{ "id": 25383, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHERINE STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Stevens", "decision_date": "2003-05-06", "docket_number": "No. 1-01-1093", "first_page": "806", "last_page": "812", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 806" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the offense of intimidation requires specific threats intended to compel a person to act against the person's will; the requisite specific intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295614 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "the offense of intimidation requires specific threats intended to compel a person to act against the person's will; the requisite specific intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176664 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11", "parenthetical": "the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial giving the State another opportunity to offer evidence not presented in the first trial" }, { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial giving the State another opportunity to offer evidence not presented in the first trial" }, { "page": "2147", "parenthetical": "the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial giving the State another opportunity to offer evidence not presented in the first trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/437/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5313827 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 N.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592090 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256255 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 853", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9689 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "2555" }, { "page": "856-57" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "2552-53" }, { "page": "860" }, { "page": "599" }, { "page": "2554" }, { "page": "864" }, { "page": "601-02" }, { "page": "2556" }, { "page": "857" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "2553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2568462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156-57" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544405 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 702, "char_count": 11802, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2805685219170834e-07, "percentile": 0.6173734453244185 }, "sha256": "6f572b9d6a156e39922d92f6b343e35d77347b2a976e7a3c115f6e68490756ac", "simhash": "1:7ba191666e4ececc", "word_count": 1986 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.941926+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHERINE STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Katherine Stevens was convicted of intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 6(a)(1) (West 2000)) and sentenced to a three-year prison term. On appeal, she contends that the trial court deprived her of her right to a fair trial by: (1) interrupting defense counsel\u2019s closing argument; (2) prejudging the merits of the case; (3) misapprehending the law of specific intent; and (4) misusing evidence. We reverse.\nDefendant was charged by information with the intimidation of Willie May Jimerson. At trial, Jimerson testified that the intimidation occurred on September 24, 2000, after she made a criminal misdemeanor complaint against defendant that alleged criminal trespass to Jimerson\u2019s vehicle. Jimerson testified that \u201c[defendant] made a statement that if I come to court I better bring a pistol with me, *** she say that she was going to get a piece of my ass.\u201d Defendant made the statement in a telephone conversation initiated by defendant four days before Jimerson was to testify in court on the misdemeanor complaint.\nDefendant testified in her own behalf and denied making threatening statements to Jimerson. During defense counsel\u2019s closing argument, the following exchanges between defense counsel and the trial court took place:\n\u201cDEFENSE COUNSEL: *** [Defendant\u2019s] words *** can be only vaguely construed to be threatening.\nTHE COURT: Yes, your definition would be perfect in a vacuum. I mean if there [were] no other things going on in someone\u2019s life, *** it would be pretty hard to convict anybody of these specific intent crimes, if in fact what you are trying to tell me means anything.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, Judge\u2014\nTHE COURT: We have the facts in this case.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: I know.\nTHE COURT: The facts are the facts.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: We have a little history ongoing between Miss Jimerson and apparently this vehicle that [Jimerson] had.\n* * *\nTHE COURT: Where do we get this? All this stuff comes in where that you are talking about \u2014 from the defendant\u2019s testimony?\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Part of that and part through Miss Jimer-son.\nTHE COURT: I didn\u2019t hear Miss Jimerson testify to any of that; okay.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, again\u2014\nTHE COURT: You know I heard what I think is the nucleus of this case.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: And again, Judge, I\u2019m just commenting about Miss Jimerson, Judge. You saw her demeanor. You saw how she came across. You saw how aggravated she got.\nTHE COURT: You know, as a matter of fact I would expect\nsomeone to be that kind of demeanor based on the questions. ***\n* * *\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: *** [Defendant\u2019s] point in calling [Jimer-son] was not to keep [Jimerson] from coming to court and that is the bottom line. Her point was trying to get\u2014\nTHE COURT: So you think that at the point in time that [defendant] made the phone call on September 24th, *** before dialing the number in order to be convicted of this would have to have the specific intent to make a threat to keep somebody from testifying against her in court?\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: No.\nTHE COURT: Or is it possible in your realm of awareness, consciousness to facts that happened, it is somehow possible that the call started with \u2018where\u2019s my clothes\u2019 and then \u2018by the way if you show up in court I\u2019m going to have your ass if you testify against me?\u2019\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, the \u2014 there was never the quid pro quo about testifying ***.\nTHE COURT: You got about two more minutes and I think you\u2019ve summed it up. I don\u2019t know, I think you overran the amount of time you took on the case to argue. I mean the facts are the facts\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: All right.\nTHE COURT: Facts do make great lawyers.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: I understand Judge. But finally again our position is she is not guilty of this charge. ***\n* * *\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m as clear as can be and convinced as can be that the State has proven your client made those statements and by those statements specifically intended to keep someone from *** testifying in a criminal case.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, Judge, now\u2014\nTHE COURT: Look at this.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Directly she did not use the words and Jimerson did not testify to the words.\nTHE COURT: Oh, man, you don\u2019t even read the cases you cite.\n***\nThere is no question in my mind that the victim in this case\nthought she was going to be hurt by your client ***.\n* * *\nEnd of story. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Unequivocally the worst, possibly the [worst], most heinous crime that comes to these courtrooms is when defendants threaten witnesses not to come to court to testify. That is what we have here.