exchange for a nine-year sentence. In case No. 98\u2014 CF \u2014 119, he pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement to recommend a sentence of no more than 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.\nOn January 11, 2001, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which he later amended, raising numerous issues. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, holding that defendant waived the issues by not moving to withdraw his plea or filing a direct appeal. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant argues that the trial court incorrectly applied supreme court precedent holding that an issue that could have been raised in an earlier direct appeal is waived for purposes of a postconviction petition. See People v. Hampton, 165 Ill. 2d 472, 479 (1995). He argues that, where a defendant does not file a direct appeal, he is not precluded from raising issues in a postconviction proceeding. Citing People v. Vilces, 321 Ill. App. 3d 937 (2001), the State responds that, where defendant neither moves to withdraw his plea nor pursues a direct appeal, he is precluded from raising in a postconviction petition most issues concerning the validity of the plea.\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)) provides a three-stage process to adjudicate petitions filed under it. In the first stage, the circuit court determines whether the petition is \u201cfrivolous or is patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). The court, without input from the State, must assess in the summary review stage whether the petition\u2019s allegations, liberally construed and taken as true, set forth a constitutional claim for relief. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). The court may not engage in any fact-finding or review matters beyond the petition\u2019s allegations. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-81 (1998).\nTo survive dismissal at this stage, the petition must present only \u201cthe gist of a constitutional claim.\u201d Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. If the court finds the petition frivolous or patently without merit, it must dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). If the petition survives the initial stage, the court may appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant and counsel will have an opportunity to amend the petition. People v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448, 451 (1999).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has held that a trial court may dismiss a postconviction petition at the first stage only if the petition fails to meet the \u201clow threshold\u201d of presenting the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001); see also People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 100-01 (2002). Particularly, in Boclair, the supreme court ruled that a trial court may not dismiss a postconviction petition at the first stage because it is untimely. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 100-01. The court emphasized the plain statutory language that the court may dismiss a petition at the initial stage only if it is \u201cfrivolous or *** patently without merit.\u201d Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 100-01. The court stated that timeliness is akin to an affirmative defense that the State can either raise, waive, or forfeit. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 101.\nLike timeliness, waiver is in the nature of an affirmative defense that the State may either raise, waive, or forfeit. Whether an issue is waived does not determine whether an issue has merit. Similar to the statute of limitations question in Boclair, the State should be required to raise any waiver issue in a motion to dismiss or forfeit the issue. The trend of recent cases such as Boclair and Edwards is to curtail trial courts\u2019 authority to dispose of postconviction petitions at the first stage. Pleading niceties and procedural technicalities should not be considered, and early dismissal is warranted only where a petition\u2019s allegations clearly lack substantive merit.\nUnder this standard, defendant\u2019s petition meets the \u201clow threshold\u201d of stating the gist of a constitutional claim. Defendant alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not move to dismiss the charging instruments on statute of limitations grounds. Although the general statute of limitations for felonies is three years (720 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 5(b) (West 2000)), the indictment and information, issued in 1998, allege that defendant committed his crimes in 1994 and do not allege any facts that would extend the statute of limitations. See People v. Gwinn, 255 Ill. App. 3d 628, 631 (1994) (if charging instrument shows on its face that statute of limitations has run, it must allege facts invoking an extended limitations period or tolling the statute of limitations).\nAt the relevant time, section 3 \u2014 6(h) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provided a five-year statute of limitations for specified sex crimes \u201cif the victim reported the offense to law enforcement authorities within 2 years after the commission of the offense.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6(h) (West 1998) (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6(i) (West 2000)). However, the charging instruments here do not specifically allege reliance on section 3 \u2014 6 or that the victims reported the offenses within two years.\nDefendant\u2019s petition states, at a minimum, the gist of a claim that counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the charging instruments. It is conceivable, of course, that the State could have obtained amended charging instruments and that counsel accordingly made a strategic decision to forgo that formality, but we cannot make that decision from the present record. Defendant has stated the gist of a constitutional claim and his petition should advance to the second stage of the postconviction procedure.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County is reversed, and the cause is remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nHUTCHINSON, EJ., and BOWMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Douglas P. Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Michael A. Hall, of Peoria, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD W. STIVERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201401\u20140991\nOpinion filed April 15, 2003.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDouglas P. Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Michael A. Hall, of Peoria, for the People." }, "file_name": "0262-01", "first_page_order": 280, "last_page_order": 283 }