{ "id": 25445, "name": "In re ROBERT R., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Robert R., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Robert R.", "decision_date": "2003-03-26", "docket_number": "No. 5-01-0814", "first_page": "343", "last_page": "354", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 343" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350-53" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783189 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213-17" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" }, { "page": "224" }, { "page": "225-26" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "312" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "765 N.E.2d 991", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "997" }, { "page": "997" }, { "page": "997" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58953 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" }, { "page": "39" }, { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0028-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 886, "char_count": 24008, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.363387402122672 }, "sha256": "75d8c7f8829c4b9436cbc9319de11749d5e1eb1cb2496abdf3927109edeb4928", "simhash": "1:e83cb5df39dd2f23", "word_count": 3793 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.941926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ROBERT R., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Robert R., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from two separate orders of the circuit court for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medications to Robert R. (respondent). Respondent filed a timely pro se notice of appeal after each of the court\u2019s orders, and we have consolidated the appeals for the purposes of this decision. The issues for review are (1) whether the circuit court erred in proceeding in respondent\u2019s absence at the first hearing and (2) whether the court erred in ordering the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication requested in the second petition, when a predispositional report had not been filed. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn August 23, 2001, respondent was transferred to the Alton Mental Health Center from the Peoria County jail after being found unfit to stand trial for aggravated battery. On September 4, 2001, Dr. Jagannath Patil of the Alton Mental Health Center filed a petition with the court. The petition alleged that respondent was a person subject to the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West Supp. 2001)). In the petition, Dr. Patil alleged that respondent had refused to take psychotropic medications while he was in jail and continued to refuse such medication while at the mental health center because of illogical or irrational reasoning and delusional beliefs.\nOn September 6, 2001, a hearing on the petition was held in a courtroom within the Alton Mental Health Center. However, respondent, a patient at the mental health center, did not appear in the courtroom. Respondent\u2019s attorney advised the court that, though respondent wanted to attend the hearing, he did not wish to be placed in restraints to be moved from the building where he was housed to the building in which the hearing was to be held. Respondent\u2019s attorney, relying upon section 3 \u2014 806 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 806 (West 2000)), requested that the proceedings be moved to a courtroom located within the unit where respondent was located. The court denied the request and found that the holding of proceedings at the mental health center was sufficient to accommodate respondent. The hearing then began, without counsel waiving respondent\u2019s presence. The court found respondent to be a person subject to the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. Respondent filed a timely pro se appeal.\nOn November 26, 2001, Dr. Patil filed another petition seeking the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. On November 29, 2001, a hearing attended by respondent and his counsel was held. Dr. Patil testified as the State\u2019s only witness.\nDr. Patil testified that he was respondent\u2019s treating psychiatrist and that he had diagnosed him as suffering from schizo-affective disorder, bipolar type. Dr. Patil testified that, as a result of this diagnosis, respondent exhibits delusional, disorganized thinking and aggressive behaviors. Dr. Patil testified that at the time of the testimony respondent was on medication and that some of his symptoms had improved. However, respondent continued to exhibit delusional paranoia and bizarre thinking. Dr. Patil stated that psychotropic medication is a necessary part of respondent\u2019s treatment, and he asked that the court approve specific dosages of risperidone and Depakote with alternating medications of Clozaril, Haldol, and Ativan. These medications, he testified, would help rid respondent of his delusional beliefs and stabilize his psychiatric condition, improving his ability to interact with others and to benefit from counseling, leading to his possible fitness to stand trial. In assessing whether respondent had any conditions that would put him at an extraordinary, serious risk of harm from any of the recommended medications, Dr. Patil noted that respondent had previously suffered a myocardial infarct that would require a workup EKG by a cardiologist before Clozaril could be administered to respondent.\nAt the close of the evidence, respondent\u2019s attorney argued that the State had not proven that less restrictive treatment options had been explored and found inappropriate. Respondent\u2019s attorney contended that, in the absence of a predispositional report pursuant to section 3 \u2014 810 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 810 (West 2000)), it was impossible for the State to have proven that less restrictive treatment options had been explored and found inappropriate. The State responded by noting that there had been specific testimony elicited on the issue of less restrictive treatment services and no contrary evidence. The State conceded that there had not been a predispositional report prepared.