{ "id": 25402, "name": "In re O.C., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. O.C., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. O.C.", "decision_date": "2003-04-11", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-0551", "first_page": "292", "last_page": "298", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 292" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "633 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5375060 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295647 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 N.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2987219 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521028 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1097" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 N.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2865501 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0723-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 677, "char_count": 13904, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0905287362140781e-07, "percentile": 0.5655240904006372 }, "sha256": "d1527af929ef32414fa6057b93766baa796590ae6620660cb39056f0b7271f96", "simhash": "1:288592341b8e9f66", "word_count": 2138 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.941926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re O.C., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. O.C., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, O.C., appeals the trial court\u2019s June 2002 order finding him subject to involuntary admission to a mental health facility pursuant to section 3 \u2014 700 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 700 (West 2000)) and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.l(a\u20145) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145) (West Supp. 2001)). Respondent contends (1) no clear and convincing evidence warranted respondent\u2019s involuntary admission, (2) hospitalization was not the least-restrictive treatment alternative, (3) respondent\u2019s procedural due process rights were violated, and (4) no clear and convincing evidence warranted an order for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. We reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn June 21, 2002, Amy Mundwiler, a supervisor at Heritage Behavioral Health Center (Heritage), filed a petition for involuntary admission of respondent by court order. The petition alleged respondent was a person who was mentally ill and who, because of his illness, was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. Specifically, the petition stated respondent was observed the day before dancing in the middle of a street and then yelling for someone to \u201cget away from me or I\u2019ll beat your f \u2014 ing ass\u201d when no one was around him. Further, respondent allegedly made a phone call stating he is a Green Beret and he will draw \u201cfirst blood.\u201d The trial court ordered the clerk to issue a writ directing the sheriff to take custody of respondent. Two doctors examined respondent and filed certificates finding respondent was subject to involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalization.\nOn June 24, 2002, Stephen Rathnow signed a petition for administration of authorized involuntary treatment. However, the petition was not file-stamped, and the docket sheets in the record do not indicate the petition was formally filed. Also on June 24, the trial court appointed counsel for respondent and set a hearing for June 25 on Mundwiler\u2019s petition. The trial court directed the clerk to send notice of the hearing, and a sheriff\u2019s deputy delivered notice to respondent on that day.\nOn June 25, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on the petition for involuntary admission. Mundwiler testified she was familiar with respondent through Heritage for about five years. Respondent\u2019s diagnosis went between bipolar disorder and schizo-affective disorder during that time. Mundwiler overheard respondent talking to a case manager, and respondent discussed how he was walking around Decatur telling people off to release his frustrations. Mundwiler heard respondent say he did not want to have to hurt anyone.\nDr. Patil testified he saw respondent in the evening after his admission. Patil characterized respondent as being very paranoid, suspicious, delusional, agitated, extremely loud, boisterous, and grandiose. Patil diagnosed respondent with bipolar disorder. Respondent had not been completely compliant with medications. Patil believed respondent was a person who was mentally ill and, because of his illness, was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another. Patil noted, \u201cWith paranoia, suspiciousness, and grandiosity, he is likely to misperceive what other people\u2019s motives are and he may work [sic] out unknowingly, not knowingly.\u201d Patil highly recommended McFarland at the least-restrictive placement. On cross-examination, Patil noted respondent\u2019s loud and boisterous behavior on the unit required intervention but respondent did not \u201ccome across to threaten anybody.\u201d\nLynn Schollenbruch, a case manager at Heritage, observed respondent screaming and cussing on a park bench while holding a guitar. She heard respondent threatening to hurt people, but no one in the area seemed to be responding to him. On cross-examination, she testified respondent had headphones around his neck. Schollenbruch heard respondent speak, \u201cI\u2019m going to kill you,\u201d although she did not witness respondent threaten any particular person who was nearby.\nSchare Antoniou testified on respondent\u2019s behalf. She had dated respondent for three years. She visited him on June 20, 2002, and he did not seem unusual. She never saw respondent do anything like cussing on the street. Respondent consistently took his medications. Respondent listens to rap music, amongst other varieties, and he likes to sing to the words. Brenda Antoniou, Schare\u2019s mother, also testified for respondent. She knew respondent for three years. She stated she saw respondent on June 19 or June 20 and he was not delusional or threatening.\nRespondent\u2019s counsel argued respondent had never harmed anyone and he was merely singing along to rap music. The trial court found the State\u2019s witnesses to be more credible. The trial court found the allegations proved by clear and convincing evidence and found respondent to be a person subject to involuntary admission. The trial court ordered respondent to be hospitalized in the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities for up to 90 days.\nAfter the trial court admonished respondent of his appeal rights, Mary Bolton, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, noted the petition for involuntary treatment. The trial court inquired whether that hearing was set for that day, and Bolton replied, \u201cI think it should be.\u201d The trial court then stated, \u201cYou\u2019re correct,\u201d and proceeded.\nDr. Patil prescribed lithium and Depakote to stabilize mood. Zyprexa treats psychotic symptoms such as delusions and paranoia. Respondent\u2019s Depakote levels were below normal, which is inconsistent with taking medication on a regular basis. Patil explained the safety of the medicines and the need for periodic blood testing. Respondent agreed to cooperate with Patil but refused when the nurses gave him the medicine. Patil stated respondent\u2019s mental state would tremendously improve with the medications and respondent would likely act out without the medications. On cross-examination, Patil noted dryness of mouth and excess urination as short-term side effects of lithium. Haldol would be administered if respondent did not cooperate. Haldol can cause stiffness, which would be taken care of with Co-gentin. However, artificial muscular movements could develop in the long term.