{ "id": 2468893, "name": "THE DU PAGE COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Du Page County Board v. Department of Revenue", "decision_date": "2003-05-29", "docket_number": "No. 2-02-0430", "first_page": "230", "last_page": "237", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 230" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "244 U.S. 205", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 343089 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "Holmes, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "1100", "parenthetical": "Holmes, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "Holmes, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/244/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2859364 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2779997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5281178 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/357/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35382 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/1055-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 F.2d 228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10524912, 10524961 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/866/0228-01", "/f2d/866/0228-02" ] }, { "cite": "263 F.3d 906", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9486196 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/263/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599287 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29956 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392-93" }, { "page": "394-95" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "393-95" }, { "page": "394-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477051 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368-69" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57347 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126414 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818-19", "parenthetical": "whether facts reflect \"substantial change of circumstances\" under child-support statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122002 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "whether given photograph meets statutory definition of \"lewd\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453265 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "whether given facts supply probable cause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0592-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 879, "char_count": 18271, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.585578251307066e-07, "percentile": 0.6811688635128921 }, "sha256": "27edf24396b9e6a88bee2895b124069b8a8beaf1b2fcce50e2c17c94c33febf5", "simhash": "1:fca9103a3335ec8d", "word_count": 2948 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:32.579911+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE DU PAGE COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEOMETER,\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the Du Page County Board of Review (Board), appeals a judgment affirming a decision by the Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois (Department) granting a tax exemption for real property owned by Good Shepherd Evangelical Lutheran Church (Good Shepherd or the church). The Board contends that the Department erred insofar as it held that a house for one of the church\u2019s schoolteachers is exempt under section 15\u201440 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15\u201440 (West 1998)). We agree. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part.\nOn May 11, 1999, Good Shepherd, a member of the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, bought land improved with a detached garage and a house. The land is near the church\u2019s other property. On August 13, 1999, the church petitioned the Department to exempt its new property from taxation for 66% of the 1999 tax year. The Board contested the petition. We summarize the evidence from the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ).\nGood Shepherd\u2019s first witness was Erik Guldberg, the president of its congregation. He testified as follows. When the congregation wishes to \u201ccall\u201d a new teacher, it obtains a fist of candidates from the synod. The voters\u2019 assembly then chooses a candidate, and the church sends her a \u201ccall letter.\u201d On March 8, 1999, the church sent a letter to Ellen Zank, \u201csolemnly charg[ing]\u201d her to instruct her students in \u201cthe chief truths of the Word of God[ ]\u201d and otherwise to follow Christian principles. Also, the letter requires Zank to assist as the school\u2019s athletic director and to conduct the vacation Bible school. In return, the church promises to receive Zank as \u201ca servant of Jesus Christ,\u201d to treat her accordingly, and (more mundanely) to pay her salary and provide her housing. On May 10, 1999, the congregation voted to require Zank to live in the house.\nDavid Rutschow, Good Shepherd\u2019s senior pastor, testified that the \u201cministry\u201d includes both the church and the school. He stated that \u201cwe\u2019re calling [pastors and teachers] to the ministry of our congregation, whether it be preaching or whether it be teaching ministry.\u201d A synod yearbook for 2001 lists Zank among the \u201cWomen in the Teaching Ministry.\u201d\nA letter Rutschow wrote his attorney in August 2000 explains that the church calls pastors to the \u201cpreaching ministry\u201d and teachers to the \u201cteaching ministry.