{
  "id": 2468822,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID J. AMBROSIO, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ambrosio",
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          "parenthetical": "Kane rationale also applies to the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1410), which has wording similar to the Cannabis Control Act"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID J. AMBROSIO, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, David J. Ambrosio, was charged with the Class 4 felony of unlawful use of a credit card. He pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful use of a credit card (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 17, par. 5921), a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to 18 months\u2019 conditional discharge, fined $200, and ordered to pay $800 restitution. Defendant completed his conditional discharge on December 22, 1993. On September 24, 2001, he petitioned to have his arrest record expunged. The circuit court denied the petition due to defendant\u2019s conviction. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.\nDefendant contends that the order entered by the trial court after his guilty plea was not final and did not include an adjudication of guilt or a conviction, allowing him to have his record expunged. The State argues that this court does not have jurisdiction to evaluate defendant\u2019s claim that the judgment is void because such an appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order. The State\u2019s claim of lack of jurisdiction is misdirected. The order that defendant is appealing is the order denying his petition to expunge. The notice of appeal was filed within days of this order, and we therefore have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.\nSection 5(a) of the Criminal Identification Act states:\n\u201cWhenever an adult or minor prosecuted as an adult, not having previously been convicted of any criminal offense or municipal ordinance violation, charged with a violation of a municipal ordinance or a felony or misdemeanor, is acquitted or released without being convicted, *** the presiding trial judge at the defendant\u2019s trial may upon verified petition of the defendant order the record of arrest expunged from the official records of the arresting authority and the Department and order that the records of the clerk of the circuit court be sealed until further order of the court upon good cause shown ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West 2000).\nIn this case, the judge apparently decided that he did not have the discretion to expunge defendant\u2019s arrest record due to defendant\u2019s conviction. Since we will be applying law to undisputed facts, we review the circuit court\u2019s decision de novo. See People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-88 (1998).\nDefendant recognizes that one must have been \u201creleased without being convicted\u201d to be eligible for arrest record expungement. People v. Satterwhite, 319 Ill. App. 3d 931, 933-34 (2001). A strict definition of the term \u201cconvicted\u201d requires that a final judgment is actually entered on a determination of guilt. People ex rel. Grogan v. Lisinki, 113 Ill. App. 3d 276, 279 (1983). We first examine whether the judgment includes an adjudication of guilt. A judgment is generally construed like other written instruments, with the determinative factor being the court\u2019s intent, as gathered from all parts of the judgment itself. Fieldcrest Builders, Inc. v. Antonucci, 311 Ill. App. 3d 597, 605 (1999). An unambiguous judgment must be enforced as drafted, but an ambiguous judgment can be read and construed in conjunction with the entire record. Fieldcrest Builders, Inc., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 605. Defendant believes that he did not receive an adjudication of guilt because, on the judgment, the trial judge did not place an \u201cx\u201d next to the box, \u201cThe court having found the defendant guilty of_.\u201d The judge did, however, complete the sentence with the phrase \u201cattempted unlawful use of a credit card 38 8\u20144 17\u20145921 Class A.\u201d As this order was entered after defendant\u2019s guilty plea, we find that it does contain a determination of guilt.\nAdditionally, we note that the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $800 as part of the disposition. An adjudication of guilt is contemplated by statute when restitution is imposed as a condition in a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge. See People v. Breen, 26 Ill. App. 3d 547, 549 (1975).\nThe term \u201cconvicted\u201d also requires that a final judgment is entered on defendant\u2019s determination of guilt. Lisinski, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 279. The final judgment in a criminal case is the imposition of a sentence. Lisinski, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 279. In this case, defendant was sentenced to 18 months\u2019 conditional discharge, as written in the judgment, giving it the status of a final judgment. As such, defendant was convicted and is not eligible to have his arrest record expunged.\nA few cases do exist in which defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to probation, but were still treated as having been \u201creleased without being convicted\u201d and allowed to have their records expunged. In People v. Kane, 85 Ill. App. 3d 252 (1980), the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cannabis. The Cannabis Control Act provided:\n\u201c(e) Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions of probation, the court shall discharge such person and dismiss the proceedings against him.\n(f) A disposition of probation is considered to be a conviction for the purposes of imposing the conditions of probation and for appeal, however, discharge and dismissal under this Section is not a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 56\u00bd, pars. 710(e), (f).\nThe appellate court reasoned that, since the defendant had been discharged, the criminal proceedings against him had been dismissed, and the discharge and dismissal were not to be a \u201cconviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law\u201d for a criminal conviction, the trial court had the discretionary authority to expunge the defendant\u2019s record. Kane, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 253; see also People v. Hansen, 185 Ill. App. 3d 560, 564 (1989) (Kane rationale also applies to the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1410), which has wording similar to the Cannabis Control Act). However, in this case, defendant was convicted under the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 17, par. 5901 et seq.), which does not contain an equivalent provision.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and GEOMETER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Matthew M. Litvak, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Meg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID J. AMBROSIO, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-02-0315\nOpinion filed June 19, 2003.\nMatthew M. Litvak, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMeg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0709-01",
  "first_page_order": 725,
  "last_page_order": 728
}