\nRespondent testified he would take Depakote but he objected to lithium. Respondent earlier took lithium with Haldol and Cogentin, and he developed gynecomastia, requiring liposuction on his chest. The trial court then recalled Patil, who stated Haldol could produce gynecomastia but lithium would never have that effect. The trial court then granted the petition for involuntary treatment.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Involuntary Commitment\nRespondent initially argues no clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding he was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. The State claims respondent\u2019s involuntary commitment was proper because his verbal outbursts are dangerous and harm is reasonably likely to occur. We agree with respondent.\nA person is subject to involuntary admission if he is mentally ill and because of his illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 119 (West 2000). A person may not be confined against his will merely because he is mentally ill if he is dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom. In re Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d 723, 727, 633 N.E.2d 169, 172 (1994). The State has the burden of showing the need for confinement by clear and convincing evidence (Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 727, 633 N.E.2d at 172), and the trial court\u2019s decision will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence (In re Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1097, 679 N.E.2d 818, 824 (1997)).\nWe find the trial court\u2019s decision to order respondent\u2019s involuntary commitment was against the manifest weight of the evidence because insufficient evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding of a reasonable likelihood of future harm. The record contains no evidence respondent ever physically harmed himself or another. After respondent had been receiving outpatient treatment through Heritage for \u201ca number of years,\u201d a case manager witnessed him on a park bench \u201cscreaming, cussing, and threatening to hurt people.\u201d However, respondent was not threatening anyone in particular, and no one seemed to respond to him. A supervisor at Heritage overheard respondent state he was telling people off to relieve his frustrations. Respondent\u2019s treating psychiatrist noted respondent\u2019s boisterous and loud behavior in the unit required staff intervention, but respondent did not physically threaten or harm anyone. Put together, the foregoing did not reach the level of clear and convincing evidence needed to find respondent to be \u201creasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself *** or another in the near future.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1\u2014 119(1) (West 2000).\nWe recognize the State submitted explicit medical testimony respondent was reasonably expected to be a serious danger to himself or others as a result of his mental illness. However, the expert\u2019s opinion was not supported by evidence respondent intended to harm himself or another. See Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 633 N.E.2d at 173. Although respondent expressed statements such as \u201cI\u2019m going to kill you,\u201d respondent was also overheard stating he was going to reheve his frustrations by telling people off.\nFurther, an expert\u2019s opinion is only as valid as the reasons for it. In re Winters, 255 Ill. App. 3d 605, 609, 627 N.E.2d 410, 413-14 (1994). Patil\u2019s testimony revealed the basis of his opinion. Patil stated respondent \u201cmay\u201d unknowingly act out by likely misperceiving other people\u2019s motives as a result of his mental illness. Patil\u2019s testimony never referred to any incident leading to respondent\u2019s involuntary admission, and he failed to opine whether respondent was likely to act consistent with the witnessed \u201cthreats\u201d as a result of his mental illness. See Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 728, 633 N.E.2d at 173. No evidence showed respondent was reasonably expected to \u201cact out\u201d by inflicting serious physical harm upon himself or another as a result of his bipolar disorder.\nTherefore, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order of involuntary commitment, and we need not address respondent\u2019s argument regarding least-restrictive treatment alternative.\nB. Authorized Involuntary Treatment\nRespondent next asserts the trial court erred in entering an order for authorized involuntary treatment. We will reverse the trial court\u2019s decision only if it is manifestly erroneous. In re Jones, 285 Ill. App. 3d 8, 13, 673 N.E.2d 703, 706 (1996).\nSection 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4) (West Supp. 2001)) requires proof of seven factors by clear and convincing evidence before authorized involuntary treatment can be administered to a respondent. The second factor states, \u201cThat because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the recipient exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4)(B) (West Supp. 2001). Dr. Patil\u2019s testimony failed to state respondent presently exhibited either deterioration of his ability to function, suffering, or threatening behavior. Rathnow\u2019s report refers only to respondent\u2019s psychiatric history and past behavior. Because the State did not present clear and convincing evidence regarding the second factor, we need not address respondent\u2019s contentions regarding the other factors.\nThe trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we reverse the trial court\u2019s order for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.\nC. Procedural Due Process\nRespondent finally claims he was denied procedural due process. The record shows respondent was not served with notice of the petition for administration of authorized involuntary treatment prior to the June 25, 2002, hearing. Under section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(1) (West Supp. 2001)), a respondent has a right to have at least three days\u2019 notice prior to a hearing on a petition for authorized involuntary treatment. The record also reveals the petition was never formally filed.\nWe take this opportunity to reiterate the following admonishment:\n\u201cThe procedural safeguards enacted by the legislature are not mere technicalities. Rather, they are intended to safeguard the important liberty interests of the respondent which are involved in mental health cases. ***\n*** The total disregard for the legislatively established procedures is contrary to the balancing of interests established by the [Mental Health] Code and should not be condoned.\u201d In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d 221, 230-31, 633 N.E.2d 74, 81-82 (1994).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s orders of involuntary commitment and administration of psychotropic medication.\nReversed.\nTURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff M. Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, and Cynthia Z. Tracy (argued), of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, for appellant.", "Scott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Charles F. Mansfield (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re O.C., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. O.C., Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20140551\nOpinion filed April 11, 2003.\nJeff M. Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, and Cynthia Z. Tracy (argued), of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, for appellant.\nScott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Charles F. Mansfield (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0292-01", "first_page_order": 310, "last_page_order": 316 }