\u201d The teachers must instruct students in the standard secular subjects and in the Bible. Teachers must teach all subjects and administer all discipline in the light of the Bible.\nThe synod operates Martin Luther College in Minnesota, which trains pastors and teachers, both of whom are \u201cpresented to the church as candidates for the ministry\u201d and receive their initial assignments from the synod. Teachers and pastors are called by the method Guldberg described.\nRutschow recounted that, on August 8, 1999, Zank was installed during a church service. The installation was conducted according to a form entitled \u201cA Rite of Installation/Ordination of Teachers.\u201d Zank professed her faith in scripture and promised that her teaching would follow the appropriate religious doctrines.\nEllen Zank testified as follows. At Martin Luther College, she received religious education but no pastoral training. She arrived at Good Shepherd a month before her installation. Zank teaches kindergarten through second grade. Good Shepherd\u2019s teachers teach \u201call the subjects that you would find in any other school\u201d and do so \u201cin the light of God\u2019s word.\u201d Zank teaches specifically religious subjects an hour each day. She is the athletic director and helps with vacation Bible school.\nZank uses one of the two bedrooms in her house as a \u201cschool office,\u201d where she grades papers and does teaching-related work. However, the house is never used for meetings or other school activities. Unlike Zank, the principal and the other teachers reside in private homes.\nThe Board called David Rutschow. Asked why only Zank lives in church-owned housing, Rutschow replied that the other teachers already had their residences and that \u201cwe had a single teacher previously who left us through death *** \u2014 she had been housed in an apartment because she was a single teacher.\u201d The congregation had paid this teacher\u2019s rent. Were Zank not living in the church-owned house, the congregation would give her a reasonable housing allowance. There were nearby apartment houses that the congregation believed were safe and well run.\nThe ALJ recommended exempting the property at issue under section 15\u201440, which at the pertinent time read:\n\u201cAll property used exclusively for religious purposes, or used exclusively for school and religious purposes, or for orphanages and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, is exempt, including all such property owned by churches or religious institutions or denominations and used in conjunction therewith as housing facilities provided for ministers *** performing the duties of their vocation as ministers at such churches or religious institutions or for such religious denominations ***.\nA parsonage, convent or monastery or other housing facility shall be considered under this Section to be exclusively used for religious purposes when the church *** requires that the above listed persons who perform religious related activities shall, as a condition of their employment or association, reside in the facility.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/15 \u2014 40 (West 1998).\nThe ALJ concluded that the house is used exclusively for a religious purpose because (1) Zank\u2019s \u201ccall\u201d requires her to Uve there; and (2) Zank performs many of her job duties there. The ALJ did not decide whether the house is exempt as a housing facility for a \u201cminister.\u201d The ALJ also held that the detached garage is exempt because it is reasonably necessary for the church to store church-related property there.\nThe Department adopted the ALJ\u2019s recommendation. The circuit court affirmed, although on the ground that the house was the residence of a \u201cminister.\u201d The Board appeals.\nThe Board does not contest the exemption for the detached garage. However, it claims that Zank\u2019s home is not tax-exempt. The Board argues that because the facts are undisputed, the exemption issue is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. According to the Board, the Department erred as a matter of law in concluding that the house is \u201cused exclusively for religious purposes\u201d (35 ILCS 200/15\u201440 (West 1998)), as the house is primarily a residence. The Department responds that even though the facts are not in dispute, the Department\u2019s decision should not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous \u2014 which, of course, in the Department\u2019s view, it is not.\nWe first address whether the Department\u2019s decision should be reviewed de novo or deferentially. The Board\u2019s assertion that this appeal raises an issue of law, to be reviewed de novo, is inherently plausible. Generally, whether a given set of historical facts satisfies a given constitutional or statutory standard is considered a question of law subject to de novo review. See, e.g., People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 615 (2000) (whether given facts supply probable cause); People v. Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d 585, 590 (1999) (whether given photograph meets statutory definition of \u201clewd\u201d); In re Marriage of Hughes, 322 Ill. App. 3d 815, 818-19 (2001) (whether facts reflect \u201csubstantial change of circumstances\u201d under child-support statute). Indeed, such was long the rule in property tax exemption cases. In 1996, our supreme court stated, \u201cWhere facts are undisputed, *** whether property is exempt from taxation is a question of law.\u201d Chicago Patrolmen\u2019s Ass\u2019n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1996).