\nThe court found that respondent was a person subject to the involuntary administration of the psychotropic medications requested, with the exception of Clozaril. Respondent filed a timely pro se appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nRespondent first argues that he was denied an opportunity to be heard when the court refused to accommodate his attorney\u2019s request to move the location of the hearing and then proceeded in respondent\u2019s absence. We disagree.\nAt the onset of the hearing on September 6, 2001, respondent\u2019s attorney informed the court that respondent originally wanted to come to court but had not understood that he would have to be restrained. Further, respondent had apparently misunderstood that the hearing was to be held in a building different from the one in which he was being housed. Respondent\u2019s attorney then requested that the hearing be moved to the forensic unit of the Alton Mental Health Center, where respondent was housed. In support of this request, respondent\u2019s attorney cited to section 3 \u2014 806(b) of the Code, which states in part, \u201cThe court shall make reasonable accommodation of any request by the recipient\u2019s attorney concerning the location of the hearing\u201d (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 806(b) (West 2000)).\nThe court, however, denied the request, pointing out that it had already made reasonable accommodations and noting further that a move to the forensic unit would raise security concerns involving court and hospital personnel. The court further emphasized the impracticality of holding a hearing wherever a patient wished it to be held. After the court had denied the request to move the hearing, respondent\u2019s attorney informed the court that he did not have authority to waive respondent\u2019s right to be present at the hearing. The court asked the State whether it wanted to lay a foundation to explain why respondent was not present. The State called Theresa Mitchell, a licensed clinical social worker employed at the Alton Mental Health Center.\nMitchell testified that she worked in the forensic unit where respondent was a patient. On the morning of the hearing, the nursing staff informed her that respondent had stated that he wanted to go to court but was agitated because he did not want to have any security devices on. Mitchell testified that, as a forensic patient at the Alton Mental Health Center, respondent was required to be secured with shackles before he could move from building to building. She testified that when she discussed the matter with him, respondent became very agitated, telling Mitchell that he did not want to go to court if he had to wear restraining devices. Mitchell said she believed that respondent would have become even more agitated, possibly to the point of becoming a danger to himself and others, if he were physically restrained and brought to court under protest.\nOn the cross-examination of Mitchell, respondent\u2019s attorney inquired about the existence of a courtroom in the unit in which respondent was being held:\n\u201cQ. All right. And is there a state seal and courtroom type area in the forensic unit in the front?\nA. We have a conference room, but it\u2019s never been used as a courtroom to my knowledge.\nQ. In the visitors\u2019 area in the front where the state seal is above the bench? Do you know where I\u2019m talking about? Is there a visi- \u25a0 tors\u2019 room?\nA. Yeah, we have a visitors\u2019 room.\nQ. And do people have to wear restraints when they go there?\nA. Well, no, but they have to be \u2014 we have to believe they\u2019re behaviorally stable before we\u2019ll let them off the treatment unit, and in my opinion [respondent] was not behaviorally stable this morning.\u201d\nAfter hearing testimony from Mitchell, the court found that there was a substantial risk of physical harm to respondent if he were brought to court against his will. The court found that there was a need for orderly proceedings and that respondent\u2019s case had been set for that day. The court then proceeded on the petition.\nSection 3 \u2014 806 provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) The respondent shall be present at any hearing held under this Act unless his attorney waives his right to be present and the court is satisfied by a clear showing that the respondent\u2019s attendance would subject him to substantial risk of serious physical or emotional harm.\n(b) The court shall make reasonable accommodation of any request by the recipient\u2019s attorney concerning the location of the hearing. If the recipient\u2019s attorney advises the court that the recipient refuses to attend, the hearing may proceed in his or her absence.\n(c) No inference may be drawn from the recipient\u2019s non[ ]attendance pursuant to either subsection (a) or (b) of this Section.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 806 (West 2000).\nOn appeal, respondent argues that strict compliance with the Code\u2019s procedural safeguards is required to ensure that the mental health system does not become a tool to oppress, rather than to serve, society and that the circuit court did not have discretion to deny his counsel\u2019s reasonable request. While we agree with respondent that the clear language of section 3 \u2014 806(b) mandates that the court make a reasonable accommodation of any request concerning the location of the hearing, it does not follow that every accommodation requested is reasonable. Accordingly, the circuit court is charged with determining the reasonableness of any such requests made under this provision.\nIn making the determination, one factor the court considered was whether the security of court and hospital personnel would be compromised if the proceedings were to be moved from the customary courtroom to a room characterized as a \u201cvisiting room\u201d in a nearby building. The court further expressed concern that such an accommodation would result in future requests to move hearings from building to building and room to room within the facility, thereby burdening the court. We find these concerns reasonable and agree with the court\u2019s finding that it had already reasonably accommodated respondent. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying his further request.\nIn arguing that the court improperly waived his presence at the hearing, respondent relies upon section 3 \u2014 806(a)\u2019s requirement that a \u201crespondent shall be present at any hearing *** unless his attorney waives his right to be present and the court is satisfied by a clear showing that the respondent\u2019s attendance would subject him to substantial risk of serious physical or emotional harm.