\nFinding of guilty, intimidation, Class III felony.\n* * *\nEverything about this case speaks out for the maximum penalty required by law for this threat.\nJudgment on my finding. All bonds revoked. Presentence investigation ordered.\u201d\nDefendant first argues that by repeatedly interrupting defense counsel\u2019s closing argument, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s constitutional right to counsel. She relies on People v. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d 102, 675 N.E.2d 200 (1996), and People v. Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d 153, 562 N.E.2d 553 (1990), in which this court reversed convictions of first-degree murder and burglary, respectively, because the trial court interrupted and curtailed defense counsel\u2019s closing argument. The State contends that defendant has waived the alleged error because she did not object at trial or raise the claim in her posttrial motion as required under People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Waiver aside, the State asserts that the trial court has great latitude to control the duration and scope of closing arguments (Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 600, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2555 (1975)), and the judge\u2019s conduct here was within the boundaries of his discretion.\nInitially, we note that the fundamental importance of a fair trial and the practical difficulties involved in objecting to the trial court\u2019s conduct compel a less rigid application of the waiver rule. People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455, 553 N.E.2d 368 (1990). Where, as here, neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is at issue, legal questions are reviewed de novo. In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 408-09, 581 N.E.2d 648 (1991).\nA criminal defendant\u2019s right to make a closing summation before the finder of fact is a fundamental right derived from the sixth amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel. Herring, 422 U.S. at 856-57, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 597, 95 S. Ct. at 2552-53. The trial court lacks discretion to deny a defendant his right to make a proper argument at closing on the evidence and applicable law in his favor. Herring, 422 U.S. at 860, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 599, 95 S. Ct. at 2554. The right is so fundamental that its denial is grounds for reversal regardless of whether the defendant was prejudiced. Herring, 422 U.S. at 864, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 601-02, 95 S. Ct. at 2556. Illinois courts have concluded that \u201c \u2018[i]n a criminal case, our statutes and constitution contemplate that the trial include an opportunity for the defendant to argue his cause by counsel.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 156-57, quoting People v. Diaz, 1 Ill. App. 3d 988, 992, 275 N.E.2d 210 (1971). \u201cA defendant who waives a jury and submits his or her rights and liberty to a trial judge is entitled to the same fair, patient and impartial consideration he would be entitled to by a jury of fair, impartial, careful and considerate peers.\u201d Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 157.\nHere, the trial court repeatedly interrupted defense counsel. Examples include defense counsel\u2019s truncated statements, \u201cWell, Judge \u2014 ,\u201d \u201cWell, again \u2014 ,\u201d and \u201cOkay, Judge, now \u2014 .\u201d The trial court exhibited impatience in telling defense counsel, \u201cYou got about two more minutes,\u201d immediately followed by the contradictory statement, \u201cI think you overran the amount of time you took on the case to argue.\u201d The trial court showed prejudgment in remarking before counsel completed his closing argument, \u201cI\u2019m as clear as can be and convinced as can be that the State has proven [that defendant committed the offense].\u201d These statements support our conclusion that the trial judge committed reversible error by denying defendant her right to make a proper closing argument.\nThe State attempts to distinguish Heiman and Smith on their facts, arguing that the quantity, sequence and duration of the interruptions in those cases were more egregious than the interruptions here. This argument is not persuasive, particularly in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s admonition that constitutional provisions are not to be given \u201ca narrowly literalistic construction.\u201d Herring, 422 U.S. at 857, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 598, 95 S. Ct. at 2553. The conduct of the trial court was sufficiently egregious to support reversal.\nThere is more in play here than issues of fundamental due process. Set aside for a moment the trial judge\u2019s final remarks, where he appears to be leaning in the direction of a maximum sentence before he has held a sentencing hearing or reviewed a presentence report. Set aside as well the court\u2019s musings on the evidence while counsel was trying to make a coherent closing argument \u2014 an argument that he has the right to shape as he sees fit, if not to convince the trier of fact, then, at the very least, to build his record for appellate review. What cannot be measured is the impact of this kind of management of a criminal trial on the onlooker. It demeans the solemnity of a proceeding where a person\u2019s liberty is at stake, it demeans the role of counsel, and it casts a shadow over the evenhandedness of the trier of fact in a proceeding where the absence of bias should be beyond the shadow of doubt.\nAlthough our disposition of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to consider defendant\u2019s other three contentions, we do assess whether, after reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of intimidation beyond a reasonable doubt. Heiman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 113. If an appellate court reverses a criminal conviction and remands the case for a new trial without deciding the sufficiency of the evidence at the first trial, it risks subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy on retrial. People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979), citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (1978) (the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial giving the State another opportunity to offer evidence not presented in the first trial).\nHaving reviewed the record here in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of intimidation beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Byrd, 285 Ill. App. 3d 641, 647, 673 N.E.2d 1071 (1996) (the offense of intimidation requires specific threats intended to compel a person to act against the person\u2019s will; the requisite specific intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense). This holding does not imply that we have made a finding as to defendant\u2019s guilt that would be binding on the court on retrial. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 310.\nWe reverse defendant\u2019s conviction based on the constitutional defect in her trial and remand for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcBRIDE, EJ., and BURKE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Laura A. Weiler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, and Amy Watroba, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHERINE STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201401\u20141093\nOpinion filed May 6, 2003.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Laura A. Weiler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Annette Collins, and Amy Watroba, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0806-01", "first_page_order": 824, "last_page_order": 830 }