\nHowever, we agree with the Department that the supreme court has rewritten the rules for reviewing administrative agencies\u2019 decisions and has overruled the cited passage from Chicago Patrolmen\u2019s Ass\u2019n. See Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 368-69 (2002). Under the new dispensation, whether given historical facts satisfy an established legal rule is a \u201cmixed question of law and fact,\u201d and an agency\u2019s resolution of that question must stand unless it is \u201cclearly erroneous.\u201d AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 392-93 (2001); City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). This rule of deference rests in part on agencies\u2019 experience and expertise in interpreting their governing statutes. AFM, 198 Ill. 2d at 394-95. The \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d test applies to Department rulings in property tax exemption cases. Swank v. Department of Revenue, 336 Ill. App. 3d 851, 860-61 (2003).\nWhat the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d test actually means in this context \u2014 what it requires a court of review to do \u2014 is perhaps ill-defined. Positing the existence of a \u201ccontinuum\u201d between de novo review of issues of law and deferential \u201cmanifest weight\u201d review of factual issues, the supreme court has called \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d an \u201cintermediate standard of review\u201d providing \u201csomewhat less deference\u201d to the agency than that given on purely factual questions. Carpetland U.S.A., 201 Ill. 2d at 369. Yet the court has said that a decision is \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d only if we are \u201c \u2018left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d AFM, 198 Ill. 2d at 395. This suggests that the test is essentially reducible to reasonableness and is thus, for all practical purposes, as deferential as the \u201cmanifest weight\u201d test used for purely factual issues.\nAdditionally, the court has modeled the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d test on the similar federal standard for reviewing purely factual findings. AFM, 198 Ill. 2d at 393-95. Yet the federal standard is extremely deferential. To be \u201cclearly erroneous,\u201d a circuit court\u2019s finding must be \u201c \u2018more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must *** strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.\u2019 \u201d Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Parts & Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988). Thus, the meaning of \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d appears to be elusive, even considering that we cannot expect mathematical precision from verbal formulae.\nFurthermore, it is not clear what practical difference the new test actually makes. It appears that in Carpetland, AFM, and Belvidere, the court did what it had done before under the de novo standard\u2014 apply its precedents to the facts at hand to decide whether the agency\u2019s decision followed the pertinent statutes and case law. If traditional de novo review is the only way that a reviewing court can ascertain whether a mistake has been committed, then nothing has really changed. However, AFM and Belvidere may aim to give the courts the last word on general questions of law while allowing an agency to \u201clegislate\u201d in a particular case where judicial precedent does not dictate the outcome. This follows from the rule that agencies\u2019 interpretations of their governing statutes deserve some deference. See AFM, 198 Ill. 2d at 394-95.\nFortunately, we can decide this case without resolving these theoretical and practical difficulties. Whatever the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d test means, it cannot mean that an agency may flout established case law. We believe that the Department\u2019s decision is inconsistent with established case law. Thus, it must be reversed.\nUnder the first paragraph of section 15\u201440, Zank\u2019s house is tax-exempt if (1) it is \u201cused exclusively for religious purposes\u201d or (2) \u201cused exclusively for school and religious purposes.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/ 15\u201440 (West 1998). The Department ruled that the house is \u201cexclusively used for religious purposes.\u201d We must infer that the Department also implicitly held that the house is used \u201cexclusively for school and religious purposes,\u201d as Zank uses part of the house as an office where she grades papers and performs other teaching duties.\nUnder the second paragraph of section 15\u201440, the house is exempt if Zank lives there as a condition of her employment (which she does) and she is one of the \u201cabove listed persons\u201d who perform religion-related activities. 35 ILCS 200/15\u201440 (West 1998). The \u201cabove listed persons\u201d include ministers. Curiously, although the record is replete with references to Zank\u2019s membership in the \u201cteaching ministry\u201d and evidence that her teaching duties include religious instruction, the Department did not decide whether she is a \u201cminister\u201d under section 15\u201440. Although the trial court did so rule, that is irrelevant because we review the decision of the agency, not the judgment of the trial court. See Calabrese v. Chicago Park District, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1065 (1998). Because the Department did not rule on this possible ground for a tax exemption, we shall not decide the issue.