{ "id": 2469818, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARRETT HARTH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harth", "decision_date": "2003-06-19", "docket_number": "No. 2-02-0320", "first_page": "712", "last_page": "718", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 712" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "501 U.S. 808", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108176 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" }, { "page": "735" }, { "page": "2608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351230 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229-31" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926958 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351230 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0225-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 652, "char_count": 13169, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5828155114230504e-08, "percentile": 0.2871350800760971 }, "sha256": "550f000906c82b2755d45f1271294b1f9b97cf311f149d18c23ad8db18223730", "simhash": "1:8aa353a71f5e71ff", "word_count": 2152 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:32.579911+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARRETT HARTH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GROMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant, Garrett Harth, was convicted of unlawful delivery of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS 570/ 401(c)(2) (West 2000)) and sentenced to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing when the trial court admitted a victim impact statement not allowed under the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2000)). We affirm.\nOn June 2, 2000, defendant was indicted in this case, No. 00\u2014CF\u20141150, for conduct allegedly occurring on or about April 12, 2000, and in case No. 00\u2014CF\u20141151 on one count each of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(e) (West 2000)), unlawful possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(e) (West 2000)), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2000)). All three charges in case No. 00\u2014CF\u20141151 were based on defendant\u2019s possession or delivery of paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA) on or about May 13, 2000. On December 19, 2000, the State added a fourth count in case No. 00\u2014CF\u20141151, alleging that, on or about May 13, 2000, defendant committed the involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9\u20143(a) (West 2000)) of Sara Aeschlimann by delivering PMA to her.\nOn June 26, 2001, after a stipulated bench trial, defendant was found guilty of the first two counts in case No. 00\u2014CF\u20141151. Apparently, the two counts were merged by the trial court as defendant was later sentenced only on the unlawful delivery charge. On August 22, 2001, the State nol-prossed the involuntary manslaughter count. On October 26, 2001, the jury convicted defendant in this case, No. 00\u2014CF\u20141150.\nThe causes proceeded to a combined sentencing hearing. Most of the testimony in aggravation concerned the circumstances leading to Aeschlimann\u2019s death, including defendant\u2019s alleged slowness and dishonesty in telling medical personnel and the police what had happened. The State argued that this evidence demonstrated that defendant was more interested in disguising his own criminal activity than in trying to save Aeschlimann\u2019s life.\nThe State also introduced a tape of a lengthy conversation between defendant and Michael Hamilton, a fellow inmate at the Du Page County jail and a police informant. Hamilton feigned an interest in selling drugs when he got out. Defendant instructed Hamilton in depth on how to sell drugs, primarily ecstasy. He told Hamilton about the different types of the drug, its aphrodisiac powers, where to obtain it, where to sell it, what prices Hamilton could expect to pay or charge, and whom to contact (including several of defendant\u2019s acquaintances).\nDefendant also discussed his own career as a drug dealer. He recounted how he began at age 16 (i.e., in 1995) by selling marijuana (and later LSD) and how he had managed to turn every place where he had worked into a \u201cdrug spot.\u201d Defendant recalled that he had been \u201cthe one in charge\u201d of several cooperative ventures; that he often sold $200 worth of marijuana in one day at his high school; and that he bought a car with some of his drug proceeds. Defendant expressed no regret over these actions, although he did say that he missed Aeschlimann and would not have bought the pills that caused her death had he known that they were PMA and not ecstasy.\nOver defendant\u2019s objection, the State introduced a written victim impact statement from Jan Aeschlimann, Sara Aeschlimann\u2019s mother, and allowed her to read the statement at the hearing. Mrs. Aeschlimann recalled her grief and depression over the death of her daughter. She also asserted that on the morning before Sara died, defendant lied about what had happened and did little to help Sara.\nThe trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 15 years in this case and 4 years in case No. 00\u2014CF\u20141151. In pronouncing the sentences, the trial judge briefly acknowledged that he had read Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s statement and the evidence in the presentencing investigation report (PSIR) that Sara Aeschlimann\u2019s death had caused her family and friends great pain. The judge noted that defendant had lied to paramedics and the police about the circumstances of Aeschlimann\u2019s death.\nMost of the judge\u2019s explanation of the sentences centered on the evidence of defendant\u2019s long-standing involvement in the drug trade. Noting that defendant was an honor student from a comfortable background, the judge recounted that defendant had boasted to Hamilton about the great amounts of drugs that he had sold and how he had gotten away with most of it by using his status as an honor student and a \u201cgood kid.\u201d Defendant bragged about having been \u201cthe one in charge\u201d in many instances. Even after defendant was in jail, he \u201cgave lessons\u201d in drug dealing. Thus, the judge reasoned, the lengthy sentences were necessary to protect the public from defendant.\nDefendant moved to reconsider the sentences, arguing that the court erred in considering Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s statement and that the State\u2019s other-crimes evidence was insufficiently reliable. The court denied the motion. Defendant timely appealed.\nDefendant argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court erred in considering Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s statement. Defendant asserts that the statement was inadmissible because Mrs. Aeschlimann was not a \u201ccrime victim\u201d and that the admission of the statement violated due process.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument is foreclosed by section 9 of the Act, which states, \u201cNothing in this Act shall create a basis for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.\u201d 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 2000). In People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225 (2001), the supreme court held that this language must be applied as written and that section 9 does not violate the separation of powers or any rights the state constitution gives criminal defendants. The court reasoned that section 9 is based on article I, section 8.1(d), of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8.1(d)), which allows victim impact statements and also states that nothing in the section or any statute enacted under it shall be a basis for appellate relief in any criminal case. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 229-31. While the admission of the victim impact statement was error, Richardson precludes appellate relief under section 9.\nWe also disagree with defendant\u2019s assertion that the admission of Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s statement violated due process. Due process bars the introduction of evidence that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991); Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 233. However, we are satisfied that the introduction of Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s statement was not unduly prejudicial and, indeed, harmless error at worst.\nIn its argument, the State did not mention Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s statement but instead focused on the evidence that defendant was an experienced and ambitious drug dealer; that he encouraged a fellow inmate to sell drags and taught him how to do so; that he showed no remorse for, and much pride in, his illegal activities; and that he lied to medical personnel and the police about the circumstances of Sara Aeschlimann\u2019s death. In pronouncing the sentences, the trial judge briefly noted that he had read Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s statement, but he explained in detail that he chose the harsh sentence in this case because the public needed to be protected from defendant. The basis for the judge\u2019s belief was the exceedingly strong evidence that defendant was a sophisticated and unrepentant drug trafficker. Much of this evidence had little if any connection with the circumstances leading to Sara Aeschlimann\u2019s death.\nThe victim impact statement of the mother consisted of four pages of powerful words and pain, yet was a small portion of the evidence at the sentencing hearing and neither the State nor the trial court placed substantial weight on it. Moreover, the statement was cumulative of information that was already in the PSIR, which detailed Mrs. Aeschlimann\u2019s sentiments toward defendant.\nWe are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant\u2019s sentence would have been no different had the court not received the victim impact statement. Surely, the introduction of the statement did not render the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBYRNE, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GROMETER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON,\nspecially concurring:\nAlthough I agree with the majority that the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that section 9 of the Act applies in this case.\nThe defendant argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court improperly considered the victim impact statement of Mrs. Aeschlimann. The majority concludes that this argument is foreclosed by section 9 of the Act, which states, \u201cNothing in this Act shall create a basis for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any criminal case.\u201d 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 2000). I disagree.\nIn the exercise of statutory construction, our primary task is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 228. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 228. The language of a statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the language is clear and unambiguous, we have no occasion to resort to aids of statutory construction. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 228.\nIt is clear that the victim of a violent crime enjoys the statutory right to present a victim impact statement at a sentencing hearing. See 725 ILCS 120/6 (West 2000). The Act \u201c \u2018provides for the right of victims of violent crimes, including the relatives of a deceased, to address the court regarding the impact of the criminal conduct upon their lives.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 49 (1998). The Act further dictates that the court consider the victim impact statements in determining a defendant\u2019s sentence. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d at 49.\nThere is no doubt that Mrs. Aeschlimann was a \u201ccrime victim\u201d as a result of her daughter\u2019s death and that her daughter was a victim of a \u201cviolent crime,\u201d as defined under the Act (725 ILCS 120/3(a), (c) (West 2000)), relative to the offense of involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9\u20143(a) (West 2000)). However, the defendant was not convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Rather, he was convicted of unlawful delivery of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS 570/ 401(c)(2) (West 2000)) and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(e) (West 2000)), which under the plain and ordinary meaning of the Act do not meet the criteria for a \u201cviolent crime.\u201d See 725 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2000); Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 228. Accordingly, the right of Mrs. Aeschlimann to make a statement as a \u201ccrime victim\u201d under the Act did not exist. See 725 ILCS 120/3 (a) (West 2000). Therefore, contrary to the majority, I believe the defendant\u2019s argument is not foreclosed by section 9 of the Act. 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 2000).\nIt is important to note that unlawful delivery or possession of a controlled substance is never a victimless crime. The obvious devastating effects of illegal controlled substances on a community, or in this case, on a family and a young woman, can never be underestimated and are every parent\u2019s nightmare. Unfortunately, the Act simply does not apply to unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Perhaps the legislature may eventually consider expanding the definition of a \u201cviolent crime\u201d to include certain controlled substance offenses.\nNonetheless, even though there was no basis in the Act for the trial court to consider the victim impact statement, the trial court\u2019s consideration of this statement was harmless error. It is well established that where a sentencing hearing is conducted before the trial court rather than a jury, the court is presumed to consider only competent and relevant evidence in determining the sentence. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 233. As such, I agree with the majority that the basis for the trial court\u2019s sentence determination was the exceedingly strong evidence that the defendant was a sophisticated and unrepentant drug trafficker. The trial court placed little, if any, emphasis on the victim impact statement of Mrs. Aeschlimann. Consequently, the admission of her statement did not deprive the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel R. Collins, of Law Offices of Daniel R. Collins, of Wheaton, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Sharmila Roy, of Naperville, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARRETT HARTH, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-02-0320\nOpinion filed June 19, 2003.\nGILLERAN JOHNSON, J., specially concurring.\nDaniel R. Collins, of Law Offices of Daniel R. Collins, of Wheaton, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Sharmila Roy, of Naperville, for the People." }, "file_name": "0712-01", "first_page_order": 728, "last_page_order": 734 }