{ "id": 25378, "name": "HAYES MACHINERY MOVERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REO MOVERS AND VAN LINES, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee (DMBC, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Hayes Machinery Movers, Inc. v. Reo Movers & Van Lines, Inc.", "decision_date": "2003-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-1139", "first_page": "443", "last_page": "447", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 443" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649685 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576586 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152590 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538-39" }, { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3461817 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "motion for entry of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is not directed against the judgment as required by Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5575590 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 417, "char_count": 9594, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.172768950710949e-08, "percentile": 0.5089261960832465 }, "sha256": "d94939ec3f9b31a225b8441b3268ae8f4f39fe158aaf029b1a9fc84981742486", "simhash": "1:9fab966e7e780db7", "word_count": 1660 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.941926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HAYES MACHINERY MOVERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REO MOVERS AND VAN LINES, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee (DMBC, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Hayes Machinery Movers, Inc. (Hayes), filed the instant action seeking a judgment against the defendant, REO Movers & Van Lines, Inc. (REO), for breach of contract. REO filed an amended third-party complaint for breach of contract against the third-party defendant, DMBC, Inc. (DMBC). On February 5, 2002, after a bench trial, the circuit court entered both a judgment in the amount of $12,800 plus costs in favor of Hayes against REO and a judgment in the sum of $12,400 plus costs in favor of REO against DMBC. Thereafter, on March 5, 2002, DMBC filed a pleading entitled a \u201cMotion for Findings,\u201d requesting that the trial court \u201cmodify the Judgment entered in this matter by providing its findings of fact and law that were the basis for the Judgment.\u201d In response to DMBC\u2019s motion, the trial court entered an order on March 20, 2002, setting forth a number of its factual findings. On April 18, 2002, DMBC filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered against it on February 5, 2002, and the trial court\u2019s subsequent order of March 20, 2002.\nIn its brief to this court, Hayes argues, inter alia, that we should dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction by reason of DMBC\u2019s failure to file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the trial court\u2019s judgment as mandated by Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). REO has adopted Hayes\u2019 brief.\nSupreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c[T]he notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).\nIt is undisputed that, in order to vest this court with jurisdiction to entertain DMBC\u2019s appeal, its notice of appeal must have been filed within the time provided in Rule 303. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538-39, 470 N.E.2d 290 (1984).\nThe resolution of the question of whether we have jurisdiction over the instant appeal requires a determination as to whether DMBC\u2019s March 5, 2002, \u201cMotion for Findings\u201d constitutes a posttrial motion such that it tolled the time for filing of a notice of appeal. For a motion in a nonjury case to qualify as a posttrial motion within the meaning of Rule 303(a)(1), \u201cone or more of the types of relief specified in section 2 \u2014 1203 [of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2000))] must be specifically requested.\u201d Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461, 563 N.E.2d 459 (1990). Section 2 \u2014 1203(a) of the Code states:\n\u201cIn all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extension thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1203(a) (West 2000).\nIn this case, DMBC\u2019s motion did not request a rehearing, a retrial, or an order vacating the judgment entered against DMBC on February 5, 2002. Our analysis turns then to the issue of whether a motion, such as the one filed by DMBC, which requests that the court provide the findings of fact and law which formed the basis for a previously entered judgment constitutes a motion for a modification of that judgment or seeks \u201cother relief\u201d within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 1203.\nRelying primarily upon the holding in Knapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d 498, 513 N.E.2d 534 (1987), DMBC argues that its March 5, 2002, \u201cMotion for Findings\u201d is a posttrial motion directed against the trial court\u2019s February 5, 2002, judgment. As a consequence, DMBC asserts, its notice of appeal, having been filed within 30 days of the disposition of the March 5, 2002, motion, is timely and vests this court with jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with DMBC\u2019s arguments in this regard and decline to follow Knapp.\nIn Knapp, the court was also faced with the question of whether a \u201cMotion for Findings\u201d was a posttrial motion. Subsequent to the entry of a final order dismissing their action, the plaintiffs in Knapp filed a motion requesting that the trial court \u201cindicate (1) whether the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for leave to file an amended complaint was granted; (2) whether plaintiffs\u2019 first-amended complaint was filed; (3) whether the complaint or amended complaint was dismissed; and (4) whether the cause was dismissed with or without prejudice.