\nWe are left with one issue: whether the house is exclusively used for religious purposes or school and religious pin-poses. We hold that it is not.\nThe five-room house is primarily a place for Zank to live. Only one room, the bedroom that serves as Zank\u2019s office, is used for school or religious purposes. No school or religious functions take place on the property. Although Zank\u2019s contract (her call) requires her to live in the house, the evidence does not establish that the nature of her duties requires her to reside there. The other teachers and the principal five in private housing. Reverend Rutschow\u2019s testimony does suggest obliquely that the church may have bought the house out of concern for Zank\u2019s safety. However, this testimony is unclear at best, and the church never argued that it felt such a need to provide church-owned housing for Zank. Also, Rutschow\u2019s testimony equally suggests that Zank could have been housed in reasonably safe and appropriate private lodgings.\nUnder these circumstances, this case cannot be distinguished from others in which courts have denied tax exemptions. In St. John Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. Board of Appeals, 357 Ill. 69 (1934), the plaintiff church operated a parochial school and sought a tax exemption for a residence occupied rent-free by one of the school\u2019s teachers. The supreme court held that the residence was not used exclusively for religious purposes or exclusively for school and religious purposes (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, ch. 120, par. 2) even though students occasionally received tutoring there. Although the house was used partly for school or religious purposes, its primary use was as a residence. Thus, it was analogous to parsonages, which, at that time, were not tax-exempt. St. John, 357 Ill. at 71.\nIn People ex rel. Kelly v. Avery Coonley School, 12 Ill. 2d 113 (1957), a private school sought tax exemptions for two apartment buildings, one of which housed its headmistress and principal custodian and the other of which was a residence for unmarried teachers. The school argued that the first building helped the headmistress and the custodian carry out their functions and saved the school money, while the second alleviated the shortage of suitable housing for unmarried teachers. The court held that neither building was used exclusively for school purposes (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 120, par. 500) because \u201cthe primary use of the property, and not its incidental uses, has fixed its status for taxing purposes. Here, as in the cases cited, the residential use is primary; other uses are incidental.\u201d Avery Coonley School, 12 Ill. 2d at 116.\nIn MacMurray College v. Wright, 38 Ill. 2d 272 (1967), two colleges sought tax exemptions for housing for faculty and staff members. The supreme court denied the exemptions, holding that the residences were not used exclusively for school purposes (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 120, par. 500.1). The property was not exempt merely because it was school-owned and school personnel lived there; the schools had to prove that the housing was used primarily for purposes that were reasonably necessary to carry out the schools\u2019 purposes. However, there was no showing that having faculty and staff live in the residences was reasonably necessary to carrying out their educational duties or that they performed these duties there. Thus, the residential use of the property was primary; the educational use was secondary. As a result, the property was not exempt. MacMurray College, 38 Ill. 2d at 278-79.\nThis case is indistinguishable from the earlier cases. As in St John, Avery Coonley School, and MacMurray College, the property at issue is used primarily as a residence and only secondarily for school or religious purposes. Although Zank\u2019s employment agreement requires her to live in the house, her job duties do not make it reasonably necessary for her to do so. Other teachers live in private housing, and the church could have made the same arrangement for Zank. It was not reasonably necessary to the church\u2019s function to provide Zank with church-owned housing. Therefore, the house is not tax exempt.\nWe affirm the grant of a tax exemption for the detached garage. We reverse the grant of a tax exemption for the rest of the property at issue.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nBOWMAN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.\nThus, the \u201clegislative\u201d function of the agency vis-a-vis the courts could resemble the legislative function of the courts vis-a-vis the legislature, i.e., the agencies \u201cdo and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.\u201d Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221, 61 L. Ed. 1086, 1100, 37 S. Ct. 524, 531 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEOMETER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Margaret M. Healy and Robert G. Rybica, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi and Janon E. Fabiano, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellee Department of Revenue." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE DU PAGE COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-02-0430\nOpinion filed May 29, 2003.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Margaret M. Healy and Robert G. Rybica, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi and Janon E. Fabiano, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellee Department of Revenue." }, "file_name": "0230-01", "first_page_order": 246, "last_page_order": 253 }