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 806(a) (West 2000). Respondent pointed out that, although the court found that his attendance at the hearing would have caused substantial risk of harm, his attorney did not waive his right to be present as required under this provision.\nHowever, an express waiver of respondent\u2019s presence at the hearing by his attorney was not necessary in this case, because counsel for respondent had already informed the court that respondent refused to attend the hearing at the noticed location, allowing the hearing to proceed in respondent\u2019s absence pursuant to section 3 \u2014 806(b). Theresa Mitchell\u2019s testimony verified respondent\u2019s refusal to attend and indicated that respondent\u2019s refusal was voluntary and knowing. The satisfaction of the requirements of section 3 \u2014 806(a), upon which respondent now relies, was unnecessary for the court to proceed in respondent\u2019s absence in this case. Thus, the court\u2019s decision to proceed on the petition without respondent present was not error.\nNext, respondent argues that the court erred in finding that he was a person subject to the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication because the State failed to submit a predispositional report pursuant to section 3 \u2014 810 of the Code. Section 3 \u2014 810 of the Code provides as follows:\n\u201cBefore disposition is determined, the facility director or such other person as the court may direct shall prepare a written report including information on the appropriateness and availability of alternative treatment settings, a social investigation of the respondent, a preliminary treatment plan, and any other information which the court may order. The treatment plan shall describe the respondent\u2019s problems and needs, the treatment goals, the proposed treatment methods, and a projected timetable for their attainment. If the respondent is found subject to involuntary admission, the court shall consider the report in determining an appropriate disposition.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 810 (West 2000).\nRespondent notes that section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code outlines the standards by which involuntary treatment may be administered. 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West Supp. 2001). Section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(3) requires the following: \u201cUnless otherwise provided herein, the procedures set forth in Article VIII of Chapter 3 of [the Code], including the provisions regarding appointment of counsel, shall govern hearings held under this subsection (a \u2014 5).\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(3) (West Supp. 2001). Respondent relies upon this language as support for his contention that the predispositional-report requirement of section 3 \u2014 810 must be satisfied in any proceedings seeking court-authorized involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.\nThe State argues that a predispositional report is intended to be used only in drafting orders related to involuntary commitment proceedings and is not applicable to proceedings for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The State points out that proceedings for involuntary commitment involve two separate hearings, one to determine if the respondent is subject to involuntary admission and another to determine how and where the respondent will be treated. The State asserts that the function of a predisposi-tional report is to enable the circuit court to decide where a respondent will be confined and treated once it has found that the individual is a person subject to involuntary commitment. The State further contends that a predispositional report serves no purpose in proceedings for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication because, in conducting those proceedings, the court is required to find only whether the administration of psychotropic medication or other forms of involuntary treatment should or should not be administered. These proceedings are therefore complete as soon as a finding has been entered, leaving nothing else to be considered.\nThe issue before us is one of statutory construction \u2014 whether section 3 \u2014 810 of the Code applies to proceedings on petitions for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. \u201cThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d People v. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39, 765 N.E.2d 991, 997 (2002). In determining legislative intent, we must first look to the statute\u2019s language, giving the language its plain and commonly understood meaning. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d at 39, 765 N.E.2d at 997. Additionally, we consider the reason and necessity of the statute, the problems sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308, 776 N.E.2d 218, 223 (2002).\nOrdinarily, we will not depart from a statute\u2019s plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by our legislature (Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d at 39, 765 N.E.2d at 997); however, we will presume that in enacting the statute the General Assembly did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 309, 776 N.E.2d at 224. \u201c \u2018 \u201cWhere the spirit and intent of the General Assembly in adopting an act are clearly expressed and its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause which would defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 312, 776 N.E.2d at 225-26. In circumstances where adhering to the literal language of the statute would yield a result that is \u201cclearly and demonstrably at odds with the intent of the General Assembly,\u201d we may disregard, modify, or supply language to give effect to the legislative design. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 320, 776 N.E.2d at 230.\nThe involuntary administration of psychotropic medications to an individual alleged to be mentally ill implicates substantial liberty interests. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 213-17, 641 N.E.2d 345, 350-53 (1994). However, these liberty interests must be balanced against the State\u2019s legitimate interests in furthering the treatment of mentally ill individuals by forcibly administering psychotropic medication where an individual lacks the capacity to make reasoned decisions concerning his or her need for such medication. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 217, 641 N.E.2d at 353. In 1991, the General Assembly enacted section 2 \u2014 107.1 as a mechanism for determining when psychotropic medications may be administered over an individual\u2019s objections. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 217, 641 N.E.2d at 353. Section 2 \u2014 107.1 serves as a guide for balancing the liberty of the individual and the State\u2019s interest in treating its mentally ill citizens. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 217, 641 N.E.2d at 353. Section 2 \u2014 107.1 provides as follows:\n\u201c(4) Authorized involuntary treatment shall not be administered to the recipient unless it has been determined by clear and convincing evidence that all of the following factors are present:\n(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.\n(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the recipient exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior.\n(C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.\n(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.\n(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment.\n(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found inappropriate.\n(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that such testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration of the treatment.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4) (West Supp. 2001).\nAs respondent has noted, section 2 \u2014 107.1 also provides that the procedures set forth in article VIII of chapter 3 of the Code govern court hearings on petitions for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(3) (West Supp. 2001). However, when first enacted in 1979, article VIII of chapter 3 addressed proceedings concerning the involuntary admission, transfer, or discharge of mentally ill individuals and did not address the involuntary administration of psychotropic medications. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 91V2, pars. 3 \u2014 800 through 3 \u2014 819. Though many of the provisions in article VIII have since been held to apply to proceedings instituted under the more recently enacted section 2 \u2014 107.1, requiring that a report be filed and considered before a disposition in cases where the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication is sought would interject an inconvenient and useless exercise into the proceedings.\nAs the State has noted, the findings a court is required to make before making an involuntary commitment differ from those required before the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. In considering an involuntary admission petition, the court must first consider whether the respondent is a person who is (1) reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or herself or (2) is unable to provide for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard against serious harm. 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 119 (West 2000). If the court finds either of these elements to be true, the court must then consider, among other things, available and appropriate facilities to treat the respondent. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 811 (West 2000) (\u201cIf any person is found subject to involuntary admission, the court shall consider alternative mental health facilities which are appropriate for and available to the respondent, including but not limited to hospitalization. \u201d). Further, the plain language of section 3 \u2014 810 provides that only after a respondent has been determined to be a person subject to involuntary admission must the court then consider, in determining an appropriate disposition on the petition, a report on the appropriateness and availability of alternative treatment settings, a social investigation of the respondent, or a preliminary treatment plan.\nThe findings a court is required to make in considering a petition seeking the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication are significantly different from the bifurcated findings required for petitions for involuntary admission. A petition seeking to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to an individual requires the court to find only whether the individual is a person in need of such treatment. Once the factors outlined in section 2 \u2014 107.1(a\u20145)(4) have been found to exist by clear and convincing evidence, the matter has been disposed of and the proceeding is complete. There is no secondary finding for the court to make.\nWe are unable to see what purpose a predispositional report would serve after a court has determined a respondent to be a person in need of involuntarily administered psychotropic medication. Further, we do not believe that the utility of a section 3 \u2014 810 report is any more apparent if it were to be used by the court prior to ruling on the ultimate issue of whether an individual is subject to the involuntary administration of medication. The substance of the report either repeats those elements that the court is required to find by clear and convincing evidence or includes matters that are not necessary for a disposition. Accordingly, we cannot find that the legislature\u2019s provision that \u201cthe procedures set forth in Article VIII of Chapter 3 of [the Code] *** shall govern hearings held under [section 2 \u2014 107.1]\u201d was intended to work an absurd inconvenience upon proceedings involving petitions for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. Therefore, we hold that section 3 \u2014 810 of the Code is not applicable to a petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Anthony E. Rothert, Elvis C. Cameron, and Jeff M. Plesko, all of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Alton, for appellant.", "William Haine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin D. Sweeney, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ROBERT R., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Robert R., Respondent-Appellant).\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 01\u20140814\nOpinion filed March 26, 2003.\nAnthony E. Rothert, Elvis C. Cameron, and Jeff M. Plesko, all of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Alton, for appellant.\nWilliam Haine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin D. Sweeney, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0343-01", "first_page_order": 361, "last_page_order": 372 }