\u201d Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 501. After observing that the plaintiffs\u2019 motion requested specific findings not stated by the trial court at the time it dismissed the action, the Knapp court held that the motion was sufficiently directed to the dismissal order to constitute a posttrial motion. Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 503. The court reasoned that, although the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for findings may not have requested an outright modification of the dismissal order, it asked for similar relief and, therefore, came within the scope of the \u201cother relief\u2019 specified in section 2 \u2014 1203. Knapp, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 503. We disagree.\nTo modify an item is to change it. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1452 (1981). A motion which merely requests that the court articulate the findings of fact and law upon which its prior judgment is predicated does not request a change in the judgment. Such a motion requests only a statement of the underlying reasons for the entry of the judgment. If the motion is granted and the court states its findings of fact and law, the judgment is not changed or altered.\nHere, DMBC\u2019s \u201cMotion for Findings\u201d requested no change in the trial court\u2019s February 5, 2002, judgment. The motion requested only that the trial court provide the \u201cfindings of fact and law that were the basis for the judgment.\u201d Regardless of the resolution of DMBC\u2019s motion, the court\u2019s $12,400 judgment against DMBC on REO\u2019s third-party complaint would remain unchanged. For this reason, we hold that DMBC\u2019s motion did not request a modification of the judgment.\nWe must next consider whether DMBC\u2019s \u201cMotion for Findings\u201d requested a type of relief falling within the scope of \u201cother relief\u2019 as that term is used in section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code. \u201c[T]he \u2018other relief specified in section 2 \u2014 1203 must be similar in nature to the other forms of relief enumerated in the section.\u201d Marsh, 138 111. 2d at 461-62. A request that a court articulate the findings of fact and law upon which its prior judgment is predicated is in no way similar to a request that the court grant a rehearing or a retrial or that it vacate its prior judgment. Further, because such a motion does not request a change in the prior judgment, it is not similar to a request for a modification of that judgment. For these reasons, and contrary to the holding in Knapp, we conclude that a motion which merely requests that the trial court state the factual findings and legal conclusions supporting a previously entered judgment is not a posttrial motion within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code.\nOur analysis of this issue leads us to conclude both that DMBC\u2019s March 5, 2002, \u201cMotion for Findings\u201d was not a posttrial motion within the meaning of Rule 303(a)(1) and that its notice of appeal is untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court\u2019s February 5, 2002, judgment. As a consequence, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 103 Ill. 2d at 539.\nAppeal dismissed.\nHALL, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON,\nspecially concurring:\nI write this special concurrence because I do not agree that Knapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d 501 (1987), was wrongly decided. In Knapp, the trial judge first entered an order that did not tell the parties which complaint was dismissed or whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. The motion at issue did not ask for findings of fact or law. It asked that the order be changed to provide clarity for the action taken by the trial judge.\nThe court correctly held the motion for findings came within the \u201cother relief\u2019 portion of section 2 \u2014 1203(a) because it requested \u201ca change in the form of the original judgment to reflect the actual action taken.\u201d Knapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 503. The first order did not further a policy of bringing finality to judgments and ends to disputes. See Sizer v. Lotus Grain & Coal Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 739, 740 (1979).\nIn contrast, the motion for findings filed by DMBC was not a post-trial motion within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 1203 (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1203(a) (West 2000). See Lewis v. Loyola University, 149 Ill. App. 3d 88 (1986) (motion for entry of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is not directed against the judgment as required by Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1)). For that reason, I agree we have no jurisdiction to consider this case.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Kanter, Mattensonn, Morgan & Gordon, of Chicago (Alan R. Morgan and George J. Rashid, of counsel), for appellant.", "Gregry J. Ramel, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HAYES MACHINERY MOVERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REO MOVERS AND VAN LINES, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee (DMBC, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellant).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201402\u20141139\nOpinion filed March 31, 2003.\nWOLFSON, J., specially concurring.\nKanter, Mattensonn, Morgan & Gordon, of Chicago (Alan R. Morgan and George J. Rashid, of counsel), for appellant.\nGregry J. Ramel, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0443-01", "first_page_order": 461, "last_page_order": 465 }